U-boat Archive - U-615 History






	U-615








	By
	*Herbert Schlipper*
	Crew 39







	© Jonathan Rosenberg 2014 - all rights reserved


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	- U-615 -

	The history of a Type VIIC U-boat, its operations 1942 – 1943 and its crew.

	In January 1942, the Personalinspektion der Kriegsmarine [Personnel Office of the Navy] ordered the Second Watch Officer of the torpedo boat "Tiger" of the 25. U-Flottille in Danzig, Oberfähnrich zur See Herbert Schlipper, to report on 17 February for U-Bootsbaubelehrung [U- boat construction familiarization] at the 8. U-Flottille in Hamburg, to serve as First Watch Officer of U-615. The boat was to be commissioned on 26 March 1942 at the Blohm & Voss Shipyard in Hamburg. U-615 belonged to the series of Type VIIC combat submarines which began with U-551 on 7 November 1940 and were being completed at weekly intervals up to U-650 at the Blohm & Voss Shipyard.

	For me, these orders were particularly upsetting, because I had been waiting impatiently since the end of U-boat Watch Officer training on 28 September 1941 in Pillau for a Command Board.

	The Commander of torpedo boat "Tiger" was just as upset because during convoy exercises in the Baltic Sea region this boat of the 25. U-Flottille had to take on the functions of an escort vessel and a U-boat hunter for training convoys, to provide U-boat commanders undergoing practical training the most realistic training possible for breaking through the screen of a convoy. Because I now gave up the role of provisional U-hunter, I felt enriched by this valuable experience, which could be useful in the expected convoy battles in the Atlantic to better outmaneuver the enemy protecting forces of a convoy. According to our knowledge of the enemy, lookouts on the escorting destroyers were the crux of being discovered.

	Together with the Watch Officers of the other torpedo boats,


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	all of whom were also members of my Crew*, one or more glasses were emptied and toasted to the change of command and to the success of our U-boat comrades in the Atlantic, who would subdue our stubborn enemies. In the beginning of 1942 our glorious Armies were still deep in conquered Russian territory and success reports from the Atlantic Front encouraged us to believe that the toughest combat operations and the will to win could move the Western allies to make concessions or agree to a truce.

	After the farewell from my Crew comrades, who later followed me into the U-boatwaffe, in the evening of a frosty February day in 1942 in Königsberg, which was very dear to my heart from training in Pillau, I boarded the express train to Berlin. The train was boarded over and over again by soldiers and civilian travelers. On 17 February aboard the old sailing ship "HEIN GODEWIND", which was docked at the Blohm & Voss Shipyard, I reported to my new Commander, Kapitänleutnant (Kptlt.) Ralph Kapitzky, who was a member of Crew 35 and came from Dresden-Loschwitz. With him in the small cabin of the disused sailing ship was his Crew comrade Kptlt. Albrecht Brandi, who was to commission U-617 two weeks after our boat was put in service. While Kptlt. Brandi had been reassigned from the Minesweeping Fleet to the U-Bootwaffe, Kptlt. Kapitzky had more than 150 missions in a Ju 86 over England during his posting in the naval air force. Unusual for a Naval Officer, and causing astonishment or curiosity to members of the Luftwaffe, he wore a Gold Combat Clasp on his blue naval uniform, a rare variant in what was then a flood of orders and decorations.

	After U-6, a Type IIA coastal submarine on which I completed U-boat training in Pillau, and U-111, a Type IXB boat for use in the high seas on which I had served as a Fähnrich during the boat’s workup period, U-615 was the third U-boat type which I got to know. It was considered the primary combat boat

* by Crew Schlipper means the intake year of officer cadets in the Kriegsmarine. Herbert Schlipper belonged to Crew X39 (also referred to as 1939a) = October 1939 (the first group of cadets in 1939). Crew X39 started with 633 officer cadets, 78 of which became U-boat commanders. 150 crewmembers died on U-boats. There was a second group of cadets taken in December 1939 referred to as XII39 or 39b. This crew started with 1080 officer cadets, of which 78 became U-boat commanders.


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	used in the North Atlantic.

	Its size was 1070 cubic meters, length 66.5 meters, diameter 6.1/4.70 meters, draft 4.74 meters.
	Output of diesel engines: 2800-3200 hp, performance of electric motors: 750 hp; speed 15 knots on the surface and 7.6 knots submerged.
	Diving depth: 150 meters (destruction depth 280 meters).
	Diesel oil: 105.3 to 113.5 tons.
	Armament: 4 bow torpedo tubes, one aft torpedo tube; 14 torpedoes or 39 mines.
	Artillery: One 8.8-cm gun, one 2-cm machine gun.
	Crew: 4 officers, 40-56 men.

	The single hull boat was divided into in three pressure-proof spaces. The stern of the vessel contained the diesel engines, electric motors and generators, electric equipment, air compressors, hand steering gear and the stern torpedo tube. Both Deutz diesels gave the boat a top speed of 17.7 knots on the surface. Two electric motors fed by extensive battery sets gave a maximum submerged speed of 7.6 knots however, this could be maintained for only one hour, then battery capacity was exhausted. With an economical speed of approximately 2 knots the boat could remain submerged up to three days. Under normal conditions, the batteries had to be recharged every 24 hours, which could only be done by surfacing to start the diesel engines which in turn drove the generators to recharge the batteries.

	Forward of the diesel room there was a tiny galley with an electric stove and a toilet operated with a hand pump. Then came the Petty Officers room and below the floor plates, the first half of the 50-ton lead battery installation.

	Amidships followed a pressure resistant compartment, the control room, which was the heart and brains of the boat with a bewildering plethora of pipes, rods, gauges, valves, fasteners, levers,


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	hand-wheels, switches, cables and control displays. The primary groups of equipment in the control room were the rudder and diving plane system, the gyro and magnetic compass, the bilge pumps, the air renewal system, the trim and control systems, a fresh water generator, the air search periscope and the chart table. From the control room, a ladder with a coaming led to the conning tower, which contained the torpedo lead angle calculator and attack periscope and on up to the bridge and the 2-cm machine gun mount.

	The Commander’s niche was reached by going forward through a hatch from the control room and was opposite the radio and sound rooms. Thereafter followed the Officer and Chief Petty Officer rooms with bunks, a forward head and below the floor plates of the mess the second half of the battery installation and the ammunition magazine.

	In the bow room were found the crew bunks and stowage for reserve torpedoes and at the forward end there were four bow torpedo tubes. The ballast tanks, regulating and trim cells, fuel bunkers and fresh water tanks were distributed in the boat with most of the fuel placed in outboard fuel tanks. The three pressure resistant sections were further divided fore and aft into rooms that were equipped with watertight bulkheads able to withstand a water pressure of about 110 meters (10-12 atm).

	The construction familiarization period offered the Officers and men the opportunity to follow up theoretical knowledge of U-boat construction learned at the U-boat school with observations of the progressive construction practice at the shipyard. This was, particularly important for machinery and control room staff because of the many layers of switches, levers and connections that were vital to the operation of the boat.

	Oberfähnrich zur See Klaus von Egan-Krieger from Werder/Potsdam was sent as Second Watch Officer direct from the U-boat School and as Engineering Officer, Leutnant (Ing.) Herbert Skora from Swinemünde.


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	As Third Watch Officer Kptlt. Kapitzky requested Obersteuermann Hans Peter Dittmer from Hamburg-Altone. Kapitzky had met Dittmer as an Unteroffizier during a patrol as Commander under instruction in U-93* with Kptlt. Korth. Dittmer had served as Combat Helmsman in U-47 under Kptlt. Prien and took part in Prien’s memorable journey to Scapa Flow in 1939 and was the only member of the crew with multiple war patrols behind him.

	After serving as a naval aviator, Kptlt. Kapitzky made a patrol* with U-93, graduated from the Command Course and took command of U-615 as his first Front boat.

	The Engineering Officer had previously been on destroyers at the Front and was promoted there from Mannschaftsdienstgrad to Obermaschinisten to Officer. At 32 he was the oldest in years on board and had a family with two children. The two Obermaschinisten Rudolf Buhlig from Gdynia and Eugene Schrade from Neu-Ulm, were about the same age and were both married. They too were newcomers to U-boat without combat experience, but were experienced engine experts.

	Of the Seamanship Petty Officers Helmut Langner from Wroclaw, Albert Zimmermann from Kastl/Kemnath, Heinz Wilke from Euskirchen, Josef Schumann from Munich, Theo Schultheis from Nuremberg, and Guenter Brauer from Helmstedt, only Bootsmaat H. Wilke has Front experience as an enlisted man. The Technical Petty Officers Heinz Blum from Rügenwalde, Stefan Lehner from Munich, Martin Schnelle from Rostock, Viktor Drobek from Brieg/Breslau, Edmund Kotzian from Wehen/Leobschütz and Obermaat Merten, (his information was no longer available through subsequent dislocation), also had no Front experience on a U-boat. Only Kotzian had served as a Maat aboard U-6, a school boat in Pillau.

	In the enlisted ranks it did not look any different. All 29 men were sent directly from the U-boat School and

* Kapitzky made 2 patrols in U-93 as First Watch Officer. He did not make a patrol as Commander under instruction.


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	had just reached the age of 19-20 years.

	Becoming a well coordinated and practiced U-boat crew was now the most urgent and crucial task of each crewmember from the Commander to the youngest sailors. All took part without complaint and with zeal and devotion. Only one Matrose had to be replaced due to unseaworthiness.

	Every day we were able to follow the progressive completion of our boat by the skilled workers of the Blohm & Voss Shipyard. Each of us harbored special confidence in the work of these men whose boats were held in high esteem among U-boat men for their reputation of quality. The quality of the welds was ultimately responsible for the fact that the pressure hull of a boat could withstand inconceivably high loads, especially from depth charge blasts.

	On the neighboring slipways we observed the completion of U-610 of Kptlt. Freiherr von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen which was commissioned on 19 February 1942. The commissioning of the boats U-611 of Kptlt. Jacobs, U-612 of Kptlt. Siegmann, U-613 of Kptlt. Koeppe and U-614 of Kptlt. Sträter followed at weekly intervals.

	As a guest at the commissioning of U-614 I was afforded the opportunity to celebrate the promotion to Leutnant on 1 March with one of my Crew comrades, the First Watch Officer of U-614 Helmut van Norden from Cologne with a special allocation of drinks and sandwiches as a double occasion. A week later, on 26 March 1942, we commissioned U-615 and were host to the crew of U-616 of Oberleutnant zur Sea (Oblt) Spindlegger which was commissioned a week later. Getting to know each others crews during the familiarization period in the 8. U-Flottille and in the shipyard brought about an interest in the fate of these boats (all of which were numbered in the 600 series) and their crews, which continued both during the war and beyond.


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	After crew drills and testing by the U-Bootsabnahmekommando (U.A.K.) [U-boat Acceptance Command] on 6 April 1942 the boat went down the Elbe river for the first time, past the town of Blankenese, through the lock at Brunsbüttelkoog, through the Kiel Canal to Kiel, where on 7 April we moored at the Tirpitz mole in Kiel-Wik.

	From 7 April to 6 May, we carried out U.A.K.- testing in Kiel Bay which demanded a lot effort and nerve by the crew. On 7 May U-615 began the transit to the east for further training and testing, arriving 8 May in Swinemünde. On 10 May the boat made fast in Danzig at the Kaiser Harbor. Independent training and U.A.G.-testing [Unterseeboote Abnahme Gruppe = U-boat Acceptance Group] was continued until 14 May. Up to 18 May, T.E.K. testing [Torpedoerprobungskommand = Torpedo Testing Command] was conducted in Gotenhafen. From 19 May to 26 May Ausbildungsgruppe (AGRU-Front) [Technische Ausbildungsgruppe = Technical Training Group for Front U-boats] was carried out in Hela with Kaptl. (Ing.) Gerd Shuren, an experienced and highly decorated U-boat Engineering Officer. Mastery of the dangerous situations that existed during depth charge pursuits was practiced by the Engineering Officer. By this Suhren gave us the necessary feeling of security, how much bow angle one could dare diving without immediately have the feeling of not being able to catch the boat, a short circuit in the vessel’s electrical system during depth charge pursuit and not to panic in case of sudden darkness in the boat, to name just a few of the many incidents that had to be practiced and mastered. This was followed by individual training of the boat at the AGRU-Front in Danzig Bay, until the boat reported for further training on 12 June at the 25. U-Flottille in Danzig

	In the meantime U-617 with Kaptl. Brandi arrived, which had been commissioned two weeks after U-615 on 9 April.

	The duty break on Pentecost Sunday was the last time in the war to take a sailing trip in a


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	sailing cruiser from the Naval Yacht Club in Danzig along with the Second Watch Officer. In glorious sailing weather we passed from Danzig-Langfeur past Westerplatte to the pier in Zopot and took our Commander and Kaptl. Albrecht Brandi with his recently married wife Eve on board for a small sailing game off Zopot. Zopot and its far-reaching pier into the sea provided an almost peacetime air and a perfect mix of recreation seekers and sailors with pretty dinghies and cruisers. The Danzig Bay offered us ideal sailing conditions under a deep blue sky to which the white cumulus clouds seemed so well matched.

	On another occasion, we had the Danzig Bay at its finest when Major Boyshausen, the Commander of the fighter pilot school in Danzig-Langfuhr [Marien Kampffliegerschule Langfuhr], took us on a scenic flight over Danzig and the coastal region in return for a visit on board U-615. After starting a Bücker Jungmann aircraft, in which the instructor and students could sit next to each other, he gave me the controls so that I could maneuver the fully aerobatic aircraft at my own discretion. The thrill of the flight experience complemented by a gorgeous view of a great coastal landscape, with incoming and outgoing vessels, and the white sails of many yachts on a deep blue sea provided a memory to last a lifetime.

	After artillery firing on 14 June in Danzig Bay and other individual training, a depth charge exercise took place on 26 June. This gave the crew an idea of the deafening volume levels you had to expect during a depth charge pursuit, because the submerged hull, which seemed to be trembling and quaking at every joint, acted like a mighty soundboard which amplified the infernal noise.

	After torpedo exercises during the period from 22 to 28 June and subsequent individual training, on 16 July U-615 proceeded to Ronne on Bornholm Island for trials at Nexo. In the sea area east of Nexo on 15 Nov 1941 I had witnessed the demise of U-583 helplessly aboard torpedo boat Tiger. The torpedo boat could not help the crew of U-583 after a collision with another submarine in the night and the entire crew was lost.

	After a short break in Ronne on Bornholm Island on 8 July U-615 continued training in Danzig again from 9 to 23 July with the 27. U-Flottille whose wartime tactical exercises against convoys in the central and eastern Baltic Sea I had so often participated in aboard the torpedo boat Tiger with the boats Lion and Leopard. Once while preparing the convoy exercises at the


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	direction of the Admiral’s Staff I had experienced the eloquence of our Flotilla Commander at that time, Korvettenkapitän (K.Kpt.) Sobe, who unfortunately went down with U-179 on 8 August 1942.

	After U-615 and its crew were certified for wartime operations, on 23 July we proceeded from Danzig to Hamburg to carry out final adjustments and overhaul for the first patrol at the Howaldt Shipyard. During the refit the Dutch passenger ship "VEENDAM", which was docked at Tollerort, served as a pleasant accommodation.

	A few days later, one evening the English carried out a heavy air raid on Hamburg at 23.00 hours. I watched with my Crew comrade A. Ritter from Felbinger, the First Watch Officer of U-619, from the boat deck of the VEENDAM.

	The crash of bombs and the huge firelight in the city seemed to conjure up an inferno. Fortunately the VEENDAM was spared completely. The next morning I went into the still smoking ruins to the Jungfernstieg [Virgin Rose] and the Old and New Wall where the fire bombs had burned the beautiful old shop houses to the ground. To my horror the beautiful Alsterpavillon, where until 20.00 hours guests had been had been listening to light music before the bombing, was completely razed to the ground by explosives and incendiary bombs. Nothing remained of the magnificent Greek colonnade before the entrance balcony, with many carved marbles and the cultivated Hamburg interior ambiance. An immense feeling of anger, disappointment and emptiness erupted in me, and I left to return to the harbor and the VEENDAM.

	After overhaul and parting with Hamburg friends the boat was finally ready for sea and cast off for Kiel on 1 September at 08.00 hours. There we moored at the U-boat Pier together with U-661 of Oblt. von Lilienfeld, which departed on the same day with us from Hamburg. In three days the boat was degaussed, the radio direction finder calibrated, oxygen was loaded, the magnetic compass compensated and the boat balanced and a final trim test was performed. On 5 September 1942 at 07.00 hours U-615 dipped the Reich War Flag at the Laboe Memorial on its first war patrol.

	After passing through the Skagerrak paying strict attention to the danger lurking there from English submarines, on 9 June we ran in to Kristiansand for water and fuel supply. The following morning we had to leave the port to cross the North Sea. We longed for heavy weather with high seas to complicate the search by the English enemy in the air and on the sea for our boat entering the Atlantic,

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since we had no idea the enemy already had the means to locate his opponent independent of weather and darkness.

In spite of the proximity of English naval bases and airfields the Commander was determined to break through the English U-boat barrier during 10-11 September between the Faeroe and Shetland Islands. We hoped we would not be caught in the clutches of a U-boat search group of several destroyers, however, the Commander’s courageous decision was right, because we sighted only a patrol vessel which we avoided without being seen.

On 12 September U-615 was in naval square AM, which included the sea area immediately north and west of Ireland. We had finally reached the North Atlantic Ocean and were assigned by Radio Message to Group “Pfeil”. In the evening at 22.25 hours in AM 3312 for the first time we had an enemy in our vicinity that shot a star shell to illuminate our position.

On 15 September at 11.21 hours in naval square AL 2850 a flying boat was spotted approaching the boat from the north in time so that it was possible to avoid the danger by crash diving. After surfacing at 12.59 hours in naval square AL 0262 there was already a twin-engine bomber bearing 100°T distance 6000 meters, approaching us which forced us to crash dive. Against this, U-661 of Oblt. von Lilienfeld had already been sunk on 15 September in an air attack in the North Atlantic with no survivors. That moved us deeply because we departed together from Hamburg and together with U-619 we were both to join the 3. U-Flottille.

The same fate also befell U-619 on 15 October with Oblt. Makowski and my Crew comrade von Felbinger. There were no survivors. Naval squares AL and AK due to their proximity to Ireland, Iceland and South Greenland were constantly under air superiority and surveillance by long-range bombers. The Allies demanded a high price in blood from the U-boat men.

But as the supply of war material and food goods for England had to pass through this sea area, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote [B.d.U. - Commander-in-Chief Submarines] in Kernevel, France had no choice but to track down the convoys there and after their discovery, to direct other boats to attack.

On 16 and 17 September U-615 was steaming back and forth as ordered in naval square AL and likewise on 18 and 19 September in naval square AK 8566 and AK 8422.

The Kriegstagebuch (K.T.B.) [War Diary] of B.d.U. (at the Military Archive in Freiburg/Breisgau, under RM 87/23) contains the locations of U-615 and neighboring boats in the following entries from 18-22 September:

“18 September - page 8	U-600	in naval square	BE 95	return transit
	U-615	“ “
	U-617	“ “
	U-619	“ “

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19 September - page 11	U-615	“ “	Op. AK
	U-617	“ “	Op. AK
	U-618	“ “	Op. AK
	U-619	“ “	AL 31
20 September - page 17	U-615	“ “	Op. AK
	U-617	“ “	Op. AK
	U-618	“ “	Op. AK

U-569 (Oblt. Kolbus) at 11.07 hours reestablished contact on Convoy 54. Around 14.00 hours Operational Control decided to set the 9 boats of Group Pfeil in about AL 40-70 on this convoy.

21 September - page 20	U-615	“ “	Op. AK
	U-617	“ “	Op. AK
	U-618	“ “	Op. AK
	U-619	“ “	AL 30

U-615 in AK 1668 was successively over run by two destroyers. The weather situation has deteriorated such that boats had to cruise before the seas and any use of weapons was impossible. Storm or hurricane was reported from southwest to west.

22 September - page 24	U-615	“ “	Op. AK
	U-617	“ “	Op. AK

U-600 in La Pallice. U-600 reported damage by a mine explosion in BF 9321 (Route “Herz”)

U-617 sighted Convoy 54 at 24.00 hours in AK 3955 on an easterly course."

The description of the situation on the B.d.U. Staff concerned the narrow perspective of tactical decisions to be taken. The boats positioned in naval squares AL and AK were in a battle with the forces of nature, which is almost hard to describe in words: On 21 September, the weather in the North Atlantic deteriorated rapidly from hour to hour, and the sea was piled up to steep mountainous waves often over 20 meters high. Lashed to a gale-force storm spray flew many hundreds of meters with high-pitched whistling, greatly reducing the visibility by a veil of water.

Around 16.00 hours the same day in AK 1668 an English single-stack destroyer suddenly came in sight, which we only discovered at almost 1000 meters due to the high waves and the spray-filled air. The enemy was so close that we could see details on the bridge without binoculars, but the 15-meter high waves forced the British to steer their ship against the wind and waves and prevented them from maneuvering across the seas on their port side.

At the sight of the hard-working and pounding destroyer in the storm, which allowed no weapons use, you could even be at war still have compassion for the enemy vessel in trouble, however, we were pleased that the forces of nature temporarily crippled


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	our most feared enemy.

	However we could not fire a torpedo at the enemy. Because of the effect of extremely high waves on the pressure sensitive vacuum chamber the depth control mechanism of the torpedoes would not work.

	Therefore we dove before the destroyer and ran at a depth of 110 meters. At 18.00 hours while submerged we were over run by another destroyer on a northerly course, and received by locating [Asdic] four depth charges, which however were far away.

	At 20.29 hours after surfacing we had a WSW storm and sent a Radio Message to the B.d.U.: "Sea state 9, no weapons use possible."

	On 22 September at 04.00 hours U-615 was in AK 2384 almost east of Cape Farewell, off southern tip of Greenland. It was my 22nd birthday. In AK 2329 at 12.00 hours as usual I assumed the First Watch with Oberbootsmannsmaat Helmut Langner, the Gefreiten Heinz Koehler and Obergefreiter Fritz Steppat. For weeks we had been in the "seal suit" oilskins which you got into from above like a wet suit. I could not believe my eyes when the brunt of the Atlantic hurricane made it look even more frightening. The white waves with tumbling crests alone accounted for a height of about 10 meters and then dropped into a trough, which was probably 10-20 meters deep. Despite previous experience with storms and hurricanes, monstrous waves approached thundering in a broad unbroken front of about 500 meters such as we simply dared not imagine. The waves rolled over the entire bridge with a clap of thunder, which tore at the men who had to hold their breath for a few seconds under water, their legs continued in a floating position in which they were held by strong safety belts until the bridge with gurgling and foaming water was free again.

	When I perceived the first approach of a plunging wave crest and the boat was deep in a trough, I heard how the rampage of the elements was reinforced by an alarming turmoil in the atmosphere from the incredible whistling of the hurricane.

	If I ever felt afraid during the war, it was on this 22 birthday at the commencement of my watch. But I had to suppress my fear and assist my two young sailors, who were not yet 20 years old, to hook their safety belts to the bulwark of the bridge.

	After each visitation of the bridge by the "Great Hulk" as we called him, I looked at my men to make sure no one had been washed overboard, because the force of the breakers, which could break stanchions like matchsticks, was able to destroy


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	the hooks or strops of the safety belts. (Thus the KTB of U-575 reported: "in the last three hours three of the safety belts have torn as a result of the over coming seas").

	Many times during storms the crew in the control room could read on the depth gauge that the boat was headed to a depth of 12 meters when a wave rushed over the bridge and the watch had to hold their breath under water. The water appeared frothy white and bright green, until the bridge was free again and the boat sank on the apex of the wave again and again into the next trough. The storm raged and howled with unbridled power and strength, and we received a Radio Message from the B.d.U.: “To Group “Blitz” do not wait for weather improvement.”

	On 24 September at 09.00 hours alarm bells rang through the boat, as a land-based bomber approached the boat at a distance of 6000 meters and forced us to crash dive. At 12.00 hours U-615 was in naval square AL 1511. When around 20.50 hours in AL 1552 a destroyer appeared at a distance of 4 nm [nautical miles], and four minutes later an attacking flying boat forced us to crash dive again, the Commander was sure that the convoy could not be far away.

