In reply U. S. S. BRONSTEIN (DE 189)   refer to:   Care of Fleet Post Office DE189/A16-3   New York, N. Y.   (SHK-ay)
	Serial No. 0090                                                                                      18 March 1944.
	S-E-C-R-E-T
	From: The Commanding Officer. To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.       Via: The Commander Task Group 21.16.       Subject: Action Report; forwarding of.       Reference: (a) CominCh ltr FFI/A12-1/A16-3 Ser 7152 of 29 Oct 1943.   (b) Lantfleet 13CL43.       Enclosure: (A) Report of Submerged and Surface Action with Enemy Submarine on 17 March 1944.
	1.        In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
	S.H.KINNEY
	Advance copy to:
	CominCh  (accompanied by sound
	recorder trace, fathometer
	trace and track chart)
	ASDevLant
	LantASW Unit
	Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

 

	U. S. S. BRONSTEIN (DE-189)
	S-E-C-R-E-T                                     ACTION REPORT
	Sinking of German U-boat on 17 March 1944
	Part I.
	A.        Composition of Own Forces.
	Commander Task Group 21.16, Captain Francis M. HUGES, U.S. Navy, in BLOCK ISLAND; Commander Inner Screen, Commander Escort Division 48, Commander G.W. PARKINSON, U.S.N.R., in THOMAS.  Task Group 21.16, U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND (CVE-21), U.S.S. CORRY (DD-463), U.S.S. THOMAS (DE-102), U.S.S. BOSTWICK (DE-103), U.S.S. BREEMAN (DE-104), and U.S.S. BRONSTEIN (DE-189).
	B.        Preliminary Operations.
	This Task Group departed Casablanca on 11 March 1944 to operate against a German submarine refueling concentration northwest of the Cape Verde Islands.  On the morning of 17 March 1944 the group was operating in vicinity of Latitude 17 N. and Longitude 30 W.
	C.        Mission.
	To seek out and destroy enemy submarines.
	D.        Doctrine.
	Destroyer Escorts furnish sound screen to escort carrier for her protection, and employ anti-submarine tactics when detached by Task Group Commander from screen to attack enemy submarines.  USF-10A governed all screening operations.  FTP-219 governed all ASW operations.
	E.        Tactical Aspects.
	1.        At 1840 GCT on March 16, 1944, Task Group Commander directed CORRY to proceed to a position where aircraft had reported submarine sighting.  This position lay (as far as this vessel could gather) 208°T distant about 23 miles.  The remainder of the escorts and BLOCK ISLAND proceeded on this course at 17 knots following CORRY.
	2.        Frequent counter marches were necessary in order to recover or launch aircraft, and little progress was made in the direction of the contact.  Flying operations were conducted throughout the night, the destroyer escorts screening and plane guarding BLOCK ISLAND.  It was later learned that aircraft had killed two men of the enemy submarine and put his periscope out of commission.  By the time CORRY reached the position the submarine had submerged and CORRY searched throughout the night in that vicinity.
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	Page Two (2) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
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	3.        At 0717 March 17, 1944 CTG 21.16 ordered BRONSTEIN to proceed and assist CORRY in the search for the submarine.
	Part II.        Narrative of Action.
	0717  GCT Set course 242°T, speed 20 knots.     0737 Changed course to 190°T.     0741 Changed course to 170T.     0816 Joined CORRY, taking position 2500 yards on CORRY's port beam, base course 180°T, speed 15 knots.  Conducting box search for enemy submarine, CORRY in tactical command.     0825 Unit changed course to 270°T using reflection turn, bringing BRONSTEIN on CORRY's starboard beam.     0921 Unit changed course to 000°T using reflection turn, bringing BRONSTEIN back to CORRY port beam.     0930 Aircraft observed 350°T, distant seven miles, circling continuously over the same position.     1020 Aircraft dropped smoke flares, at intervals, along a track 340°T.     1023 Plane requested unit, by voice radio, to investigate oil slick, course 340°T, speed 15 knots.     1031 Following movements of CORRY, proceeding down oil slick, CORRY to right and BRONSTEIN to left of slick, course 340°T, speed 15 knots.     1038 Changed course to 330°T, speed 15 knots, as the end of the slick was approached.     1042 BRONSTEIN established Sonar contact bearing 015°T, range 1800 yards.  Came right to that course, maintained speed 10 knots.  Sound contact identified as submarine by width of target, nature of echo, recorder traces, moderate down doppler, and range rate of seven knots.  Plot showed submarine moving away from ship and turning left slowly.  Bearing now 050°T and drawing left slowly.  CORRY ceased echo range and stood by.
