U-boat Archive - U-boat KTB - UA 1st War Patrol

UA - 1st War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Kiel	27 April 1940	Kiel	10 May 1940	14

Click the icon to download a KMZ file displaying the U-boat track, significant events and locations for this patrol. You must have Google Earth loaded on your computer to view this file. Download Google Earth here

Ships Hit

None

Note: The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website. The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

                                K r i e g s t a g e b u c h

      " U.A. "

21.09.39 Commissioning.

22.9. - 20.10.39 Testing.

22.10.39 - 14.03.40 Construction Germaniawerft.

15.03. - 15.04.40 Remaining testing.

19. - 22.04.40 Dry-dock Germaniawerft.

23. - 25.04.40 Outfitting.

26.04.40 Operation.

      Korvettenkapitän and Flottillenchef

               on behalf of!





© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

                                          1st Transport cruise

   K r i e g s t a g e b u c h

                  of the

   Unterseebootes "U.A.".

   Kommandant: Kaptlt. C o h a u s z

   Beginning on 22.4.1940.

   Concluding on: 10.5.1940.

               D i s t r i b u t i o n :

"U.A." Copy No. 1

7. U-flottille    "    " 2

B.d.U.-Org-    "    " 3

O.K.M.    "    " 4 + 5

- 1 -

22. - 26.04.40 Outfitting.

In total loaded on board:

160.3 cbm gasoline,

5.2 tons of Arado lubricating oil (Luftwaffe)

1116 rounds 8.8 cm ammunition,

   50 rounds 8.8 cm illumination ammunition,

1 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun - 4.8 tons + ballast + commando equipment.

Equipment for 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun and for battery about 9 tons.

16 aircraft bombs each 250 kg.

In addition: 15 cbm additional U-boat lubricating oil and 400 potash cartridges for U-boats.

So an impressive payload equivalent to 9 railroad tankers and 3 railroad cars! Calm and solid stowage turned out to be absolutely necessary.



27.04.40

01.00 Departed the Holtenau lock for first war and North Sea patrol.

07.50 After sometimes proceeding in fog made fast in Brunsbüttel.

09.15 Under anti-aircraft escort down the Elbe. At Cuxhaven the anti-aircraft escort and U-boat were lost in the fog.

12.00 Elbe II

Fog, ENE 3 Its getting really thick, we will stick it out, can still hand over the naval pilot at Elbe II.

16.00 AN 9573

ENE 3-4, foggy, Sea 2

16.11 Carried out test dive, I decide, because it is still foggy and visibility is barely 200 meters, to enter Route 2 at higher speed before it gets dark. A virtue must be made out of necessity in war! An observation by the enemy in this fog is hardly possible.

20.00 Warning Area, AN 6932 upper-left At highest transit speed in the Warning Area on Route 2, it first got clearer about 21.30 hours.

NE 2

24.00 North edge of the Warning Area, AN 6531 center-right

Sun and Moon Data 27.04.40

- 2 -

28.04.40

04.00 Central North Sea Passed Route 2.

AN 6161

05.17 Dove at dawn, boat is in the vicinity of the known enemy U-boat position of the Great Fisher Bank. Cloudy sky.

08.00 Central North Sea

AN 4979

11.01 - 11.36 Surfaced to ventilate the boat and take a sun navigation fix. There are gasoline fumes in the forward head and in the Chief Engineer's room.  Apparently gasoline entered through leaking packing or after slowly but steadily eating away at the packing, through to a small extent for the time being. This fact becomes nastier if the boat is forced to be at great depth for a long time.

12.00 AN 4973 Day's run = 287.6 nm from 27.-28. April 12.00 hours (therefore without the first part of the Canal and Elbe cruise).

NE 3-4, Sea 3, overcast

Dived due to the cloud deck getting lower. (aircraft danger)

15.08

[* illegible hand written word here]
At periscope depth, the boat was unexpectedly down by the stern (up to 17° stern down) and broke through the surface despite only Sea State 4. It was brought under again with negative buoyancy tank, fell through and only after almost 1/2 hour of effort was the boat steered back to depth 20 meters on an even keel. The final [tank] fillings taken after the boat was rebalanced corresponded to the initial fillings. This phenomenon, which occurred for the second time today, can be explained in part by the gasoline tanks, where either gasoline and water shift against each other when loads occur or an air or gas bubble has formed. However, * it also occurred in normal conditions, structural improvements to diving tank ventilation are necessary.

15.36 Surfaced, visibility clear. Began surface transit.

16.00 AN 4946 center

(Central North Sea west of the Skagerrak)

ESE 7, Sea 5-6, scattered overcast

19.00 Drifting mine sighted in square 5950. No Radio Message report, to not betray position and because the mine is drifting. It would have been more correct to shoot it, in the prevailing swell this was not done.

19.53 - 21.45 Crash dive for enemy patrol vessel (fishing trawler) in square 4627 upper. Enemy bypassed at silent running. Surfaced at 21.45 hours and ran clear .

Sun and Moon Data 28.04.40

- 3 -

continued

28.04.40

21.00 AN 4627

ESE 6-7, Sea 5

24.00 AN 4381 center-right edge Night surface transit.

Sea area east of the Orkneys Shetlands

EbyS 5, Sea 4-5

29.04.40

04.00 AN 2858

East of the Shetlands

ENE 2, heavy Swell

05.17 - 08.40 Dived, because the boat comes before the bright north horizon of the breaking dawn here. If only the nights were longer here! For such a large boat, the narrow passage east of the Shetlands would be better. The strength of this boat lies in the open sea area as an endurance and good deep sea boat, the narrowness of the North Sea area and its close surveillance are not suitable for it.

08.00 AN 2828

East of the Shetlands

NE 3, Sea 2-3

09.20 - 10.13 Crash dive for enemy aircraft, type Haviland

10.43 - 15.25 After a short surface cruise again a crash dive is necessary for the same type enemy aircraft. With the clear visibility, the enemy seem to be flying a barrier east of the Shetlands to Norway. The compressed air supply of the boat is too small, even thought the current command had asked for more. For reasons of stability, the O.K.M. turned it down. Now with the frequent crash dives it is needed. The low compressed air supply has to be included in one's considerations now. Yet even more compressed air cylinders went into the keel or the bilges without any significant deterioration in stability! Again there is some gasoline smell in the boat (packing).