	However, the convoy commodore apparently changed its general course based on air surveillance information, because our search was unsuccessful until 25 September.

	Only on 26 September in naval square AK 0323 had the hurricane subsided but the seas were still rough with high swells. At 12.00 hours, Brandi (U-617) reported: "20 steamers in convoy in AK 6385."

	Brandi, who like us was on his first war patrol and had already had success and was envied by all of us because of his fortune. We immediately operated on his convoy message, while we cursed the poor visibility, which amounted to only 1-2 nm.


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	Instead of this convoy on 27 September we met U-607 (Kaptl. Mengersen). After comparing navigation data came to course 270° for further search.

	On 28 September at 12.00 hours U-615 was in AK 5857. There the wind was force 5, Sea state 6, Swell 4, with Vis. [visibility] 8 nm. On the following day the convoy was sought in AK 7297 in the fog in direction 150°T [T = true bearing], but without success.

	Since our fuel inventory was concerning, we received the comforting message from the B.d.U.: “Supply from Czygan about 5 October in BD 7555." and set speed and course for the expected supply from the U-boat tanker U-118 of K.Kpt. Czygan.

	After midday position in AK 7511 (on 1 October), AK 7943 (on 2 October) and BD 1678 (on 3 October), on 4 October in BD 4349 at 04.10 hours we sighted U-216 (Kaptl. K. O. Schulz) and U-599 (Kaptl. Breithaupt) and eventually the eagerly awaited U-118. But then a rising southerly gale made fuel transfer impossible. Even on 5 October the transfer attempt had to be aborted because of the swell and the boats U-216, 599, 615 and 118 came to a southerly course.

	Oil transfer only began on 7 October at 11.07 hours in BD 4955 in Sea 2, Swell 1, Vis. 10 nm. After the hose put overboard by U-118 was picked up by our sailors and connected to our fuel oil loading fitting on the upper deck, the two boats had to steer parallel courses and maintain identical speeds, so that the hose connection is not ripped off, which required great skill, attention and seamanship.

	When I recognized the First Watch Officer on the supplier as my Crew comrade Hans (Hassan) Falke who I was at the Naval Academy, a greeting went back and forth and I captured the first supply with a camera. Hans & I had been in the same group at the Academy under the revered Group Officer Kaptl. Hermann Bauer, from Koblenz, and we had been adopted into the U-boat Force together in 1941.


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	After completion of supply at 20.47 hours, we continued our journey in direction 310°T. Nearly 14 days later U-216 was lost with all hands on 20 October 1942 southwest of Ireland. On 24 October 1942 U-599 (Kaptl. Breithaupt) was lost northwest of the Azores by bombs and there were also no survivors.+ The supplier U-118 was lost on 6 December 1943 with the entire crew, a victim of the aircraft carrier USS BOGUE.

	[hand written note: + with my Crew comrade Leutnant zur Sea Joachim Tönse as Watch Officer.]

	On 11 October we had cruised over 582 nm. At 12.00 hours we reached naval square AJ 8679 south of the west coast of Greenland and east of the Canadian Labrador coast. At 16.13 hours in AJ 8952 a smoke feather was sighted bearing 85°T, bow right target angle 90°, distance 6 nm. We maneuvered ahead at maximum speed dived around 19.12 hours in AJ 8975 for our first submerged attack. At 19.56 hours Kaptl. Kapitzky shot a two-fan from tubes one and two and after 90 seconds scored one torpedo hit. At 20.00 hours, we heard the diesel sounds of a German U-boat and after surfacing, met U-607 (Kaptl. Mengersen) at the sinking location. U-607 congratulated us on the success and said we had pre-empted him by a few minutes with the torpedo.

	Near the sinking location we spotted a large oil slick and a wood raft with 10 sailors from the torpedoed steamer, young men in their mid-twenties, very disciplined and calm, without shouting and waving despite the rain and cold that surrounded them. We gave them a bottle of rum in the raft, took the Captain and 1st Engineer on board and ran off at top speed to escape pursuers. To our horror a man floated clinging to a plank of wood far away from the raft, and cried out for help, but we could not go back to save him. It was a terrible image of the war to remember that never left me. We internally displaced what we had seen, because


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	death was our constant companion and a similar fate might await us.

	In October, in the cold Labrador Current, there was little chance of survival for the men on the raft, especially since the sea state increased in the evening and again during the night.

	From Captain [Finn] Abrahamson, a Norwegian from Kristiansand, we learned that the 6800-ton steamer "EL LAGO" was registered in New York and was in ballast on the way home. Because of a heavy storm that prevailed on the previous days, the Captain was busy fighting against the heavy sea, while the convoy had been torn apart, so they had to continue the journey alone. Immediately after the torpedo hit the ship had sunk and could not put more boats in the water. The Chief engineer was killed in the torpedo explosion in the engine room. The rescued 1st Engineer, a Dutchman [named Gerrit Baas in American sources but called Geerd in the German text] from the area around Rotterdam, had a long black piece of skin hanging down from his arm and had suffered serious burns from hot diesel oil, a shocking sight for us die-hard U-boat men.

	Our combat helmsman, Obergefreiter Gerd Diesing, from Gelsenkirchen, spontaneously offered to provide his namesake Geerd from the Netherlands a bunk, and the crew in the bow compartment, who always had to share bunks, made a permanent bunk available to the burn sufferer. They also patiently endured the bad odor which was caused by the treatment of the serious burns with cod liver oil ointment by our radioman and medic who with the greatest caution and circumspection had initially removed the malodorous diesel oil film from the burnt skin.

	After a few days all of our dressing material was used up by the frequent dressing changes and the crew divided up linens and towels, to provide to the "enemy". As promised the German Gerd took care of Dutch Geerd and fed his charge. Treatment with cod liver


	- 17 -

	oil ointment continued for the rest of the patrol.

	On 12 October when U-615 was in AJ 8926, the Radio Message Order was issued: "To Group Wotan: Operate on Mäßenhausen-report, go."

	We reached AJ 9267 at 12.00 hours, but at 13.10 hours despite good visibility of 7 nm, the convoy remained invisible. U-599 with Kaptl. Breithaupt came in sight in the afternoon and signal traffic was exchanged.

	At dawn on 14 October at 00.07 hours in AJ 6980 we discovered a destroyer bearing 240°T and behind it a corvette bearing 300°T on an easterly course. At 02.30 hours a destroyer approached us bearing 190° with two red lights one below the other, which were occasionally extinguished. We believed it was a locating or night vision device, because the lights appear to be infrared lamps aimed in the direction of our boat and the enemy was trying to approach us.

	As we ran at top speed from him, he could not bring his greater speed to bear towards us, since he would be in danger of undercutting his bow in a wave because of the high sea state. The wild chase lasting over an hour let our pulse rise up and held each nerve fiber on edge as we experienced a hunter in sight of a trophy boar, the only difference being that we were the hunted and I as a torpedo officer waited for the opportunity to shoot the pursuer with the stern torpedo.

	We would have had a better chance of this if we had already been provided with the new “Wren” torpedo responsive to propeller noises, which was specifically designed as a defensive weapon against pursuing destroyers.

	Because the bearing from us to the enemy remained constant and the distance of 2000 meters was not decreasing, he tried to force us to submerge by shooting star shells. When this did not happen he abandoned his pursuit. As the Commander suspected, we had met the convoy at the rear screen and thus he began the search in a


	- 18 -

	northeast direction with success. At 10.35 hours in AK 4785 clouds of smoke from the convoy were discovered bearing 320°T and 160°T.

	At 11.21 hours a corvette bearing 10°T, 7 nm away, target angle 0°, while bearing 40°T more masts were visible. When Kapitzky turned towards what was thought to be an independent, it turned out to be a corvette with two masts, which was avoided astern.

	While the corvette was still lurking 7 nm away, at 11.58 hours in AK 4723 another corvette with two masts came in sight (with NW 4, 5/10, Sea 4, Swell 5, Vis. 7 nm). At 14.36 hours in AK 4845 a destroyer approached quickly bearing 250°T 5 nm and forced us to crash dive because the starboard diesel was out of service and does not give enough speed. Since yesterday the chase has covered 264 nm and the crew was almost constantly at Action Stations. I felt respect for the physical performance of the Commander, who spent hours and hours with the watch on the bridge, with tough determination to get to the convoy. After nearly 18 hours without a break in service with wet gear I felt the limit of my resilience, as the eyes barely open due to the strain of looking out, especially during the night.

	At the direction of Obermaschinist Buhlig and Obermaat Merten the technical personnel took the damaged part of the diesel installation apart while submerged and after a few hours reported the successful repair of the diesel to the Commander. After surfacing Kapitzky could search at maximum speed again. On15 October at noon the boat was in AK 5859 and had covered 252 nm in a period of 24 hours, with visibility 3 nm, Swell 2. A German U-boat appeared, with which we exchange recognition signals (it was the boat of Kaptl. Lamby [U-437]).

	At 17.00 hours in AK 5819 a Liberator bomber suddenly appeared out of the mist, only 2000 meters away, and flew towards us at 50 meters altitude,


	- 19 -

	forcing us to crash dive. At shallow depth we received three very closely placed bombs that shook the boat strongly, but the boat held and we swore by the good work at Blohm & Voss.

	While proceeding at periscope depth it was determined that the bomber was circling the diving site and had thrown a smoke bomb to mark the location. We received three more bombs, but they were not close.

	The convoy could not be far away because while submerged the propeller noises of destroyers and corvettes could be heard all over the horizon. When we surfaced around 17.30 hours, a German U-boat was in sight, with which we compared navigation data and we discovered shrapnel on the bridge and the aft platform that had stuck in the wooden grating and also damage to the superstructure of the bridge. If they had been any closer U-615 would be gone for good at 4000 meters depth in the North Atlantic.

	On 16 October our boat was in AK 5982 and had covered 234 nm in a 24 hour period in low seas, light swells with a Vis. of only 1 nm. The weather deteriorated almost hourly and on 18 October a southern storm had built enormous waves and powerful swells again. New seas poured over the bridge watch forcing cold frothy white salt water in the men’s eyes, mouth, nose and ears. The visibility was only 50-500 meters.

	On 18 October at 00.25 hours in naval square BD 2289 we sent the following Radio Message: "Hurricane center 22.30 hours 968 mb, shifting clockwise, SSE to W, heavy 10, from the west, fog, Sea 6, medium Swell, low shifting quickly."

	On 20 October the storm had finally abated somewhat, and at 04.00 hours we reached naval square BD 1921.

	On 21 October at 10.44 hours once again a Liberator was sighted in naval square AK


	- 20 -

	7863 at an altitude of 3000 meters above the boat. Anxious minutes followed because the boat had been seen too late, but we probably remained undetected in the high seas.

	We searched for the convoy until 23.10 hours in direction 200° but it was not found despite good visibility. With the low fuel level in our tanks further operations appeared hopeless.

	At 16.00 hours in naval square BD 3869 with Sea 4, Swell 3, and Vis. 10 nm a steamer was sighted bearing 20°T, steering a southerly course and approached quickly at 12-14 knots. About 18.21 hours U-615 dove to attack. At 18.52 hours Kaptl. Kapitzky shot a valuable four-fan at the steamer, as the fire control system may have been damaged by the bombs. After a long 61 seconds, a metallic blow was heard throughout the boat, which apparently stemmed from a torpedo failure. But after 67 seconds there was a hit in the stern. 20 seconds later another explosion was heard in the ship.

	The ship was of the SYDNEY STAR class of about 12,000 GRT. At 19.10 hours it turned to port and remained lying stopped with a slight list to starboard. Otherwise no effect was seen on the ship. On the seemingly somewhat deeper stern a heavy gun of at least 10.5-cm caliber could be seen on the superstructure, but which seemed unmanned.

	After a miss from the stern torpedo tube due to an order error, at 19.15 hours torpedo tubes I and III had to be reloaded as quickly as possible while submerged. The Torpedo-Mechanikersmaat Günrher Brauer, Mechanikerobergefriter Rolf Wizuy from Berlin and Mechanikerobergefriter Walter Zimmermann, from Rogetz/Magdeburg now contributed by summoning all the force they were capable of. By hard work, the torpedoes weighing over a ton were raised from the spare stowage with pulleys, and after the Torpedo Officer had installed the impact fuse


	- 21 -

	in the explosive charge, the torpedoes were loaded into the ordered tubes.

	Kapitzky then steered the boat to the east side of the ship, where the boats had been put into the water and fired a shot at 20.24 hours from tube I. After 35 seconds there was a hit amidships but the ship showed no further effect. Thereafter, Kapitzky steered the to the west side of the enemy, noticed that light smoke issued from the stern, and fired another coup de grâce from tube III. After 70 seconds there was a hit at the forward edge of the rear superstructure.

	At 21.21 hours the ship began to sink and you could hear the bursting of the bulkheads and the sound of ripping steel throughout the boat. At 21.33 hours we heard at periscope depth, a huge explosion and felt a huge shock in the boat, which was probably caused by self-detonation of depth charges or ammunition on board the enemy. Since the sound room reported piston sounds to the north, the Commander moved off in an easterly direction.

	At 22.10 hours after surfacing in good visibility there was nothing more to see of the ship, to confirm the sinking properly Radio Message was sent to B.d.U.: "BD 3984 Type SYDNEY STAR sunk southerly course, 14 knots, sank after three hits, NW 3, Sea 3, medium Swell, cumulus clouds, showers, 1029 mb, return transit." As early as 01.40 hours on 24 October, the confirmation came in a Radio Message from B.d.U.: "To Kapitzky: You sank EMPIRE STAR."

	The joy on board was great because it had been properly reported by us as a valuable refrigerator ship of this class of 12,656 GRT. Only our Norwegian Captain had caused some excitement, because of the loud explosion of bombs on the sinking ship, he was thrown into panic, running from the bow room to the control room, we had to draw attention to the danger posed by destroyers and ask him to calm down and go back to his place in the bow.

	On 25 October U-615 was proceeding through the Bay of Biscay.


	- 22 -

	Over the past 24 hours the boat had traveled 252 nm and at noon was in BE 5868. At the same time on 26 October, after covering 227 nm, 5 of which was submerged the boat was in BE 9319 north-west of Cape Ortegal at the Spanish Biscay coast and we looked forward to our assigned port of La Pallice. Even our attentive lookouts on the bridge discovered no enemy aircraft over the Bay of Biscay, so that a large day’s run could be achieved on the surface.

	In the evening there was moonlight and to our disappointment moderate waves annoyed us. Strong marine phosphorescence swirled in the wake behind us and on the barrels of the two MG 34s the Watch Officer and the rearward looking Maat observed licking small flames of St. Elmo’s fire. In the Bay of Biscay we would have preferred three rough days before the end of the patrol to be better hidden from the view of any patrol vessels.

	On 27 October in naval square BF 7151 at 02.19 hours suddenly the glaring blue-white beam of light of an arc lamp flashed in front of the bridge of the boat. Then a Liberator bomber approached from the east at a low altitude about 100 meters above the water. Fire flashed from the cannons aboard the bomber and bullet impacts chirped around the heads of the bridge watch, then a bomb exploded next to the bow and a water geyser pours from the night onto the boat. Everything happened so fast and by surprise, that return fire by us was pointless, as the attacker has already disappeared in the dark night and turned off to port.

	After the Chief Engineer reported the boat ready to dive from the control room, we crash dived to a safe depth and avoided other bombs. We felt that we had narrowly escaped our fate, because the bomb was close to the boat.

	At 04.32 hours in naval square BF 7152 we heard a detonation bearing 145°T, where before there had been diesel sounds, presumably from a submarine, and we hoped that another boat on the surface had not been


	- 23 -

	attacked with the searchlight.

	We were completely unaware and uninformed at that time, which leadership must be criticized for, that already several boats had been attacked at night with searchlights and destroyed. Instead, we supposed that marine phosphorescence had become our downfall.

	To help a radar-guided attack succeed, even in a dark night, a British squadron commander worked on the development of a strong searchlight mounted under the wing of an airplane which could be turned on just before reaching the target to ensure the complete surprise of the enemy and to bring about a well-aimed bombing almost without resistance.

	Since the summer of 1941 it was known that the enemy possessed Funkmeßtechnische Seeaufklärergeräte [Radio Technique Sea Reconnaissance Gear = Radar] so called ASV in the frequency range around 1.70 meters and 1.55 meters. As a remedy however, Admiral Dönitz ordered:
	1. All front submarines were equipped with Funkmeßgeräten [= FuMB – passive radar detector]
	2. U-boats with active FuMO [radar] were provided opportunities for own radio location.

	U-615 was equipped with the so-called Metox device that worked in the frequency band 1.8 meters to 4.00 meters and could detect radar pulses up to 100 kilometers away. The antenna was a crude wooden cross known as the Biscay Cross, with a simple wire covering. Two sensitive cables led to the receiver in the radio room. It was only possible to operate while on the surface with the cables leading out through the open coning tower hatch. To make matters worse, it had to be rotated 90° every 5 minutes as the diagram showed two blind sectors. Furthermore, in heavy seas, the conning tower hatch could not be completely closed, so tons of water poured into the boat and also the antenna had to be taken out of the holder and handed down into the boat for every dive maneuver. Especially in crash dives all this cost valuable seconds that were sometimes critical


	- 24 -

	for the survival of the boat. Finally, the cross was too weak and broke in a seaway when a sea washed over the bridge.

	In areas dominated by enemy air, such as the Bay of Biscay, the continual detection of locating signals and reports of detection led to heavy stress on the nerves of the U-Boat crews. When the enemy finally noticed the rapid submerging of the located boats, he only turned on the radar beam in the aircraft briefly and, after locating during the day, always flew towards it in the clouds dipping to exploit the element of surprise in the attack approach.

	Towards the end of 1942 the long-range bombers of Coastal Command, which were used for anti-submarine warfare, were equipped with two revolutionary new radars which operated in the centimeter wave. The Germans had abandoned their research because the experts of the large electric companies and the university departments did not consider this to be realistic!

	When the bombers used in the fight against the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay were fitted in addition to Leigh searchlights under the wing with the new 9.7-cm ASV Mark III radar, the Metox-gear was silent. It could not intercept the new radar detection and sinkings of unsuspecting Commanders and crews increased alarmingly.

	Already on June 11, 1942 Admiral Dönitz recorded in his B.d.U. KTB: "Because there is no defense against British Sunderland flying boats and heavy combat aircraft, the Bay of Biscay has become the playground of the Royal Air Force. As the English locating set is developed, further danger to submarines will increase more and more; damage will be on a larger scale and total loss of boats will be the result. It is sad and depressing for the U-boat crews


	- 25 -

	that no forces are in place to protect a boat which can not dive due to aircraft bombs, and thus the boat becomes helpless from further air attacks."

	This is certainly a frightening analysis with even more terrible consequences for the struggling U-boat men!

	After the evening’s clash we remained submerged a long time as a precaution, so even though we extended our stay in the perilous Biscay Bay, we reached naval square BF 7255 submerged with a day’s run of 156.4 nm of which 33.8 was submerged. At 13.00 hours a depth charge series could be heard in a northerly direction and all our sympathy extended to our affected comrades.

	At 13.50 hours we surfaced to proceed on the surface. We discovered machine gun bullet holes on the upper deck and a bullet in the MG 34 sandwiched between the barrel and the surrounding cooling ribs that had missed me while manning the gun by a few centimeters.

	This only lasted until 16.02 hours when a large land-based aircraft about 8 nm away which disappeared in the clouds forced us to quickly crash dive.

	On 28 October BF 8169 was reached at 12.00 hours. The day’s run amounted to 127 nm, of which 26.3 nm was submerged.

	After reaching the continental shelf we now hoped fervently for good luck and to remain untouched by sea mines, which the enemy threw on the U-boat entry routes to the return harbors on the Atlantic coast.

	After another day’s run of 111 nm and 140.5 nm on 29 and 30 October of which 17.6 and 19.5 were submerged, shortly after reaching BF 6855 we were at the receiving point for a German minesweeper convoy, which led us safely to port.

	Around 16.00 hours U-615 glided into the inner lock of La Pallice with two success pennants at the periscope accompanied by the


	- 26 -

	sounds of a military band.

	A cheerful set of Flotilla members gave a warm welcome to us newcomers to the 3. U-Flottille in La Rochelle.

	The Commander reported to the Flotilla Commander, K.Kpt. Zapp, that U-615 was back from its first patrol while the crew had formed up on the stern. Even our involuntary guests from Norway and Holland stood surprised on the upper deck, glad after the extra excitement on board a submarine to have escaped safely. With handshake and words of thanks, they said goodbye to the entire crew and disembarked in internment.

	After the welcome ceremony that we let pass around us like battle-hardened warriors, we shifted the boat for several weeks of shipyard overhaul at the nearby submarine base. Thus the first war patrol of U-615 was brought to a conclusion after 55 days of Front operations.

	While the crew was billeted in a barracks in La Rochelle, for the officers there was a requisitioned hotel of the lower middle class, which was enhanced by rooms with bathrooms. Located in the middle of the city on the fish and vegetable market "Schepke House" was completely unsecured at two roads leading into the market, which surprised not only me. When for example the officers present gathered for dinner in the dining room located in the basement, you could easily see this from the road and a determined group of the Resistance could eliminate a majority of the officers of a U-boat Flotilla with light weapons through the unsecured window without risk. But fortunately such fears proved unfounded.

	On the second day after our return the B.d.U., Admiral Dönitz, came to La Rochelle for the mustering of crews returning from patrol and to award


	- 27 -

	individual soldiers with the Iron Cross, including our Cook Rudolf Mahnke, as the first from U-615.

	While we were lined up in a large warehouse in the square Dönitz delivered one of his pithy speeches to the crew, calling on them for constant vigilance and readiness to fight until victory was won.

	In the evening he sat with us in the Schepke House in the mess in a circle of mostly young watch officers, since most of the commanders had already departed for reporting or on vacation. He impressed us very much by his outspoken nature and how he asked us, without inhibitions from their Oberbefehlshaber [Commander-in-Chief] to ask questions freely of him.

	Of course, since the Americans had just landed in the area of Dakar, many questions concerned this issue. One question which concerned the possibility of Americans breaking through in North Africa and the possibility that Rommel's Afrika Korps thereby might fall back, was not considered as realistic according to reports of the German Secret Service, to which he referred, because this required the construction of roads for the supply and that would take months. By the way, this was a wrong assessment by the German Secret Service, because with the help of American road construction equipment (bulldozers) the Americans managed in an incredibly short time. Nor was anything said, which touched on the onset of Allied landings in North Africa which took place a few days later, because this succeeded in spite of the many submarine reconnaissance lines to bring huge numbers of troops and war material in countless ships unhindered by the U-boats across the Atlantic to North Africa. Naval leadership must have known this and should not have allowed it to be concealed.

	Against this, his assessment of the effectiveness of the submarine weapon was characterized by great confidence; he introduced us young front officers with many prospective innovations that would soon make our weapon


	- 28 -

	even more powerful and assured to do everything in his power to strengthen our struggle at sea.

	The highlight of the evening culminated with the promise of our Admiral that he would charter a large passenger steamer after the war to take all U-boat drivers on a world tour of the most beautiful areas of the world, as thanks for the struggle and effort of each U-boater. All received this promise with deep satisfaction and broke into shouts of enthusiasm. For us young officers at the Front he was the "Big Lion", which we all appreciated and we had the impression that he felt very comfortable and resolved.

	He handled the wounded Leutnant zur See Kandzior, First Officer of U-333, with obvious care.

	This boat, under the command of Kaptl. (Ali) Cremer, had returned heavily damaged to La Pallice a few days before us. On 6 October 1942 off Freetown the boat engaged in a unique battle with a British warship. It was attacked there at night by the corvette CROCUS emerging from a rain front with artillery and machine guns. Kaptl. Cremer and the First Watch Officer were hit immediately. Because of the shallow water it was impossible to dive the boat. The onrushing corvette speared U-333 on its bow, but when both broke away from each other again, the battle began anew. The corvette followed the German boat at a short distance and hit the conning tower with their machine guns, Cremer was hit again, but when the enemy wanted to ram again Cremer succeeded by maneuvering with hard rudder to make a hook and then to dive and put the boat on the bottom at depth 100 meters, where the crew managed to contain the flooding and to escape the waiting enemy after surfacing.

