REPORT OF PROCEEDING 1000 Z /21 - 2000 Z /24 February 1943.
 
(WITH O.N. (S) 167,  O.N. 166 and U.S.C.G. "CAMPBELL")
 
     
 
From: C.O.  O.R.P.  "BURZA".
   
Date: 1/3/43.
   
To: COMTASK 24.
 
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          At 1100 Z /21 "BURZA" was detached from escort of O.N. (S) 167 to overtake and reinforce O.N. 166, in accordance with C. in C. W.A.'s 0932a/21.  Speed was 16-1/2 knots, prudent maximum for one boiler.  
     
          The estimated position of O.N. 166 given in this signal from C. in C. W.A., was such that I expected to join at about 0500 Z /22.  When C.T.U. 24.1.3's 1625 Z /21 was received giving a position much ahead of the estimate and the speed of the convoy as 9 knots and not 6, it was obvious the "BURZA" could not join until the evening of the 22nd.  My 0209 Z /22 was therefore despatched.  
     
          At 0755 Z /22 flashes of gunfire were sighted ahead and slightly to port.  On closing, at 0938 Z /22, a burning merchant vessel was sighted.  My 1004 Z /22 informed S.O.  Course was altered towards and at 1034 Z /22 two submarines at a range of not less than 10 miles were sighted.  The merchant ship was the NYY. "NIELSEN ALONSO" abandoned and burning abaft the bridge.  The submarines dived on being sighted and Enemy Report was sent at 1043 Z /22.  It was assumed that these "U" Boats had been having a little target practice on the "NIELSEN ALONSO".  Meantime, C.T.U. 24.1.3's 1002 Z /22 had been received giving the position of O.N. 166 as only about 30 miles from "BURZA".  This later turned out to be wrong, and revised position was sent at 1400 Z /22.  
     
          As she was a danger to navigation and to prevent the enemy known to be in the vicinity from getting any information from her the "NIELSEN ALONSO" was sunk by torpedo at 1116 Z /22.  My 1140 Z /22 informed S.O.  In view of the fact that the conservation of fuel was vital and the convoy had to be overtaken at the earliest possible time, no signal was sent to obtain permission to sink the ship.  It was considered that "BURZA" could not steam round waiting for the reply in the circumstances.  After the sinking, course was resumed for overtaking the convoy at 18 knots.  
     
          "DIANTHUS" was sighted at 1515 Z and some signals regarding position of O.N. 166 were exchanged.  My 1810 Z /22 to S.O. reported the fact that "DIANTHUS" was 5 miles astern of me.  
     
          At 1530 Z /22 speed was reduced to 12 knots on account of heavy swell right ahead.  Signal to this effect was sent to 1801 Z to U.S. Destroyer "SPENCER".  Reply timed 1945 Z requested "BURZA's" presence urgently in convoy and speed of 20 knots to catch up, also to take station in position "P" on arrival.  
     
          Speed was therefore increased to 16 knots (which was the maximum possible in the existing weather) at 1952 Z.  
     
          Contact was finally established with the convoy by R.D.F. at 2030 Z range 11 miles, right ahead.  On closing the convoy from astern, a corvette, presumably in position "S" challenged "BURZA" by light.  This was answered.  At 2102 Z signal was sent to "SPENCER" saying BURZA would be in station by 2200 Z.  
     
          At 2120 Z, when about 4000 yards abreast the last ship in the port column, two explosions were heard in the convoy and smoke and flame were seen to be coming from two ships in convoy in a position which indicated that the attack had come from the port side of the convoy.  All merchant ships at once fired snowflake rockets and some escorts opened fire with starshell, some of which was right above "BURZA".  
     
          At 2124 Z as this illumination was making "BURZA" a splendid target for "U" Boats suspected to be to port, "ACTION STATIONS" were "sounded Off" and starshell fired on ship's port bow and beam at 2129 Z in the hopes that "U" Boats might be discovered.  R.D.F. 271 had been ordered to sweep from ahead to 1200 on the port side but neither starshell nor R.D.F. disclosed anything.  Course was still shaped to taking up position "P".  
     
          At 2135 Z, Asdic Operator reported an echo bearing 190 (Red 60) range 1200 yards.  Ship went in to attack with D/Cs and at 2145 Z a pattern was dropped.  Contact was maintained and at 2156 Z a second attack was delivered.  This was considered very accurate, but submarine being in the middle of the pattern.  The contact then indicated that the "U" boat was surfacing and immediately R.D.F. watch on the position was ordered.  Senior Officer had been advised on R/T.  
     