12.00 AN 2822 center Day's run = 174 nm.

Submerged

13.00 Passed the latitude of 60°N at 311'E to the north.

16.00 AN 2385 center

NE 2, Sea 1

East of the Shetlands

16.40 - 21.12 Crash dive. Smoke clouds and mastheads in 45°R. Later

Sun and Moon Data 28.04.40

Sun and Moon Data 29.04.40

- 4 -

continued

29.04.40 a large steamer comes in sight at about 15 nm range to starboard out of range between the boat and the Norwegian coast and passes on the opposite course. With the extraordinary visibility (the Norwegian coast was still seen at 40 nm) the approximately 4000-ton size steamer was recognized with flag and apparently neutrality markings. In accordance with our mission did not follow further. While 10-15 depth charges were heard at great range. (The hunt for U-14 60 nm to the west) Later more propeller sounds beyond the limit of visibility.

20.00 AN 2352 lower-right It was dark here about 22.30 hours and light again in the morning at 03.30 hours.

Submerged.

Vis. great, light Swell

Northern North Sea

24.00 AF 8773 lower-left

SE 1, light Swell

30.04.40

04.00 AF 8447 Again great visual range and a flat sea. Advanced at higher speed to the north, clear of the Shetlands Passage and the Norwegian coast in the open sea area.

E 1, Sea 1

Sea area northern North Sea at 62°30'N

06.30 Short Signal sent for passing 62°30'N. Received confirmation from B.d.U.

08.00 AF 7365

NE 1-2, Sea 1, northern North Sea

08.15 - 15.40 Test dive. During the test dive sounds were reported in the north, a steamer that goes far over the horizon. New sounds ahead to starboard with extraordinarily good visibility. Much too flat sea (Swell) and very good listening conditions. Nothing is seen in the periscope, I decide to surface briefly, to take advantage of a possible attack opportunity.

11.03 Immediate crash dive for an English destroyer of the A-Class, that comes on westerly course and target angle 25° up to about the upper edge of the bridge over the horizon. The destroyer was sleeping. Crash dive worked perfectly, destroyer shifted past at about 5000 meters at silent running by the boat and drove around a bit longer astern. Could the Short Signal have betrayed me or is it a remote escort of the convoy formation later reported by U-29? Because the sea is mirror flat and with the fabulous listening conditions initially remained submerged a while. If there was no night send wind! Now I would like to be an English destroyer on

Sun and Moon Data 29.04.40

Sun and Moon Data 30.04.40

- 5 -

continued

30.04.40 the hunt! The boat itself is very stable in the swell with its gasoline cargo, the depth control with the stern heaviness already a small feat. Because of the valuable cargo and mission the supreme law is: break through quickly and unseen, unfortunately everything else has to take a back seat.

12.00 AF 7335 Day's run = 217 nm.

16.00 AF 7333 Since I am going into Frohavet and Trondheim-Fjord without any knowledge of the sea situation (except for the warning from the B.d.U. about Örlandet and yesterday's air reconnaissance message) and I do not know whether enemy patrol vessels, destroyers or where troops have landed there, I want to watch the entrance submerged in daylight, enter and arrive in Trondheim in evening twilight.

NNE 1, flat Swell



01.05.40

00.00 AF 5831 It was first dark at 24.00 hours and already at 03.00 hours bright again. So there are only about 2 - 2 1/2 hours which are somewhat dark. Too short, to charge the battery of compressed air except in the open sea area. For U-boats the fjord is a very bad area.

ENE 1, flat Swell

Sea area north of Moldefjord

03.40 Dived at the beginning of dawn and on the mainland first coming in sight, to be unnoticed entering Frohavet and determine what lies there.

04.00 AF 5931

ENE 1, light Swell

08.00 AF 5936 Ran in submerged.

ENE 1, light Swell

Frohavet entrance

12.00 Frohavet, submerged No vessels are seen in Frohavet so far, only a flying boat, probably English nationality (Haviland) was seen. Above it is mirror flat. On Very low Frequency one filler message follows after another. Why don't they just give situation reports that would be good for those of us up here who have to be submerged and cannot listen to the radio broadcast?

Light Swell

Day's run = 212.5 nm.

16.00 Frohavet, submerged The further you get into inner Frohavet, the more you can see the fact that English destroyers or transports are not here.

Flat sea

Sun and Moon Data 30.04.40

Sun and Moon Data 01.05.40

- 6 -

continued

01.05.40 Inner Frohavet

20.00 Submerged

21.00 The boat has now come within 6 nm of the Flessa beacon. It is certain that there are no more English naval forces here in Frohavet. I decide after 17 hours submerged to surface and enter- at the beginning of dusk as an ally - because the situation and ownership in the Trondheim area are by no means always known to me. The critical corner at Flessa was passed and no destroyers or similar things were sighted. In fact, the Stuka squadron, which had only now relocated to Trondheim, ended the Trondheim blockade by English destroyers 2-3 days ago. In the meantime Oerlandet is no longer an enemy area, as it turned out later when passing and later in Trondheim. Suddenly searchlights ahead from the inner fjord. My Recognition Signal was not answered. Between doubts of a enemy or poorly equipped friend, - counterpart reports as a German patrol steamer, - I decide, to break through right in front of the Trondheim batteries, if necessary, ruthlessly. This intermezzo later became clear as a regrettable failure of the patrol steamer, who did not have his Recognition Signals for that day and moreover behaved clumsy, so that by a hair’s breadth an own patrol steamer could have been damaged by its own U-boat here.



02.05.40

01.23 Made fast Trondheim. Klve Harbor.

Day's run up to 01.23 hours = 75.5 nm a total in 5 days Kiel - Trondheim 1048.8 nm covered.

09.03 Trondheim Shifted to the Ytre Harbor to offload the general cargo. Conference with Seebefehlshaber Trondheim, Freg. Kapitän Pufendorf.

1.) Proposed giving the sea situation in Trondheim Fjord to Gruppe and B.d.U., because this is important for other boats (U-32 - U-101) for assessing what is to be expected in the inner fjord. This was accepted.

2.) Information on the latest torpedo experience (depth settings and Pistol) about which he was completely in the dark. In response to an inquiry, the Seebefehlshaber in Group West set incorrect values for the coastal torpedo battery built in the Trondheim Fjord from tubes of the destroyers, which made the successes doubtful.

Sun and Moon Data 01.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 02.05.40

- 7 -

continued

02.05.40

It is being unloaded. The Luftwaffe is happy about the help from the sister service. The gasoline from "U.A." and "U-101" will enable a Stuka mission on a larger scale on 2 May possibly with the destruction of an English cruiser and transports. A visible satisfaction for the crew in this selfless task. The unloading itself does not go very quickly with primitive crane equipment (this one is handled by us because of the Norwegian people who fled). The alarm readiness in Trondheim is being reduced after it gradually became apparent that the strong English naval forces positioned close to the fjord are covering the retreat from Andalsnes and Namsos.