	The KTB of B.d.U. from 6 October 1942 to U-333 contains the words:


	- 29 -

	"U-333 was located by a corvette in about ET 2989 and fired on for twenty minutes with artillery and machine gun fire from 500–0 meters. One officer and three men killed, one Petty Officer missing. Commander and First Watch Officer wounded. Boat is badly damaged but clear to dive.

	On 9 October 1942: U-333 is being brought home by Kaptl. Kasch. Boat has more damage but is able to crash dive. For Commander and First Watch Officer there is no danger to life. On 23 October 1942: U-333 entered La Pallice.”

	From the Befehlshaber der U-Boote KTB on 1 October 1942 boats with the 3. U-Flottille (see Bundesarchiv Freiburg RM 87/51) U-132 (Kaptl. Vogelsang), 134 (Kaptl. Schendel- K. Brosin), 257 (Kaptl. Rahe), 258 (Kaptl. von Mäßenhausen), 259 (Kaptl. Köpke), 262 (Kaptl. Atzinger- Kaptl. Shiebusch), 332 (Kaptl. Libe – Oblt. Hüttemann), 333 (Kaptl. Cremer), 373 (Kaptl. Loeser – Oblt. von Lehsten), 402 (K.Kpt. von Forstner), 432 (Kaptl. H.O. Schultze – Kaptl. Eckhardt), 458 (Kaptl Diggins), 569 (Kaptl. Hinsch – Oblt. Johannsen), 571 (Kaptl. Möhlmann – Oblt. Lüssow), 572 (Kaptl. Hirsacker – Oblt. Kummetat), 596 (Kaptl. Jan – Oblt. Kolbus), 600 (Kaptl. Zurmühlen), 611 (Kaptl. von Jacobs), 615 (Kaptl. Kapitzky), 619 (Oblt. Makowski), 620 (Kaptl. Stein), 625 (Kaptl. Benker) – Oblt. Straub), 661 (Oblt. von Lilienfeld), 706 (Kaptl. von Zitzewitz), 752 (Kaptl. Schroeter), 753 (K.Kpt. von Mannstein) only about 5 or 6 boats of 26 were at the base.

	Leave was granted, which affected one third of the crew in succession. You could see the familiar officers and Crew comrades in the Officers' Mess frequently changing faces, some of them only once or twice and then never again. Such was the meeting with the Engineering Officer of U-571, my Crew comrade Siegfried Meinen from Berlin, with whom I had made music at the Naval Academy a few times, a godsend because he stole the show with his masterful piano playing, but unfortunately it only happened a few times. As our subsequent stays were too different in the 3. U-Flottille we never got together again and he fell on 18 January 1944 with the entire crew under Oblt. Lüssow in naval square AL.

	After completing my ten day vacation in Mülheim-Ruhr


	- 30 -

	which was characterized by regular air raid alarms and by the surprising American landing in Operation "Torch" on 8 November 1942 in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, I stayed a day in Paris on the way back, for me the first time to see this beautiful city in the center. I dined at Maxim and visited the Sheherasade which Dönitz had also visited a few times and that the Oberbefehlshaber had recommended. It was said that former Tsarist Officers worked as a waiters there. These wore a typical Kosakenlitewka and a large Siberian also claimed to me to have been a Tsarist soldier.

	A day later, in La Rochelle there were only a few days left until preparations began for the next operation, U-615’s second war patrol.

	The second war patrol of U-615.

	The KTB of U-615 for the second war patrol covered the period 1 November 1942 to January 9 to 1943. For the overhaul time in La Pallice the KTB included the following facts:
	1 November: Provisions offload and clearing the boat;
	6 November: Shift to dry dock; 14.03 hours boat set [on the blocks];
	14 November: 09.00 hours boat floated;
	17 November: Fuel loading, shift to Bunker 1;
	18 November: 09.00 hours pier side trial;
	20 November: Sea trial;
	21 November: Fuel, oil, ammunition and torpedo loading;
	22 November: Boat taken over;
	23 November: Provisions loading;
	24 November: 09.00 hours radio direction finder calibration and final trim test;
	25 November: Final adjustments on board, fresh provisions loading, 17.00 hours put to sea on the second war patrol.


	- 31 -

	After a final trim test U-615 was taken in convoy by a Sperrbrecher and accompanied until 00.40 hours. The anti-aircraft escort ended at 04.00 hours on 26 November and U-615 continued its transit alone into the operational area. There was little swell, but we remained unmolested during the night. Towards morning we dived to proceed submerged until 19.10 hours in BF 9171. At 23.17 hours the sound room reported location on the 168-cm wave that caused us to crash dive immediately.

	On 27 November at 01.35 hours we surfaced again in BF 8373 and continued the transit on the surface. On 28 November we submerged again for aircraft location in BE 9383 and reached position BE 9292 on 29 November (04.00 hours) and BE 9165 (12.00 hours). We came to course 312° to the ordered objective and passed BE 6771 (20.00 hours) and BE 5937 (00.00 hours) with wind NE 2, Sea 1 Swell 1, Vis.1 sm.

	On 30 November at 00.30 hours a shadow came in sight bearing 140°T, about 6 nm away. Action Stations were ordered and we tried to maneuver ahead at high speed to attack.

	Unfortunately 02.00 hours arrived with a glassy sea and very bright moonshine. A warship formation with an aircraft carrier came in sight. There were three large units in the front and at the rear several small units were distinguished. A destroyer was seen ahead and on the port side of the formation. We hoped that clouds rising in the east would make the night favorable for a surface attack which would be my first as Torpedo Officer. The hunting fever took hold of me.

	But an escort vessel suddenly broke away from the formation, headed right for our boat and forced us to move away from the convoy, which then changed course to starboard so that it passed quickly out of sight.

	When our pursuer broke off his chase after about 45 minutes, we ran at


	- 32 -

	top speed toward the vanished enemy, but he remained unseen.

	After a short dive to listen which did not yield any results, we set off at top speed on northeast courses to continue the search and sent a Radio Message: "BE 5920 convoy, suspect warships, forward 3 large, aft several small, large zig zag to 30°, speed over 15 knots, 05.00 hours out of sight.”

	We quarreled with the fate, that such fat targets that had escaped us and that the fortune of war had not held. We had no idea that the British and American scientists had developed a revolutionary innovation as critical to the war as radar, namely "High Frequency Direction Finding" abbreviated HF-DF. It was a device that made it possible to take a bearing even on the shortest radio signals of the German boats, make it visible on a panoramic window and determine the location of a transmitting boat, which the German side had always ruled out. Once the Allies' HF-DF told of the radio signal of a submarine, an escort left the convoy at top speed towards the boat and on approaching, turned on his radar to track down the exact location of the submarine. This could be just as useful for a Coastal Command bomber.

	The U-boat remained before the onrushing corvette or destroyer because of its lower speed and usually only had the opportunity to dive and receive a depth charge prosecution to escape. Most often the outcome was highly unsatisfactory, because later electronic search devices like Asdic or sonar had become so developed that only 12 depth charges were required to destroy a boat where several dozen were needed before. Furthermore, the Allies had a new kind of mortar for launching of projectiles from the bow, the Hedgehog (Igel). Developed with new more powerful explosives, two dozen water bombs simultaneously detonated at different depths* in a "water square" and therefore had strong destructive power. In addition, the Squid, another type of mortar, and "Fido", the U-boat seeking torpedo which the Americans had developed, came later. The first

* Hedgehog projectiles were fitted with fuse that exploded on contact and not with a hydrostatic fuse.


	- 33 -

	Fido dropped from an aircraft on 19 May 1943 destroyed U-954, on which a son of Dönitz was Second Watch Officer.

	After the introduction of visual bearing equipment (HF-DF) each U-boat that sent a convoy contact keeper signal could be detected, tracked and then forced to submerge. Many were destroyed, while the convoy changed course. It was said that the British Huff-Duff device makes it understandable why a large number of convoys were not reached as a result of the many radio messages demanded of the U-boat Commanders and why many convoys remained undetectable despite patrol and reconnaissance lines and the approach of many boats. Furthermore, at the end of 1942 a considerable portion of U-boat losses fell to this technique and less as a result of the introduction of radar.

	From the perspective of the historian it should be noted that it was the apex of German deception by her enemies that, until the end of the war, the Germans learned nothing whatsoever of the existence and operation of HF-DF. Concerns of the Front Commanders about unnecessary and treacherous wireless telegraphy at sea (as Flotillenadmiral Otto Kretschmer describes in a meeting with Jochen Brennecke, The Turning Point in the U-boat War, page 473 and following), which the staff at the U-boats brushed aside, since they denied categorically that Short Signals could be intercepted and bearings taken. To the leadership tragedy on the radar issue now joined another on the bearing issue, which was then surpassed by the penetration of the Allies in the German radio key which enabled them to decipher every German radio message.


	- 34 -

	When war broke out in 1939, the code of the German Wehrmacht was unbreakable due to the invention of the German "Enigma" cipher machine. With the help of the Polish Secret Service, the British arrived very early in the possession of an Enigma, and with the help of leading Allied mathematicians succeeded in 1940 in breaking the Enigma code and developed a decoding machine. During the Battle of Britain, radio messages that had been sent between German aircraft and their control centers on the ground two days earlier could be read.

	Thus, from May 1940 until the last day of the war, the British and their Allies had insight into the secret plans of the German military leadership.

	The British did everything they could to achieve a breakthrough in the submarine radio key, they tried to get their hands on key rotors for the Enigma, or even a complete Enigma machine (which for the Navy was far more complicated than that of the German Air Force), original key material and to obtain instructions for encryption.

	In a large-scale commando operation against Lofoten for this purpose they captured key documents from the German patrol boat KREBS that revealed to them the location of German weather observation ships in the Atlantic. Next, they were able to shut down the weather vessel observation ships which were extremely important for the conduct of the war. From the weather vessels MUNICH and LAUENBURG, they were able to capture more highly secret key documents.

	In May 1941, after the unsuccessful scuttling of U-110 whose commander tragically lost his life after realizing the failure of scuttling, the British boarded U-110 and took the Satzbuch [sentence book, to convert sentences into four-figure groups] and Kenngruppenbücher [indicator group book to set up the Enigma machine] for wireless communications, the short signal specifications for U-boats, papers-for setting the machine key, the radio blotter and the Naval Enigma machine itself. The best kept secret of the German U-boats fell into British hands and they kept that success absolutely secret.


	- 35 -

	Thus the Allied war took on a new quality: from the Battle of Britain in 1940, the U-boat war, the campaigns of Rommel in Africa to the Normandy landings in 1944, the Allies often knew in advance what operations the Germans intended to take.

	"Action-Ultra" was kept completely secret by the Allies until long after the war. No evidence betrayed to the self assured Germans that all of her radio traffic was intercepted and so it provided a strategic and tactical advantage that was crucial for the outcome of the war.

	The name "Ultra" is connected with a whole number of painful episodes of the U-boat war. When decipher specialists, including German emigrants, succeeded in decrypting the routes of the supply U-boats in the Atlantic, whose positions were communicated to boats needing replenishment by radio in mid-1943, the domination of the German submarines was finally broken in the Central Atlantic, in particular due to the loss of the supply U-boats.

	From the radio orders of their most dangerous enemy, Admiral Dönitz, and the reports of his U-boat Commanders, the enemy drew secret information. The huge number of radio messages about locations of U-boats, their condition, their attack tactics, new types of torpedoes, dispositions and intentions of the leadership, to name just a few, revealed such a wealth of information of the most secret nature, that there was no generally accepted parallel not only in naval history, but in all of history.

	It is incomprehensible that those Germans responsible believed until recently that they were absolutely secure, although one always had to proactively anticipate that key documents could fall into the hands of the enemy, and as it turned out, they fell early in the war.

	At the end of 1942, we as officers


	- 36 -

	had not the slightest knowledge or even a suspicion of all this. Quite the opposite had been conveyed to us at the intelligence school because the Germans had always been technological leaders in this field.

	On 29 November at noon U-615 reached square BE 5621 with a day’s run of 191 nm.

	On 1 December, at 12.00 hours we were in BE 1939 with a day’s run of 171.4 nm after passing BE 2794 and BE 2746.

	At 20.30 hours a Radio Message Order was received: “Boat belongs to Group "Draufgänger" and occupies square AL 1985 in patrol line.


	- 37 -

	Southwest bound convoy expected from 6 December.” Half an hour later, our passing report was sent to the B.d.U.

	The days passed in nerve-racking monotony from 1–4 December as the boat moved from BE 1279 via BE 1168 to positions in AL 7881 and AL 7573. The tension resulted from the awareness that you were in the main battle area to the west of Ireland in naval square AL.

	Finally on 4 December at 14.00 hours in AL 4567 the First Watch discovered a steamer bearing 100°T, 6 nm away. It ran at high speed and zig zagged strongly to the west. Because he came up quickly, we dove to attack at 14.13 hours.

	At 14.46 hours the Commander shot a three-fan at 2000 meters in view of the highly changing course of the enemy, but because the enemy changed course to 120° at the moment the torpedoes were shot, they went past ahead. At 15.45 hours when we surfaced, the mast tops were still visible above the horizon. We attempted to catch the independent at top speed, but despite the zig-zag courses of the steamer, he gradually ran out of sight and we broke off the hunt at 18.18 hours and reported by Radio Message: "15.00 hours naval square AL 4559, three misses on independent, zig zagged after the shot, large zig zags to the west. Speed 18 knots, W 2, Sea 2, Vis. very good, showers.”

	As a Torpedo Officer my battle station during submerged attack was in the conning tower next to the Commander who gave his orders to enter into the torpedo lead angle calculator, while he estimated the location and speed of the enemy through the periscope; so I could sympathize with his great disappointment about the luck of the enemy and the loss of three precious torpedoes and I felt just as unhappy in my own skin.

	On 15 December we were at the ordered position. A storm system


	- 38 -

	moved back over us with rough seas, high swells and a Vis. 1 nm. The bad weather also held on 6 December when we were between AL 1991, 1981 and 1985 where it was ordered: "19.00 hours in reconnaissance line course west, speed 7 knots, on 7 December 11.00 hours come about course east, speed 7 knots.”

	After passing AK 0372 at 16.00 hours the Radio Message order was issued: "Draufgänger come about, course NW, speed 10 knots" and at 19.00 hours: "8 December new reconnaissance line from AK 2564 to 2964 eastbound convoy on 7 December in AK 4189, 50-70°, 8 knots."

	Accordingly we came to course 290° until the order was received on 8 December: “Patrol line settled, operate on contact keeper report, adjust speed so that convoy is detected early in the day.”

	In the course of 8 December U-615 reached naval squares AK 3911, AK 2875 and AK 2752.

	At 16.27 hours in AK 1668 alarm bells tore the crew from their routine. A Liberator bomber turned out of a cloud 5000 meters away at an altitude of 400 meters approaching the boat. In 68 seconds the boat had disappeared from the surface, but at the same time the bomber approached the dive site at high speed to unload its deadly cargo over the submerged boat. Anticipation was in the faces of the crew while the boat went deep at a great down angle, but the expected depth charges were not heard.

	At 17.21 hours Kapitzky ordered "Stand by to surface". After the bridge was free the watch had manned their positions again and at 17.24 hours a Liberator approached the boat from 6000 meters away at an altitude of 400 meters and forced us to crash dive.

	The four-engined American aircraft of type B-24 Liberator had an armament of 10 machine guns of caliber 1.27


	- 39 -

	cm and could carry about two tons of bombs. At the end of 1942 Coastal Command had available 122 Liberator II MK V with ASV (radar) and Leigh Lights which constituted a major threat to the U-boats. In 1943 of the 3,000 Liberators delivered to the British several hundred went to Coastal Command for anti-submarine warfare. Another 1,200 machines were still in Canada. Such air cover in mid-Atlantic in late 1942 was a nasty surprise for us.

	In our opinion, with such a strong air cover, a convoy had to be located in the vicinity and shortly after surfacing a steamer was sighted bearing 260°T. At 18.01 hours, a bomb was thrown at us indiscriminately, apparently to keep us submerged, but at 19.04 hours the Commander ordered us to surface and get through to the steamer sighted at top speed. The boat operated at 20.00 hours in AK 2541 and the weather was NNE 5, 8/10, Sea 4, Swell 4, Vis. 1 sm.

	On 9 December after repeated dives to listen at 00.45 hours there were piston sounds bearing 85-120°T and at 02.05 hours the convoy was discovered. Again we were in ignorance of the true situation, we thought that the bright night and northern lights in the sky were responsible for ensuring that an escort had spotted us and forced us off to the south of the convoy.

	Once we thought the pursuer had been shaken and wanted to get at the convoy, at 07.07 hours a star shell suddenly detonated over the boat in the darkness. A destroyer 2000 meters away ran in at the boat at target angle zero with foaming bow and forced us to crash dive because a diesel was not running full power. After the dive, the engine oil pump and the pump bearings of the master gyro compass had to be removed and repaired. During the repair, the convoy ran over the boat in two groups, during which the grinding of the propellers was clearly heard. After the repair and surfacing at noon, the starboard diesel failed again at 15.07 hours and forced us to submerge again for repairs. We sent the Radio Message: “07.30 hours square 2623 forced to submerge by destroyer. Convoy suspected in fast and slow parts. Overrun by 2 groups


	- 40 -

	with 2 hours between them. Position square 3511, pursuing to the east, Junker's compressor out of service, cylinder liner torn. NE 6, Sea 6, Swell 4, showers, Vis. moderate. All naval squares AK.” While submerged the camshaft bearing was removed and the lubricating oil connector tightened.

	U-615 surfaced at 19.05 hours. At 20.30 hours the port diesel failed again and the intake valves had to be replaced. Masch.Obergefreiters Walter Mamczak from Beuna, Berhhard Reyak from Neuss, Rolf Haase from Chemnitz, Otto Marx from Koethen/Klepzig, Josef Pruss from Hagen, Hans Meisch from Zscherben/Hall, Erwin Bischoff from Breslau and their officers worked with commitment by the sweat of their brow and smeared with oil, as if in a competition complete the repair successfully.

	At 10 December at 00.35 hours in AK 3629 there were star shells on the horizon bearing 35°T and 60°T. As we got closer, at 04.15 hours we sighted the convoy ahead in a broad line with an escort running up and down on the starboard side. At 05.25 hours we sent the Radio Signal: "Convoy in sight in AL 1523" At 06.32 hours as we attempted to push from astern into the convoy, a destroyer approached at top speed at 1000 meters from the boat. At first he shot a star shell that made us distinct and then shot with tracer ammunition that exploded over the boat and forced us to go deep quickly with increased bow down angle. The destroyer had just thrown depth charges on another submarine. Up to 08.15 the destroyer stood between the other boat and the submerged U-615, moving back and forth but without attacking with depth charges.

	After the fading of the Asdic pulses, which sounded like hammers on the hull, we surfaced again and at 08.57 hours in AL 1533 reported to the B.d.U.: "AL 1531 located by destroyer, fired at by anti-aircraft machine guns, no contact, last convoy course 90°, 7 knots.

	At 11.16 hours when we discovered the mastheads of the convoy again bearing 60°T,


	- 41 -

	we radioed the boats of our group: "Convoy in sight in AL 1629."

	It took only until 12.25 hours before a Liberator approached from 8000 meters away and 1000 meters altitude and forced us to crash dive again. The cat-and-mouse game between submarine and aircraft continued when we surfaced again around 13.00 hours. At 13.12 hours a Catalina flying boat at 500 meters altitude appeared and circled flying around the boat and then at 14.57 hours approached directly to force us to crash dive. It circled a long time over the dive location.

	At 17.14 hours we sent a new radio message: "AL 1664, dove for Liberator 3 times, last convoy position AL 1662, course 90°, 8 knots, still 84 cbm [cubic meters].”

	On 11 December the order was issued that the boat should head for AK 03 and accordingly at 04.00 hours we immediately left AL 2859 on course 260° to the new objective. Suddenly at 11.28 hours in AL 2792 a land-based bomber at 8000 meters range flying at low altitude forced us to submerge. The same thing happened the following day on 12 December, after U-615 was assigned to Group "Ungestüm" and was to occupy position AL 4113. At 10.51 in AL 0143 a Catalina forced the boat to submerge as protection against bombs. We then moved back and forth in position on 13 and 14 December until on 15 December at 12.00 hours new orders instructed us to be in a reconnaissance line from AK 1878 to 5241 and then steer 238°, and to expect a convoy.

	Again on 15 December at 15.17 hours a land-based bomber appeared 4000 meters away at low altitude and forced us to submerge. Afterwards, we believed that the plane could not stay with us long before he returned because of the long range to the Atlantic coast. We surfaced again at 15.50 hours. But already at 16.05 hours a land-based Blenheim bomber appeared and forced us to submerge. We used the Radio Message report to the B.d.U. to deliver a weather report: "AK 5119 aircraft 2 times, possibly a Blenheim, N 4, Sea 4, freshening, 4/10, Vis. good, 964 mb.”


	- 42 -

	On 16 December U-615 was in AK 5229 and 5329 at 11.03 hours a Catalina flying boat appeared forcing us to submerge again, which confirmed our view that the convoy could not be too far away. The sound room then reported piston sounds bearing 150°T.

	After surfacing at 12.37 hours we went at top speed in the direction of the suspected convoy and at 12.44 hours sent a Radio Message to the gathering group Ungestüm: "AK 6119 flying boat, bearing 150° two smoke clouds in sight, Loeser-convoy." Then another at 13.32 hours: "AK 6119 piston sounds bearing 150°T, searching after, SE 3, Sea 3, short Swell, 2/10, Vis. good, 955 mb, 58 cbm. Several steamers and escorts bearing 160°T, on course 240°.”

	At 14.05 hours, we sent another Radio Message: “AK 6158 escort in sight, approaching fog banks."

	At 15.40 hours a destroyer of the starboard remote screen appeared 2 nm away bearing 230°T, which had undoubtedly taken a bearing on us with the unknown HF-DF, and forced us to crash dive quickly. At 16.01 hours we were back on the air again: "15.50 hours AK 6175 forced to submerge by destroyer, convoy course 240°, 8 knots, showers, changing visibility, freshening from the west.”

	At 18.33 hours, one and a half hours after surfacing, we unexpectedly came on the convoy in a rain shower 2 nm away and had to dive before a corvette which had appeared in gap in the rain. When we finally surfaced at 20.20 hours to enter the convoy while taking advantage of the showery weather, we had a mishap and the diesel engine room reported that the diesel would allow only a reduced speed.

	According to popular opinion, we could not have met a larger misfortune, especially as the weather conditions for the surface attack in the chill weather were almost perfect, significantly different than on 30 November and on 10 December when there


	- 43 -

	were very bright nights that made infiltrating into the convoy impossible. And now, in the hours for repairs we ran out of it!

	On 17 December, when repairs were completed, the weather had now become heavy storms. U-615 was again struggling against the ever-increasing seas which provided the watchful men on the bridge with thunder and tons of cold water, but far and wide there was no convoy to discover.

	At 04.19 hours and 06.28 hours Kapitzky reported to the B.d.U.: “03.00 hours, AK 5916 piston sounds bearing 110°T, WNW 7, Sea 6, high W-Swell, Vis. 1/2 - 2 nm, 972 mb." and then: "05.00 hours, AK 5919 nothing, searching to the southwest.”

	In another Radio Message: "Yesterday in convoy recognized 3 steamers over 5000 tons, additionally close escort corvette, starboard sweeper escort destroyer. Position AK 5895, WNW 7, high Swell, Vis. 4 nm, breaking up, 992 mb." The Radio Message Order was received: "In the current weather the convoy does not move from its position, continue search and gain ground to the southwest . . .”

	It seemed as if nature wanted to defy the irrationality of the people who fought with the most cruel hardships on the sea, for the North Atlantic formed a seething cauldron as a WSW-storm replaced the other and true wave mountains arose whereby pursuit of the enemy or use of weapons was unthinkable.

	The physical strain of the bridge watch was so great from thundering waves continually passing over the bridge that the watch was changed every two hours instead of the usual four. As each wave came over, the Watch Officer on the bridge quickly


	- 44 -

	closed the turret hatch until it sealed, with the result that the two diesel engines had to draw their combustion air from inside the boat. This created a huge suction in the boat, with a corresponding ordeal for the crew who felt the pressure on the eardrums and lack of air until the conning tower hatch was opened again to equalize the pressure.

	Tons of water continually roared through the hatch, which could never be completely closed and poured through the conning tower into the control room, from where the pump carried it overboard again.

