U. S. S. HAYTER
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(DE 212) |
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FILE No. DE212(TE)/A16-1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Serial No. FR/fx Care of Fleet Post Office | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
New York, New York, | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
17 May 1945. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CONFIDENTIAL | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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1. In compliance with reference (a) enclosures (A), (B), (C) and (D) are herewith forwarded. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FRED HUEY | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE TORPEDOING | ||
OF THE U.S.S. FREDERICK C. DAVIS |
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(DE-136) |
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At the time of her torpedoing the DAVIS was in a modified AFIRM material condition setting. This meant that in addition to a regular BAKER condition (with all XRAY and YOKE fittings closed) a number of the ZEBRA fittings, notably quick acting doors in transverse bulkheads between A-203-AL and A-204-L and C-203-L and C-204-L were kept dogged down. In addition all fittings below the first platform deck were secured in accordance with orders from the First Lieutenant. Special precautions were taken to limit damage aft in the event of a hit by an acoustic torpedo, which was regarded as the greatest threat. FXR gear was streamed. | ||
The watch was as follows: Officer -of-the-Deck, Lieut. (jg) J.E. McWhorter, Jr., J.O.O.D., Ensign R. E. Minerd; two lookouts on the flying bridge; a ready gun crew on number 2 3"50; ready gun crew on the twin 40MM; and a depth charge crew on the fantail. All four engines were on the main line. No. 2 generator located in B-2 had the power load. The electric plant wa not split plant. The fire main was split, the cut out valve in B-2 being secured. Pressure forward was supplied by fire and bilge pump in B-1 and pressure aft by a similar pump in B-3. The watch had been relieved at 0745; chow had been served - a few stragglers and mess-cooks were still in the mess hall; and 0810 the boatswain mate of the watch had passed the word for all hands to muster on stations and turn to. | ||
The DAVIS was steaming on a line of bearing normal to the base course 305°T, with the U.S.S. HAYTER, (DE-212) on the starboard beam, distance 3500 yards and the U.S.S. NUENZER the same distance on the port beam. Speed was 16.8 knots, 295 RPM. At approximately 0830 the sound man reported a sound contact on bearing 045° relative at a distance of about 2000 yards, and asked if that bearing were clear. The J.O.O.D. checked the bearing and reported it clear. Force of the sea at the time was about "Four". The J.O.O.D. asked, "What is the nature of the echo?" and the sound man replied that it was very clear and with low doppler. The sound man then reported that he had lost contact after the second echo. The submarine contact had dropped rapidly aft on the starboard side. Noise from the FXR gear interfered with the sound search as it dropped aft. At this point the O.O.D. ordered 'right standard rudder" and then informed the other ships by TBS that the DAVIS had a sound contact, and that she was dropping out of formation to investigate it. The J.O.O.D. went below to CIC to plot the contact should it be ragained. On his way down he passed Captain Crosby who was on his way up to the flying bridge. At this time the No. 2 3"50 gun was called and ordered to man the hedgehog, pull the pins and stand by to fire. As the DRT was being set up, Lieut. (jg) H. Astrin (CIC Officer) arriving in CIC and it is believed that Lieut, F. S. Bambauer (Executive Officer) entered at the same time. Sound contact was regained at 0835 and plotted from 0836 to 0839; however no good course or speed could be determined as the sound man had not started using BDI and was still giving cut-ons. The last plot before the explosion was at 0839 and gave a range of 650 yards; the bearing is believed to have been 080°T. | ||
At 0840 the DAVIS was struck by the torpedo on the port side in the vicinity of frame 61. The following description of the ship after the hit is based on the accounts given by those survivors who actually saw conditions as they existed in the several compartments and deck spaces. | ||
(ENCLOSURE A) | ||
S E C R E T | ||