03.05.40 Trondheim In the morning more general cargo was unloaded. Afternoon started with gasoline delivery near the air base at the fuel tanks at Mil. Since unloading started, of necessity the boat has not been clear for diving.



04.05.40 Trondheim Further gasoline offload at a second location. (At Standard Oil) 14.00 hours shifted alongside "PAUL JACOBI" to offload the rest of the gear and take over an English aircraft torpedo Mk 12 which was reported and recovered by Norwegians. The pistol and MZ-mechanism were sent directly to the homeland by aircraft by "PAUL JACOBI".

16.00 Shifted in the river mouth to offload lubricating oil etc.

Cooperation between air reconnaissance and U-boats flown twice a day in the Norwegian sea area does not yet exist in organizational terms. Here it would be a good idea to get the air situation to the Norway U-boats as quickly as possible. This is the only way for the U-boat to have a current overview of where it can operate on the return transit against the enemy or whether there are destroyers in the fjord. In the case of a closer communications link, air reconnaissance = U-boats via B.d.U. or via the M.N.O. Trondheim for example the 18 hours submerged transit by "U.A." would become unnecessary in Frohavet, just as after my consultation with Seebefehlshaber Trondheim and Sea situation Radio Message to Gruppe West it was no longer necessary for "U-101". The Norway U-boats must be treated as a kind of U-boat Group in terms of radio and, if necessary, tactically. A base commander

Sun and Moon Data 02.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 03.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 04.05.40

- 8 -

continued

04.05.40 north or temporarily the M.N.O. the north coast of Norway (e.g. Trondheim and Bergen) collect the various air reconnaissance results every day, sift them and transmit them directly as a remote radio station on the "x-Circuit wavelength" of the Norway U-boats as air reconnaissance of their area to the boats positioned north of 59° latitude and at the same time to B.d.U. This ensures that it is passed on to the Very Low Frequency wavelengths. Then the U-boat is in the picture 1-2 hours after the aerial reconnaissance over a sea area of around 200 nm to sea and can make quick decisions. The 21.11 hours B.d.U. Radio Message about the Stuka attacks on reported enemy forces on 2 May were received by "U.A." and "U-101" 10-12 hours late. The detour via Luftkreiskommando 10 means an unbearable amount of delay. "U.A." and "U-101" already had the reports and results of this reconnaissance and the attack about 1-2 hours later in their direct Harbor communications. If the boats had been allowed to operate in the northern sea area, such an attempt at transmission was planned and envisaged.



05.05.40 Trondheim The unloading was finished. The boat is made ready again. During a visit by the Kommandanten to the Værnes airfield, the main port of operation, the judgment was taken from Trondheim and now for Narvik, in consultation with Major Harlinghausen, it was determined that the gasoline of the 3 boats made possible the heavy employment of the Stukas on 2 May 2nd. and further action. In 4 days, an [illegible word] security group is scheduled to arrive in Trondheim to analyze the car gasoline available there, so that the biggest fuel concerns will probably be overcome, especially for the next crucial Narvik operation. Given the huge number of aircraft deployed at Trondheim airfield, in my opinion U-boats can only bring a small percentage [of aviation fuel] unless a boat arrives every two days. Aerial bombs are very desirable, but their number is limited for practical purposes. The Trondheim-Oslo railway connection is expected to be completed in 2-3 weeks."

19.00 Departed Trondheim and trim test.

20.15 After trim test departure course.

22.00 Passed the signal station and battery.



Sun and Moon Data 04.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 05.05.40

- 9 -

06.05.40

00.00 Frohavet

NE 1-2, clear Sea [typo?]

03.50 - 04.58 Crash dive for aircraft not recognized nationality in the morning twilight. After surfacing "U-101" in sight astern, exchanged Recognition Signals.

04.00 AF 5922

Northern North Sea

NE 1, flat Sea, Swell

05.40 - 06.02 2nd crash dive for aircraft at visual range 10-15 nm and glossy sea, possibly own reconnaissance.

08.00 AF 5599

SSE 2-3, Sea 1

12.00 AF 5872 Day's run from 5 May 19.00 hours - 217 nm.

SbyE 4, Sea 3, clear, northern North Sea

16.00 AF 8126 Transit speed 50 nm parallel to the Norwegian coast.

SSW 6, Sea 4-5, overcast

20.00 AF 8177 In the meantime it has cleared up and the Norwegian coast can be seen far off. The short nights and the sometimes enormous visual range simply force a "breakthrough". This necessarily reveals the strongest side of the U-boat, its invisibility!!

Sea 3, S 3-4,

Northern North Sea

21.08 - 23.30 Crash dive before a U-boat conning tower sighted abeam to port in about 8-10 nm, apparently an enemy type. The Watch Officer had the impression, it had to be handled quickly and gave the Alarm, without getting the Kommandant on the bridge. Submerged the enemy was no longer determined, apparently he carried out a crash dive at the same moment. After the onset of darkness surfaced and because no enemy was made out, ran off to the south. The boat shows submerged depth control difficulties of a construction nature. So if the boat goes from periscope depth to 20 meters, it falls strongly down by the stern and at the same time becomes considerably heavier, the deeper it goes. Suspect the incorrect venting of an aft tank (one ??). An examination and restoration of full readiness is necessary and must follow after the patrol.

24.00 AF 8442

Northern North Sea

S 3, Sea 3

Sun and Moon Data 06.05.40

- 10 -

07.05.40

03.31 - 09.34 Dived for the breaking dawn and overhaul [illegible few words]

04.00 AF 8742

08.00 AF 8745

Northern North Sea, east of the Shetlands

09.34 Surface transit.

12.00 AN 2324 Day's run = 237 nm.

East of the Shetlands

S 3, Sea 2-3

16.00 AN 2841 Surface transit.

East of the Orkneys

SSE 3-4, Sea 2-3

20.00 AN 4261

Central North Sea

S 2-3, Sea 1-2

22.40 Drifting mine square 4530, which was reported by "U-24" 5 nm further northeast, passed 50 meters to port. The attempt to shoot with the M.G. C/30 had to be abandoned due to the darkness from visibility reasons for the boat (safety distance). This drifting mine are the pests of the North Sea. Theoretically they should be duds.