	The high humidity in the boat left everything in a moist and damp condition. Sausage and bread were constantly attacked by mold. Only the terry towels were dried until commencement of the watch on the warm diesel engines because they were placed by the men inside the "seal suit" around the neck to prevent the penetration of water into the diving suit, however, that had to be paid for by a wet jacket collar for the duration of the watch.

	A rat, which had been hunted in vain in the control room since departure, especially since they gnawed on the sausages hung there, in an attempt to leave the unspeakably storm-tossed wet boat managed to clamber on the smooth iron ladder into the conning tower for which it paid with its life. Some began to speak of rats who wanted to leave the sinking ship, which began to depress the mood on board and shut down the spirited language.

	18 December at 04.00 hours the boat was in AK 8169. It was ordered by Radio Message: "For Group Ungestüm no fuel supply possible, boats begin return transit accordingly. Break off search, remain in reached area. It may be possible to pursue straggling steamers tomorrow.”

	In AK 8419 at 16.00 hours the weather was WSW-storm 10, Sea 7, Swell 8 and Vis. only 500 meters.

	On 19 December at 04.00 hours in AK 8712 a WSW-storm had arose strength 10,


	- 45 -

	Sea 9, Swell 8 and Vis. only 200 meters from storm and lashing spray. The inhospitable weather with a Swell of 9 accompanied us the rest of the day until 24 December during which the boat proceeded from BD 1236, BD 5346 to BC 3939.

	On Christmas Eve, at 17.08 hours we dove for a little Christmas party. An artificial Christmas tree had to serve for the Christmas spirit. We surfaced again on course 194°.

	According to Radio Message Orders: "On 25 December be in patrol line from BD 2272 to 5334 to intercept a Southwest bound convoy”. We headed to our position. Navigation data was compared during a meeting with U-524 (Kaptl. Steinäcker) with A. Behrendt from my Crew as First Watch Officer, as well as during a meeting with U-628 (Kaptl. Hasenschar).

	On 26 December U-615 was in BD 3427. The weather was calm and there was a small sea with a moderate wind and swell with a good Vis. 9 nm. The order was given to remain as a patrol line in the reached area and monitor the area carefully as the passage of a convoy could be expected.

	Shortly thereafter, a Short Signal was received from U-664 (Kaptl. Gräf) which reported the convoy in BE 4131 on southerly course. After that we operated on course 200° on the Gräf-report. Due to the low fuel inventory a Radio Message was sent to B.d.U. after which the fuel supplement was promised with the order to continue to operate on the convoy. On 27 December we achieved a day’s run of 212.7 nm in BD 6436, SSW 4, Sea 4, Swell 3, Vis. 4 nm. After receiving the bearing signals from the contact keeper of our convoy, at 22.00 we saw star shells bearing 140°T and at 02.50 hours (28 December) transmitted: "BD 6896 sounds bearing 140°T."


	- 46 -

	At 03.28 hours a shadow appeared bearing 180°T, which is now easy to explain, it was the searching destroyer that had taken a bearing on U-615 with its HF-DF gear. At 03.44 hours he closed the boat to within 1000 meters away at target angle 0° and forced us to dive deep quickly. The boat then received 12 depth charges in two series however suffered no failures. After surfacing at 05.15 hours a Radio Message was sent: "04.00 hours BD 9311 forced to submerge by destroyer, depth charges, convoy in BD 9314 by sound bearings, stand by for bearing signals.”

	From our bearing signals a destroyer appeared at 06.29 hours, 4 nm away, which forced us to run off to the east. At 07.56 hours this destroyer was again in sight on his eastward advance, forcing us to evade, but the Commander succeeded in maneuvering ahead for a daylight attack on the convoy. About 17.35 hours the convoy came in view, which proceeded in line abreast with up to 12 ships. A corvette was on the starboard side forward and two more were ahead of convoy. Kapitzky radioed: "Contact on convoy, fuel inventory below 10 cbm inexact because both gauges are out of service. Decision: submerged attack, taking position directly ahead of the convoy.” This was followed by another Radio Message at 18.56 hours: "Convoy BD 9856, course 180°, 10 knots, widely spaced line abreast, about 10 ships, intend twilight attack due to fuel situation, SW 2, Sea 2, slight Swell, Vis. very good, 1035 mb, steady.”

	At 19.15 hours U-615 dove to attack. At 20.30 hours the submerged boat was apparently detected by one of the escort vessels in front of the convoy by submerged location [Asdic] and the escort came towards the submerged boat at high speed. The Commander then quickly gave the order to go deep. At 60-80 meters the boat received two depth charge series that were close and caused failures in the electric motor and in the control room. In the conning tower standing next to the Commander, the shaking of the boat by the pressure wave from the depth charge explosions was so powerful that one could expect the worst and you sighed in relief as the Engineering Officer reported the boat ready for further submergence. Numerous subsequent depth charges kept the boat submerged until 00.42 hours.


	- 47 -

	On 29 December at 00.54 Kapitzky sent the report: “20.30 hours during attack detected by defense BD 9867, well-placed depth charges, minor damage, broke off due to fuel situation.”

	At 01.21 hours two shadows come in sight bearing 260°T on which the Commander wanted to initiate an attack. Two escort vessels approached the boat at target angle zero and forced it to run off at top speed, which is reported with the Radio Message: “01.00 hours BD 9864 on surfacing forced off to the north by two trailing corvettes.”

	Shortly after 15.00 hours we discovered a smoke screen bearing 170°T and a seaplane about 8000 meters away, altitude 200 meters which caused us to dive. After we surfaced again at 17.10 hours, a mast tip and a seaplane in close escort with forays to the northwest were sighted. Kapitzky reported with the Radio Message: "Naval square BD 9856 smoke cloud and seaplane. Weather as for yesterday completely overcast, 1035 mb, steady. Crash dive for aircraft, steamer about 3000 tons steers west, speed 4 knots, astern a crane.”

	At 19.00 hours the steamer briefly came to a northerly course, swiveled the crane and took the aircraft aboard.

	After surfacing, at 10.14 hours the steamer was in sight bearing 330°T, 3 nm away and ran zig-zag courses from 180-290°.

	Just when I got the opportunity to perform my first surface attack as Torpedo Officer, our Obergefreiter Hans Krohn, of Stettin, reported in his sector, a low camouflaged speedboat that only a good U-boat lookout could detect against the dark background of the sea and the cloudy sky. With hard rudder ordered to port the approach is dodged and then we came back on attack course 200°. The steamer no longer zig zagging, had approached U-615 to within 3000 meters steering 270°.

	At 22.06 hours I fired a torpedo from tube one, depth 3 meter, distance 1000 meters. After 123 seconds there was indeed a blast, but there was no water column at the target or effect seen on the ship. Shortly before the explosion a flash was observed at the stern of the steamer.

	As the second attack was initiated, the lookout again discovered


	- 48 -

	the approaching motor boat in the darkest sector bearing 90°T, which we avoided to starboard. There was then a detonation at the steamer at 22.28 hours, whose cause was not apparent. I shot a second electric torpedo from tube three at 22.29 hours, depth 3 meters, 800 meters away and again no effect was seen on the ship. After the shot, the motor boat went back in and exchanged brief light signals with the steamer illuminating us with the searchlight. At 22.37 hours I fired another torpedo from tube two depth 3 meters from 800 meters and this time there was no water column or effect on the target. Shortly before the detonation was again a flash at the stern with smoke noticed subsequently. Then there was a strong smell of burning oil.

	At 22.47 hours a new torpedo attack was carried out with the same depth setting from 900 meters from tube four, the result was the same: no effect. Then we ran behind the stern of the enemy on its starboard side and shot another torpedo at 22.52 hours from the stern torpedo tube from 600 meters. After the shot, the boat continued on. We were convinced that it was probably a submarine trap protected from the detonations by torpedo nets, the flash on board and the smoke was staged to deceive us. In some cases, U-boat traps managed to bring hidden cannons to bear against a U-boat coming too close and used them to sink the boat, which I later heard happened to U-111. The Commander fell.

	Kaptl. Kapitzky then set off to the south to reload torpedoes and at 23.02 hours we observed four detonations that were staged with depth charge launchers on the stern of the ship. At midnight the enemy was lost from sight and we received on 30 December the order: "Leimkühler and Kapitzky remain in area of the sinking of the previous night, continue searching for Havaristen. Kapitzky suggest meeting point for 31 December, fuel transfer


	- 49 -

	from Leimkühler for return transit. 20 cbm for each as necessary.”

	We put out a warning to boats of our group from: “Naval square BD 9885 trap [reported by] Leimkühler during the day, course west, 5 knots, close and remote escort by aircraft type Vought-Sikorsky. 19.00 hours recovered by crane. 22.23 hours 5 single shots, 3 detonation no effect or water column, nets possible, suppose heard all misses, speed changes, before each detonation flash on the stern, perhaps a depth charge projector. Night course south to west, speed 10-12 knots, cooperating with a low fast boat, signal traffic.”

	After proceeding submerged from 06.52-10.20 hours the U-trap was discovered again around noon bearing 155°T, 5 nm away, again on a southwest course. It smoked heavily black and white and shot a signal flare, as they had possibly located us.

	Again we sent a corresponding Radio Message: “Naval square CE 3157 U-boat trap, course southwest, speed 5 knots, smoking alternately black and white, shoots rockets, suspect that the boat was noticed, S 4, Sea 3, Vis. good, Stratus Cumulus, 1034 mb, falling. . .”. At16.25 hours U-Leimkühler confirmed his meeting with us on 31 December to supply fuel.

	On 1 January 1943 we heard the success message from Oblt. Trojer of U-221* that he sank the U-boat trap with a surface runner G-7a torpedo. From the mention of the torpedo nets in our Radio Message Trojer decided to shoot a G 7a torpedo that had a higher speed than an electric torpedo and accordingly could make the evasive maneuvers of the enemy less effective. He took into account that the G 7a left a noticeable bubble track and that is why it was never shot during the day. But Trojer went against all the rules and overcame any existing net defense by setting the torpedo as a surface runner. Thus, the torpedo track was detected by the enemy, however given the high speed of the torpedo there was no time for an evasive maneuver.

* the ship in question was indeed a U-boat trap, the British Special Service Vessel HMS FIDELITY (D 57). The U-boat that Schlipper refers to was actually U-435 (Kptlt. Siegfried Strelow) which sank HMS FIDELITY on 30 December after two torpedo hits (one G7e and one G7a which were set to depth 3 meters). FIDELITY had streamed torpedo nets which may explain the misses by U-615.


	- 50 -

	Due to the short range during the firing of torpedoes, the enemy tried to bombard the submerged U-boat and Trojer suspected wire-guided projectiles, which gave the impression that wire cables slid along the hull.

	Trojer, whom I had seen in 1941 at his entry time [perhaps as trained to take command of U-221], received the Knight's Cross on 24 March 1943 and fell on 27 September 1943 with his entire crew in an air attack in the North Atlantic.

	On 31 December in BD 9789 at 12.00 hours we asked U-Leimkühler to send bearing signals. After these were sent at 16.21 hours, it is no longer surprising today that at 17.30 hours a corvette appeared bearing 75°T at a distance of 7 nm, but at 18.09 hours it reassuringly was lost from sight, which we reported by radio as a precaution. About 18.29 hours U-225 finally came in sight, but did not take over fuel due to the rising seas. Then in U-225 a connection for the fire hose, by which oil was to be transferred could not be found.

	Our concern increased from hour to hour, as our fuel tanks were almost emptied to the dregs. On 1 January 1943 U-615 and U-225 were in BD 9457 waiting for the supply boat U-Neumann, who would deliver the much needed fuel. But we heard nothing from the supplier and on 2 January 1942 Kapitzky radioed: “Request bearing signals to meet.” and once again: “Request bearing signals from Neumann.” and a third time at 18.09 hours on the same day: “Transfer from Leimkühler still not possible. Still 2 cbm. No bearing signals from Neumann.”

	The whole situation was Kafkaesque. On U-225, the connecting piece was found at the last minute and we could begin pumping the oil. With our four lengths of fire hose, the oil transfer went surprisingly well for all of us despite the swell as we drove at slow speed into the sea with the E-motors. At 23.20 hours on 2 January


	- 51 -

	we had taken over 22.5 cbm of vital fuel and were able to stop the transfer.

	To my surprise the First Watch Officer aboard U-225 was my Crew comrade Dieter Dinkelmann. During our time together we had both sailed on a naval training ketch on the Flensburg Fjord and with his exquisite American hit records he gave our fellow sailors much joy. He was distinguished by high intelligence, sporting ability and, although coming from Soest, a Rhenish cheer. After we had exchanged greetings and good wishes, both boats went their separate ways again. It was a last meeting, because U-225 was destroyed on 21 February 1943 in the North Atlantic by depth charges from an American escort vessel. There were no survivors.

	On 3 January the B.d.U. Radio Message was received:
	“1. Kapitzky overnight with economical fuel consumption until Neumann has reported.
	2. Neumann, as soon as other boats supplied go to Kapitzky.
	3. Leimkühler remain with Kapitzky.”
	On 4 January at 00.30 hours we were able to report that the supply had already been carried out and we had begun our return transit.

	At 04.00 hours U-615 was in BD 9499 Sea 2, Swell 2, Vis. 3 nm north of the Azores proceeding in the direction of the Bay of Biscay on the homeward transit to La Pallice.

	The midday positions from 4 January 1943 were BE 7584 with a day’s run of 176.5 (of that 0.6 nm submerged)
	On 5 January BE 8527 with day’s run of 191 nm,
	On 6 January BE 9285 with day’s run of 203 nm, (of that 7.6 nm submerged)
	On 7 January BF 7284 with day’s run of 173 nm, (of that 29 nm submerged)
	On 8 January BF 8319 with day’s run of 206.6 nm, (of that 26.7 nm submerged)
	On 9 January 1943 at 11.01 it came with a great sense of relief and gratitude when the Speerbrecher escort came in


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	sight and led us safely to the coast.

	In the afternoon, U-615 entered the La Pallice lock without a pennant on the periscope. We were comforted there by a member of the staff because of our shooting misfortune and mechanical failures with soft words that one was glad that we had returned safely.

	This ended the second war patrol of U-615 after 46 Front days, 7022.8 nm, of which 405.3 nm were submerged. After the fact it was considered the hardest and most depressing patrol of all, from the storms in hurricane strength, the many mechanical failures to the condition of helplessness against the enemy aircraft over the Atlantic and the unknown location by convoy escort vessels.

	Not only the Commander and the officers on watch, but the crew often went up to eighteen hours without sleep, sleep interruptions and during the convoy operations, physical and especially mental stress for a Commander of 26 years is unimaginable and commands respect.

	In the familiar "Schepke House" in the market of La Rochelle one moved into his room, took a long missed bath and fell into a deep sleep.

	Again, one was surrounded by the companionship of the young officers at the Front, with the next departure ahead, heard stories of individual boats that had not returned, and of comrades who had fallen in the bloom of youth, happy people among them, including those with which we had sat together and laughed a few weeks ago.

	Officers and men were sent back on leave in turns during the overhaul of the boat. After a 24-hour train ride to Mülheim-Ruhr, it was always exciting to see whether the parental home had survived the almost daily air raids on the Ruhr in one piece. A powerful air mine had razed the old Styrum City Hall, 150 meters


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	away, to the ground. The massive building from the founder’s time, with its vaulted ceilings seemed to be built for the centuries. It had given such stability. Also the adjoining house had been razed to the ground. The police chief, well known to me, had been buried under the rubble in the town hall. I now experienced in the few days off the fear and danger under which the civilian population constantly had to withstand since the beginning of the war. When driving to Mülheim, only 6 km from the city center, the trip was interrupted often to visit the shelters because of air alarms in broad daylight.

	The German troops of the 6th Army were involved in heavy fighting in Stalingrad on the Volga and the city was surrounded by the Soviets. In North Africa, the Americans were on the rise and the situation of Rommel's Afrika Korps was always precarious.

	When I met people on furlough from Russia, whom I knew from school days or the Jungvolk [German Youth], I was glad to be able to explore their views on the situation on the Eastern Front. A former member of my Jungzuges [Boy’s Platoon] was at Rzhev [Russian city in the approaches to Moscow]. Despite my pessimistically colored questioning I was surprised that men on leave from Russia were of the opinion that one can keep the Soviets at bay because you feel superior to the Russians, despite all previous animosity. What an overestimation. I let myself be somewhat appeased because I trusted the opinions of the young soldiers I viewed as prudent. This was very different from the assessment of older friends who had already experienced the First World War and apparently secretly listened to the English broadcast. Then indignation was heard about the evacuation of Jewish neighbors who were already at an advanced age.

	To my disappointment, I did not meet any of my old Class comrades or friends during my Front leave and after 10 days


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	I had to go to back to La Rochelle and broke the journey up for 24 hours in Paris.

	In contrast to the Ruhr, Paris seemed a paradise, no air raids chased the man in the street and on the Champs Elysees we sat outdoors in the sun in front of the bars. In the covered market, there was a brisk commerce which one no longer saw at home.

	For the evening, I bought a ticket for a show at the "Lido" on the Champs Elysees and let myself cheer the presentation of changing stage sets for several hours.

	The following day while I was peacefully transported from Gare d’Austerlitz [railway station in Paris] from the summery southwest France to La Rochelle, soldiers on the Eastern Front were in ice and snow and in Stalingrad the 6th Army was dead or in captivity.

	As a sign of solidarity with the 105,000 captured soldiers of the 6th Army on the Volga, a curfew for was imposed for members of the Wehrmacht in La Rochelle for two days.

	In the "Schepke House" there was a happy reunion with Leutnant Ing. Hermann Hartke of my Crew, whom I was with in 1940 in Calais in preparation for the planned invasion of England, Operation "Sea Lion", and since shared a friendship.

	His Commander of U-402, K-Kpt. Freiherr von Forstner, was one of the most successful commanders of the flotilla, and a few days later, on 6 February 1943, received the Knight's Cross. U-402’s outbound orders soon finished our common sojourn and U-402 continued to be very successful until it was destroyed northwest of the Azores on 13 October 1943. There were no survivors.


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	The third war patrol of U-615.

	The KTB of U-615 for the third war patrol starts with the entries for 10 Jan. 1943 and ends on 20 April 1943.
	10 January: La Pallice cleared the boat;
	11 January: Torpedo and provisions loading;
	18 January: Dry docking;
	10 February: Pier side trial;
	12 February: Sea trial;
	13 February: Cast off, fuel oil loading;
	14 February: Torpedo and ammunition loading;
	15 February: Provisions loading;
	16 February: Final trim test, dry docking for the purpose of repairing a leak in main ballast and reserved fuel oil tank starboard;
	17 February: Cast off;
	18 February: 16.55 hours put to sea on 3rd war patrol;
	17.35 hours taken under escort by Sperrbrecher.
	At 21.36 hours, as the escort was being released, a four-engined bomber flew over at an altitude of 200 meters and attacked the escort. We ran off at AK.

	Six detonations on 19 February in naval square BF 8322 at 17.56 hours showed us that the enemy was active again in the Bay of Biscay.

	On 20 February we mostly stayed submerged at night. On 21 February at 01.43 hours the radio room reported aircraft locating, which we reacted to by crash diving. At 01.58 hours 5 detonations were heard, apparently when the plane dropped bombs on our suspected dive location.

	On 22 February the boat was in BE 6737, where only a slight swell was perceived, with a visibility of a few miles. At 15.13 hours in BE 5649 a Whitley aircraft approached out of the clouds at 2000 meters altitude and only 3000 meters away and forced us to react quickly. We received four depth charges that exploded close by, but fortunately did not cause any failures in the boat.

	On 23 February U-615 was in BE 2796, when the order was received: “Boat


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	belongs to Group Burggraf and occupies position AK 9398 in the course of 25 February.”

	At 02.00 hours while proceeding to that position the best lookout on my watch, Gefreiter Heinz Köehler from Issigau/Hof, suddenly noticed a shadow in the pitch-black night in his observation sector. In the moonless night, against the high swell, the low silhouette of another boat was noticed only for a brief moment by its greater darkness against the surrounding seas. It was a German U-boat, which we avoided by only a few feet behind his stern with the command "hard to starboard". Had we maintained course a fraction of a second longer we would have struck the stern of the other boat in the area of the diesel room. A twenty year old U-boat man had saved the lives of many U-boat men through his tireless keen observation on a dark night, but also demonstrated that a young man in this war felt that degree of responsibility, instead of dozing, which would not be noticed at night, he focused like a lynx on his lookout. Words of appreciation were the reward for the sailor from Bavaria.

	I had the terrible experience of the sinking of U-583 with all hands on 15 November 1941 after the collision of two U-boats near Bornholm in my memory. Then on 3 May 1943 U-439 (Oblt. von Tippelskirch) and U-659 (Kptl. Stock) collided west of Cape Ortegal Spain, in the dark of night during a convoy operation, both boats with two crews were lost.

	On 27 February at 17.05 hours we received the order: "With speed and course to reach position line 2 on 28 February at 08.00 hours.” (for U-615 AK 8965)

	This was followed on 28 February by the Radio Message: “Reconnaissance line abolished. On 3 March be in patrol line in position AJ 9687, northeast bound convoy is expected.”

	This was followed on 5 March by the order:


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	"From 23.00 hours, course 45°, speed 6 knots over ground. In the morning of 6 March at 10.00 hours come about and at 21.00 in the evening remain stopped in old patrol line.”

	On 6 March came the further order: “Boat belongs to Group Raubgraf and occupies position AJ 9515 in patrol line.”

	Boat of Group “Burggraf”: Bernbeck, Lohmann, Fraatz, Eckhard, Manseck, Gräf, Uphoff, Kapitzky, Hüttemann, Bertelsmann, Walkerling, Feiler, Kruschka, Zurmühlen, Schamong, occupy patrol line from square FS 7445 to GA 9275 at economical transit speed. These boats form new Group Raubgraf.

	The B.d.U. was of the opinion that he had all the usual North Atlantic convoy routes covered with three major U-boat groups of 43 boats: with groups " Stürmer" and " Dränger" who were fanned out far to the south of Greenland and the far west of the entrance to the North Channel and group "Raubgraf," which he established east of Newfoundland and south of Greenland.

	As in January 1943, wind speeds of 100 km/hour were measured in February from a hurricane, which reached its peak in March. As far as seafarers could remember, no such uproar of the elements had been recorded in the annals of weather and the news on the radio spoke of the worst storm of the century. Also, convoys which were bound from the USA to England still located in the west HX 229, HX 229A, SC 122 and in the East, HX 228 and SC 121, and vice versa from England, the return convoys ON 173, ON 172, then further to the west ON 171, ON 170 and ON 169, had not been able to maintain formation against the force of wind and waves. 43 submarines were active against the avalanche of freighters and convoys.

	On the morning of 6 March Convoy SC 121 plodded one thousand miles south of Greenland, there with a course that by chance led him through a gap between two U-boats in the patrol line and was about to escape the boats. But then the lookout


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	of U-405 (K.Kpt. Hopmann) discovered the convoy in the mist and rain, sparking a sighting report and held contact for long hours to bring up the boats positioned nearby by bearing signals.

	Shortly after midnight U-230 (Kaptl. Siegmann) and U-591 (Kaptl. Zetsche) arrived and sank two ships. On 8 March U-526 (Kaptl. Möglich) U-527 (Kaptl. Uhlig) U-591 (Kaptl. Zetsche) U-190 (Kaptl. Winter Meier) and U-642 (Kaptl. Brünning) arrived and sank five other steamers. On 9 March, SC 121 lost its eighth ship by U-530 (Kaptl. Karl Lange) and its ninth ship on 10 March by U-409 (Oblt. Maßmann). The convoy lost 20% of its ships and no U-boat was lost.

	While some forced off boats still doggedly pursued SC 121 up to the air defensive belt off the entrance to the North Channel, Dönitz shifted the patrol line of group Raubgraf, the group formed east of Newfoundland, 120 nm to the north based on the decoding of an English radio message to counter the suspected evasive maneuvers of HX 228. But the convoy moved south and the mass of boats, including U-615, was far north of the convoy course. However, U-336 (Kaptl. Hunger), standing at the southern end of the line, sighted HX 228 on 10 March with 60 ships, protected by nine warships and the American aircraft-carrier BOGUE.

