U-38 - 4th War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Wilhelmshaven	8 April 1940	Wilhelmshaven	27 April 1940	20

 

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Ships Hit

None

Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

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			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h    U  38  .
			Kommandant:    Kapitänleutnant    L  i  e  b  e  .
			Beginning:    6.  4.  1940.
			Ending:       27  4.  1940.
				© U-boat Archive 2023 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 1 -
		06.04.40	Cay's run  ./.	Shipyard overhaul, outfitting.
			Wilhelmshaven, Westwerft
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		07.04.40	Cay's run  ./.
			Wilhelmshaven, Westwerft	Shipyard overhaul, outfitting.
				22.00 hours  Shifted to the U-boat Base.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		08.04.40	Day's run 136
		11.30	Wilhelmshaven, U-boat Base	Cast off.
			W 2	12.30 hours  Cast off Lock III entrance.
				13.03 hours  Test dive on the Jade.
				15.21 hours  Passed Lightship F under anti-aircraft escort by 2 customs cruisers.
				16.30 hours  Repeated test dive.
			Fog, later better visibility	17.35 hours  Released anti-aircraft escort due to fog.
				19.10 hours  Recognition Signal exchanged with 2 patrol vessels.
				Passed through Route II Warning Area.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		09.04.40	Day's run 160 (296)	On Route II.
			NNW 3, freshening	The loaded condition of the boat prohibits running at high speed, because overcoming seas make lookout impossible.  In the course of the night and in the morning for this reason slowed to LF.
				07.35 hours  Crash dive for aircraft.
				08.50 hours  Crash dive for aircraft.
				Heard depth charges submerged.  The first time 3, with the 2nd crash dive 7, however far off.
				09.20 hours  Once more 6 charges.
				09.34 hours  Surfaced.
		13.45	N 6	13.45 hours  Several steamers in sight to the NW with southwesterly course.  Avoided to the east.  Boat lay badly and makes only 5-6 knots.
				19.43 hours  Crash dive for aircraft.
				In the course of the afternoon Radio Messages come in from B.d.U. concerning assignment of waiting stations, as well as the Radio Signal concerning enemy main body.
				In the course of the day and night ran through the English Warning Area to the north.

	Sun and Moon Data 08.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.04.40

	- 2 -
		10.04.40	Day's run 186 (482)
				07.15 hours  Bypassed a steamer running to the NW to the east.
				After the wind abated a bit and with longer seas can run at higher speed again.
				11.55 hours  Radio Message from B.d.U. concerning going to Narvik.
		12.00		12 51 - 15.13 hours  )
				18.44 - 19.30 hours  )  Crash dive for aircraft.
		20.00	60° 16' N
			3° 32' E
			NW 3
		24.00	60° 53.5' N
			3° 38.0' E
			N 5
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		11.04.40	Day's run 316 (798)
		04.00	61° 41' N
			3° 47' E	Continued transit.
			N 2
		08.00	62° 08' N
			3° 40' E	No events.
			SW 2	15.30 hours  Incoming Radio Message order from B.d.U. concerning attacking enemy forces reported by U-48.  Ran to the given position
		12.00	62° 55' N
			4° 57' E
			SE 5
		16.00	63° 48' N	19.00 hours  In the area of the reported enemy forces,m followed an oil trace, but no results.
			6° 14' E
			S 4	20.00 hours on Radio Message orders from B.d.U. continued on because there is no contact.
		20.00	64° 29' N	21.15 hours  Torpedo shot heard to starboard.  Shot from U-48, as later reported by Radio Message.
			6° 53' E
			S 6-7	Did not run to U-48's unmaneuverable cruiser because:
				1.)  Fining it in the low visibility weather is unlikely.
				2.)  Quick arrival in Vestfjord seems more important.
				23.44 hours  Incoming Radio Message concerning disposition in Vestfjord.
		24.00	65° 12' N	No events.
			8° 22' E
			S 6-7
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		12.04.40	Day's run 221 (1019)
		08.00	66° 35' N	08.15 hours  1 tanker and 2 destroyers in sight.  Aft target angle.  No attack.  Reconnaissance Signal.
			11° 10' E

	Sun and Moon Data 10.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 11.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 12.04.40