24.00 AN 4562

Central North Sea

S 3-4, Sea 2

08.05.40

03.22 Short Signal passing report 57°30N was incorrectly sent at 57°N. "U-101" reported shortly thereafter, unfortunately again close by us.

04.00 AN 4868

Central North Sea

SbyE 1, Sea 1

04.48 - 06.46 Dived for lightness. About 400 meters astern to port on surfacing 2 drifting mines were sighted in square 4895.

08.00 AN 6110

Central North Sea

S 1, Sea 1

08.55 - 12.56 Forced to submerge by a patrol vessel (fishing trawler) off the Dogger Bank. The patrol vessel carried out a listening pursuit (no S-gear) with stopping, turnning etc, got away from the enemy by changing course. If possible one must go around .

Sun and Moon Data 07.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 08.05.40

- 11 -

continued

08.05.40

12.00 AN 6141 Day's run = 282.5 nm.

14.25 - 17.12 Forced to by the same patrol vessel, approaching at great range. It doesn't get any closer this time, but caused the boat to get stuck and first have to run away far off the general course to surface again. Once again am drawn strongly to the S and then proceed on zigzag courses around the general course to the entrance of Route 1

18.45 In so doing a drifting mine comes in sight to starboard, distance about 5000 meters, square 6424 upper-right.

16.00 AN 6171

S 1, Sea 0-1, near the Dogger Bank

19.55 - 21.08 Dived for a fishing trawler of the same type as in the morning passing ahead of the boat (proceeds with set driving sails with the wind calm).

20.00 AN 6461

Dogger Bank

Flat sea, S 1

24.00 AN 6578 Off the entrance to Route 1 encountered a series of fully illuminated fishing trawlers fishing. Report sent to B.d.U. concerning entering Route I at 01.00 hours.

East of the Dogger Bank

S 0-1, Sea 0, marine phosphorescence



09.05.40

04.00 AN 6943,

Route 1, in Warning Area

E 1-2, Sea 1

05.50 Initially steered serpentine courses in the Deutsche Bucht (course with 2-5° rudder angle around 10-20° to each side around the general course). Purpose of the serpentine course is to offer the enemy U-boat one layer of difficulty more at every moment, inconsistency is necessary. This method is not recommended for longer cruises because of the disadvantages in terms of navigation, but it appears to be very promising on short stretches in U-boat-endangered areas and is also advantageous compared to long-haul zigzag cruises.

06.30 Recognition Signal exchange with German DO 17.

08.00 AN 9573

E 1-2, Sea 1, Vis. clear

Deutsche Bucht

12.00 Made fast Helgoland U-boat harbor.

Day's run = 294 nm.

Sun and Moon Data 08.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 09.05.40

- 12 -

continued

09.05.40

14.30 Cast off Helgoland U-boat harbor.

16.00 [possibly DITHMARSCHEN] Taken in convoy by mine escort formation "SCHARNHORST - DITTMARSCHEN" at Northern grounds, in mine convoy with a base speed 9 nm up the Elbe. From Altenbruch under escort by only a Sperrbrecher together with "U-101" and "GAZELLE".

23.22 - 00.18 Brunsbüttel Locks.



10.05.40

from 00.18 Canal cruise with delay by air danger and fog. 119 nm from Helgoland to Kiel.

Total distance covered on the return transit 1149 nm - 2197.8 nm for the entire patrol.

10.00 Made fast Holtenau Locks.

10.45 Made fast Kiel, Tirpitz Mole.

               Final Conclusions:

In summary, the following can be said:

1.) The task, which for the boat meant the renunciation of its actual character, the attack, was in my opinion not without special importance at the right moment of a critical phase in the supply of the Trondheim Luftwaffe (settlement of the Trondheim situation and start of the Narvik attack). With the change and favorable settlement of the military situation in the Trondheim area, the task of transport U-boats is, in my opinion, less important. In the coming days, the supply capability of one or more submarines will be in smaller proportion to the need for the daily increasing personal and material operations. Now the overland supply or breakthrough in transport ships, modeled on the "Levante", which reached Trondheim at the crucial hour must begin. For a U-boat, the now almost completely ended nights and calmer weather conditions as well as the pitfalls of the fjord entrances definitely makes the relationship to success problematic. I am of the opinion that the few U-boats should be used for attack if the transport situation in Norway allows.

Sun and Moon Data 09.05.40

Sun and Moon Data 10.05.40

- 13 -

2.) In Trondheim I see an excellent, also air-protected, Atlantic U-boat base. For this it is necessary that

a) the entrances are secured according to plan.

b) our own air escort will continue to be expanded as it is now.

c) Trondheim is being expanded as a supply base for submarines. There is a promising shipyard for minor repairs. The Navy must now ensure its needs immediately before the Luftwaffe expands too much. Shipyard workers are already migrating to the Air Force; sheds, houses, berths, etc. must already be taken over immediately. Atlantic boats could operate from here, only to return to their home ports through the narrow and fouled North Sea area when the shipyard lay period was too long. Accommodation and supplies in Trondheim partly with available resources, partly with supply, in my opinion, can be managed without any particular difficulties. A base manager north will soon be necessary.

3.) The boat has generally proven itself well, improvements on a smaller scale are still necessary after the experience at the Front. The clear weakness of the boat in the North Sea area is its size and thus visibility and target area as well as its compromise values as a Turkish submarine (80 meter diving depth, regulating tank only up to 40 meters in order to do this supplemental regulating tank, unfortunate interior room arrangements, insufficient compressed air supply, etc.). However, its strength as a large open ocean boat is undoubtedly in the open sea are in surprise use at remote points of the enemy supply lines, e.g. Africa coast, Trinidad etc. If I know the advantages and disadvantages of the converted boat exactly, I can see the good opportunities for this boat.

4.) The possibilities of using a Front U-boat (in contrast to a Merchant U-boat) as a transport U-boat are relatively large with little conversion cost. It was possible to take around 9 gasoline tank cars and 3 rail cars of cargo.

- 14 -

Despite the best workmanship, the gasoline represented a considerable danger without enemy influence. There were almost always gasoline fumes in the boat or outside the boat, the extent of which, however, remained within tolerable limits. Safe and quiet stowage is necessary, saving time leads to a reduction in seaworthiness, the workmanship of the stowage and thus the amount of cargo taken over.

	Enclosures to UA's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the document

Chart	Track chart of entire patrol

Transcript.

Comments of the Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote.