Compartment A-203-L (the passageway and the crew's and CPO heads) was filled with smoke. The door to the crew's head, locked at the time, was blown off its hinges. A-204-L (passageway and CPO quarters) had more intense smoke and fumes. The fume-tight door to CPO quarters was jammed, so that exit had to be made via the escape scuttle. The ladder was red hot as was the gun crew shelter just above, (A-101-ACEL) which was subsequently seen to be full of flames. Little is known of the condition of A-205-L (Crew's berthing and messing) or the fate of its occupants other than the remark that "forward compartment hatches (doors) were not dogged down". A -206-L (the after mess-hall) suffered severe damage. Tables were tossed on top of each other and lights, as elsewhere, went out. The after bulkhead (frame 59) and the deck were so ruptured that both B-1 and the gyro IC room were exposed to view. Oil rushed out of the diesel oil overflow pipes and fires were raging. No survivors testimony is available as to the conditions in B-1 which apparently took the main impact of the torpedo. B-2 was seen from a topside hatch to be "a roaring furnace". Two men are known to have escaped from B-2, but both were badly burned and injured and did not survive. Two watch standers in B-3 managed to escape from that compartment. Upper level gratings were blown out of place, the emergency switchboard caught fire as did fuel oil filters by the engines and No. 4 engine was bent over. The bulkhead on the port side was caved in but apparently no water came in on this side. Water was coming in on the starboard side through a split seam or loose plates and also in a large stream by the emergency generator. Water pressure on the main lasted for three minutes until the fire and bilge pump in B-3 failed as water shorted out No. 3 ship's service generator which was supplying it with power. Blistered paint on the bulkheads indicated possible paint fire. B-3 flooded rapidly, with water reaching the upper gratings in an estimated one minute. The whole compartment was soon flooded up to the topside escape hatches. No account was offered as to the conditions in B-4 as at the time of this writing, the only survivor has not yet been able to give his account. C-201-L were secured immediately. In C-202-L the steam line broke on the portside over bunk 313. The hatch leading topside to passageway A-101-ACEL was jammed and could not be properly dogged down. Doors between C-202-L and C-203-L were secured immediately. No damage was reported in C-203-L or any of the other compartments further aft, other than a jammed escape hatch in C-205-E, (after steering). Doors between C-203-L and C-204-L and C-205-E were secured after all occupants had gone forward. An observer on the fantail reported a huge gush of flame and smoke on the starboard side amidships, at the time of the torpedo hit. One man having just come out of the galley and proceeding down port quarterdeck was blown forward about ten feet just in time to witness the buckling of the weather deck. Survivors reports indicate that the weather deck buckled about frame 61 and also frame 100. Gaps of nine to ten inches were subsequently at frame 100. Reports on the machine shop are inconsistent. Some survivors reported fires raging and the deck split open while others make no mention of this. A CO2 bottle was seen expended in B-104 (20MM clipping room). Flames were reported issuing from the starboard side of the athwartships passageway (frame 99 to 101). The deck was observed hot and buckled. The ship's galley was ablaze and its equipment overturned. Nothing is known of the fate of the occupants of the officer's country other than a report that as seen from the gun crew shelter the wardroom was seen as filled with dense smoke and was very hot. A ready gun crew of four men led by Lieut. (jg) W. E. Downing was standing by the hedgehogs and they were prepared to fire. | ||
(ENCLOSURE A) | ||
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S E C R E T | ||