	- 3 -
		continued
		12.04.40		10.50 hours  Recognition Signal exchange with a U-boat astern, that remained in visual range until 12 45 hours.
				Weather is very bad, proceeding at periscope depth is hardly possible.
		12.00	67° 10' N	12.45 hours  Lofoten mountains in sight, crash dive for destroyer.
			12° 09' E
			S 7	13.15 hours  Surfaced, destroyer is still astern, again crash dive.
				Remained at depth until darkness, because propeller sounds are heard continually and the seas are so heavy that nothing is seen at periscope depth.
				For this reason also Radio Message from B.d.U. concerning disposition in Vågsfjord was first received at 20.50 hours and confirmed at 23.23 hours.
		20.00	67° 14.5' N
			12° 07.5' E
			S 5-6, rain, Vis. low
		24.00	67° 24' N	In the course of the night received a situation report and information on the Vågsfjord operation.
			12° 15' E
			S 5-6, rain, Vis. low
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		13.04.40	Day's run 100 (1119)
		04.00	67° 31' N	Proceeded to the north west of Lofoten
			11° 18' E	07.45 hours  Crash dive for aircraft, that fly in the direction of Narvik.
			S 6-7
				Due to high lubricating oil consumption only ran at HF, where the boat leaves an oil trace.
		12.00	68° 37' N	15.00 hours  Aircraft in sight.  Crash dive.
			13° 49' E	After a brief period 3 bombs far off.
			SE 3
		16.00	69° 04.5' N	No events.
			14° 27' E	19.08 hours  Sent position report, however the Radio Message was incorrectly encoded.
			S 3-4
				Off Andesnes changing courses, to run in at night.
		20.00	Andesnes	20.36 hours  Crash dive for 2 destroyers.  Initiated attack, but was forced deep by the approach of the destroyers, no depth charges.
		24.00	69° 20' N
			16° 29' E
			SSE 3-4
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.

	Sun and Moon Data 12.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 13.04.40

	- 4 -
		14.04.40	Day's run 96 (1215)
			Into Vågsfjord	Headed in, but no beacons burned, so back and forth in position in the fjord and headed in at dawn.
				05.30 hours  Dived.
				11.22 hours  Attack on a SOUTHAMPTON cruiser, protected by a destroyer.  3-fan from 4000 meters, target angle 90°.  Miss.  Tube III a firing failure, reason unexplained.
				Enemy did not run into Andesnes, instead in the direction of Tranøyfjorden
				Radio Message prepared to send immediately at the next surfacing.  Enemy probably went to Tromsø.
				13.00 hours far under land at Askerøya 2 destroyers run at high speed to the south.  Surfacing by day and remaining unnoticed is not possible.
		19.00	North of Askerøya	About 19.00 hours off Sandsøy 3 destroyers ran over the boat at high speed.
				21.45 hours  Surfaced and lay close under land at Stanglandet to charge.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		15.04.40	Day's run 54 (1269)
			Vågsfjord	03.30 hours  Dove again and went to position at Askerøya.
			Very calm sea, Vis. good, sunny	08.30 hours  Sighted carrier aircraft in the direction of Bygdensund.
				Taken from the Radio Messages picked up during program Times and during the night that English landings are to take place at Gratangen.  Due to the weather and especially due to the very bright nights, I have doubts about how the boat is to stay in Vågsfjord, because the charging time is too short and the stock of potash cartridges will last a maximum of 3 days if surveillance is deployed here. The situation of the Narvik boats, sounds the same considerations.
				11.15 hours  3 destroyers to the south with northeasterly course.
				11.38 hours  5 detonations in the vicinity of the boat.  It must have been aircraft bombs.  Temporarily went to depth 70 meters.
				About 12.30 hours sighted the landing formation on a southeasterly course.  I had the impression, that the formation came through the Tjeldsund.  To the north east with 2 destroyers set out a battleship, type WARSPITE.  Initiated attack because the others are too far away.
				Formation consists of:  WARSPITE, FROHBISHER, about 20 destroyers and three large passenger steamers (2 and 3 smokestacks).