1.)	Gasoline transport, which endangered the boats, has been ceased.
2.)	The boat was informed of the enemy situation as far as possible and necessary.
	A detailed briefing on the results of aerial reconnaissance was unnecessary, since the boat was not to be used for attacks.
	The intention of the MNO to independently initiate an exchange of messages by submitting Radio Messages on the U-boat wavelength cannot be approved.
3.)	The use of Trondheim as a U-boat base is pursued elsewhere.
4.)	"U.A." is particularly suited as a transport boat. Its use for attack missions in the North Sea is not intended.
5.)	It is regrettable that the poor diving characteristics of the boat caused by poor management of the vents, if they are really applicable - were not already recognized during the U.A.K.-period. Checks and remedial action will be taken care of.
6.)	It was the patrol trip of the boat in the war zone, in the future do not see things as more difficult or worse than they are.

Signed in draft D ö n i t z.

For the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote

- The Chief of the Operations Department -

Signed in draft G o d e .

- - - - - - - -

Click the icons to view the associated records

Return to the U-boat KTB page










	K r i e g s t a g e b u c h
		" U.A. "


21.09.39		Commissioning.

22.9. - 20.10.39		Testing.

22.10.39 - 14.03.40		Construction Germaniawerft.

15.03. - 15.04.40		Remaining testing.

19. - 22.04.40		Dry-dock Germaniawerft.

23. - 25.04.40		Outfitting.

26.04.40		Operation.

		Korvettenkapitän and Flottillenchef
		on behalf of!






		© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

- 1 -




	22. - 26.04.40		Outfitting.
			In total loaded on board:
			160.3 cbm gasoline,
			5.2 tons of Arado lubricating oil (Luftwaffe)
			1116 rounds 8.8 cm ammunition,
			50 rounds 8.8 cm illumination ammunition,
			1 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun - 4.8 tons + ballast + commando equipment.
			Equipment for 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun and for battery about 9 tons.
			16 aircraft bombs each 250 kg.
			In addition: 15 cbm additional U-boat lubricating oil and 400 potash cartridges for U-boats.
			So an impressive payload equivalent to 9 railroad tankers and 3 railroad cars! Calm and solid stowage turned out to be absolutely necessary.

	27.04.40
	01.00		Departed the Holtenau lock for first war and North Sea patrol.
	07.50		After sometimes proceeding in fog made fast in Brunsbüttel.
	09.15		Under anti-aircraft escort down the Elbe. At Cuxhaven the anti-aircraft escort and U-boat were lost in the fog.
	12.00	Elbe II
		Fog, ENE 3	Its getting really thick, we will stick it out, can still hand over the naval pilot at Elbe II.
	16.00	AN 9573
		ENE 3-4, foggy, Sea 2
	16.11		Carried out test dive, I decide, because it is still foggy and visibility is barely 200 meters, to enter Route 2 at higher speed before it gets dark. A virtue must be made out of necessity in war! An observation by the enemy in this fog is hardly possible.
	20.00	Warning Area, AN 6932 upper-left	At highest transit speed in the Warning Area on Route 2, it first got clearer about 21.30 hours.
		NE 2
	24.00	North edge of the Warning Area, AN 6531 center-right

- 2 -




	28.04.40
	04.00	Central North Sea	Passed Route 2.
		AN 6161
	05.17		Dove at dawn, boat is in the vicinity of the known enemy U-boat position of the Great Fisher Bank. Cloudy sky.
	08.00	Central North Sea
		AN 4979
	11.01 - 11.36		Surfaced to ventilate the boat and take a sun navigation fix. There are gasoline fumes in the forward head and in the Chief Engineer's room. Apparently gasoline entered through leaking packing or after slowly but steadily eating away at the packing, through to a small extent for the time being. This fact becomes nastier if the boat is forced to be at great depth for a long time.
	12.00	AN 4973	Day's run = 287.6 nm from 27.-28. April 12.00 hours (therefore without the first part of the Canal and Elbe cruise).
		NE 3-4, Sea 3, overcast
			Dived due to the cloud deck getting lower. (aircraft danger)
	15.08	[* illegible hand written word here]	At periscope depth, the boat was unexpectedly down by the stern (up to 17° stern down) and broke through the surface despite only Sea State 4. It was brought under again with negative buoyancy tank, fell through and only after almost 1/2 hour of effort was the boat steered back to depth 20 meters on an even keel. The final [tank] fillings taken after the boat was rebalanced corresponded to the initial fillings. This phenomenon, which occurred for the second time today, can be explained in part by the gasoline tanks, where either gasoline and water shift against each other when loads occur or an air or gas bubble has formed. However, * it also occurred in normal conditions, structural improvements to diving tank ventilation are necessary.
	15.36		Surfaced, visibility clear. Began surface transit.
	16.00	AN 4946 center
		(Central North Sea west of the Skagerrak)
		ESE 7, Sea 5-6, scattered overcast
	19.00		Drifting mine sighted in square 5950. No Radio Message report, to not betray position and because the mine is drifting. It would have been more correct to shoot it, in the prevailing swell this was not done.
	19.53 - 21.45		Crash dive for enemy patrol vessel (fishing trawler) in square 4627 upper. Enemy bypassed at silent running. Surfaced at 21.45 hours and ran clear .

- 3 -



	continued
	28.04.40
	21.00	AN 4627
		ESE 6-7, Sea 5
	24.00	AN 4381 center-right edge	Night surface transit.
		Sea area east of the Orkneys Shetlands
		EbyS 5, Sea 4-5
	29.04.40
	04.00	AN 2858
		East of the Shetlands
		ENE 2, heavy Swell
	05.17 - 08.40		Dived, because the boat comes before the bright north horizon of the breaking dawn here. If only the nights were longer here! For such a large boat, the narrow passage east of the Shetlands would be better. The strength of this boat lies in the open sea area as an endurance and good deep sea boat, the narrowness of the North Sea area and its close surveillance are not suitable for it.
	08.00	AN 2828
		East of the Shetlands
		NE 3, Sea 2-3
	09.20 - 10.13		Crash dive for enemy aircraft, type Haviland
	10.43 - 15.25		After a short surface cruise again a crash dive is necessary for the same type enemy aircraft. With the clear visibility, the enemy seem to be flying a barrier east of the Shetlands to Norway. The compressed air supply of the boat is too small, even thought the current command had asked for more. For reasons of stability, the O.K.M. turned it down. Now with the frequent crash dives it is needed. The low compressed air supply has to be included in one's considerations now. Yet even more compressed air cylinders went into the keel or the bilges without any significant deterioration in stability! Again there is some gasoline smell in the boat (packing).
	12.00	AN 2822 center	Day's run = 174 nm.
		Submerged
	13.00		Passed the latitude of 60°N at 311'E to the north.
	16.00	AN 2385 center
		NE 2, Sea 1
		East of the Shetlands
	16.40 - 21.12		Crash dive. Smoke clouds and mastheads in 45°R. Later