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	Page Three (3) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
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	1048-1/2 Fired full hedgehog pattern, ship on course 030°T, center bearing of submarine 032T, hedgehog fired (2) degrees inside left cut.  Contact lost at 250 yards.  Ship brought left slowly with 5° rudder after firing, turning in direction of movement of submarine.     1051 Regained contact on port quarter bearing 260°T, range 300 yards.  Echos still excellent, definitely submarine.  Opened out to 1000 yards for re-attack and turned to left.     1054 Commenced re-attack, submarine bearing 211°T.  Submarine on course 350, bow attack, up doppler, bow traces.     1055 Fired full hedgehog pattern bearing 220°T, ship's head 217°T.  Fathometer was started as soon as pattern was fired, and a short time after, a reading of 360 feet was obtained.  (Depth of water 2600 fathoms.  Fathometer trace is forwarded with recorder traces).     1057 Regained contact on starboard quarter, distant 400 yards.  Circled slowly right to open and re-attack.  Propeller noises can be heard during each attack.     1059 Commenced re-attack on submarine bearing 000°T, distant 950 yards.  Submarine on course 315°T, quarter attack.     1102 Fired full hedgehog pattern on bearing 000°T.  submarine bearing 000°T at this time.  Passed directly over submarine and obtained a fathometer reading of two hundred and forty feet.  The submarine appeared to be rising slowly.  (Fathometer trace accompanies recorder traces).     1106 Regained contact on starboard quarter bearing 110°T, distant 450 yards.  Circled slowly right and opened range to 1200 yards for depth charge attack.  Increased speed to fifteen (15) knots.  Submarine also in turn to right nearly concentric with ship's turn, at a speed of about three (3) knots.     1109 Commenced depth charge attack. Submarine on course about 090, bearing 152T from BRONSTEIN.  Attack developed into beam attack, fifteen (15) knot range rate, no doppler, beam traces.     1111 Dropped eighteen (18) charge, double layer medium pattern.  The shallower settings were mark six (6) slow sinking, and
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	Page Four (4) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
	S-E-C-R-E-T
	the deeper charges mark nine (9) fast sinking.  Between the boils of #2 and #4 (numbering by FTP-219) port K-gun charges, there appeared a large air slug.  This was similar to the slugs used by tame submarines in ASW training and shot from torpedo tubes, except that it was considerably larger and the black-brown color of the depth charge boils and the blue of the ocean.  The DRT plot later showed this attack to be an extremely accurate one, and it is felt that the attack jarred the submarine up considerably.  Some oil was noted when the area was recrossed.     1116 Opened out to re-attack.  Contact regained, but was in the depth charge disturbance so it was doubtful whether the pattern or the submarine was the source of the echo.  Two (2) sweeps were made through the area.  Each time no pattern was dropped, because the echo was doubtful, and it was desired to keep the area as clear as possible of depth charge disturbance in order that the submarine would not escape behind the resultant sound interference.       Later results indicated that the submarine was actually in the pattern disturbance, and proceeding out at extremely low speed during this time.  The contact was probably the submarine.     1131 CORRY which had been standing by moved in to take up the search.  BRONSTEIN moved out to about two thousand yards and commenced to circle the area.     1147 CORRY gained sound contact.     1150 CORRY dropped a depth charge pattern.  THis pattern was 030°T, distant 1100 yards from BRONSTEIN's depth charge pattern.  CORRY did not regain contact.     1152 CORRY and BRONSTEIN commenced "unwinding clock" search, CORRY in tactical command.     1201 CORRY made sound contact.     1206 Sound contact proved false.     1218 CORRY made sound contact.     1221 CORRY fired pattern of depth charges.  CORRY continued to investigate, BRONSTEIN circled.  Contact not regained.