	U-221, (Oblt. Trojer) succeeded in penetrating the convoy on the night of 11 March and triggered an inferno in a torpedoed ammunition steamer. U-221 was able to avoid the subsequent pursuit, but the destroyer HARVESTER discovered U-444 (Oblt. Langfeld) from our flotilla, which had torpedoed a 7000 tonner, forced U-444 to the surface with depth charges and rammed the U-boat. Both vessels were severely damaged and were as they parted again became victims of pursuers: U-444 by the French corvette ACONITE, where most of the crew perished with the boat, and the HARVESTER by a torpedo from U-432,


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	(Kaptl. Eckhardt) also of our flotilla. The Free French corvette ACONITE searched for the submarine which had sunk HARVESTER. U-432 was forced to the surface with depth charges and rammed. The boat’s Commander and Engineering Officer Juergen Beese of my Crew took to the depths. 21 of the crew were rescued.

	On 11 March at 14.23 hours in AJ 6721 Sea 5, Swell 5, and Vis. 1000 meters, a patrol vessel was sighted at 3 nm at target angle 0° that forced us to dive. He disappeared in a light rain, so we did not reach position for a submerged attack.

	When we surfaced at 16.23 hours, the patrol vessel was still 1000 meters away on a northerly course and forced us to dive again immediately. The same was repeated at 18.18 hours when the patrol vessel was only 1000 meters away from us again.

	A Radio Message from Kapitzky at 20.41 hours reported to the B.d.U.: "AJ 6715 from 15.00- 20.00 forced to submerge by stationary patrol vessel, W 6, Sea 5, 1028 mb steady, snow showers."

	At 21.58 hours a patrol vessel came in sight again, bow left, target angle 20°, but we were able to run off. Then at 22.10 hours another patrol vessel comes in sight, bow left target angle 90°, and a destroyer at 22.18 hours, bow left, target angle 90°, the first at 1200 meters and the other at 3000 meters, they seem to form a search group.

	On 12 March Kapitzky reported the situation: "AJ 6715 stationary patrol vessel from 15.00 hours, square 6741 21.00 hours destroyer southerly course, high radio top mast. No convoy found, going to position. W 7, Sea 6, medium swell, Vis. 100 - 5000 meters, snow showers, 1029 mb steady.”

	At 16.14 hours in AJ 5922 U-435 (Kaptl. Strelow) came in sight. On 13 March U-603 (Kaptl. Bertelsmann) reported the convoy in AJ 6747 [course] southwest and sent bearing signals. He bore 129°T and we move towards him. But escorts of the escort group by HF-DF take bearings on the contact keeper and force Bertelsmann to submerge and deceive the approaching boats


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	by false southwest courses, while the convoy commodore ordered a new general course of 180°. That is the reason that U-615 could not find the convoy despite several attempts at searching by sound.

	The on 14 March at 00.09 hours the order is received: "Continue operation on southwesterly courses.” At 13.26 hours the alarm bells sounded, as a Liberator appeared at low altitude approached the boat from 5000 meters away and threw a bomb on the diving boat, which fortunately caused no damage.

	At 14.50 hours, after sending our message: "13.25 hours naval square AJ 8845 aircraft bomb, Liberator, 65 cbm.” we hear locating. On my order to crash dive as Watch Officer on the bridge, the Biscay Cross had to be passed down through the conning tower hatch in a great hurry. Now in the great rush the wooden cross - on which the long antenna cables were attached - got stuck in between the rungs of the ladder to the conning tower, so when I entered the conning tower and was about to close the hatch, I [literally] sat down on the wooden cross that blocked the way. It made it impossible for me to close the conning tower hatch, but also Gefreiter Koehler standing below me was unable to lift the cross up, because I was sitting on it. As usual on entering the conning tower I had ordered the flooding of the boat to accelerate the diving operation and the boat had already tilted with the overcoming seas reaching the edge of the bridge. I quickly had to get myself back up on the bridge to force the conning tower hatch from above, because otherwise the boat would have been swamped and lost. One sea had struck me already and because I wanted to strike the hatch closed, my responsive Koehler got the cross free, so that at the last second I could get back in--together with half a ton of water--and get the hatch closed. From then on, we did not have the Biscay Cross on the bridge, not knowing that it had long since become useless.


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	After surfacing at 16.00 hours already at 16.49 hours a Liberator forced us to crash dive. In the air search periscope the Commander could see a flying boat attacking another U-boat with two aircraft bombs.

	After we surfaced at 19.02 hours, at 19.09 hours again a low flying land-based bomber few towards us from 4000 meters away and forced us to crash dive. Finally, 24 minutes after surfacing again at 20.00 hours a Liberator required us to submerge again quickly.

	After the unsuccessful pursuit of ON 170 pounding its way on the northern route from Greenland to New York, because the Escort Group of two destroyers, a sloop and four corvettes succeeded in forcing the contact keeper and U-615 to submerge, the B.d.U. broke off the operation and placed the eight boats of group Raubgraf for 15 March on a patrol line ahead of convoy SC 122 coming from America. This course was determined by B-Dienst [Radio Intercept Service]. Group Raubgraf was made up of the Type VIIC boats: U-84 (Kaptl. Uphoff), U-91 (Kaptl. Walkerling), U-435 (Kaptl. Strelow), U-600 (Kaptl. Zurmühlen), U-603 (Kaptl. Bertelsmann), U-615 (Kaptl. Kapitzky), U-664 (Oblt. Gräf) and U-758 (Kaptl. Manseck).

	On 15 March at 12.00 hours U-615 was in BC 2239, NNE 8, Sea 7, Swell 6, Vis. 500 meters to 2 nm. As for the convoy, the boats of group Raubgraf were unlucky because the storm hindered their advance such that they did not reach the specified patrol line until 16.00 hours, a time when the convoy had already long since passed this position and was then approximately 80 nm further to the east.

	On 16 March at 09.20 hours the returning boat U-653 (Kaptl. Feiler) reported the convoy in BD 1491 and the first Raubgraf boats got contact on the convoy at 13.00 hours. This was not as suggested the 52 ship strong mammoth convoy


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	SC 122, but the parallel convoy HX 229 that that only consisted of 38 ships. At 14.31 hours U-615 sent two Radio Messages: "BD 1519 destroyer and clouds of smoke, convoy recognized" and shortly afterwards: "Have contact on the convoy BD 1521".

	Due to a failed periscope the Commander was unable to launch a submerged attack and remained on the port side of the convoy. A destroyer zig zagged up, but apparently the boat was not detected. The convoy steered an easterly course at 7 knots.

	At 17.26 hours and 20.00 hours Kapitzky radioed: "Convoy BD 1525 course east, 7 knots," and "Convoy BD 1538, 100°, 7 knots". Followed at 20.53 hours by the signal U-615: "Send bearing signals", which is repeated at 22.20 hours. At 23.14 the convoy was 4 nm away, when the forward escorts noticed the boat in the moonlit night and forced it off to the north.

	On 17 March at 00.06 hours Kapitzky sent another Radio Message: "Enemy is in BD 1612 course 30°, 8 knots, about 20 steamers, 3 columns, N 4, Sea 2, high swell, Vis. 4 nm, sending bearing signals." This was also sent at 01.50 hours.

	In the meantime U-603 (Bertelsmann) had sunk the ship ELIN K. At 00.23 hours U-758 (Manseck) torpedoed the 6,800 GRT ZAANLAND JAMES, which later sank. He also torpedoed the 7176 GRT OGLETHORPE later sunk by U -91 (Kaptl. Walkerling). At 00.20 hours U-435 (Kaptl. Strelow) torpedoed the American ship WILLIAM EUSREIS of 7,196 GRT, later given a coup de grâce by U-91. At 02.30 hours U-91 sank the American, "HARRY LUCKENBACH" of 6,366 GRT. U-616 (Kptlt. Koitschka) fired a miss on the destroyer VOLUNTEER, while U-600 (Kaptl. Zurmühlen) shot a four-fan including the new FAT torpedo that hit the 8,714 GRT freighter NARIVA, the 6125 GRT IRENEE DU PONT and the 12,156 GRT WALKOCHER SOUTHERN PRINCESS.

	On the night of 17 March, the boats of group "Stürmer" arrived from the north and gained contact on the still strong convoy of


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	51 ships SC 122. U-338 (Kaptl. Kinzel) sank three ships of 17,838 GRT and torpedoed another, which was later sunk by U-665 (Oblt. Haupt). U-631 (Kaptl. Kruger) and U-338 (Kaptl. Kinzel) also succeed in day submerged attacks and sink a 7,252 GRT and 5,258 GRT freighter [respectively].

	At 01.52 hours the convoy was 90°T from U-615, 3 nm away. On the port side 3 destroyers at a distance of 1000 meters behind one another, to the left several shadows of the convoy. 1 steamer lay bearing 100°T with 1 destroyer. When Kaptl. Kapitzky closed for surface attack, the boat was detected at 02.52 hours and forced off to the west.

	At 03.00 hours a new attack was initiated. This time there were light signals between the steamer and the destroyer. Then the boat was detected by the destroyer again and forced off to the north.

	At 03.44 when Kapitzky attempted to enter the convoy from behind the escorts, the steamer, which seemed to be a salvage vessel, and the destroyer fell back so that U-615 was forced into the trailing destroyers.

	When we succeed at 04.32 hours in breaking through between two escorts, the convoy was no longer visible and at 05.00 all escorts suddenly ran at high speed to the northeast. Probably the boat was detected while sending bearing signals as Kapitzky correctly suspected, and then bearings were taken and the boat screened by the escorts and forced off.

	At 06.15 hours a fiery glow was seen bearing 90°T. When U-615 closed, we noticed a burning ship. The boat was discovered in the firelight by an escort and forced off in direction 200°. After the escort stopped the pursuit, we tried to get ahead of the convoy again on the port side, but by 08.00 hours the convoy was not found. Even diving to listen was not successful.

	At 16.54 hours we crash dived because a land-based aircraft bearing 340°T, 5000 meters away, altitude 200 meters turned toward the boat. After surfacing at


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	18.37 hours in AK 8941 in Sea 3, Swell 3, Vis. 8 nm we searched in legs around 80° [50° in KTB] and after diving to listen at 23.17 hours discovered propeller sounds bearing 40°T.

	On 18 March Kapitzky reported: "AK 8932 propeller sounds bearing 40°T." and repeated at 03.35 hours: "AK 9472 propeller sounds bearing 340°T."

	At 10.30 hours U-610 (Kptlt. von Freyberg-Allmendingen) signaled: Convoy in AK 9165. The contact keeper bore 60°T.

	When we ran with dogged energy and bleary-eyes to the convoy at top speed, at 17.39 hours we saw a Liberator almost fatally close at 2000 meters, altitude 200 meters turning toward us. In heavy seas, we had noticed it too late. Crash dive! Across the sea we went deep with a steep down angle. We were in luck because the there were no aircraft bombs. Shortly after surfacing at 18.22 hours we received the message from U-634 (Kptlt. Brosin): "Convoy in AK 9317." and requested bearing signals of him.

	From AK 6964 at 24.00 hours we spotted the convoy. On 19 March at 01.13 hours it was about 4 nm away bearing 190°T. Three destroyers ran ahead of the convoy. To port ahead was the previously observed steamer with a destroyer escort, a little set off from the convoy. We made out 5 columns, speed 5 knots, course 40°. Again there was a very bright moon and the moonlight was now reflected on the exceptionally silvery mirror-like sea. In these light conditions, the contours of a U-boat were highlighted clearly in the night binoculars by darker coloring, as I had experienced during convoy exercises on torpedo boat Tiger several times; in contrast to the doctrine of the metrological school that in moonlight, a U-boat was difficult to discover. As at 01.35 hours a destroyer came up from astern, we dove because we could not get away and surfaced at 02.51 hours after the noise of the propellers decreased again. We were positioned a short distance from two other German U-boats also looking for a gap to penetrate the enemy's columns.

	At 04.00 hours we reached AL 4742 and a half hour


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	later tried to push from astern past the escorts into the convoy but a FAT warning from U-441 (Kaptl. Hartmann) forced us to run away from the convoy.

	A FAT warning, valid for 30 minutes, required a boat that was located within a convoy to run off from the convoy on receiving the warning at top speed, or, if this was not possible, dive and go to at least 50 meters depth. The warning was necessary because of the use of the new loop running Federapparattorpedo [Spring Torpedo Apparatus], known as FAT. FAT could be set before shooting so that it ran a loop to the right or left, at a speed of 30 knots and a running distance of 12,500 meters. The G 7a FAT had a small bubble track. This was the reason that it should only be used at night to give the enemy no clue as to the new method.

	At 05.00 hours a destroyer 1500 meters away suddenly approached the boat at high speed and target angle zero. Because Kapitzky recognized that running was not possible, he ordered that the boat go quickly to depth 220 meters. At 05.15 hours, the boat received 10 frighteningly close depth charges. The infernal noise of the explosions boomed unimaginably loud and the floor boards shook like an earthquake. The rays of Asdic gear on board the pursuer which automatically gave the depth charge launcher the direction and depth for the depth charge shot, hammered audibly with a continuous ping ping on the hull from bow to stern and back repeating time after time.

	The crew at Action Stations held their breath and listened and stared up into space. Running only at silent speed, the E-motors made slight noises.

	At 05.28 hours a second attempt was made by the escorts. Eight depth charges were very close, creating an indescribable bang. The boat shuddered as if blows were thrown from Titan’s hand, but the pressure hull withstood the explosions. From the individual action stations came reports of


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	small failures that could be resolved quickly. Two to three destroyers tried to locate us and then alternately tossed their depth charges.

	At 05.55 hours a series of 8 depth charges again laid alarmingly close to the boat. The Asdic impulses ceased and at 06.11 hours again 10 depth charges near the boat and the same at 06.33 hours.

	For hours the depth charge runs continued and series' of depth charges fell at 06.39 hours, 06.44, 06.49, 06.57, 07.33, 07.44, 08.25, 08.32, 09.48 close, 10.20 hours somewhat distant. After our sound room detected no escorts on the surface in our vicinity, the Commander gave the order to surface at 12.44 hours. A destroyer mast tip was detected bearing 350°T.

	At noon the boat was in AL 4718 and already at 12.55 a biplane approached from 3000 meters away and forced the boat to submerge again.

	At 14.27 hours Kapitzky sent the Radio Message: "05.15 hours detected during attack by destroyer. 5 hour depth charging, Asdic, explosive location, 18 ships, 5 columns, course 45°, 5 knots, after surfacing forced to submerged by patrol vessel and biplane. SE 2, Sea 2, 4/10, showers, Vis. 15 nm, 1000 mb steady, 22 cbm."

	U-615 reached AL 4727 at 16.00 hours and the B.d.U. radioed: "Attempt to reach attack position today because in the morning the operation will be broken off.”

	But on 19 March the boats repeatedly reported "continuous air" when they were forced to submerge by wide-ranging continuous air surveillance. The last victim of the Battle of 19 March was not an Allied freighter, but a German boat. In the afternoon, a British Sunderland surprised U-384, from our 3. U-Flottille under the command of Oblt. von Rosenberg Gruszcinsky, at the moment of diving. The bombs were exactly on target. U-384 sank with its entire crew. Kurt Krumscheid of Kiel was in my Crew.


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	Early on 20 March, after an uneventful night Dönitz ordered the boats to break off the operation against the two convoys. The largest convoy battle in history was over.

	On 21 March he sent a radio message to settle with all boats that had fought in this battle: "Gratitude and appreciation for the greatest success that was ever achieved against a convoy."

	In the three-day battle against convoys SC 122 and HX 229, in which U-615 had operated as contact keeper, the Allies had lost a total of 141,000 GRT. From the four convoys, altogether 202 ships steaming in the first twenty days to Europe in March, the U-boats had sunk 42 ships, representing a loss rate of 20%.

	"Never again," the British Admiralty later ruled, "The Germans were never closer to breaking the connection between the New and the Old World than in the first 20 days of March 1943."

	Kaptl. Kapitzky reported the boat was ready for operations, apart from the upper deck damage which could be repaired in calm weather conditions. At 16.05 hours in AK 9557 the order was received: "Kapitzky take over 65 cbm from U-Wolfbauer."

	For the [repair] work, wooden gratings which were damaged by depth charges were lashed on deck so they could not betray the boat with noise, as could happen while submerged. Gefreiter Koehler, equipped with a life jacket, was sent to the upper deck to perform this work. In Sea 2, Swell 3 the boat was put into the wind and waves. Just as he finished his work the seas increased. An unexpectedly high wave washed over the boat and pulled the man overboard. In the choppy sea, it was difficult to keep an eye on him. We had hardly passed the alarm "Man Overboard", and before we could react with speed and rudder maneuvers, a cross sea miraculously threw our faithful Koehler, who had


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	belonged to my watch since the commissioning, back on deck. We were glad to have gotten him back because the low water temperatures in the North Atlantic would have soon brought about life-threatening hypothermia.

	On 23 March at 07.45 hours in BD 2511 the supplier came in sight, already at 08.45 hours oil and food could be taken over. After completion of this work at 17.45 hours we came back on a northerly course and reported


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	completing supply on 24 March from AK 8677.

	The position of the boat on 25 March was BD 1638, Sea 3, Swell 3, Vis. 3 nm when we were ordered to remain in position line as a patrol line at 22.00 hours. This was followed on 26 March in BD 2715, by the order to steer course 340° 10 knots from 20.00 hours. Further incoming orders directed the boat to position AK 8742 on 27 March, AK 8712 on 28 March and on 29 March ordered Kapitzky to occupy AJ 92 as temporary attack area.

	From 30 March to 9 April 1943 we patrolled in the area of AK 92 and in reconnaissance line from AJ 6847 from 7 April without detecting ships or aircraft with a total day’s run of 1017.2 nm. The boat now belonged to U-boat Group “Adler”.

	On 10 April 1943 at 09.50 hours, the forward lookout of the Third Watch of Obersteuermann Dittmer, Obergefreiter Hans Krohn, of Stettin, sighted a steamer bearing 280°T, bow right 30°, 5 nm away. We attempted to maneuver ahead on the port side of the steamer to attack. The steamer had a modern clipper bow, three masts, size 10-12,000 GRT camouflage paint and proceeded at 12-13 knots.

	At 13.46 hours in AK 4842 we dove for submerged attack. When opening the outer door of the aft torpedo tube much water entered the E-motor through a defective changeover valve [selects whether compressed air enters the tube ahead of or behind the piston] which made depth control of the stern-heavy boat difficult. Initially the steamer was not visible due to the heavily fogged periscope. The listening gear reported continuous sound bearings from 222°T.

	At 14.23 hours the enemy is suddenly seen at target angle right 90°. The listening gear had failed completely. The Commander turned the boat hard and at 14.30 hours shot a four-fan at target angle 110° , distance 2000 meters and target speed = 12 knots. After 3.5 minutes, a torpedo explosion was heard


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	and at 14.42 hours the steamer emitted heavy yellow and white smoke and lay stopped 5000 meters away. At 15.07 hours another explosion was heard. The steamer smoked black now. No further effect was determined and he ran in circles so that the submerged boat could not approach for a coup de grâce.

	At 17.00 hours, the ship ran slowly on a northerly course. About 17.56 hours the steamer shot with artillery, but an enemy or target was not detected through the periscope.

	When we surfaced again at 18.00 hours the steamer bore 50°T, 6 nm away. General course was now 60°. U-615 maneuvered ahead again. At nightfall the enemy made heavy course and speed changes. At 24.00 hours AK 4682 is reached, Sea 1, Swell 2, Vis. 3 nm and the enemy zig zagged continuously every ten to twenty minutes from 100 ° to 0 °. Kapitzky set off to the north of him, waited until he has calmed down a bit and then U- 615 ran back towards.

	On 11 April at 04.00 hours in AK 5417 and very dark night, the Commander ordered an attack on the surface by the First Watch Officer who waited for the enemy to make a northern zig zag and then shot a two-fan from 1000 meters with target speed = 12 knots and target angle left 90°. After 62 seconds, a torpedo hit the ship amidships, which stopped it and a strong diesel odor was smelled on U-615’s bridge and many lights were seen on the upper deck of the steamer, several of the boats were put out. However, no effect on the steamer could be seen.

	The First Watch Officer shot a coup de grâce at the slowly drifting steamer still fully floating on an even keel, without any lead angle. After 41 seconds, a hit occurred in the stern, whereupon the ready service ammunition exploded, but otherwise nothing. We wondered about the quality and toughness of this ship after so many torpedo hits, or about the dubious quality of our torpedoes.

	Then the commander steered the boat to the port side


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	of the enemy to give him another coup de grâce. The distance to the steamer was about 500 meters, as the First Watch Officer actuated the trigger on the target optics. As the torpedo left the tube, the Commander and the First Watch Officer were full of disappointment, as the torpedo ran towards the steamer as a surface runner and a significant track was produced at the surface when it broke out of the water. However it held its course, and after only 39 seconds, a hit occurred at the level of the bridge and the steamer literally flew into the air.

	The blast wave generated a strong effect in the boat and on U-615’s bridge, the entire bridge crew was ripped from their feet and hurled to the deck. As it turned out later, no one had been swept overboard. The Commander next to the First Watch Officer standing at the UZ0 (the target optics), was wounded by a splinter on the right upper arm. A huge orange colored ball of fire and fireball arched over the explosion and fell down on us. First, the idea of a self torpedoing shot through our heads. The seconds-long shock and surprise was stopped immediately by the familiar cry of crash dive, because all stood up as the order was assimilated as if the flesh and blood had been electrified and jumped into the conning tower, as they had drilled 1,000 times, even the wounded Commander, who could not move fast enough and moaned in pain.

	Inside the boat they also had the first impression of self torpedoing, because the pressure wave sucked all the air out of the boat and whirled charts and loose items through the boat up into the conning tower.

	It could be considered a stroke of luck that we showed the steamer the narrow front silhouette at the moment of explosion, since by day it was found that much damage was caused to the upper deck by fragments. An upper arm thick part of our 8.8-cm cannon on the bow was smoothly shaved off; to our happiness, because otherwise


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	it would have penetrated the conning tower and caused the inability to dive. Also the porcelain insulators of the antennas were smashed and one net deflector was torn.

	Except for Kaptl. Kapitzky no one from the bridge crew was injured. A splinter had torn the leather jacket and uniform including the skin on the right upper arm and another splinter had separated 5 cm of the upturned collar of his leather jacket as if with a scalpel, without causing an injury. From 05.15 hours we ran off to the west and then to the south, and from the steamer only a cloud of smoke could be seen. After the war I was able to find that this ship was the American EDWARD D. DUDLEY of about 12,000 GRT. Just for a moment I can harbor admiration for the exquisitely built ship. The surface runner, which was usually a failure because it did not hit a ship fatally when the point of impact was at the water line, obviously caused the detonation of bombs which were intended for German cities. Therefore, we were all delighted with the destruction of ammunition on board the steamer.

	After passing AK 5415 at 08.00 hours at 11.25 hours we sent the Radio Message: “Naval square AK 5415 at 05.17 hours 12000 tonner after 3rd hit overnight flew into the air. Starboard aft net deflector torn, steamer was presumably an auxiliary warship. Commander bruised shoulder. 26 cbm, request orders. NNW 3, Sea 1, 996 mb falling, 10/10, Vis. 4 nm, rain.”

	Because the Commander’s bruise from the splinter was very painful and he could not move his upper arm and shoulder so that a suspected broken collarbone existed, the Commander was not operational. I volunteered as a substitute for the Commander: "Position naval square AK 5770, Commander bruised right shoulder and upper arm from blast fragment, possible broken collarbone, still not fit for duty, request return transit.”

	Around 16.00 hours the order came to begin the return transit to La Pallice.

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On 12 April at 12.00 hours AK 8569 with day’s run of 155.8 nm,

" 13 April	" "	BD 2366 " " "	154 " ,
" 14 April	" "	BD 3654 " " "	152 " ,
" 15 April	" "	BE 4288 " " "	177.7 " ,
" 16 April	" "	BE 8211 " " "	203 " , (0.9 submerged)
" 17 April	" "	BE 9122 " " "	150.5 " , (8.5 submerged) was reached

At 19.08 hours a two-stack destroyer was detected bearing 140°T, bow left, target angle 30°, 5 nm, running at high speed. We reacted by crash diving. By sound bearings he ran off on a northerly course.

After the danger was over, we surfaced at 21.15 hours and continued through the Bay of Biscay on the surface.