- 4 -



	continued
	29.04.40		a large steamer comes in sight at about 15 nm range to starboard out of range between the boat and the Norwegian coast and passes on the opposite course. With the extraordinary visibility (the Norwegian coast was still seen at 40 nm) the approximately 4000-ton size steamer was recognized with flag and apparently neutrality markings. In accordance with our mission did not follow further. While 10-15 depth charges were heard at great range. (The hunt for U-14 60 nm to the west) Later more propeller sounds beyond the limit of visibility.
	20.00	AN 2352 lower-right	It was dark here about 22.30 hours and light again in the morning at 03.30 hours.
		Submerged.
		Vis. great, light Swell
		Northern North Sea
	24.00	AF 8773 lower-left
		SE 1, light Swell
	30.04.40
	04.00	AF 8447	Again great visual range and a flat sea. Advanced at higher speed to the north, clear of the Shetlands Passage and the Norwegian coast in the open sea area.
		E 1, Sea 1
		Sea area northern North Sea at 62°30'N
	06.30		Short Signal sent for passing 62°30'N. Received confirmation from B.d.U.
	08.00	AF 7365
		NE 1-2, Sea 1, northern North Sea
	08.15 - 15.40		Test dive. During the test dive sounds were reported in the north, a steamer that goes far over the horizon. New sounds ahead to starboard with extraordinarily good visibility. Much too flat sea (Swell) and very good listening conditions. Nothing is seen in the periscope, I decide to surface briefly, to take advantage of a possible attack opportunity.
	11.03		Immediate crash dive for an English destroyer of the A-Class, that comes on westerly course and target angle 25° up to about the upper edge of the bridge over the horizon. The destroyer was sleeping. Crash dive worked perfectly, destroyer shifted past at about 5000 meters at silent running by the boat and drove around a bit longer astern. Could the Short Signal have betrayed me or is it a remote escort of the convoy formation later reported by U-29? Because the sea is mirror flat and with the fabulous listening conditions initially remained submerged a while. If there was no night send wind! Now I would like to be an English destroyer on

- 5 -



	continued
	30.04.40		the hunt! The boat itself is very stable in the swell with its gasoline cargo, the depth control with the stern heaviness already a small feat. Because of the valuable cargo and mission the supreme law is: break through quickly and unseen, unfortunately everything else has to take a back seat.
	12.00	AF 7335	Day's run = 217 nm.
	16.00	AF 7333	Since I am going into Frohavet and Trondheim-Fjord without any knowledge of the sea situation (except for the warning from the B.d.U. about Örlandet and yesterday's air reconnaissance message) and I do not know whether enemy patrol vessels, destroyers or where troops have landed there, I want to watch the entrance submerged in daylight, enter and arrive in Trondheim in evening twilight.
		NNE 1, flat Swell

	01.05.40
	00.00	AF 5831	It was first dark at 24.00 hours and already at 03.00 hours bright again. So there are only about 2 - 2 1/2 hours which are somewhat dark. Too short, to charge the battery of compressed air except in the open sea area. For U-boats the fjord is a very bad area.
		ENE 1, flat Swell
		Sea area north of Moldefjord
	03.40		Dived at the beginning of dawn and on the mainland first coming in sight, to be unnoticed entering Frohavet and determine what lies there.
	04.00	AF 5931
		ENE 1, light Swell
	08.00	AF 5936	Ran in submerged.
		ENE 1, light Swell
		Frohavet entrance
	12.00	Frohavet, submerged	No vessels are seen in Frohavet so far, only a flying boat, probably English nationality (Haviland) was seen. Above it is mirror flat. On Very low Frequency one filler message follows after another. Why don't they just give situation reports that would be good for those of us up here who have to be submerged and cannot listen to the radio broadcast?
		Light Swell
			Day's run = 212.5 nm.
	16.00	Frohavet, submerged	The further you get into inner Frohavet, the more you can see the fact that English destroyers or transports are not here.
		Flat sea

- 6 -



	continued
	01.05.40	Inner Frohavet
	20.00	Submerged
	21.00		The boat has now come within 6 nm of the Flessa beacon. It is certain that there are no more English naval forces here in Frohavet. I decide after 17 hours submerged to surface and enter- at the beginning of dusk as an ally - because the situation and ownership in the Trondheim area are by no means always known to me. The critical corner at Flessa was passed and no destroyers or similar things were sighted. In fact, the Stuka squadron, which had only now relocated to Trondheim, ended the Trondheim blockade by English destroyers 2-3 days ago. In the meantime Oerlandet is no longer an enemy area, as it turned out later when passing and later in Trondheim. Suddenly searchlights ahead from the inner fjord. My Recognition Signal was not answered. Between doubts of a enemy or poorly equipped friend, - counterpart reports as a German patrol steamer, - I decide, to break through right in front of the Trondheim batteries, if necessary, ruthlessly. This intermezzo later became clear as a regrettable failure of the patrol steamer, who did not have his Recognition Signals for that day and moreover behaved clumsy, so that by a hair’s breadth an own patrol steamer could have been damaged by its own U-boat here.

	02.05.40
	01.23		Made fast Trondheim. Klve Harbor.
			Day's run up to 01.23 hours = 75.5 nm a total in 5 days Kiel - Trondheim 1048.8 nm covered.
	09.03	Trondheim	Shifted to the Ytre Harbor to offload the general cargo. Conference with Seebefehlshaber Trondheim, Freg. Kapitän Pufendorf.
			1.) Proposed giving the sea situation in Trondheim Fjord to Gruppe and B.d.U., because this is important for other boats (U-32 - U-101) for assessing what is to be expected in the inner fjord. This was accepted.
			2.) Information on the latest torpedo experience (depth settings and Pistol) about which he was completely in the dark. In response to an inquiry, the Seebefehlshaber in Group West set incorrect values for the coastal torpedo battery built in the Trondheim Fjord from tubes of the destroyers, which made the successes doubtful.