	Sun and Moon Data 14.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 15.04.40

	- 5 -
		continued
		15.04.40		Shortly before the shot the battleship turned away and ran to the SW towards the formation.
				Attacked again and shot a 3-fan from 4500 meters.  Miss.  Probably misjudged speed.
				In the meantime the formation had come about and steered SW.  FROBISHER and a  large steamer came out of Bygdensund, turned to the SW.
				During the attack on WARSPITE 2 times multiple aircraft bombs, but without result.
				Now the formation broke up.  WARSPITE with 2 steamers to the SW, FROBISHER with one steamer came about again to the east.
				Initiated attack on steamer.  Depth charges from a destroyer 300 meters away, the boat was shaken strongly, especially as it was at periscope depth.  Went deep.  Listening pursuit.  In the course of this locating also determined.  Proceeded on changing courses out of Vågsfjord to the north.  In the process close to cliffs in the entrance because destroyers patrolled.  Once more received depth charges, however at great depth.
				23.15 hours  Surfaced close under land behind the skerries at Holmenvaer to charge.
				Radio Message to B.d.U. concerning the situation.  Was not heard.  Am missing 17 Radio Messages, because there was no opportunity the whole day.  From Radio Messages picked up during the night, gathered that the formation landed south of south of Bygdensund.  Pursuit not possible, because Vågsfjord is heavily monitored and there is no possibility to charge there.  The nights with increasing moon are bright as day and visibility is very good.  I intend to remain at Andesnes and was strengthened in this conclusion by the Radio Message of B.d.U.
				Apparently U-65 encountered a 2nd formation already leaving.  Under the current conditions I believe a stay in Vågsfjord is not possible due to the lack of charging time and the prevailing lightness.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.

Sun and Moon Data 15.04.40

	- 6 -
		16.04.40	Day's run 43 (1342)	At lightness still remained under the protection of land, to breathe as long as possible.
				Found oil traces on the port side center and aft but they only appeared light.  Dived when a fishing cutter appeared and moved off to sea to go south of Andesnes
				13.00 hours  Surfaced, afterwards found an oil trace 1000 meters long.  Very alarming.  I suspect depth charge damage.  Tried to pump main ballast and auxiliary fuel tank 4 to 7, then blow 4 and see if the damage is corrected.  To do this, first dived again and then evaded to the east.
		18.00	Andfjord	5 depth charge detonations north of Holmenvaer.  At first thought they were aircraft bombs, that were thrown on our oil trace.  At darkness charge the battery under land in the east.
			NE 5-6, Swell
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		17.04.40	Day's run 85 (1427)	At lightness examined the boat for oil traces.  On the port side aft there is still a little oil, the center oil is gone.  Main ballast and auxiliary fuel tank 4 was pumped to 7.
			Andfjord
			NNE 5-6, partly snowstorms, Vis. then below 1000 meters
				Intention:  Go north again to check for an oil trace, in which case blow fuel tanks 2 and 3.  So set off well to the north.  Afterwards go in position at Andesnes Lighthouse.
				Incoming Radio Message from B.d.U. concerning distribution of boats without U-47.
				No periscope weather.
				Situation evaluation:  I believe that on 15 April there were two convoys in Vågsfjord.  In the night of 15-16 April one unloaded (observed by U-47), the other left Andfjord seen by U-65 in the evening.  There is no observation of the departure of the 2nd convoy, it may still be awaited.  Was not in position one night due to oil trace examination.
				The disposition off the exit of the fjord is of prime importance, much more favorable because it is possible to set off in good time for charging when surveillance is strong.  It's no longer dark at night, due to the increasing moon.  The oil trace is still very light, I have not blown out tanks 2 and 3.
		16.00	NNE 5-6, again Vis. good
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.

	Sun and Moon Data 16.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 17.04.40

	- 7 -
		18.04.40	Day's run 89 (1516)	01.00 hours  Blew out fuel tanks 2 and 3.
			North of Andesnes	02.30 hours  Inbound destroyer coming from sea into Andfjord  Dived.
			Vis. very good, moonlit, calm sea
				03.47 hours  Surfaced.
				04.50 hours  Dived before a destroyer coming out of Andfjord, then however came about.  Spent the day submerged back and forth in position.  Surfaced at 22.00 hours and headed to the south into Andfjord, in so doing at 23.05 hours 3 shadows ahead.  Avoided to the west.  Vessels later went around Andesnes into the sea to the west.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		19.04.40	Day's run 80 (1596)	00.54 hours  Surface attack on medium ship that at range was thought of as a FROBISHER-type cruiser.  It is very bright, had to shoot at long range (4000-5000 meters).  Too far for submerged attack.  After the shot dived, because visibility is very good.  After 9 minutes detonation.  Results not observed, because had to remain at depth due to a destroyer.
			At Andesnes
				Set off to the NE.
				In the course of the day surfaced a few times to pick up Radio Message and take an all around sweep.
				20.32 hours detonation of a torpedo and listening sounds of further torpedoes as well as a destroyer in the vicinity.  These were the shots of U-65.
				The torpedoes and the boat were easily heard.  Continued moving back and forth in position off Andesnes to charge.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		20.04.40	Day's run 258 (1854)	03.10 hours  Received orders to go west of the Shetlands.  Because of the previous Radio Message to B.d.U. concerning shots made and because the observed situation corresponds to that of U-65, did not report again.
			West of Vesterålen
				09.40 hours  Radio Message from U-65 concerning sighting of 1 battleship and 1 transport steamer.  Headed for them and at 11.00 hours submerged to attack.  Ships were too far to starboard and the target angle too great when they appeared.  Gave up the attack after they came in sight.  Surfaced and operated on the convoy reported by U-47 as ordered, expected in the morning about 04.00 hours.  Boat has an oil trace again, stronger at higher speeds.  Sent a Radio Message to B.d.U.