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	Page Five (5) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
	S-E-C-R-E-T
	1244 Unit continued search.     1315 CORRY dropped depth charge pattern and opened for re-attack.  BRONSTEIN slowed and paralleled CORRY on her starboard quarter.     1318 Bow of submarine broke water (Lat. 16-52 N, Long. 30-26 W) astern of CORRY bearing 207°T, range 2500 yards from BRONSTEIN, target angle 280°T.  Opened fire with all 3"/50 calibre guns, 40mm twin, and all port 20MM guns.  CORRY commenced turn to right.  Came right with standard rudder and reversed course.  (Turn made to right to prevent fouling CORRY's range).  All guns firing when not blind during turn.  When turn was completed all guns except port 20MM bore on target.     1323 Aircraft dove on submarine, but did not drop anything.       The conning tower came into view, and then the decks.  Submarine surfaced and proceeding at low speed.       BRONSTEIN was in a position to open fire immediately on sighting.  Hits with the main battery (3"/50 Double Purpose) commenced on the third salvo and continued throughout the firing.  The noise of the automatic weapons made it impossible to hear salvo buzzers, and from this time on the battery was at rapid fire continuously except when the two forward guns ceased firing during the turn.  The 3" tracers proved of great assistance to fire control.  CORRY's fire was excellent, and it is assumed that the majority of damage was by her 5" guns.  Both ships were consistently on the target.  It is impossible to state the exact number of hits, as no one in this vessel kept count, nor if the exact number were known would it be possible to say which were CORRY's and which were BRONSTEIN's.  The majority of hits were made on conning tower, and the conning tower was, several times, completely enveloped in black smoke.       40MM fire was not as accurate as 3", but by its volume, it made up for this with many hits.  The director proved erratic and control was shifted to manual, with good results.       20MM fire was at first short, but the gunners soon elevated sufficiently to come on the target.  The fire was heavy but had considerable dispersion, probably due to the fact that the gunners could not identify their own fall of shot at the target.
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	Page Six (6) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
	S-E-C-R-E-T
	60 rounds 3"/50 A.P.         9 rounds 3"/50 A.A. set on safe.     292 rounds 40MM (alternate A.A. and A.P.   1440 rounds 20MM.     1325 Submarine commenced to settle stern first.  Conning tower disappeared but bow remained out of the water.     1326 Bow of submarine disappeared.  Estimated angle of sinking fifty degrees to the horizontal.  As it went down, the bow appeared to twist around as if the submarine had rolled over.     1330 Commenced picking up survivors.  Thirty-seven men were taken aboard BRONSTEIN.  THis vessel does not know how many were recovered by CORRY.       One officer who appeared to be the captain, and two chief petty officers were separated from the men.  All were searched immediately on coming aboard and then marched forward to the forecastle where they were kept under guard.  THey were not allowed to converse with each other, and no conversation was held with them except as necessary in handling their movements.       A wheel that appeared to be part of a coding machine was found upon the officer.  He had supported and towed a wounded man to the ship's side, and the wheel wa taken from him as soon as he reached the rail.  (Found in his trouser pocket).  It is believed that this officer put the wheel in his pocket before abandoning the submarine, intending to get rid of it in the water, and in the excitement neglected to do this.  The wheel was slightly bent and the wiring broken, implying that it had been wrenched from the machine to which it belonged.  The wheel was packaged separately and transferred to BLOCK ISLAND together with all other articles collected.  (It is this paragraph which causes the report to be classified secret).     1405 Commenced transferring prisoners, by whaleboat, to CORRY for further transfer to BLOCK ISLAND.  Two stretcher cases were transferred after treatment by pharmacist mates, one badly burned, and the other with severe shrapnel wounds.     1440 Completed transfer of prisoners, and commenced collecting what small debris was in the area.