- 7 -



	continued
	02.05.40
			It is being unloaded. The Luftwaffe is happy about the help from the sister service. The gasoline from "U.A." and "U-101" will enable a Stuka mission on a larger scale on 2 May possibly with the destruction of an English cruiser and transports. A visible satisfaction for the crew in this selfless task. The unloading itself does not go very quickly with primitive crane equipment (this one is handled by us because of the Norwegian people who fled). The alarm readiness in Trondheim is being reduced after it gradually became apparent that the strong English naval forces positioned close to the fjord are covering the retreat from Andalsnes and Namsos.

	03.05.40	Trondheim	In the morning more general cargo was unloaded. Afternoon started with gasoline delivery near the air base at the fuel tanks at Mil. Since unloading started, of necessity the boat has not been clear for diving.

	04.05.40	Trondheim	Further gasoline offload at a second location. (At Standard Oil) 14.00 hours shifted alongside "PAUL JACOBI" to offload the rest of the gear and take over an English aircraft torpedo Mk 12 which was reported and recovered by Norwegians. The pistol and MZ-mechanism were sent directly to the homeland by aircraft by "PAUL JACOBI".
	16.00		Shifted in the river mouth to offload lubricating oil etc.
			Cooperation between air reconnaissance and U-boats flown twice a day in the Norwegian sea area does not yet exist in organizational terms. Here it would be a good idea to get the air situation to the Norway U-boats as quickly as possible. This is the only way for the U-boat to have a current overview of where it can operate on the return transit against the enemy or whether there are destroyers in the fjord. In the case of a closer communications link, air reconnaissance = U-boats via B.d.U. or via the M.N.O. Trondheim for example the 18 hours submerged transit by "U.A." would become unnecessary in Frohavet, just as after my consultation with Seebefehlshaber Trondheim and Sea situation Radio Message to Gruppe West it was no longer necessary for "U-101". The Norway U-boats must be treated as a kind of U-boat Group in terms of radio and, if necessary, tactically. A base commander

	Sun and Moon Data 02.05.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.05.40
	Sun and Moon Data 04.05.40

- 8 -



	continued
	04.05.40		north or temporarily the M.N.O. the north coast of Norway (e.g. Trondheim and Bergen) collect the various air reconnaissance results every day, sift them and transmit them directly as a remote radio station on the "x-Circuit wavelength" of the Norway U-boats as air reconnaissance of their area to the boats positioned north of 59° latitude and at the same time to B.d.U. This ensures that it is passed on to the Very Low Frequency wavelengths. Then the U-boat is in the picture 1-2 hours after the aerial reconnaissance over a sea area of around 200 nm to sea and can make quick decisions. The 21.11 hours B.d.U. Radio Message about the Stuka attacks on reported enemy forces on 2 May were received by "U.A." and "U-101" 10-12 hours late. The detour via Luftkreiskommando 10 means an unbearable amount of delay. "U.A." and "U-101" already had the reports and results of this reconnaissance and the attack about 1-2 hours later in their direct Harbor communications. If the boats had been allowed to operate in the northern sea area, such an attempt at transmission was planned and envisaged.

	05.05.40	Trondheim	The unloading was finished. The boat is made ready again. During a visit by the Kommandanten to the Værnes airfield, the main port of operation, the judgment was taken from Trondheim and now for Narvik, in consultation with Major Harlinghausen, it was determined that the gasoline of the 3 boats made possible the heavy employment of the Stukas on 2 May 2nd. and further action. In 4 days, an [illegible word] security group is scheduled to arrive in Trondheim to analyze the car gasoline available there, so that the biggest fuel concerns will probably be overcome, especially for the next crucial Narvik operation. Given the huge number of aircraft deployed at Trondheim airfield, in my opinion U-boats can only bring a small percentage [of aviation fuel] unless a boat arrives every two days. Aerial bombs are very desirable, but their number is limited for practical purposes. The Trondheim-Oslo railway connection is expected to be completed in 2-3 weeks."

	19.00		Departed Trondheim and trim test.
	20.15		After trim test departure course.
	22.00		Passed the signal station and battery.

- 9 -




	06.05.40
	00.00	Frohavet
		NE 1-2, clear Sea [typo?]
	03.50 - 04.58		Crash dive for aircraft not recognized nationality in the morning twilight. After surfacing "U-101" in sight astern, exchanged Recognition Signals.
	04.00	AF 5922
		Northern North Sea
		NE 1, flat Sea, Swell
	05.40 - 06.02		2nd crash dive for aircraft at visual range 10-15 nm and glossy sea, possibly own reconnaissance.
	08.00	AF 5599
		SSE 2-3, Sea 1
	12.00	AF 5872	Day's run from 5 May 19.00 hours - 217 nm.
		SbyE 4, Sea 3, clear, northern North Sea
	16.00	AF 8126	Transit speed 50 nm parallel to the Norwegian coast.
		SSW 6, Sea 4-5, overcast
	20.00	AF 8177	In the meantime it has cleared up and the Norwegian coast can be seen far off. The short nights and the sometimes enormous visual range simply force a "breakthrough". This necessarily reveals the strongest side of the U-boat, its invisibility!!
		Sea 3, S 3-4,
		Northern North Sea
	21.08 - 23.30		Crash dive before a U-boat conning tower sighted abeam to port in about 8-10 nm, apparently an enemy type. The Watch Officer had the impression, it had to be handled quickly and gave the Alarm, without getting the Kommandant on the bridge. Submerged the enemy was no longer determined, apparently he carried out a crash dive at the same moment. After the onset of darkness surfaced and because no enemy was made out, ran off to the south. The boat shows submerged depth control difficulties of a construction nature. So if the boat goes from periscope depth to 20 meters, it falls strongly down by the stern and at the same time becomes considerably heavier, the deeper it goes. Suspect the incorrect venting of an aft tank (one ??). An examination and restoration of full readiness is necessary and must follow after the patrol.
	24.00	AF 8442
		Northern North Sea
		S 3, Sea 3

- 10 -




	07.05.40
	03.31 - 09.34		Dived for the breaking dawn and overhaul [illegible few words]
	04.00	AF 8742
	08.00	AF 8745
		Northern North Sea, east of the Shetlands
	09.34		Surface transit.
	12.00	AN 2324	Day's run = 237 nm.
		East of the Shetlands
		S 3, Sea 2-3
	16.00	AN 2841	Surface transit.
		East of the Orkneys
		SSE 3-4, Sea 2-3
	20.00	AN 4261
		Central North Sea
		S 2-3, Sea 1-2
	22.40		Drifting mine square 4530, which was reported by "U-24" 5 nm further northeast, passed 50 meters to port. The attempt to shoot with the M.G. C/30 had to be abandoned due to the darkness from visibility reasons for the boat (safety distance). This drifting mine are the pests of the North Sea. Theoretically they should be duds.
	24.00	AN 4562
		Central North Sea
		S 3-4, Sea 2
	08.05.40
	03.22		Short Signal passing report 57°30N was incorrectly sent at 57°N. "U-101" reported shortly thereafter, unfortunately again close by us.
	04.00	AN 4868
		Central North Sea
		SbyE 1, Sea 1
	04.48 - 06.46		Dived for lightness. About 400 meters astern to port on surfacing 2 drifting mines were sighted in square 4895.
	08.00	AN 6110
		Central North Sea
		S 1, Sea 1
	08.55 - 12.56		Forced to submerge by a patrol vessel (fishing trawler) off the Dogger Bank. The patrol vessel carried out a listening pursuit (no S-gear) with stopping, turnning etc, got away from the enemy by changing course. If possible one must go around .