With a day’s run of 185 nm (of which 12.5 nm were submerged) we arrived at noon on 18 April in BF 2122, and with a day’s run of 213. 4 nm (of which 13.4 nm were submerged) on 19 April at noon BF 8331 and a Radio Message Order informed us that we would be taken under escort on 20 April at objective point Pilz.

On 20 April at 04.00 hours we reached BF 6788 and passed two boats departing from La Pallice U-468 (Kptlt. Schamong) and U-569 (Oblt. Johannsen), which was lost four weeks later in the North Atlantic.

At 08.30 hours with a sense of relief we were greeted by the escort that awaited us, took us under escort and accompanied us to La Pallice. With a day’s run of 215 nm (15.2 of which were submerged), we entered the inner lock and were received by a band and Flotilla comrades and Red Cross nurses, who took the wounded Commander, who had partly recovered from his wounds, for a souvenir photo in their midst.

Thus ended the third war patrol of U-615, which took part in the largest convoy battle during 62 Front days.


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	Preparations for the fourth war patrol of U-615 from 20 April 1943.

	During the shipyard and repair time a second platform for mounting a second 2-cm MG was installed on U-615. This was to put the boat in a better position to defend itself on the surface against surprise attack by aircraft when it was already too late for diving. Since this required crew training for air defense, some sailors went to the Anti-Aircraft School at Mimizan to be admitted there. The commencement of the war patrol was scheduled for 25 April 1943.

	The first few days at the base went frantically after clearing out the boat and the torpedo and provisions offload. A war correspondent asked about the sinking of the ammunition steamer and asked for the submission of a report of this entire dramatic event in English and French. He noticed had noticed that I had mastered both languages. I agreed and learned that completion of the tape recording, until everything was perfect and convincing and did not seem implausible, was more complicated than I imagined.

	There was an oppressive atmosphere at Schepke House, because the Commander of U-572, Kaptl. Hirsacker, was being court-martialed. Based on the testimony of two of the boat's Watch Officers he was accused of cowardice before the enemy and was sentenced to death. When we moved for the third time into Schepke House, we were the unfortunates not allowed to eat our meals with him in the Officer’s Mess, but had to take him his food. The sight of his sympathetic face, surrounded by light blonde wavy hair and medium build, marked by the seriousness of the situation, remained in my memory. On the question of what I would have done in the Watch Officer’s place (Leutnant (Ing.) Walter Rambau and Leutnant zur Sea Felix Korsch -who were members of my Crew 39) I did not reply, but had the firm conviction that I would have not brought my Commander in question.


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	On 24 April 1943 Kaptl. Hirsacker took a gun that was passed to him and enforced the death sentence on himself. Both Watch Officers also fell a short time later in the Atlantic.

	The Officers then waited for the next surprise that that the uniforms of Officers who had been on patrol, were untraceable. The manager, an Obermaat der Reserve, who had our full confidence because of his amiable Viennese style, explained that someone there must have accidentally swapped the uniforms. My uniform of the best naval fabric never reappeared. My Crew comrade Hermann Stuckmann turned out to be a knight in shining armor who helped me with a uniform, because the Flotilla was only able to give me a coupon for uniform fabric.

	After a few days Stuckmann was reassigned to Command course and we both hoped that we would see each other there in a few weeks. At the Naval Academy, we had shared a common room and since that time felt connected, especially since we also came from the same area: Leverkusen and Mülheim-R.

	After his reassignment from U-571 in La Rochelle however, we did not see each other again. He was commander of U-621 and was the only Crew comrade who was awarded the Knight's Cross and fell with his entire crew on 18 August 1944 off La Rochelle.

	U-571 (Kaptl. Möhlmann) was severely damaged by aircraft bombs at convoy ONS 2 between 7-14 April 1943 as well as U-613 (Kaptl. Koppe) and both boats had to return for repairs to La Pallice. To our mutual surprise the Second Watch Officer of U-571, H. Hübsch, was from my hometown, which improved our awareness of the situation in the homeland.

	As for our boat, it had been rumored that that we would not come back, probably because of the length of the operation. That may have been the trigger that caused the unfaithful steward to set my uniform aside. Later it became known that the corrupt Verwaltungsfeldwebel who had embezzled things from fallen submarine men


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	had been held accountable.

	On Easter Sunday (it was 25 April) I went with our Oberbootsmannsmaat Helmut Langner, Funkobergefreiter Helmut Fischer, from Ravensburg, Matrosengefreiter Heinz Koehler and the Matrosegefreiter Alfred Daus from Marsow/Schlawe (Pom.) from Bordeaux to the Mimizan Plage Anti-Aircraft School. There was the most beautiful spring weather and the train ride opened up a well-known wine region to us. A long layover period for the connecting train enabled us to explore the city by tram and the Opera Square appeared very worthwhile to visit. We left Bordeaux with pleasant impressions of this city. Mimizan Plage on the other hand consisted of the decrepit buildings and the barracks of the shooting school behind the high dunes. After a short theoretical briefing on shooting, the 2-cm machine gun was exercised from a stand in the dunes shooting at a disc that was towed by a light aircraft. Although the whole thing was unrealistic, at least it gave us our first shooting exercise, because hardly anyone had tested a 2-cm machine gun on board in an emergency situation. Only when the losses by attacking aircraft soared to exorbitantly high, was the concept of defense born by the submarine itself. Now from Easter Monday to the following Friday, 30 April shooting was practiced in the dunes towards the Biscay and the journey back to base was begun on May 1.

	The Commander was on leave. As his deputy, I had the task of steering the boat out of the bunker through the inner lock into the outer harbor basin to trim in May. After this task, the boat had to pass through the lock again and be placed in the U-boat bunker. The sun was at the zenith of a blue sky with white cumulus clouds when we heard the ominous engine noise of an entire squadron of American four-engine bombers approaching the U-boat Bunker from east at an altitude of about 3000 meters


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	over the almost noiseless slow movement of the E-motors. One would have liked to have hid when they saw the release of the many bombs from the aircraft in the clear sky that seemed to be targeted directly at the boat. The bow had only just reached the protective cover of the bunker with the bridge of the boat still outside the protective concrete cover, when the carpet of bombs exploded on both sides of the boat on shore and on the water surface and on the bunker itself but especially on a construction site of another bunker to be built south of the first. Some deaths and injuries among the German and French construction workers were deplored, but fortunately nothing happened to the boat, the people on deck and on the bridge.

	There had not been a German interceptor in the sky, because they were used in Russia. But also there was not much to see and hear of the flak!

	In the evening talks in the Officers' Mess, the recent losses of our flotilla were only discussed in a dilatory manor. You mentioned in passing "now it has also caught it" without knowing the circumstances which often could only be determined after the war. If one had the second war patrol behind them, one prepared for the fate that would soon come because the average life span of a boat amounted to 90 days. Particular concern was felt for members of ones own Crew, which had experienced a lot together since entering the Navy or for previous trainers who were also often role models. To this group belonged K.Kpt. Lohmann, commander of U-89, who had been my first Company Commander in 1939 on Danholm Island at Stralsund and who I had greeted before his departure in the Flotilla. He fell on 14 May 1943 in the North Atlantic, a total loss. Or Kaptl. Heinrich Göllnitz, commander of U-657, who I was with 1941 as a Midshipman aboard U-111 and was with me on some humorous incidents on the


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	ocean liner HAPAG NEW YORK in Danzig. Before his departure, I learned from him that U-111 had already been sunk on 4 October 1941 and his Commander, Kaptl. Kleinschmidt, was killed in battle with a U-boat trap. It only took a few days before U-657 was also sunk by depth charges on 17 May 1943 by the British frigate SWAL, a total loss.

	I was shocked at the fate of K.Kpt. Thurmann of U-553, who was from my hometown. Shortly before his departure on 16 January I was with him and had told him about a newspaper report that had recognized him as a great son of the city. He was missing from 19 January 1943 in the Bay of Biscay.

	To redeem my voucher for uniform material on 7 May I made a trip to Paris. The Engineering Officer of U-572, Leutnant (Ing) Walter Rambau, a member of my Crew, was with me by chance. After arriving there, we were both assigned to stay at the Westminster Hotel next to the Cafe de la Paix, but made almost no use of the accommodations because the city attractions offered so much. We strolled to the Opera at Montmartre to the Champs-Elysees and Place de la Concorde, and went into the Navy Department to obtain the fabric at the German Commissariat. In the evening we were in the "Lido" and the "Doge" and after a short night's rest threw ourselves back into the turmoil of the metropolis, on Tuesday we had to return to La Rochelle. We were in the same Company at the Naval Academy, yet we had never met. After a personal meeting we got along well together and I learned to appreciate my Crew comrades.

	We both looked forward to subsequent home leave, Walter Rambau to Moravian Ostrava, where he, a Huguenot descendant, was at home, while I boarded the leave train to Paris and Cologne on 15 May 1943.


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	During the passage of the train through Cologne on 16 May the wounds of war that had struck the city were obvious and in Duisburg there was an air raid. At 22.30 hours I got out of the leave train in Mülheim-Ruhr and went with my suitcase, which contained several bottles of wine as valuable gifts, on the three-kilometer walk to my parents' home. Except for the replaced windows and absence of people, because all residents had rushed into an air raid shelter, everything was still in order.

	Despite the thundering of the flak batteries I went to bed dead tired and in the morning was greeted by a happy mother returning from the bunker.

	On the night of 15 to 16 May British planes attacked the Möhnetal dam with special bombs and the population was warned of a tidal wave of dysentery after water masses in the Möhne Neheim-Husten had flowed into the Ruhr. The rumors among the population already assumed forms of the Apocalypse and the water authority even began to demolish the side reinforcements at the Ruhr bridge in the city, so the water could better wash over the bridge. When I went to the Ruhr get an overview, the sight of a high water level with floating carcasses was bad enough, but a tsunami was out of the question, so in many cases I addressed anxious people as soothingly as a Navy Officer could be.

	After the war in 1952, during a site visit of the Civil Division of the District Court of Arnsberg, I was appointed speak to witnesses of the events in Niederense below the dam. A fellow student was an anti-aircraft assistant on the dam and after the bombing even jumped over the narrow crack in the wall, but the enormous water pressure of about 135 million cubic meters of water continually increased the gap to a large semicircle.

	The POW camp with French soldiers below the dam


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	and the village of Himmelpforten one kilometer further away with an old monastery was swept away by the waters of the Mohne and all the animals on pasture in the narrow valley were caught up and washed away by the water. The estuary in Neheim-Husten was severely affected. Ultimately however, what the [British] military planners had hoped for in 1943, to cripple the war industry in the Ruhr because of power and water shortages, failed.

	On 23 May I got an invitation from friends to who studied medicine in Bonn, and was happy to see old Bonn again still almost intact. On 25 May I went to visit relatives in Wewer by Paderborn, the refuge of a circle of relatives from the bomb endangered Ruhr and on 27 May went to Paderborn to return on a leave train to France. During the night the train shot through the burning of Wuppertal. Cologne also had to endure an attack during the evening. There were no pleasant impressions of farewell from home.

	The almost peacetime scenery in France and especially in Paris was quite different, if one did not look behind the facades. On Saturday, May 29 I traveled from Paris to La Rochelle.

	At the base optimism was felt because some boats were ready to sail as Officers and Commanders swapped their blue uniforms for the olive drab "Submarine kit".

	Kaptl. G. Thäter of U-466 had been ordered to return from vacation almost immediately after his marriage, because the situation in the Atlantic had deteriorated dramatically for the U-boats.

	The losses of 3. U-Flottille had grown alarmingly


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	in May 43. Losses included:
	U-332 (Oblt. Hüttemann) that departed from La Pallice on 24 March on 2 May by total loss west of Finisterre,
	U-753 (K.Kpt. Alfred von Manstein) on 15 May in the North Atlantic. Total loss.
	U-752 (Kaptl. Schroeter) on 23 May in the North Atlantic. Total loss.
	U-569 (Oblt. Johannsen) on 22 May in the North Atlantic. Total loss.
	U-258 (Kaptl. von Mäßenhausen) on 21 May in the North Atlantic with Fritz Eichhorn of my Crew as Chief Engineer. Total loss.
	U-638 (Oblt. Staudinger) departed on 20 April from La Pallice, on 5 May in the North Atlantic. Total loss, and the aforementioned
	U-89 (K.Kpt. Lohmann) on 14 May. Total loss.

	Improved weapons of ever greater explosive power caused a deadly turn for the submarine force and numerous Allied countermeasures began to have a catastrophic effect.

	In early June, in the absence of Kaptl. Kapitzky, I received the German flying ace Captain Hermann Graf, who had shot down 150 enemy aircraft on board U-615 and explained to him the many instruments on board. He was clearly impressed and I received a return invitation to the airfield at La Rochelle. The flier had hardly any aircraft and aviation fuel had become a rarity. The champagne or cognac was plentiful, with which one washed his resentment against the leadership down on a green table.

	Shortly before our departure I also received an invitation for a ride from a small castle near the city in which a General resided. I was handed a black horse with a huge height and experienced a wonderful ride with an accompanying Sergeant.


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	I was glad I did not take all the jumps over ditches and small hedges of my leader, who my horse willingly followed, because I would have been thrown from the saddle.

	On 2 June I photographed Walter Rambau and Felix Korsch of U-572 with my camera, who departed on a journey with no return.

	Our departure date was delayed to 10 June due to minor modifications. After the boat loaded torpedoes, ammunition and supplies on 12 June 1943 at 07.00 hours in the morning, U-615 was ready for the next operation - the fourth war patrol.

	Note: Since the KTB of U-615 from 20 April 1943 through the sinking of the boat on August 7, 1943 was lost, the KTB information comes from U-600 (Kaptl. Zurmühlen) and U-257 (Kaptl. Rahe). These three boats operated together from 12 June (Pentecost Saturday) from La Pallice to cross the Bay of Biscay. The locations in the KTB of U-600 coincide completely with the no longer available KTB from U-615 until the dissolution of the group for independent transit.


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	The fourth and final war patrol of U-615.

	On 12 June, one day before Pentecost, at 08.00 hours the lines were cast off in the La Pallice U-boat bunker and the fourth war patrol began. At 09.16 hours the boat left the internal lock. Together with U-600 (Kaptl. Zurmühlen) and U 257 (Kaptl. Rahe) U-615 proceeded with a Sperrbrecher escort to the objective Point "Pilz" in the Bay of Biscay, where at 14.00 hours the Sperrbrecher escort was dismissed. In convoy with two minesweepers the boats then headed for Point "Schloßpark". At 19.40 hours all three boats made their first deep dive test and after surfacing dismissed the minesweeper escort at 22.00, then proceeded through the Bay of Biscay as a submarine group in accordance with the outbound orders.

	As senior Officer, Kaptl. Zurmühlen led the group, U-257 followed him in his wake and U-615 was set out on the starboard side in the gap between two boats. Kaptl. Zurmühlen had been an intelligence officer in 1939 as a lieutenant on the cadet training ship SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, and had taught us midshipmen the basics of communications engineering and so was familiar to me. He had put his boat into service 5 weeks before ours at Blohm & Voss, joined the 3. U-Flottille in March and was with us in action at SC 122 and HX 229. Zurmühlen embodied that type of naval officer who had made the U-boat force so effective, men who knew their business, were bold and joyful, and like many Commanders, radiated warmth.

	At 22.49 hours we dived to proceed submerged to break through the massive barrier of strong enemy air and naval forces which constantly monitored the area from Cape Finisterre to the English Channel. The American Liberator, Coronado and the British Lancaster could cover more than 2000 nm


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	and at 1000 nm from their bases could patrol for at least four hours before they had to fly back. The large losses of boats in the Bay of Biscay demanded the greatest caution.

	On 13 June the group surfaced together at 08.00 hours, then they quickly gathered and formed to optimally combine the firepower of the three boats for defense against the expected air raids.

	The armament on the bridge of U-615 consisted of two MG 15 and two double MG 81 Z, which were mounted in the bridge cladding. The narrowness of the space on the bridge prevented targeting an attacker straight up. The boat was converted in the shipyard and had received a second platform with a 2-cm MG and the useless, in advanced stages of the war, 8.8-cm gun had been removed. The armament of the other two boats was the same as ours although was modest enough when compared with the arming of the long-range aircraft with far-reaching larger caliber machine guns.

	At noon the boat had covered 181 nm in the last 24 hours of which 28.2 were submerged and one was glad of any distance traveled when crossing the Bay of Biscay without being attacked.

	On 13 June at 20.00 the group reached naval square BF 7329. At 21.55 hours we submerged to proceed submerged until 08.00 hours on 14 June, and then continue the group transit on the surface. As agreed we surfaced. There was little sea, low swell and good visibility of 10 nautical miles.

	As early as 08.59 hours a Sunderland flying boat appeared out of the clouds circling the formation at a distance of 6-10000 meters and 400-800 meters altitude sending bearing signals.

	At 09.34 hours a second Sunderland appeared and a third at 09.43 hours, which now circled the group together. When


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	a favorable situation over the circling planes appeared, the transit group crash dived and went deep very quickly, and managed to surprise the enemy, for the three series of three depth charges thrown were not dangerous to the boats.

	At 16.02 hours, the group surfaced in BF 7272 to proceed on the surface. This only lasted until 16.13 hours, when a land-based bomber approached the formation from directly ahead and attacked U-600, which fought the attackers with machine-gun fire. The aircraft turned off after simultaneous fire from U-615 and then attacked U-257 throwing a train of bombs, because after surfacing this boat had not approached close enough to the surfacing of the other two boats. After the attack, the aircraft disappeared into the clouds.

	U-257 reported minor damage to the rudder and one dead among the bridge watch.

	About 16.40 hours the aircraft was in sight again, circling the formation and temporarily disappearing in the clouds.

	About 17.31 hours the four-engined bomber engaged the formation exactly from ahead at low altitude of 20 meters with onboard weapons and received from U-600 and U-615, in particular Oberbootsmannsmaat Langner on the aft 2-cm MG, the decisive hit in the port engine and starboard wing, whereupon the plane pulled a trail of smoke for 1500 meters and plunged into the sea astern with high flames after a tank in the wing area exploded at 17.33 hours.

	The men on the bridge rejoiced over the shoot down and cheered, so that the men in the boat could hear it, because from their location they must passively endure the sounds of battle, the rapidly firing MG's, the constant rhythm of the cannon and the crash of bombs. If a bomb hit the boat, there could have been little chance of escape for them in the aft engine room or in the control room, but the small group of


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	defenders on the bridge would have a chance not to be taken into the depths by the boat.

	Obermaat Langner, the shooter who scored the decisive hit, had belonged to my First Watch as the First Seaman since the commissioning. He had completed several courses at the artillery and torpedo school that marked him as a weapons specialist. This proved the usefulness of the practice in the dunes near Mimizan Plage after our return from the third war patrol, because after that he had saved our lives. We were all appreciative of the man whose tracer bullets from his 2-cm MG smashed into the enemy’s port wing.

	At 20.00 hours the transit group reached BF 7189 with light NNW wind, sea 4, Swell 3, Vis. 10 nm, Cumulus 3, 1010 mb, +17°C. It was 21.05 hours when a bomber appeared from the clouds, orbited the formation and attacked at 21.12 hours from 150 meters altitude with cannons and bombs. While Kaptl. Kapitzky, Obermaat Langner and navigator Dittmer fired with their machine-guns at the enemy, I desperately attempted to clear a jam in the misfired 2-cm gun. Before I could get the faulty projectile out of the barrel, the bomber raced past our port side, apparently without any results from the three boats, which was attributed to the high speed of the enemy. But we were lucky, as the two bombs exploded without causing damage to U-600 or U-615.

	However we were dealing with a tough and courageous enemy who wanted to avenge his comrades, because at 21.16 hours he came at an altitude of 50 meters from our starboard side towards U-615 and covered us with 6-8 bombs that just missed the target ahead of the bow.

	After the battle noise subsided, we noticed that our Boatmaat Heinz Wilke, from Euskirchen, was mortally wounded. At the Alarm call


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	he rushed to the machine gun on top of the platform and occupied the position of the First Watch Officer. He had shot an entire ammunition belt of the double-MG 81 Z at the starboard side of the approaching aircraft and there was machine-gun fire of the plane, recognized by the many visible bullet holes, next to the position of the First Watch Officer.

	At 21.36 hours the group crash dived just when the plane disappeared into the clouds and continued the transit submerged.

	On 15 June at 08.04 hours the group surfaced in BE 9639 for fast charging of the batteries and dived again at 09.31 hours to proceed submerged.

	At 21.57 hours Kaptl. Zurmühlen sent a Radio Message to the B.d.U.: "13 June only detection, 14 June in BF 7258 circled by 3 Sunderlands. Group dive, heavy depth charges. 7272 Rahe bombed, slight damage, 1 dead. On 2nd attack approach on me by land-based 4-engined aircraft fired upon. 7421 flying boat. Bombed twice no damage. U-615 1 dead. 15 June only surfaced to charge. Position 9647. All naval squares.”

	The group then dove to proceed submerged until surfacing at 08.00 hours on the morning of 16 June for fast charging of the batteries in BE 9594 in similar conditions to the previous day, namely SW 4, Sea 4, slight well, Vis. 6-8 nm, 1021 mb, 17°C.

	At 09.04 hours a Sunderland came from the clouds at target angle zero and attacked the group from ahead. Four bombs fell on the port side of U-600, the nearest 20 meters from the stern of the boat.

	Miraculously U-600 was not unable to dive but lost a sailor on the bridge by strafing. Thus, all three boats had lost a man defending from bomb attacks.


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	At 09.16 hours the boats use the turning radius of the flying boat to crash dive to a depth of 100 meters and received several depth charges, which resulted in the failure of the gyro-compass of U-600. The boats remained submerged until 16.00 hours, then surfaced again for fast charging of the batteries and the sea burial of the dead in BE 9811. Because of the difficult situation in the air the funeral could not be carried out in a solemn way. After Bootsmaat Wilke was laid to rest in a sailor’s grave at 16.08 hours at 43°46'N and 14°24'W, a few minutes later at 16.17 hours a Sunderland appeared at target angle zero. Once the aircraft was in range of our 2-cm MG's, fire was opened and it immediately turned away. About 16.39 hours the boats again used the turning radius of the flying boat to crash dive and remain submerged until fast charging at 20.55 hours. The day’s run of both of the last two days due to the long dive times are each of about 85 nm, of which 54 nm was submerged. Fast charging was continued until 22.00 hours. Because of the air danger the boats proceed submerged until 08.00 hours on 17 June. At 08.59 hours we submerged again. After two short recharges of the batteries during the day, the boats surfaced at 17.14 hours and were in BE 8967 soon thereafter.

	Impatiently we hoped get the transit of the Bay of Biscay over with as quickly as possible.

	For over 24 hours the enemy had apparently regrouped their hunting and concentrated on other boats, as heavy bombardments perceived at some distance from us. The hour-long detonations pointed to an intense pursuit of a U-boat by a search group or a Hunter-Killer group. These groups consisted of four to six destroyers or frigates, and sometimes even got the help of fighter aircraft. Aircraft carriers were well equipped with radar, Asdic and HF-DF to detect submarines. Once a boat was located underwater with Asdic, one more escort vessel was used to attack the boat with depth charges, while


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	a search vessel at silent speed maintained contact on the boat with Asdic. There have been persecutions up to 30 hours. Depth charges with bursting settings at different depths were serially thrown until the boat was hit and disappeared on the Asdic, or had been forced to surface and could be destroyed by bombardment and ramming.

	Therefore, all our sympathy was with those inbound or outbound boats that were in mortal danger in the Bay of Biscay. The crews of the three boats in the depths of the Bay of Biscay had now been granted some time to work off their strained nerves. To protect oxygen consumption each off watch crew member had to move as little as possible. In the control room the watch officer steered the boat at the ordered depth of water with the two diving plane operators, while the control room staff had to monitor many gauges and indicators and aside from the faint sound of the electric motors, there was an almost eerie silence in the boat until noise of groaning steel alerted the senses. The gauges all showed 80 meters depth, and the check reports of the control room watch confirmed the accuracy of the instruments. But instinctive distrust allowed only immediate blowing to surface, since only enormous water pressure on the hull was capable of producing the impression groaning steel. During depth charge pursuits, the infernal noise of exploding bombs almost always drowned out the crackling of the compressed steel tube when a boat went to great depths over 200 meters.