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	Page Two (2) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
	S-E-C-R-E-T
	Upon reaching the survivors a film that resembled fine coal dust had been observed in patches on the water.  The oil which was expected was not in evidence.  The only objects present in the water were splintered pieces of wood that appeared to be parts of deck grating, and showed evidence of having been splintered by shell fire.       Seven of the survivors taken aboard the BRONSTEIN were brought aboard already treated for injuries or burns.  These men had been bandaged before they left the submarine.     1633 BRONSTEIN rejoined BLOCK ISLAND anti-submarine screen.
	Part II        Commanding Officer's Comments
	1.        The entire task group contributed to the sinking of this submarine.  THe result was the product of teamwork that realized fully the mission of CVE groups by combining every weapon, air and surface.
	2.        The Commanding Officer of U.S.S. CORRY deserves great credit for the manner in which he employed that ship and U.S.S. BRONSTEIN to persistently attack the submarine over a period of hours until it was forced to surface.  Although contact was lost several times Lieutenant Commander C.D. HOFFMAN, U.S. Navy so conducted the search that each time contact with the submarine was regained and the attacks continued.
	3.        Although the surface ships finished the submarine, this would have been impossible had not aircraft commenced the action, and the following day directed the surface vessels to the submarine's position.
	4.        The Destroyer Escort as a class is frequently criticized for its lack of offensive power.  Unfortunately the major portion of this criticism comes from the very officers who man these vessels.  This commanding officer has nothing but praise for the armament of these ships.  In this and a previous engagement the battery gave an excellent account of itself.  For this type of duty these ships are engaged in it is sufficient.  The fire of these vessels can be accurate, rapid and heavy.  It is regretted that in each case where this ship encountered an enemy on the surface, torpedo fire was impossible due to danger to ships of own task group.
	5.        It should be noted that the BRONSTEIN was on her first duty following her shakedown period which ended 7 February 1944 on which date she reported for duty.  Credit is reflected
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	Page Eight (8) - - USS BRONSTEIN (DE-189)  ACTION REPORT of 17 March 1944.
	S-E-C-R-E-T
	upon the DEstroyer Escort Shakedown Group, Bermuda, which prepared this ship to take her place in the fleet, ready to fight, in a very short period.
	S.H.KINNEY_________
	Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
	Commanding Officer.

 

	In reply U. S. S. BRONSTEIN (DE 189)   refer to:   Care of Fleet Post Office DE189/A16-3   New York, N. Y.   (RCC-wr)
	CONFIDENTIAL                                                                                       18 March 1944.
	EXECUTIVE OFFICER REPORT OF ACTION
	Reference:        (a)  Art. 948, U.S. Navy Regulations.
	1.        At 1042 Z, when initial contact was established, the Executive Officer was in C.I.C.  A plot of the contact was immediately started, and the information received from sonar evaluated.  Constant information as to target course and speed and recommended courses was kept flowing to the Conning Station.  When battle stations were manned, the regular plotting officer took over, and this officer, in the capacity of Evaluator, attempted to keep the bridge informed of the tactical aspect of the situation at all times.  This included recommended courses to steer for regain contact, and the maneuvering of the vessel to re-attack position.
	2.        At 1312 Z the Executive Officer again manned his battle station, as C.I.C. Officer and Evaluator.  At the time of arrival on station a radar contact had been picked up, the Plotting Officer had commenced tracking, the the ready guns had opened fire on the surfaced target.  Radar contact was verified as a surfaced submarine by the Commanding Officer.  Plot indicated that the submarine was moving on course 090°T at about five (5) knots, so attention was concentrated on giving advance ranges and relative bearings to gun control.
	3.        Upon hearing the word from radar that "Pip" was disappearing, a final plot of his position was made, and the Executive Officer went to the bridge to survey the situation.