	Sun and Moon Data 18.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 19.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 20.04.40

	- 8 -
		continued
		20.04.40		Due to lubricating oil consumption can no longer run at GF for long periods of time.
		12.00	68° 50' N	Course 216°, 11 knots.  The developing NW wind is not pleasant for the awaited attack in the morning, Especially since it throws up a swell so you can't attack submerged.
			13° 00' E
			NW 4
		20.00	67° 41.5' N
			10° 40' E	Attack on the convoy is expected about 08.00 hours.
			NW 5-6
		24.00	67° 12' N	Hail and thick snow squalls made the visibility very bad in places.
			9° 45' E
			NW 5
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		21.04.40	Day's run 210 (2064)
		04.00	66° 37' N	No events.
			8° 36' E
		08.00	66° 09' N	08.45 hours  Convoy in sight ahead to port.  I'm ahead of a destroyer, which was already coming out, before I could correctly determine the target angle of the convoy.  Initially maneuvered ahead to the east, to get in front of him.  When the target angle was 0°, the first destroyers are already so close that I have to dive.  Ran with because I have to shoot with stern torpedoes, but it takes a long time until the convoy arrives.  Depth control is feasible.  Use of the periscope is very difficult in the high short swell.  It was too much.  During the attack sometimes snow showers, that completely take away the visibility.
			7° 19' E
				11.00 hours  To port and starboard a destroyer, that must have seen us, despite the periscope being continually overspilled, then shortly after one turned towards us and gives depth charges in the immediate vicinity. With the approach of the destroyer, the masthead of a steamer came in sight, however it was too late.
				It is not possible to get close with this strong screen.  You can't listen either, because the swell is too high.  At such moments one thinks to use the boat in this way is completely senseless, because nothing can come of it.  Against such a strong screen and unfavorable weather, where you can not overlook the situation before, you are hopelessly inferior. The depth charges are the proof.
				For a while was still pursued,

	Sun and Moon Data 20.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 21.04.40

	- 9 -
		continued
		21.04.40		but no more depth charges.  The escort is satisfied with forcing us under.
		14.00	AF 5239	Surfaced again about 14.00 hours, after depth charges were heard at a greater distance, as well as a submerged U-boat nearby (U-47).
				Pursued in direction 50°.  The smoke feathers of the convoy were seen once more about 15.00 hours, then lost in a snow squall and not found again.  The navigation differences make themselves apparent, U-65 reports the convoy southeast of my position, continued in the old direction. [to the NE]
				In the course of the afternoon a U-boat was sighted in the west running with.  Disappeared in a snow squall.
		20.00	66° 35' N	Got no contact on the convoy.  No attack weather, seas area too high.
			8° 11' E
			NNW 6    AF 2981
		24.00	67° 13' N	Continued on to the NE, to get ahead of the convoy in any case.
			9° 03' E
			AF 2698	Radio Message from U-65 that contact was lost.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		22.04.40	Day's run 240 (2004)
		04.00	67° 41' N	04.40 hours  Came about, because in accordance with Radio Message from B.d.U. we are to head for the Shetlands with lost contact.
			10° 05' E
			NNW 6
		08.00	67° 15' N	When trying to pull the torpedo in tube II to recharge, determined that tube II was under pressure and the outer tube door had jammed shortly before closing.
			9° 25' E
			NNW 4-5, snow
		12.00	66° 34' N	No particular events.  Weather is freshening.  15.00 hours  Radio Message to B.d.U. concerning the condition of tube II.
			8° 26' E
			NNW 5
		16.00	66° 07' N	No further events.  Boat went to LF. because overcoming seas hinder the lookout.
			7° 32' E
			W 4
		20.00	65° 37' N	21.47 hours  Orders for return transit.  Assuming that our Radio Message concerning the last bow torpedo was could be understood incorrectly, sent once again that we still have 4 stern torpedoes.
			6° 28' E
			W 5-6
		24.00	65° 11' N	No events.
			5° 34' E
			W 5-6
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.