- 11 -



	continued
	08.05.40
	12.00	AN 6141	Day's run = 282.5 nm.
	14.25 - 17.12		Forced to by the same patrol vessel, approaching at great range. It doesn't get any closer this time, but caused the boat to get stuck and first have to run away far off the general course to surface again. Once again am drawn strongly to the S and then proceed on zigzag courses around the general course to the entrance of Route 1
	18.45		In so doing a drifting mine comes in sight to starboard, distance about 5000 meters, square 6424 upper-right.
	16.00	AN 6171
		S 1, Sea 0-1, near the Dogger Bank
	19.55 - 21.08		Dived for a fishing trawler of the same type as in the morning passing ahead of the boat (proceeds with set driving sails with the wind calm).
	20.00	AN 6461
		Dogger Bank
		Flat sea, S 1
	24.00	AN 6578	Off the entrance to Route 1 encountered a series of fully illuminated fishing trawlers fishing. Report sent to B.d.U. concerning entering Route I at 01.00 hours.
		East of the Dogger Bank
		S 0-1, Sea 0, marine phosphorescence
		S 0-1, Sea 0, marine phosphorescence
	09.05.40
	04.00	AN 6943,
		Route 1, in Warning Area
		E 1-2, Sea 1
	05.50		Initially steered serpentine courses in the Deutsche Bucht (course with 2-5° rudder angle around 10-20° to each side around the general course). Purpose of the serpentine course is to offer the enemy U-boat one layer of difficulty more at every moment, inconsistency is necessary. This method is not recommended for longer cruises because of the disadvantages in terms of navigation, but it appears to be very promising on short stretches in U-boat-endangered areas and is also advantageous compared to long-haul zigzag cruises.
	06.30		Recognition Signal exchange with German DO 17.
	08.00	AN 9573
		E 1-2, Sea 1, Vis. clear
		Deutsche Bucht
	12.00		Made fast Helgoland U-boat harbor.
			Day's run = 294 nm.

- 12 -



	continued
	09.05.40
	14.30		Cast off Helgoland U-boat harbor.
	16.00	[possibly DITHMARSCHEN]	Taken in convoy by mine escort formation "SCHARNHORST - DITTMARSCHEN" at Northern grounds, in mine convoy with a base speed 9 nm up the Elbe. From Altenbruch under escort by only a Sperrbrecher together with "U-101" and "GAZELLE".
	23.22 - 00.18		Brunsbüttel Locks.

	10.05.40
	from 00.18		Canal cruise with delay by air danger and fog. 119 nm from Helgoland to Kiel.
			Total distance covered on the return transit 1149 nm - 2197.8 nm for the entire patrol.
	10.00		Made fast Holtenau Locks.
	10.45		Made fast Kiel, Tirpitz Mole.


			Final Conclusions:

			In summary, the following can be said:
			1.) The task, which for the boat meant the renunciation of its actual character, the attack, was in my opinion not without special importance at the right moment of a critical phase in the supply of the Trondheim Luftwaffe (settlement of the Trondheim situation and start of the Narvik attack). With the change and favorable settlement of the military situation in the Trondheim area, the task of transport U-boats is, in my opinion, less important. In the coming days, the supply capability of one or more submarines will be in smaller proportion to the need for the daily increasing personal and material operations. Now the overland supply or breakthrough in transport ships, modeled on the "Levante", which reached Trondheim at the crucial hour must begin. For a U-boat, the now almost completely ended nights and calmer weather conditions as well as the pitfalls of the fjord entrances definitely makes the relationship to success problematic. I am of the opinion that the few U-boats should be used for attack if the transport situation in Norway allows.

	- 13 -




				2.) In Trondheim I see an excellent, also air-protected, Atlantic U-boat base. For this it is necessary that
				a) the entrances are secured according to plan.
				b) our own air escort will continue to be expanded as it is now.
				c) Trondheim is being expanded as a supply base for submarines. There is a promising shipyard for minor repairs. The Navy must now ensure its needs immediately before the Luftwaffe expands too much. Shipyard workers are already migrating to the Air Force; sheds, houses, berths, etc. must already be taken over immediately. Atlantic boats could operate from here, only to return to their home ports through the narrow and fouled North Sea area when the shipyard lay period was too long. Accommodation and supplies in Trondheim partly with available resources, partly with supply, in my opinion, can be managed without any particular difficulties. A base manager north will soon be necessary.
				3.) The boat has generally proven itself well, improvements on a smaller scale are still necessary after the experience at the Front. The clear weakness of the boat in the North Sea area is its size and thus visibility and target area as well as its compromise values as a Turkish submarine (80 meter diving depth, regulating tank only up to 40 meters in order to do this supplemental regulating tank, unfortunate interior room arrangements, insufficient compressed air supply, etc.). However, its strength as a large open ocean boat is undoubtedly in the open sea are in surprise use at remote points of the enemy supply lines, e.g. Africa coast, Trinidad etc. If I know the advantages and disadvantages of the converted boat exactly, I can see the good opportunities for this boat.
				4.) The possibilities of using a Front U-boat (in contrast to a Merchant U-boat) as a transport U-boat are relatively large with little conversion cost. It was possible to take around 9 gasoline tank cars and 3 rail cars of cargo.

	- 14 -




				Despite the best workmanship, the gasoline represented a considerable danger without enemy influence. There were almost always gasoline fumes in the boat or outside the boat, the extent of which, however, remained within tolerable limits. Safe and quiet stowage is necessary, saving time leads to a reduction in seaworthiness, the workmanship of the stowage and thus the amount of cargo taken over.