	4.        The reporting officer noted that all guns were firing accurately, and numerous puffs of black smoke, appearing around the conning tower and hull, indicated hits were being obtained.  The submarine wa in an awash condition, with bow and conning tower only above the surface.  At no time did this officer see the full length of the submarine.  Due to the fact that CORRY was firing also, it was difficult to determine how many hits were scored by this ship's 3"/50 battery.  The fact that the submarine was hit is positively known due to the appearance of black bursts mingled with a column of water which completely hid the conning tower from view on several occasions.
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	Page Two (2) - - EXECUTIVE OFFICER REPORT OF ACTION of 18 March 1944
	CONFIDENTIAL
	At one point, about 30 seconds before the submarine started down, a particularly large burst was noted.  This burst was so much larger than any of the others that it excited a spontaneous cheer from all personnel topside.
	5.        The order to cease firing was given when the submarine started to sink slowly, due to the fact that CORRY was entering the area which was dangerous due to this ship's gunfire.
	6.        CORRY ceased firing when the submarine was definitely going down, and it was clearly seen to sink slowly, stern first, until the conning tower disappeared under the water and its angle with the surface increasing.  Finally when the bow was at an angle of about 60° with the surface, it started to disappear, and slowly sank out of sight.
	7.        At this point survivors were observed in the water close to the point of sinking, and this officer took charge of the survivor detail, and made ready for receiving prisoners.
	8.        Two metal rescue ladders and two cargo nets, lashed to the starboard side of the main deck, were lowered, and the ship hove to with the survivors to starboard.  Four men three of them armed, were stationed at the head of each rescue ladder and net.  The unarmed men thoroughly searched each man prior to his coming inboard of the lifelines, and the personal belongings were all placed in a box for future inventory.  The prisoners were marched, in groups of three, to the foc's'le, where they were kept under guard by ship's personnel stationed behind the gun shield.  Medical attention was given those requiring it by the PhM1c LeGORE, who was stationed on the foc's'le for that purpose.  Two seriously injured men, one suffering a bad burn and the other badly wounded by shrapnel, were taken to the main battle dressing station in the wardroom.  Here they were given emergency first aid treatment by the ship's three Pharmacists Mates, and prepared for their transfer to CORRY.  It is to be noted here that all Pharmacist Mates were convinced that the burns suffered by the aforementioned man were recent-within the past eight (8) hours.
	It was observed that many of the prisoners suffered longitudinal surface scratches on arms and legs.  These it is assumed, were acquired when leaving the escape hatch, and since no survivors were observed in the water during gunfire, it is further felt that they left the submarine after it started down, having given it up as lost.
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	Page Three (3) - - EXECUTIVE OFFICER REPORT OF ACTION of 18 March 1944
	CONFIDENTIAL
	9.        It was noted by this officer that an estimated 6 to 8 of the prisoners who came aboard were carefully bandaged for injuries previously received.  It was evident that this treatment had not been administered during or after the gunfire.  In the opinion of the Executive Officer, these men were injured during previous attacks, and had been treated in the submarine prior to its final surfacing.
	10.        A total of 37 prisoners were taken by this vessel, one of whom was an officer.  In accordance with previous directives, this officer and two CPO's were immediately segregated from the enlisted personnel.  No attempt was made to converse with the prisoners, either in German or English, except to give orders in English.  However, one of this ship's force, who understands German, was detailed to stand close by and listen for all he could hear.  No conversation was overheard, so it was decided to forbid the prisoners to converse with each other.  After this order was given no word was said, except for occasional requests for cigarettes.  The prisoners were given all the water and cigarettes they desired.
	11.        At 1405 Z the transfer of prisoners to CORRY was commenced, and, by 1440 Z all prisoners, including the two badly injured, had been sent over by small boat to CORRY, without incident.  All personal belongings were also delivered to CORRY's boat officer, in order that they might be kept with the prisoners.
	12.        The Executive Officer desires, not to commend any individual, but rather to commend, as a team, the whole of C.I.C. personnel.  Each officer and man, without a doubt, performed his assigned duty quietly, efficiently, and delivered all that was expected of him throughout the submerged and surface attacks.
	R. C. COE______
	Lieutenant, USNR.