	It turned out that that probably due to the bombs thrown all gauges had jammed indicating 80 meters depth while the boat slowly dropped to 240 meters and reached close to destruction depth. Our distrust prevented the entry in the KTB of the B.d.U. "missing unknown" as in the case of U-163, which was presumed lost on 15 March 1943 after departure, as well as U-196, U-326, and U-398.

	On 18 June at 04.00 hours the group was in BE 8973, and on 19 June reached the North Atlantic, west of the Bay of Biscay, at 00.00 hours in CF 2338.


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	At 21.54 hours U-600 sent the Radio Message: “16 June BE 9585 Sunderland bombed me, no damage. Matrosen Gefreiter Laub fell. 9811 contact holder shaken by group dive. Suggest armored bridge. Position CF 2259.”

	On 20 June at 07.30 hours we received the order: “To Zurmühlen, Rahe and Kapitzky: After disbanding common transit head for. . . Neide, Dahlhaus, Kapitzky, Rahe, Zurmühlen naval square 50 of the large square west of DG.”

	At 08.00 hours in CF 2524 we surfaced to fast charge and at 09.15 hours dived again. We still dived in daytime mainly to escape the air threat.

	On 21 June the group now saw several days unmolested by enemy fighter-bombers and one felt relief at the thought to have come out of the reach of the bases of the aircraft squadrons and gained the supposedly protective width of the Atlantic Ocean. The experience the past few days led to the conclusion that the defensive tactics of our group transit were correct and could be instructive.

	At 08.00 hours we surfaced, to the northeast of the Azores in CF 5139 and after dissolution of the transit group Zurmühlen, Rahe and Kapitzky set off on their journey in an independent transit on the surface on course 210°.

	The Commander then informed the crew of U-615 that the boat would head for the Caribbean as operations area to disrupt the local ship traffic of the Allies sustained by tankers. This was already suspected when pith helmets and tropical clothing were received in La Rochelle which were for use near the Equator and they were happy to get another area of operations after three operations in the North Atlantic, with endless convoys and mostly bad weather, because naval squares AL, AK, AM and AJ, had become a mass grave for German U-boat men. We did not know of the mass destruction of 31 submarines to 21 May 1943 and the unsuccessful attacks against the heavily protected convoys SC 130 and HX 239, which had led Dönitz to cancel the operation of his U-boats. On 24 May, he ordered his boats to leave the North Atlantic


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	and to proceed to the Central Atlantic because he was of the opinion that there the defenses of the enemy would be weaker. This day marked a defeat of historic importance because of superior ingenuity of the engineers on the part of the enemy, an overwhelming number of ships, aircraft, and the introduction of new weapons and techniques had broken the back of the U-boat war in its current form and tactics.

	In one of the nights following the dissolution of the group march U-615 passed the Azores and the free watch was granted a free view through the night binoculars of the highest mountain of the island group. Portugal still had not given in to political pressure from the Allies to build an American air base in Horta, which should close the gap in the air surveillance in the Central Atlantic. This reality was only a few weeks away, but in ignorance of these things, the bridge watch had been asked to keep the highest vigilance in the Azores. But fortunately we experienced no surprise from the air.

	On 25 June at 08.00 hours southwest of the Azores in CE 4933 U-Zurmühlen came in sight, recognition signals were exchanged. Another four boats appeared during the morning to be filled with fuel from a supplier. Soon after the supplier, U-488 came in sight, from which we had to fill to full inventory. With the experience now gained the refueling was carried out without incident. After releasing the hose connection to U-488 (Oblt. Bartke), we went within hailing distance of U-535 (Kaptl. Ellmenreich), which was on the way home to his base and had to pass on fuel and provisions to Kaptl. Zurmühlen. Within hailing distance I could see the First Watch Officer, my Crew comrade Harald Pfeffer, we had not seen each other for more than 1-1/2 years. We gave U-535 letters to our relatives, but these did not reach their recipients, because U-535 was sunk a few days later on 5 July in the Bay of Biscay with no survivors. With all good wishes for each other U-600 passed out


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	of sight. The boat had been assigned the Freetown area as operations area. U-600 returned to Brest from there after three months on 10 September and received for his work a judgment worth reading by the B.d.U.: "The long war patrol offered the Commander and crew only a number of "disappointing neutral hunts", several aircraft attacks and depth charge pursuits rather than attack opportunities. The aircraft shoot down during the brave battle during the Biscay transit was gratifying. Moreover, the patrol was especially stressful for the crew.
	Recognized success: a four-engine aircraft = shot down.
	For the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote
	Chief of the Operations Department
	Signed: Godt"

	Zurmühlen again left on patrol on 7 November, reported for the last time on 23 November and on 25 November northeast of the Azores was destroyed by two British frigates by depth charges. There were no survivors.

	After leaving supply group-Bartke on 26 June U-615 continued on its way to the Caribbean and reported the full refueling as well as the death of Boatswain's Mate Wilke after several days of moving a safe distance from other boats. The pleasant weather in the southern latitudes, and the absence of enemy air or naval forces gave us a few days of peace and security never experienced previously, as well as detachment from the military life. The bridge watch lookouts were able to follow the dolphins at play as they jumped just before the bow of the boat cruising in groups springing out of the waves and with lightning-fast movements to join in the game for a long time. Even a giant sperm whale was felt with powerful fountains while scooping breath. After the crew was able to feel safe far from any coast the Commander granted the free watch below a dip in the crystal clear waters of the Central Atlantic and for a few minutes the hard U-boat men were turned into merry fooling around boys.


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	It was early July, when around 14.00 hours mastheads appeared above the horizon, which immediately forced us into the role of the pursuer and the chance to hunt a valuable independent fired the entire crew.

	Until nightfall we kept out of sight, maintained contact and maneuvered ahead at top speed to attack, until the Swedish KUNGSHOLMEN identified himself as a neutral in the peace-time splendor of her many lights. At 500 meters, in a dark melancholy mood, we took in the snow-white ship that passed out of sight on a north-easterly course.

	After consultation with the Officers Kaptl. Kapitzky decided to breakthrough into the Caribbean between the French island of Guadeloupe and the British Island of Montserat on 13 July; however, on 12 July in clear weather and low seas the lookout reported a 20,000 GRT tanker on an easterly course. With extreme power we maneuvered ahead at highest speed for hours, but had to give up the tanker with its higher speed, disappointed that we had to give up the pursuit.

	On the night of 13 July we were even more surprised to discover Antigua and Montserat without protecting vessels or aircraft and Guadeloupe was passed at a small distance. Our thoughts went back to the centuries in which European explorers and then daring sailors and pirates dominated and made these islands and the Caribbean unsafe and the British and the Spanish Crown had secured rich benefits by conquest, robbery and piracy.

	We now proceeded by long dives interspersed with short transits on the surface to recharge the batteries toward the objective of La Guaira on the Venezuelan coast.

	High demands were made on the on the crew’s resilience. Yet there was not the slightest complaint regarding morale and discipline on board. Our Cook Rudolf Mahnke just 20 years old worked tirelessly in his


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	small galley and always brought tasty food to table.

	If one could characterize quiet heroism under the most revolting conditions of war, there would be no worthier example than those young sailors who day after day and month after month, in the storms of the Atlantic, or the sweaty tropics regularly supplied their crew mates with food and sometimes for weeks had no fresh air to breathe. And this happened in a U-boat with an eighty percent chance of coming to rest with him at the bottom of the sea.

	The bridge team was offered an overwhelming sight one evening as U-615 stood 1 nm off the port of La Guaira. Unfamiliar constellations appeared high in the dark blue to black subtropical sky. Car headlights lit a mountain road at a height of more than 2000 meters and the stars were found to be lights of Puebla at that altitude. Giant mountains projecting directly from the Caribbean several thousand meters into the sky offered us an incomparably great setting, but the harbor, north of the capital, Caracas, offered not the slightest target, as far as we could search with our Zeiss binoculars.

	Therefore, the Commander decided to proceed to the port of Willemstad, on the island of Curacao in the hope of detecting tanker traffic. But the situation on Willemstad was the same and we expanded the search in Aruba, also without success. When charging the batteries and ventilating the boat, we were able to dive apparently unnoticed before patrolling American aircraft.

	On 25 July we celebrated the 27th birthday of our Commander submerged for which Obergefreiter Mahnke conjured a small cake. On 28 July, the boat was


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	again off Willemstad with its pretty white houses in the Dutch colonial style. At dusk, our wait was worth it because we saw a tanker escorted by a destroyer, on course for Willemstad. Unbeknownst to the escort we succeeded in getting into firing position and the First Watch Officer shot a two-fan from ½ mile on the tanker just before the entrance to the port and instantly turned it into a huge flaming conflagration. Terrible scenes were then played out before our eyes as the steel of the hull was soon red hot, so that none on board could escape the inferno. The commander let the boat proceed in the evolving cloud of smoke from our victim to shake off the pursuing destroyer. After two hours the oncoming destroyer forced us to dive and we were also over run by him, but he might have lacked the experience in Asdic tracking and anti-submarine warfare to get our escaping boat. We rounded Curacao on the west side, and steered a north-east course to depart from the Caribbean, especially since our fuel supplies were scarce. On 28 July Kapitzky sent a message to B.d.U.: “1. Up to 11 July fast independent vessels course west some escorted via ED 76. 12 July 15 knot tanker on easterly course hunted unsuccessfully. Thereafter no traffic. 2. From EC 96 to the southeast individual small coastal vessels. Off main harbor light sea patrol, heavy traffic from the west to northwest. Detached convoys and tanker groups of up to 6 ships, in loose formation. Arriving around 20.00 hours departure not observed. Exploratory U-boat hunts, light air patrol, submerged by day, location detected once at night without attack. Listening under the coast bad, at sea better than visibility. 3. 28 July EC 9626 tanker 6000 GRT sunk. Still 71 cbm.”

	Because the enemy was now aware of the presence of a U-boat anyway, the risk of having a bearing taken by the enemy


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	could be accepted in order to inform B.d.U. of the situation.

	U-615’s Radio Message was also detected and bearing taken by the Americans and an intensive search immediately began. The boat was pursued by the U.S. Air Squadrons in Aruba, Curacao and Trinidad.

	During the day we remained submerged except for surfacing twice briefly to ventilate the boat; at night we tried to cover as much distance as possible.

	Given the low underwater speed of the type VIIC boat averaging 3-4 knots, it was relatively easy for the pursuer to get the approximate location of a boat once discovered by plotting its low speed. Therefore the Commander considered different behaviors for deflecting our pursuers, including approaching the islands because they would complicate detection, but mostly our course was for the open sea which offered the best chance to escape.

	Shortly after surfacing on the evening of 29 July, the first night attack took place with bombs from a B-18 bomber of an Air Squadron stationed in Aruba. The bombs detonated on the water surface without causing damage to the boat or personnel. Fortunately this attacker was not yet equipped with a Leigh Light, with which the attackers were so successfully fitted in the Bay of Biscay, but fired four flares to illuminate the target. This however cancelled the element of surprise and we replied with good defensive fire so much so that the bombing did not completely succeed After the flares were extinguished on the water, the aircraft lost contact with us as a dark black subtropical night arched protectively over the boat.

	The next bomb attack took place shortly after we surfaced


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	on the evening of 1 August by a B-24 Liberator bomber which had come from Curacao. The following evening [during an attack on convoy GAT 77] PC 1196 attempted a depth charge attack on U-615. Both times we got away without injuries to the boat or personnel.

	During the day while submerged we heard the calls of the B.d.U. to U-572, commanded by Oblt. Kummetat to report. Since U-572 did not report, we could guess that one more boat of our Flotilla was lost with the Engineering Officer Walter Rambau with whom I had started my business trip to Paris in May and the First Watch Officer Felix Korsch of my Crew.

	Only after the war, the book of naval historian Morison (The Atlantic Battle Won, Vol. X) showed that a Mariner flying boat of Air Squadron VP-205 from Trinidad on 3 August at night around 00.25 hours sent the message "sighted submarine, attacking.” What then took place in the dark of the night north-east of Trinidad, remains forever in the dark and left to ones imagination, because since that night no trace or debris of U-572, the attacked boat, nor the attacking Mariner flying boat was ever found!

	On the evening of 5 August, after covering about 200 nautical miles on its return transit from Willemstad, U-615 was attacked with the help of three flares north of the island of Blanquilla by a Martin Mariner flying boat from Trinidad of Naval Air Squadron VP-205, the same squadron that destroyed U-572 on 3 August.

	For the rest of the night the pilot, Lt.(jg) J.M. Erskine, USNR circled the area in which he had discovered the submarine to attack it immediately upon surfacing however, U-615 remained submerged.

	Because the pilot had consumed his fuel at dawn he just reached Trinidad. Another Martin Mariner flying boat was dispatched by Squadron VP-205. Its pilot, Lt. A.R. Matuski, USNR, tried for 7 1/2 hours to keep the diving area under surveillance, to attack immediately in the event the submarine surfaced.


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	Meanwhile, the Commander decided while submerged, that after dinner on 6 August at 19.10 hours German time he would surface to ventilate the boat and allow the crew, which by now had already gone almost a month mostly submerged and endured the intense heat, to get some fresh air. According to local time, which was 6 hours different, it was 13.10 hours.

	After surfacing, there was a sigh of relief through the boat when the fan ran again donating fresh air. At noon in the Caribbean, a fresh breeze blew from east, Sea 3, medium-sized cumulus clouds and about 30°C. After exactly 10 minutes the Commander on the bridge ordered Crash Dive.

	No sooner had the boat reached about 40° bow down at a depth of 30 meters, a huge explosion of multiple depth charges shook the boat so inconceivably that everyone thought it was the end. The boat had been pushed back to the surface by the force of the explosion, and was thus in the most dangerous and helpless situation that allowed the attacker to throw his bombs at the target without endangering his own aircraft. Therefore, everything had to be done with "All hands forward" to make the boat bow heavy and get it to dive again. The boat responded and was now too bow heavy, because enormous amounts of water came from aft of the engine room and flowed through the control room into the bow compartment. The incoming damage reports prompted the Commander to immediately give the order “Blow all tanks” to still catch the diving boat and bring it to the surface. Navigator Dittmer who commanded respect from everyone with the authority of the most patrols, gave soothing words to the young crew members in the disastrous situation, as they had to work to get the cascading water mass in the bow back aft, in order to make the boat stern heavy to surface again.

	The seconds seemed endless, until the boat was caught and leveled at 260 meters.


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	It was amazing to see the young sailors, from whom the war had robbed their youth in the hair-raising situation of the deeper settling boat with well over 6 tons of water in the boat and the seemingly endless slow surfacing. None panicked and there were no cries of distress or moaning, just concentrated effort and discipline, ready at any time to comply with the orders of the Commander. In the diesel engine room the pressure hull was cracked and the starboard diesel was torn from its base.

	Water poured under pressure into the boat through the crack in the pressure hull, which increased the deeper the boat sank. As a result of the tilting of the starboard diesel and jamming of the propeller shaft, a fire broke out in the starboard E-motor due to a short circuit, which was fought with great courage by Obermaschinist Schrade, Maschinenobergefreiter Joseph Faus, of Cologne, and Maschinenobergefreiter Fritz Franke, from Zielenzig/Neumark. It was a miracle that the port E-motor still worked, and using one propeller the boat was brought up agonizingly slowly. Because the large stern down angle reinforced the sensation of slipping backwards, everyone watched the hands of the depth gauge spellbound.

	In the wardroom closed lockers were torn from their latches and broken glass from shattered bottles of fruit juice littered the deck. A metallic command speaker firmly welded to the hull had been blown off by the explosion, and the First Watch Officer had been hit in the back. Some men were injured by flying glass. When the bridge broke through the water’s surface and prepare to fire was ordered on the bridge, the men, as if moving by magic began to occupy the guns and to pass ammunition to the bridge hand to hand in a great hurry. Hardly had this been done, when one saw the Mariner flying boat approaching the boat, attacking with cannons. Only when the aircraft closed to 300 meters,


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	the Commander gave the order to fire and hits in the aircraft caused it to crash just 100 meters ahead of us into the sea, where by its bombs exploded, so that nothing more was seen of the aircraft.

	A later recapitulation of the events by the Washington Post of 20 November 1943, the Reader's Digest, November 1945, pp. 121 and Morison, already cited above, page 196 says that the Trinidad Naval Air Base on 6 August 1943 at 13.21 hours received a U-boat sighting report from Lt. Matuski with information on the latitude and longitude and the phrase "go on the attack."
	13.30 hours he radioed: "Submarine damaged bow out of the water, makes about 2 knots away."
	13.35 hours: "U-boat hull down."
	13.37 hours: "Aircraft no damage, no casualties."
	13.48 hours: "Distress-damaged, damaged, I am on fire."
	Then there was nothing more. Matuski and nine other crew members were killed."

	After the cheers of Hurrah were silenced on the bridge, the engine personnel attempted to master the leakage and damage in the boat before the next attackers arrived.

	But this turned out to be much more serious than was suspected. Besides the already reported damage, it turned out that one starboard main ballast and reserve fuel oil tank was torn and so a significant oil trail was formed behind the boat. Then the port diesel could no longer be started, so both diesels were out of service. Additionally the radio and gyro-compass were destroyed and the cables of both periscopes ripped. In the conning tower the torpedo lead angle calculator was blown from the bulkhead, so that no more torpedoes could be fired and on the bridge all wooden gratings were gone from the explosion, a significant disadvantage for the 4 gunners, who now had no flat deck under them, because the pressure hull of the conning tower was curved and did not offer the shooter a secure


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	grip, so they could not move fast enough to follow an attacker.

	Except for the port-E-motor running the boat at reduced speed at 2-3 knots, the boat was still under control. As a Godsend, at least the Junkers compressor still ran to deliver the important compressed air for the ballast tanks. Air constantly escaped through the damaged ballast tank on the starboard side, which required repeated re-blowing, because the boat gradually began to list to starboard. This presented the shooters more difficulty in target acquisition, particularly as the stern of the boat was permanently under water up to the conning tower.

	On the question of the diving ability of the boat, which imposed itself in anticipation of the appearance of additional aircraft, Kaptl. Kapitzky agreed with the opinion of the First Watch Officer to wit: we must remain on the surface and fight it out with the enemy and defend ourselves as long as possible, rather than try a test dive as the Engineering Officer suggested. Because even if the dive test would not have led to the enormous burden of the penetrated water into the boat at the stern of the boat, it would have been impossible to remain submerged a longer time given the condition of the boat. On surfacing all of our compressed air would be exhausted and then we would find ourselves in the same miserable situation if we were then taken by the arriving bombers. This course of action was a truly Herculean decision for a young Commander, for it also meant it was very likely that we would lose lives. Very soon we realized how important our compressed air supply was because the stern sank deeper and the boat listed more and more to starboard, which required frequent re-blowing of the ballast tanks, so that the boat straightened somewhat.

	Twenty minutes had passed when the next Mariner aircraft from Trinidad appeared.


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	Its pilot, Lt. Crockett, USNR, flew around the boat several times before he attacked about 15.45 hours local time. Diving from 1500 feet from ahead of U-615, he threw an explosive bomb which exploded fairly close, about 25 meters ahead of the boat to port. We were glad that the 4 torpedoes stuck in the forward torpedo tubes received no initial spark.

	At 15.55 hours Lt. Crockett began the next attack of the Mariner. According to later accounts the forward gunner fired several 100 round ammunition belts at U-615 from the double “50 caliber” machine guns. The bridge watch fired U-615’s machine gun at the attackers, and even during the approach achieved hits in the starboard wing which caught fire. The pilot pulled the aircraft into a turn and began a new attack from astern to destroy the boat by dropping depth charges because he feared that the burning engine would explode.

	But while the aircraft was still in a dive, the machinist A.S. Creider USN, was able to extinguish the fire with several bottles of CO² foam on the shot-through fuel line in the wing.

	On departure to port the pilot saw a huge explosion, with a huge cascade of water covering the entire boat (see action report Crockett, page 2).

	The famed Obersteuerman had fallen. When the aircraft departed it almost literally made our blood run cold, because he was one of the most popular and pleasant on board with Hamburger humor, exemplary bearing and a reliable navigator. Now at 22.40 hours MEZ he had followed his father, who had fallen in 1917, in death. A head shot had wiped out this auspicious life on his 10th patrol. A conversation immediately before the attack made the reality of his death incomprehensible.

	At 16.08 hours Crockett reported success in fighting the fire to Trinidad and requested reinforcement, while he circled the boat and waited for an opportunity to deliver his last MK 24 bombs [actually a MK 24 homing torpedo - Fido] on the boat.


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	At 16.35 hours local time, 27 minutes after he had managed to extinguish the fire in the aircraft, a Lockheed Ventura arrived from Trinidad.

	Both aircraft began simultaneous attacks from either side of the boat, with one pilot protecting the other with cannons for a targeted bombing. Crockett watched a perfect covering of the boat by depth charges, two ahead to port, one only 20 feet away from the bow, one detonated within 20 feet to starboard. By the observation of the pilots they literally raised the boat up out of the water then covered U-615 with high water columns.

	At the beginning of an attack all shooters on the bridge hid, or crouched and rose abruptly only on Kapitzky’s call when the enemy was within the range of our guns. Since the aircraft’s powerful longer range cannons tried to quell the operation of machine guns on board, it took a lot of courage, without any armor protection on the bridge to look death in the eye, jump up and fight off the enemy. In so doing Obermaat Langner was shot through the shoulder pad of his 2-cm machine gun. Attempts to weld to repair this damage were interrupted by subsequent attacks. Crockett even brought his last bomb to drop after we had given our navigator over to the sea.

	At 00.15 hours German time, or 18.15 hours local time the first of two Mariner flying boats arrived from Trinidad flown by Lt.(jg) J.W. Dresbach, USNR.

	The three aircraft now took position on three sides for simultaneous attacks on the boat, with the recent reinforcement attacking U-615 from astern. The defense focused primarily on the most recently arrived aircraft since with a full bomb load it presented more danger to the boat and crew. Then the nose cannons began again at greater range


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	to quell the crew on the bridge. But they rose again in the murderous hail of fire from three sides and fought back. A huge explosion seized the boat about 10 meters behind the stern, but U-615 still floated, thanks to Hamburg Blohm & Voss quality, albeit mortally wounded and steering in circles, while the empty attackers shot innumerable ammunition belts at the boat on departing. After that the three aircraft remained at a slightly more respectful distance from the boat and we hoped for the early and rapid onset of darkness. As the third machine threw its bombs from 1000 feet altitude, they were all a bit apathetic.

	At 18.34 local time, or 00.34 hours MEZ a second Mariner arrived from Trinidad flown by Lt.Cdr. Null. Crockett and the Ventura bomber carried out another attack with cannons, while the Mariner attacked at target angle zero from astern the boat. But the depth charges were released too early and to our good fortune were too far astern, apparently because our desperate courage had earned considerable respect from the pilots.

	At 18.42 hours local time Crockett led a further attack of the aircraft with onboard weapons and bombs. U-615 survived again. While all the bombs struck behind the boat, a fright shot through us when Kaptl. Kapitzky and Obermaat Langner were seriously wounded and sank to the deck of the bridge and 2-cm platform. The commander was shot so high through the hip bone that no tourniquet could help. In contrast, the right knee of our Obermaat had been completely shot to pieces.

	Kaptl. Kapitzky gave his last statement to me that as First Watch Officer I was to take over command of U-615 and asked me to give a final message to his parents in Dresden from him because he felt that he would not make it.

	We shook his hand and I stammered huskily some phrases to encourage him, but he responded only with painful moves.

	I turned with a speaking tube and told the entire crew to


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	obey my commands and that our motto - all for one and one for all - had to apply.

	As the boat threatened to settle further aft, I ordered the ballast tanks blown and to bring the wounded on the forecastle to place and secure them in our single three-man dinghy I ordered our medic, Funkmaat Theo Schultheiß, from Nuremberg, to inject morphine.

	At 18.50 local time an Army Air Corps B-18 bomber arrived from Zandery, flown by Lt. H.L. Widerhold followed by another Mariner with Lt.Cdr. R.R. Jester, but in the mean time darkness and rain clouds denied the attacking aircraft the clear visibility needed for an accurate depth charge attack.

	From 19.00 to 19.55 hours local time Crockett threw four parachute flares from 5000 feet altitude, but could not precisely identify the boat. It was not until 21.18 hours and 23.00 hours local time that the B-18 covered the boat with depth charges, but they were too far away.