     

 

     

   
        At 2205 Z, "U" Boat was sighted from the bridge fine on the starboard bow.  Ship was turned towards for a ram, but "U" Boat was inside ship's turning circle.  It was too close to record on R.D.F. Screen by Asdic, which had lost contact, regained it with both H.E. and Echo.  The order to "Open Fire" was given at once and both Oerlikons and the Hotchkiss on the starboard side opened up as well as the pom-pom.  Even at that close range, it was extremely difficult to see the target as drizzle started at this critical time.  "Cease Fire" was ordered after one minute at 2206 Z as target was lost to view.  It was presumed "U" Boat dived and, during a thorough Asdic Search of the area, a doubtful contact was obtained.  A further D/C attack was carried out with unknown results.  Contact was then lost and not regained.  Course was shaped to re-join convoy and signal was received from "SPENCER" asking "BURZA" to screen him while he picked up survivors.  Reply was sent at 2311 Z asking for his position.  He stated that he was in position A.  Being at this time still about eight miles astern of the convoy due to the attacks on the "U" Boat, course was shaped to get to position A at 16 knots.  (It has since been discovered that it was TRILLIUM" who sent the signal asking me to screen him, but secondary Call Signs were being used and had not been passed to "BURZA".
 
          When about 2 miles astern of the convoy, signal timed 2315 Z was received from "SPENCER" giving orders for "BURZA" to close "CAMPBELL" who had been damaged, immediately, and take her in tow.  "CAMPBELL's" position relative to the convoy was included.  Course was altered towards this position at 2324 Z.  While proceeding , at 16 knots, "TRILLIUM" was passed who said he was acting as Rescue Ship and picking up survivors from a torpedoed merchant ship.  
     
          At 0034 Z/23, challenges were inter-changed with a warship which turned out to be "CAMPBELL".  
     
          "CAMPBELL" then signaled that he had a submarine on port quarter and advised me not to open fire on it as his boat was alongside taking off survivors.  I noticed that S.O.S. was being flashed continuously from the "U" Boat so closed it.  "CAMPBELL" then again warned me not to "Open Fire" saying "Our men are on sub."  and followed this with a "Close us".  I asked what assistance he required and was told to "Stand By."  At 0015 Z I sent "Shall I prepare to take you in tow".  "CCAMPBELL" replied "We will not permit you to tow us.  Please stand by to screen us".  Finally, it was decided to circle "CAMPBELL" at 8000 yards.  At 0125 Z "CAMPBELL" sent "It would be better if some other ship towed and you screened.  Suggest you tell Escort Commander".  I replied "My orders are to take you in tow and I am sure no other escort can be spared".  At 0207 Z a 61 group code from "CAMPBELL" was received for transmission to "SPENCER" this was sent at 0220 Z.  In it, it was stated that it was extremely unwise for "BURZA" to tow and suggested that a suitable vessel be detached from the convoy immediately for the job and "BURZA" screen.  
     
          At 0227 Z, signal was received from "CAMPBELL" asking me to pick up remaining survivors from the "U" Boat.  It should be pointed out that the submarine was about 3,000 yards from "CAMPBELL".  At 0305 Z /23, I had closed "U" Boat within 100 yards.  I lowered nets down the ship's sides to enable survivors to climb aboard and then, by loud-hailer, ordered them to swim across.  There wa a heavy swell and "U" Boat's deck was awash so I could not safely go in any closer.  Three men swam across.  One was picked up at once, another unavoidably got caught in the starboard propeller and was not seen again while the third was taken onboard after 50 minutes.  Six men were still standing on the bridge shouting that they had wounded and begging me to lower a boat.  At 0420 Z I did this and at 0503 Z boat returned with five survivors.  The sixth, who refused to jump in the water, had to be left as the boat could not go alongside the "U" Boat with its deck awash.  
     
