S E C R E T |
||
H.M.C.S. "HAIDA" |
||
6th July, 1944. |
||
Sir; |
||
I have the honour to submit the following report of the sinking of a "U-boat, believed to be "U-971," on 24th June, 1944, in the English Channel. |
||
2. On Saturday, 24th June, 1944, H.M.C.S. "HAIDA (Senior Officer), and H.M.S. "ESKIMO," forming Force 26, were patrolling in support of the 2nd Escort Group, in accordance with the Commander-In-Chief's 24 0848B. |
||
3. On receipt of Escort Group 2's 24 1316B, at about 1345B, it was decided to shift the patrol 30 miles to the south. This was reported in my 1347B and the new patrol line was reached at 1508B. Ships were in line abreast, 5 cables apart, patrolling at 25 knots, zig-zagging on a mean course of 090. |
||
4. At 1545 a Liberator aircraft was observed about 5 miles astern (bearing 250 degrees) dropping bombs or depth charges. Course was immediately altered towards by blue pendant and at 1558, on approaching the scene of the attack, which was marked by a smoke float, speed was reduced to 7 knots and an A/S search commenced with "ESKIMO" about 1 mile north of HAIDA." |
||
5. First contact was gained by ESKIMO at 1625 and by HAIDA at 1634 and during the next two hours nine deliberate attacks were carried out, seven by ESKIMO. |
||
6. At 1917, nearly an hour after the last pattern had been dropped, HAIDA was stopped 850 yards from the target, bows on, watching for movement when the plot reported target moving. ESKIMO had lost contact at about 1900 and was searching at slow speed. It was decided to attack without waiting for ESKIMP to regain contact and pattern "G" had been ordered when at 1921 the submarine surfaced about 800 yards ahead at an inclination of about 100 left. Fire was opened from "B" gun and a hit obtained on the conning tower, with the second salvo. High Explosive was used and penetrated the conning tower, starting a fire, the flames being clearly visible through the hole made. No further hits were obtained with main armament and fire was checked as soon as it was apparent that the enemy did not intend to fight. Close range weapons were used during the same period. |
||
7. The crew commenced abandoning ship almost immediately the submarine surfaced and HAIDA and ESKIMO both closed with ideas of boarding. HAIDA lowered a whaler and motor boat and ESKIMO a whaler, but the U-boat went down before either could reach her. All boats then proceeded to recover prisoners, disembarking them in ESKIMO, while HAIDA circled the area. The last six recovered by HAIDA's motor boat were embarked in HADIA to save time. A total of 52 prisoners were recovered, including the Captain and four other officers. Six were injured, three seriously. They were landed at Falmouth, at 0300 on 25th June, 1944, in accordance with the Commander-In-Chief's 24 2330B. |
||
8. A/S conditions were generally good. In the initial stages HAIDA experienced doubtful and non-sub echoes but later the target was classified "Submarine" and held consistently. Blowing of tanks was heard after the second attack and it is considered that the submarine went to the bottom at that time and remained stopped. |
||
 |
 |
|
- 2 - |
||
9. Team work on the whole was excellent. Signals were made both by V/S and VHFR/T and the firing ship, which was generally ESKIMO, almost invariably fired when on my bearing from the directing ship. At 1655 both ships commenced as attack simultaneously and ESKIMO was told to go ahead. At 1806 HAIDA carried out an attack but was too close to ESKIMO and fire was haled. The difference between the force of ESKIMO's Minol charges and HAIDA's Amatol was very apparent. |
||
10. The team work and operating of the A/S crew in HAIDA were excellent once contact had been established. Anti-gnat tactics were employed, speed being increased to attack when inside 700 yards. |
||
11. The Liberator who carried out the original attack was signaled by light but attempts to exchange information were unsuccessful. He could not be contacted by VHFR/T or on 2410 kc/s. |
||
12. It was anticipated that HADIA and ESKIMO would be relieved by the 15th Escort Group during the hunt. H.M.S. "MOORSON" was sighted and my 24 1742 passed by V/S at 1755 and an other escort vessel was sighted at about 1900 but failed to answer V/S signals made by 20" S.P. |
||
I have the honour to be, |
||
Sir, |
||
Your obedient servant, |
||
 |
||
H. G. DeWolf |
||
Captain, R.C.N. |
||
Enclosures: |
||
1. Training of plot. |
||
2. Recorder tracing - original only. |
||
3. Form S1203. |
||
4. Signals. |
||
5. Particulars of prisoners. |
||
Distribution: |
||
| COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PLYMOUTH. | ||
| (copies to: | ||
| Captain (D) Plymouth, | ||
| Commander (D), Tenth Destroyer Flotilla, | ||
| The Director of Naval Intelligence, | ||
| Director of A/S Warfare. | ||
|
|
|
Enclosure 4 . |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
H.M.C.S. HAIDA |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ACTION SIGNALS VH/F | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
Page 2. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
Page 3. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
Page 4. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Page 5. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
W/T ACTION SIGNALS
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||