	When there was a break in the fighting at nightfall after the fateful attack and we could take the two badly wounded men from the bridge down to the forecastle to a boat in front of the coning tower.

	The lull was very welcome, as our ammunition ran low and of 4000 rounds of 2-cm ammunition there were probably about 1000 failures.

	After nightfall the wind picked up and generated light waves and intermittent rain deprived our searching enemies even more visibility. By stopping and refraining from shooting exchanges in the darkness, we avoided disclosing our exact location. Except for manning the control room, with the Engineering Officer, Second Watch Officer and Control Room Mate Reinhold Abel, from Arnswalde/Pomerania, and Obermaschinist Schrade and Obergefreiter Dhows in the E-motor room, all hands were ordered out of the boat and the boat was prepared for sinking.


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	In particular all secret and code documents were destroyed and thrown overboard by the Second Watch Officer as Communications Officer with the radio men.

	At 01.10 hours MEZ the boat’s forecastle had settled so far that waves washed over both machine gun platforms. By blowing the ballast tanks, the boat was raised somewhat, but then a wave washed over the forecastle, where the men had to hold on to the antenna wire, to avoid being washed overboard. Also, the boat with the wounded and the two men who held it firmly, were caught by a wave and swept overboard. I was almost at the limit of despair by this report because the search appeared almost hopeless in the dead of night, I said to the crew that we would find the dinghy with Kaptl Kapitzky and Obermaat Langner and the Obergefreiter Richard Suhra, from Breslau, and Gefreiter Herbert Fricke, from Rieder/Hartz at all costs to save the men and in the case that we all must swim to have something to which an exhausted swimmer could hold on and urged them all to keep the sharpest lookout. With the aid of temporary recognizable star Sirius and taking account of wind and waves, I ordered Gefreiter Alois Koegelmeier, from Upper Cologne Bach/Landshut, to make a large circle to port at KF with port E-motor. A seemingly endless time passed before the boat had completed the circle and the boat could also be identified, but it was too far away from U-615, for anyone to dare to swim there. Again I spoke strongly to the crew trying anything to restore the men in the boat and to counteract the emerging lethargy that had taken hold. The men on the bow men completely drenched by the rain and waves were fully exposed to the cold wind and constantly had standing to hold on to the antenna. To an appeal for a volunteer swimmer equipped with a long safety line, to reach the floating boat, Maschinenmaat Viktor Drobek from Brieg/Breslau, who was not only a brave man but a good swimmer, reported for this effort.


	- 107 -

	Again the impossible attempt was made to steer through the area where the boat was last seen instinctively with a large circle to port with the E-motor at KF. Meanwhile, the aircraft made further attacks, but, due to the weather conditions, inflicted no damage. On the contrary, unintentionally it was possible to see the small boat with the wounded by the flares of an attacker and to close to within a distance of 10 meters, so that Maschinenmaat Drobek could swim up secured by a tether and carefully recover the boat. No words can express how moved we were that we had managed this, the rescue was a case of improbable luck, since we had to counter the torque of a port engine while turning in a circle to port.

	The initial joy was mixed with deep disappointment, as the Gefreiter Fricke reported that Obergefreiter Suhra who was securing the boat with him had been washed overboard and had disappeared after a short time in the waves, after he had called him to join him in the boat. Richard Suhra, large in stature, as the person responsible for the ammunition delivery in hours of battle had carried out this duty which required enormous physical effort in an excellent manner. It was obvious that he was a good swimmer, he could not cope with the psychological stress of being washed overboard on a dark night and a cardiac death put an end to his life, because he suddenly no longer reported to calls from his comrades floating nearby.

	He was with us since the commissioning in March 1942. Everyone on board liked him because of his companionship, his commitment and his amiable Silesian disposition and we felt the loss very painfully.

	While it was still possible for our medic to provide Kaptl Kapitzky with morphine, the medic lost the morphine and the syringe due to an overcoming wave


	- 108 -

	because he had to hold on to the antenna wire. This was a tragedy since we could not provide the greatly suffering Obermaat Langner any other help and could only assist him with words and ask him to persevere.

	At 04.00 hours MEZ the death of Kaptl. Kapitzky was reported to me and I went briefly to the dead man on the forecastle and ordered the preparations for the burial at sea of our Commander.

	U-615 now required ever shorter intervals to re-blow the ballast tanks which had obviously suffered damage and the compressed air supply was always low, even though the compressor still provided us with compressed air.

	After the waves already flooding the bridge from astern poured down through the coning tower hatch into the conning tower, I ordered the starboard fuel oil tank, which had no damage, expressed using compressed air as the fuel could not be used anyway and we converted the fuel oil tank for use as a ballast tank and the boat righted itself again a bit higher out of the water, so that you did not always have the feeling that the boat threatened to sink over the stern. When the rain stopped, all men could individually go into the boat to provide themselves with dry clothes and the cook supplied each man with fruit preserves, so that everyone could strengthen themselves against the foreseeable end of the boat. The crew made final preparations in case "All man overboard" was ordered. It was particularly important to stay close together in the water and a number of life jackets were joined with safety line to which they could attach themselves when needed and could rest.

	When at 07.00 hours we passed Kaptl Kapitzky, who had been wrapped in a hammock, into the sea with a hurrah for our brave Commander, the aircraft, favored by the


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	end of the rain, tried to attack U-615 attack again with depth charges. One hour after the unsuccessful air attacks we saw on our starboard side at 500-1000 meters distance a low shadow, which we believed was the bridge silhouette of a German U-boat. Because of the hopeless situation in which we found ourselves, reason was outweighed for a moment and we believed in the possibility that U-159 (Oblt. Beckmann) was before us, although he had not reported from the Caribbean since 13 July despite the request of the B.d.U. But then distrust outweighed the wishful thinking and I ordered U-615 to steer in a dark rain front to show a slim silhouette of our boat.

	That our skepticism was justified was proven only after the war. U-159 had already been sunk on 15 July in the Caribbean with the Engineering Officer Klaus Idel of my Crew. There were no survivors. From the reports of the battle, it was clear that the aircraft had ceased their attacks at that time because they could not recognize friend from foe in the radar.

	Because after 07.00 hours MEZ, 01.00 hours local time on 7 August U-615 settled aft again despite frequent re-blowing deeper, I prepared all the men for the imminent sinking of the boat. Still the men with Obermaschinist Schrade remained at their battle stations in the E-motor room until the very end. They had to remain there helpless through the heavy bomb detonations behind the stern of the boat. Your eyes were presented with a scary situation by the water mass, which had come from an invisible point in the boat, reinforced by the stern down angle gave the impression that the boat might sink at any time, which they could hardly escape on the long walk through the diesel room to the control room and from there to the bridge.

	What these men experienced in the machinery spaces during the many hours of battle and the struggle for the preservation of the boat,


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	overcoming their suffering and fear of death surpasses the imagination of the average person, this would require the epilogue of a poet's mouth. For me it was the simple heroism of German U-boat men.

	At 08.00 hours German time again a wave washed into the conning tower hatch and into the control room requiring stronger blowing, it was clear to us that due to the reported compressed air supply and increasingly shorter intervals of re-blowing, the boat would only stay afloat until around 12.00 hours MEZ or 06.00 hours in the morning local time. We now entered the eagerly anticipated period of twilight in the hope of being spotted and then to have a chance at salvation. As the water in the E-motor room was so high that a short circuit of the motors had to be expected, all men except for the Officers in the control room and the Control Room Mate, which on orders had to operate the hull closures of the boat for the sinking of U-615, were ordered out of the boat. At 11.25 hours MEZ the Engineering Officer reported the failure of the air compressor, which had so far allowed us to survive. From then on, we only counted the minutes until the last compressed air would be consumed.

	At 05.47 hours local time in the early dawn the American destroyer "WALKER" (DD 517) came in sight. After it approached to a shorter distance the war ensign was hoisted on U-615, all men except for the Officers on board went overboard, and the hull valves were then opened as ordered. As the bow of U-615 went under, the Control Room Mate Abel, the Chief Engineer and the Second Watch Officer jumped from the bridge into the sea and as Commander of U-615 for the last twelve hours I then left the bridge with a jump to swim to my men. With three cheers our boat sank to the bottom of the Caribbean 4000 meters below with the flag waving.

	According to the logbook of the destroyer "WALKER" the destroyer sighted the boat in diving condition at 05.47 hours local time, in position


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	12°-56'-48'' N and 64°-54'-18'' W and men gathered around an inflatable boat were sighted at 06.07 hours local time. The destroyer conducted a sound pursuit in the area near the dinghy until a huge explosion was heard, apparently triggered by the detonation of 14 torpedoes by the great water pressure at a depth of 4000 meters. A wicked punch to the body was felt by the men floating in the water. The destroyer had just taken two men of the swimming group on board, when he suddenly took up great speed and moved away from our group on a zig-zag course. In an effort to give the enemy no insight into the effectiveness of its attacks, the solution was found to say in the interview by the enemy Interrogating Officers, that the Commandant had stayed on board and gone down with the boat. This was later followed by each crew member. The men on the boat then reported the now-extinguished life of our brave protector Helmut Langner. Had we fought on land, our Oberbootsmannsmaat would have a chance of survival, albeit with loss of a leg, but now he had to share the fate of many U-boat men, who on ill-equipped and not suitable for combat against aircraft U-boats were severely wounded, and remained without medical care until the sinking of the boat or their death.

	One tragedy of this kind took place on 24 August to U-185 (Kaptl. Maus) after U-Maus had taken a part of the crew of U-604 (Kaptl. Höltring), which was bombed and not able to dive. When U-185 was bombed by aircraft from the U.S. aircraft carrier CARD and abandoned by its crew, Kaptl. Höltring had to shoot at their request two seriously wounded men of his own crew for which no rescue was possible. Kaptl. Höltring also went to his death with U-185.

	When the destroyer "WALKER" first ran off we feared that it would not return for our rescue due to the U-boat danger, but then the destroyer came back at 07.20 hours, again


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	approached the group and began to set out boarding nets by which we came on board, while American sailors with their machine pistol stood at the rail and took us for reception.

	The Officers were immediately separated from the rest of the crew members and the Security Officer of the "WALKER" noted in the logbook the taking aboard of a dead man in the boat, and the capture of three officers and 40 men. Three men with gunshot wounds, one with splinter injuries and other men with contusions and lacerations were treated medically. Then all got a hot shower for the first time since 12 June and received new khaki pants and shirts. A ship's doctor always took care of every issue, and the officers were housed in the cabin of the First Officer.

	The treatment of German prisoners of war aboard the destroyer was characterized by chivalry, equivalent to the best naval tradition.

	According to an entry in the logbook, the destroyer continued the search for the submarine, supported by two aircraft and two cutters of the Navy until the morning of 8 August and then continued to Port of Spain, Trinidad.

	On Sunday morning at 10.15 hours (on 8 August) they brought all the prisoners on deck. The American ship's carpenter had made a stretcher at the starboard railing, and on it Oberbootsmannsmaat Helmut Langner was laid out wrapped in a hammock.

	On the bridge deck of the "WALKER" a platoon of American sailors was set out in white uniforms with rifles, while the free watch observed from everywhere. The U-boat men with their beards stood perfect order in front of their dead comrade, to give in a convincing manner a picture of the soldierly spirit at the heart of the German Navy to pay their last respects to their fallen comrade with a triple Harrah.

	When the First Seaman of U-615 slipped from the stretcher of the destroyer "WALKER" into the sea, the American sailors who were bitter enemies just a few hours ago, shot to honor and salute the brave enemy. At 17.03 hours the


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	same day the destroyer made fast at the east side of Pier 1, Port of Spain. The prisoners were blindfolded and taken ashore. Until transfer to a prisoner and interrogation camp in the United States, they were brought to a Marine camp, where they found blameless treatment according to the Geneva Convention.

	In the U.S., some sailors were taken to the interrogation camp in Fort Meade, likewise our Engineering Officer, where American and British Intelligence officers interrogated them concerning details of the boat, weapons, diving depth and the U-boat Force overall. They were helped by a Gefreiter Drechsler of U-118, who under different names was put in the cells of just captured U-boat people to examine them. And when they answered the questions of an allegedly innocent comrade, the Americans heard everything through hidden microphones. However, with an unerring instinct [the prisoners] soon smelled out the snitch, and then the Americans sent the useless defector, probably mindlessly, with about 3000 other naval prisoners in the Papago Park Naval Prison Camp. When he was approached there by Rolf Wizuy of U-615 about his spying activities, he did not reveal himself, but became lost in lies and excuses. A group of 30 U-boat people asked to make a judgment about the traitor. When the camp spokesman initially wanted to inform the German camp leader, Fregattenkapitan Wattenberg, the men opposed it because they thought that Drechsler could still be dangerous to them and as described in "Die Gefangenen" (from Carrell/Böddeker pages 78-91) adjudicated the death sentence by hanging. They struck down the powerful Dreschler who violently fought back and put a noose around his neck and hanged the unconscious man in a washing barracks.

	A U.S. military court sentenced seven men to death for that offense, including 5 men from U-615. They were: Helmut Fischer, at the time of the offense 21 years old, Günt Külsen, 21 years old, Fritz Franke, 20 years old, Bernard Reyak 20 years old and Rolf Wizuy, 22 years old.


	- 114 -

	Helmut Fischer said, like all the others standing on his actions, "Therefore, the execution of Dreschler only happened because we have to fight for our country as German soldiers as prisoners of war. Dreschler was a traitor, and therefore he had no right to continue to live among us."

	After the defeat of Germany, on 26 August 1945 in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the convicted were led to the gallows Helmut Fischer said to his other comrades: "We will die as upright Germans - just as we have lived." and everyone nodded in agreement and went to death with this attitude.

	The sinking of U-615 and the captivity of the crew in the United States and later in Attichy, France until 1946/1947, the memorable patrols of the boat and the story of her crew including its final conclusion, the battle of U-615 was one of morality, courage and toughness. It later spurred journalistic interest and meticulous historical development on the part of Americans and probably one of the most comprehensive tributes provided a German U-boat, the Washington Post ran on 20 November 1943 a comprehensive report under the title "U-Boat Sunk After Ten-Hour Battle With Seven U.S. Planes. One Flying Boat and Crew of Ten Lost, Blimp Forced Down and Pilot of Another Plane Killed in Savage Fight."

	And in the December issue of Reader's Digest from 1945 a representation of the events of 6 and 7 August 1943 appeared by a winner of the Pulitzer Prize renovated under the heading: "The silence was invisible under the sea". Finally, U-615 was given a more extensive mention in Vol. X of the "History of United States Naval Operations in


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	World War II" by S.E. Morison page195-197.

	Morison’s work is based on reports of the pilots and air crew involved in the battle against U-615, among others the attack phases was described as follows: Lt.(jg) O.R. Christian from squadron VP-204 in Trinidad, describes the attack of the PBM3S at 18.25 hours by Lt.(jg) J.W. Dresbach for the record: Sun to the NW, 010° above the horizon. The attack was intended to be from astern. Cumulus 4, base 2000 feet, bombs: 4 MK 44 with Torpex, 2 MK 17 with TNT, 1 MK 24.

	The submarine headed about 300°, but slowly turned to starboard as we approached. It opened fire from the conning tower at us as we were 1000 feet away. Still in a dive on the boat Lt.(jg) Dresbach was hit in the chest and arm. With his last strength he triggered the bombs, then I saw him slump and make a motion that I should take control of the aircraft in his pilot's seat. I pulled the aircraft out of the dive to start a new attack. Lt.(jg) Dresbach was brought to the forward room where he died. Lt.(jg) Hilbert took the pilot's seat to help me. At 18.30 hours we came out of the clouds and Lt.(jg) Hilbert started a 50° nose-dive to drop the bombs from 1900 feet altitude. Only one exploded on the port side of the boat from 100-200 feet and caused no damage. The boat fired all the time as we flew this attack.

	Casualties:
	Lt.(jg) Dresbach killed in action,
	E.H. Baites, gunner, wounded in the leg, large blood loss,
	H.E. Kerr, bombardier, shot on the left side, three broken ribs, wounded in the leg and hip,
	Lt.(jg) T.M. Hurley, in the face by splinters from the instrument panel,
	P.R. Lannigan, radio operator and radar man, wrist injury by bullet fragments.
	The plane had 14 bullet holes, all apparently from 30 caliber fire.


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	2 holes above the bow gunner’s window,
	2 holes above bombardier’s window,
	2 holes in the port nacelle,
	1 hole in glass above second pilot’s seat,
	2 holes in the radar housing,
	2 holes in the starboard nacelle,
	1 hole through blade of the starboard propeller.

	In addition, the air speed indicator was shot through, the rate of climb indicator, the absolute altimeter, both artificial horizons, compass system and the automatic pilot.

	Lannigan, the radio operator reported:
	On the D/C run I was on the flight deck, standing up beside the radar. When we were quite a way from the sub, I saw puffs of smoke coming from the port side of the conning tower and then the tracers coming at us. I could feel our plane getting hit. I could see men on the submarine. The conning tower seemed full of people. I could watch our machine gun fire. The first shots hit to the starboard side then the port side of the conning tower. I did not see any of the men fall, but I do not know how they kept from being hit. The bullets were going right into them.

	E.J. Ruff, rear cannon, reported:
	I saw the explosions of the depth charges. Instead of four explosions there was just one huge explosion. It was 25-30 feet astern of the submarine. The explosion shook the sub so violently that it that it then staggered back and forth at a sharp angle of heel to starboard. I returned the fire of the boat with about 100 rounds of 50 caliber machine gun it and the tracers were hitting the conning tower of the submarine. Also, I saw the demolition bomb explode at the port side the boat. In this attack, I shot about 50 rounds with the machine gun and scored hits on the tower.

	Lt. Crockett in Mariner 205-P-11 suffered no casualties,


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	but the aircraft was damaged by 6 bullet holes, probably due to fire of the 30 caliber namely:
	1 bullet hole in the port wing tip,
	1 shrapnel hit in the port wing tip one bullet hole in the port float,
	1 bullet hole in the port engine cowling under the No. 8 cylinder, resulting in a loss of oil 4 gallons per hour,
	1 bullet hole in the starboard gull wing, which caused the fire and a shot through the starboard cargo space, this hit put the compass out of action and even pierced the ceiling of the aircraft to the outside.

	The much faster Lockheed Ventura bomber, however received no hits.

	The final report of the Trinidad Bomber Command on the evaluations of the officers and crews of the aircraft involved by Naval Intelligence begins with the statement that this was one of the greatest battles of this war fought between aircraft and an enemy submarine.

	This report of life and death on board a type VIIC U-boat in the years 1942-1943 is dedicated to the dead comrades from U-615 and those who proved themselves as men, although most of them were only around 20 years old. However, also about the brave enemy, many of whom had German names.

	The crew of U-615 in August 1943 consisted of the following officers and men:


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	1. Kapitänleutnant Ralph Kapitzky, Commander, Dresden, 27;
	2. Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Schlipper, First Watch Officer, Mülheim-Ruhr, 23;
	3. Oberleutnant zur See Klaus von Egan-Krieger, Second Watch Officer, Magdeburg, 23;
	4. Oberleutnant Ing. Herbert Skora, Engineering Officer,Swinemünde, 33;
	5. Obersteuermann Hans Peter Dittmer, Third Watch Officer, Hamburg, 26;
	6. Oberrsaschinist Eugen Schrade, Hausen/Meu-Ulm, 33;
	7. Obermaschinist Rudolf Buhlig, Gotenhafen, 32;
	8. Oberbootsmannsmaat Helmut Langner, Breslau, 25;
	9. Bootsmannsmaat Albert Zimmermann, Kastl/Kemnath, 23;
	10. Bootsmannsmaat Heinz Wilke, Euskirchen, about 23;
	11. Torpedo-Mechanikersmaat Günter Brauer, Helmstedt, about 23;
	12. Funkmaat Josef Schumann, München, about 23;
	13. Funkmaat Theo Schultheiß, Nürnberg, about 23;
	14. Obermaschinistenmaat Martin Schnelle, Rostock, about 23;
	15. Maschinistenmaat Stefan Lehner, München, about 23;
	16. Maschinistenmaat Viktor Drobek, Brieg/Breslau, about 23;
	17. Maschinistenmaat Heinz Bluhm, Rügenwalde, about 23;
	18. Maschinistenmaat Edmund Kotzian, Wehlen/Ieobschütz about 25;
	19. Maschinistenmaat Reinhold Abel, Kleeberg/Arnswalde, about 23;


	- 119 -

	20. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Richard Suhra, Breslau, about 22;
	21. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Hans Krohn, Stettin, about 21;
	22. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Fritz Steppat, Kulmen/Hohensalzburg, Ostpr., about 22;
	23. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Gerhard Diesing, Gelsenkirchen, about 22;
	24. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Rudolf Mahnke, Hamburg, about 21;
	25. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Erwin Kahlert, Kehrisch/Strehlen, about 22;
	26. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Kurt Alexander, Borkenau/Sensburg, about 21;
	27. Matrosen-Gefreiter Alfred Daus, Marsow/Schlawe, Pom., about 21;
	28. Matrosen-Gefreiter Herbert Ender, Siegersdorf/Strehlen, Schles., about 20;
	29. Matrosen-Gefreiter Herbert Fricke, Rieder/Ostharz, about 20;
	30. Matrosen-Gefreiter Heinz Koehler, Issigau/Hof, about 20;
	31. Matrosen-Gefreiter Alois Koegelmeier, Oberkoellnbach/Landshut, about 20;
	32. Funk-Obergefreiter Helmut Fischer, Ravensburg, about 21;
	33. Funk-Obergefreiter Heinz Ehlers, Neumünster, about 21;
	34. Torpedomechaniker-Obergefreiter Rolf Wizuy, Berlin, 21;
	35. Torpedomechaniker-Obergefreiter Walter Zimmermann, Rogetz/Magdeburg, about 21;
	36. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Walter Mamczak, Beuna, about 22;


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	37. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Bernhard Reyak, Neuss/Rh., 20;
	38. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Rolf Haase, Chemnitz, about 21;
	39. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Josef Faus, Köln/Rh., about 21;
	40. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Otto Marx, Koethen/Klepzig, about 21;
	41. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Hans Meisch, Zscherben/Halle, about 21;
	42. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Josef Pruß, Hagen-Haspe, about 21;
	43. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Fritz Franke, Zielenzig/Neumark, 20;
	44. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Erwin Bischof, Breslau, 20;
	45. Maschinen-Gefreiter Günter Külsen, Düsseldorf, 21;
	46. Maschinen-Gefreiter Johannes Hartmann, Duisburg, about 20;
	47. Maschinen-Gefreiter Karl-Heinz Lehr, Frankfurt/M., about 20;
	48. Matrose II Hermann Schulz, Offleben/Brschwg., about 20.

	Of the crew of U-615 that were killed:

	1. Bootsmannsmaat Heinz Wilke shot by aircraft on 14 June 1943 in the Bay of Biscay,
	2. Obersteuermann Hans Peter Dittmer shot by aircraft on 6 August 1943 in the Caribbean,
	3. Matrosen-Obergefreiter Richard Suhra lost overboard on 6 August 1943,
	4. Kapitänleutnant Ralph Kapitzky on 7 August1943, after being heavily wounded by aircraft fire,
	5. Oberbootsmannsmaat Hemut Langner on 7 August 1943 after being heavily wounded by aircraft fire.

	And in captivity by an American


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	military court death sentence for killing a spy and traitor:

	6. Funk-Obergefreiter Helmut Fischer on 25 August 1945,
	7. Meehaniker-Obergefreiter Rolf Wizuy on 25 August 1945,
	8. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Bernhard Reyak on 25 August 1945,
	9. Maschinen-Obergefreiter Fritz Franke on 25 August 1945,
	10. Maschinen-Gefreiter Günter Külsen on 25 August 1945.

	(See: Carell/Böddeker, Die Gefangenen [The prisoners], pages 74- 91, Ullstein-Verlag, 1980).














	© Jonathan Rosenberg 2014 - all rights reserved

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	1st patrol - North Atlantic	5 SEP - 30 OCT 42

	2nd patrol - North Atlantic	25 NOV 42 - 9 JAN 43

	3rd patrol - North Atlantic	18 FEB 43 - 23 APR 43

	4th Patrol - Caribbean	5 SEP 42 - 30 OCT 42
	Reconstructed KTB