UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
     
  A16-3(2)  
  Serial 0524  
  4/Rs  
     
 
From: The Atlantic Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
   
Subject: VC-9Anti-Submarine Action by Aircraft Report #9 dated May 22, 1943; Analysis of.
   
Enclosure: (A) Subject analysis.
 
     
          1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.  
     
          2. The squadron is deserving of considerable credit for its twenty-one hours of effective activity which was climaxed by the heretofore unheard of surrender of an enemy submarine’s crew to a carrier based airplane and by the sinking of the submarine itself.  It is considered that, in view of the training it conducted for the squadron prior to its convoy escort trip, the Aircraft Anti-Submarine Warfare Development Detachment Atlantic Fleet is in a large measure responsible for the efficiency of the attacks delivered and for the quantity of the results achieved.  
     
  3.  It is of particular interest to note that following this attack, none of the evidence (oil, debris, etc.) which ordinarily indicates the extent of damage inflicted was observed in the area.  
     
     
                                                                                                   
 
                                                                                                    P. R. HEINEMAN
  
 
 
     
     
     

 

 
 
     
 
ANALYSIS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY AIRCRAFT
     
     
  Unit report:  No. 9.  
  Airplane Type:  TBF-1.  
  Squadron No.:  7.  
  Pilot:  Lieutenant H.S. Roberts, USNR.  
  Unit:  VC-9.  
  Location of Attack –  Latitude      50-21 N.  
                                   Longitude   35-38 W.  
  Date:  May 22, 1943.  
  Time:  1740 (Zone plus 1).  
     
          1.  The airplane was flying at an altitude of 3000 feet, widely circling a smoke float which had been dropped at the position of an attack made by another plane of the squadron about 36 minutes before.  The weather was clear with unlimited ceiling, 15 miles visibility, and scattered clouds at 3000 feet altitude.  Radar was not being used.  At a range of one mile and on the port beam, the gunner and the radioman obtained a sight contact on a submarine coming to the surface.  A diving attack was begun immediately.  At an altitude of about 600 feet, airspeed 190 knots and target angle 1800, the pilot released two Mark 44 depth bombs and two Mark 17 depth bombs all with fuses set to function at 25 feet and spaced by intervalometer with setting 80 feet.  At the time the bombs hit the water the submarine was fully surfaced, and two distinct explosion areas were seen to straddle the submarine midway between its conning tower and stern.  The submarine was seen to rise out of the water, sink below the surface, and then rise again, apparently lying on its side, and with its bow well out of the water.  After floundering for a short time, the submarine went below and then rose again on an even keel.  The plane’s gunner then opened fire on the submarine and, when he ceased fire to change ammunition cans, 20 or 30 men appeared on the conning tower and began to wave a white cloth.  Gunfire was directed at these men in order to keep them below and prevent them scuttling their ship.  Instead, many of them jumped into the water, while some remained on board and continued to wave the white flag.  About one and one-half hours after the attack a destroyer arrived to take off survivors.  Very shortly thereafter the submarine sank stern first, and the plane departed, having been recalled to the ship.  
     
          2.  The conduct of this attack was excellent in every respect.  It is believed that this is the first time in history that the crew of a ship at sea has surrendered to a land plane.  It was apparent that the members of the submarine’s crew were surrendering themselves, but there was no guarantee that they intended to surrender their ship, which, if it could have been taken in tow by a surface vessel, would have proved a valuable prize.  For that reason it is considered that the use of gun fire in an attempt to prevent scuttling (a common practice) was proper.  
     
          3.  The report of this action was complete and well prepared.  The excellent series of 19 gun-camera photographs forwarded with the report provides a very good pictorial record of the action.  The 8 x 10 enlargement of one of the photographs is beautiful evidence of the effectiveness  
     
 
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ANALYSIS OF ANTI_SUBMARINE ACTION BY AIRRCRAFT
 
(continued)
  
     
  of the attack and of the difficulties being experienced by the submarine.  Three of the smaller pictures show rather violent air eruptions indicating that, in all probability, strenuous efforts were being made to regain the surface.  
     
          4.  The supplementary note forwarded with the series of reports states that this was the same submarine as the one which had been attacked 36 minutes before, and the reported bearings and distances from the convoy bear this out.  The geographical positions reported, however, are evidently in error as they indicate speeds far in excess of those attainable by any submarine or convoy.  
     
          5.  This attack came at the end of about 21 hours of effective anti-submarine activity on the part of the squadron concerned.  During this time, one sighting was obtained, and six attacks were delivered.  At least one of the submarines attacked was sunk, and the rough treatment received by the others should engender in the enemy a very healthy respect for the capabilities of our carrier based planes.  
     
          6.  As a result of this excellent attack the crew of the submarine surrendered, and the submarine itself was sunk.  
     
     
     
 
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