          At 0500 Z, I closed "CAMPBELL" and continued screening at 2,000 yards.  From SPENCER's" 0305 Z /23 it seemed likely that "U" Boats were approaching our position.  I decided that to sink the "U" Boat by gunfire in the dark too big a risk of giving away "CAMPBELL's" position and would wait until daylight.  R.D.F. contact with the damaged "U" Boat was maintained till 0620 Z and then suddenly disappeared.  It had not drifted very far in the time and so the position of the last contact was closed during the circling of "CAMPBELL" but no trace of the submarine was found.  As the submarine had a list to starboard and her decks awash, it was considered that she could not dive on account of damage to pressure-hull.  As R.D.F. conditions were good and the visibility of daylight up to 15 miles, I consider it was impossible for the "U: Boat to have escaped on the surface.  It can be safely assumed, therefore, that it sank when R.D.F. lost contact.  It is pertinent to add that, had the remainder of the crew intended to get the "U" Boat under way again, it is extremely unlikely that the Chief Engineer (who was one of my prisoners) would have left the boat.  
     
          In view of C.T.U. 24.1.3's 0435 Z /23, I sent my 0859 /23 to "CAMPBELL" giving the situation as I knew it.  His reply received at 1010 indicated that he could fuel me at the rate of 10 to 20 tons per hour but I considered it too risky to fuel without another escort as screen.  He was banking on towing ship being detached from O.N. 167.  In the meantime, C. in C. W.A.'s 1001 Z /23 was received.  My 0822 /23  
     
     

 

     

   
was then sent suggesting that survivors and some of the crew be transferred in "CAMPBELL's motor boat.  (My motor boat had been damaged by weather and could not be used.)  This operation was begun at 1210 Z and went on until 1600 Z.  COMTASK's 24's 1418 /23 confirmed that operation should be carried out.  My 1613 Z /23 informed COMTASK 24 of the situation, and indicated that I could remain with "CAMPBELL" only until mid-day on the 24th.
 
          Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force's 1352 Z /23 informed me that "TENACITY" had sailed with "NANAIMO" as escort overtaking her.  I also received COMTASK 24's 1629 Z /23 instructing "SALISBURY" to proceed to "CAMPBELL's" assistance.  COMTASK 24's 2005 Z /23 advised me that "SALISBURY" might be expected at about dusk on the 24th; this signal also requested me to make every effort to remain with "CAMPBELL" until "SALISBURY's" arrival.  
     
          A cypher from "CAMPBELL" was enciphered and transmitted at 1835 Z /23 to COMTASK 24.  
     
          I passed night intentions at 1547 to "CAMPBELL".  The night passed without incident.  
     
          C. in C. W.A.'s 0152 Z /24 to escorts of O.N. 167 indicated that an escort would be detached at daylight when the convoy was closest to "CAMPBELL's" position.  H.M.S. "HARVESTER's" 0840 Z /24 confirmed this and "DAUPHIN" joined at 1300 Z /24.  He had ordered to screen me while I refueled from "CAMPBELL" and then proceed to ST.JOHN'S.  I considered furling was impracticable (See my 2114 Z /24 owing to lack of necessary gear in "CAMPBELL".  THis was proved by the fact that "DAUPHIN fueled and got 7 tons in two hours, 2-1/2 inch canvas hose was used but the tow was about 300 feet and pressure thereby reduced.  
     
          By this time my fuel position was becoming serious and leaks in feed water tanks aggravated the situation, I was eager to leave at the earliest moment but "DAUPHIN" and "CAMPBELL" arranged the oiling between themselves so I had to remain as screen.  Finally, when "DAUPHIN" threatened to take "CAMPBELL" in tow, I could wait no longer so proceeded to St. John's.  My 2114 Z /24 reported situation to Shore Authorities.  
     
          "SALISBURY" did not arrive at dusk on the 24th., as he went to O.N. 167 to fuel.  I therefore ordered "DAUPHIN" to remain with "CAMPBELL" till "SALISBURY's" arrival as he had five days fuel remaining and I had only enough for three days at 12 knots.  Course was shaped for St. John's at 2033 Z/24, which was reached at 1306 Z /27 without further incident.  
     
          Seven prisoners, 50 survivors and 120 of "CAMPBELL's crew were landed on arrival.  
     
     
  DISTRIBUTION:  
     
                                  COPIES:        4 Capt. "D" Greenock.  
                                                         1 H.M.S. "HARVESTER".  
                                                         1 U.S. Destroyer "SPENCER".  
     
                                                         (Sgd.)  Gitutko Lt.Cmdr.  
     
                                                                    COMMANDING OFFICER.