	Sun and Moon Data 21.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 22.04.40

	- 10 -
		continued
		23.04.40	Day's run 198 (2502)
		04.00	64° 45' N	Transit to the south.
			4° 58' E
			W 6
		08.00	64° 14' N	No events.
			4° 33' E
			NW 5
		12.00	63° 29' N	12.40 - 13.45 hours  Crash dive for aircraft.
			4° 05' E
			NW 1-2, Swell
		16.00	63° 14' N	16.44 hours  Crash dive for aircraft.  Proceeded submerged.
			4° 00' E	18.30 hours  Heavy bomb detonation heard.  Must have been powerful explosive charges.
			NW 1-2
				19.00 hours  Surfaced, nothing seen.
		20.00	62° 51' N	Continued transit to the south.  Oil trace found once again.  I intend to blow out the oil tonight.
			3° 57' E
			NW 1
		24.00	62° 31' N	External bunkers were transferred to 7, then 2, 3 and 4 were blown out.
			3° 25' E
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		24.04.40	Day's run 247 (2749)
		04.00	61° 40' N	At dawn determined that the oil trace was better, however not completely cone.  The remainder certainly comes from the diesel.
			3° 02' E
			N 2-3
		08.00	61° 02' N	Transit to the south.  10.15 hours Crash dive for aircraft.
			2° 50' E
			N 1-2, sunny, Vis. good
		12.00	60° 34' N	No events.
			2° 40' E
			N 1-2
		16.00	59° 54' N	18.08 hours  Crash dive for aircraft.  Proceeded submerged until 20.20 hours.  Heard continual detonations from depth charges and/or aircraft bombs.
			2° 30' E
			NE 1-2
		20.00	59° 26' N	Transit to the south.
			2° 27' E
		24.00	58° 34' N	The aircraft surveillance between Norway and the Shetlands is more active than that encountered here, however cannot determine of they are German or English aircraft.
			2° 38' E
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.

	Sun and Moon Data 23.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 24.04.40

	- 11 -
		25.04.40	Day's run 155 (2909)
		04.00	57° 36' N	No events.  05.40 hours  Dived.
			2° 38' E	I intend to remain submerged at the level of the Warning Area by day, because the extent of English surveillance is not known.  In so doing a delay of 1 or 2 days must be expected.
			ENE 2-3, light Swell
		08.00	57° 05' N	Proceeded submerged.  In the course of the morning listening sounds from fishermen are heard.  Periscope all around sweep confirms the observation.  They remain observable until about 16.00 hours, then disappear in the west.
			2° 40' E
			ENE 2-3, overcast
				Detonations were heard continually.  Over night headed south across the warning area.
				No observations.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		26.04.40	Day's run 157 (3056)	By day on the bottom off Route I.
			E 1-2	At night through Route I headed into the Deutsche Bucht.  Very low visibility, in the morning of the 27th fog.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.
		27.04.40	Day's run 142 (3198)
			E 1-2, misty	08.06 hours  Dove at Lightship "F", to await anti-aircraft escort.
		11.15		Made fast in the lock
		11.50		Made fast at the U-boat Base.
				Kptlt. and Kmdt.

	Sun and Moon Data 25.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 26.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.04.40

 

	Enclosures to U-38's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the document
ChartA	Chart of the period    8 April to 11 April at 07.00 hours     - outbound transit in the North Sea
	and from    23 April at 22.45 hours to 27 April    -  inbound transit in the North Sea
ChartB	Chart of the period  from 11 April at 07.00 hours to 23 April at 22.45 hours - operations area
Maschine	KTB Machine Section
Torpedo	Torpedo firing reports
Radio	Excerpt of the Radio Log

 

	Comments of the Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote.
	1) Given the crucial importance of catching the transports, "U-38" should have tried by all means on April 15, after the depth charge pursuit, to advance south again, where as he knew, the transports were stationed. 2) The attacks on 14 April, 15 April, and even probably that on 19 April would have been better omitted, since they were not within range.
		Signed in draft    D  ö  n  i  t  z  .
		For the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote.
		- The Chief of the Operations Department -

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