The mast broke near the yardarm; the upper part fell aft and dangled from the lower part of the rigging. A yeoman, after extricating himself from beneath an upset filing cabinet got out of the ship's office, noticing as he left that there was smoke and fire in the passageway and that the door to the radio shack was closed. The motor whaleboat was still in the skids. The J.O.O.D. reported dense smoke and fumes in CIC and the pilot house, and several doors were jammed. One occupant of the pilot house was seen to have badly broken legs and another was lying on the deck unconscious. Little is known of the conditions of the flying bridge. The O.O.D. was found dead inside the #2 3"50 gun shield having been hurled apparently to that position by the explosion. The starboard lookout similarly was seen hanging inboard from a belaying pin on the signal bridge having apparently been thrown down from the lookout sponson. No trace was seen of Captain Crosby. Lieut. Bombauer was seen by one observer to jump off the bridge. He is believed to have drowned as he had no life jacket. The messenger who was on watch on the bridge was seen swimming some distance from the ship, but he also had no life jacket. | ||
Members of the crew began to abandon ship on their own initiative soon after the explosion. Many individuals found it impossible to man their battle stations when they attempted to do so. No word was passed after the explosion. Life rafts, life nets, and shores were thrown off over the side with most of the men going off the port side which appeared most favorable for abandoning ship. As far as possible depth charges were checked to see if they were on "Safe". One survivor later reported that the charge in No. 5 K-gun had broken out of its arbor and couldn't be set on "Safe". Another reported that the cap was off the charge on No. 6 K-gun. At any rate one depth charge did explode while about twenty feet of the stern was still in the air, injuring many men in the water. | ||
The expansion about frame 61 appears to be the point at which the ship finally broke in two. The ship settled amidships, a port list developed and about seventeen minutes after the explosion the DAVIS was entirely beneath the waves. That the fantail stayed afloat as long as it did was probably due to the fact that personnel aft were able to dog down and secure most major water-tight fittings. | ||
(ENCLOSURE A) | ||
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S E C R E T | ||||||||
USS HAYTER (DE-212) |
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REPORT OF RESCUE OF SURVIVORS FROM THE U.S.S. FREDERICK C. DAVIS (DE-136) | ||||||||
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1. On the 24th of April 1945 the U.S.S. HAYTER (DE-212) was operating with CTU 22.7.1 as a unit of the scouting line. It was searching for an enemy submarine which carrier aircraft had definitely established as being in the area on the 23rd of April 1945. The HAYTER was steaming on a line of bearing, normal to the base course of 305° T, with the DAVIS on the port beam, distance 3500 yards, and beyond the DAVIS were the other ships in the scouting line. | ||||||||
2. At approximately 1030 Zebra, the DAVIS reported a sound contact on her starboard bow in the direction of, but forward of the HAYTER. At approximately this same time a HAYTER soundman also reported a sound contact to the officer of the deck, and executive officer of the HAYTER, who was also on the bridge at the time. The DAVIS reported the contact to CTU 22.7.1 by voice radio, stating that she was coming about to investigate the contact, which had by this time passed down between her and the HAYTER. The HAYTER and the rest of the scouting line slowed preparatory to giving the DAVIS whatever assistance was necessary. | ||||||||
3. While continuing to investigate her contact the DAVIS maneuvered so that her port beam was in line with the port quarter of the HAYTER, at a distance of 3500 yards. At 1040 Zebra, the DAVIS was struck by a torpedo on the port side amidships. From the bridge of the HAYTER bellows of smoke could be seen rising from the DAVIS and she crumpled amidships. The top of the foremast of the Davis was broken and was only prevented from crashing to the deck by the various guylines. The HAYTER immediately reported to CTU 22.7.1 that the DAVIS had been torpedoed. The HAYTER with the other ships in the scouting line was ordered to pick up contact on the submarine, and the U.S.S. FLAHERTY was ordered to standby to pick up survivors. | ||||||||
4. The HAYTER commenced an observant around the stricken DAVIS, which was by this time fast settling in the water. The FLAHERTY picked up contact on the submarine first, at which time the HAYTER was ordered to replace the FLAHERTY in the rescue of survivors. At approximately fifteen minutes after the DAVIS was torpedoed she sank slowly beneath the waves. Survivors from the DAVIS were clinging to life rafts, nets and shores, which had been thrown over the side, while others held on to pieces of wood struggling to stay afloat in the water. | ||||||||
5. The HAYTER commenced a circular sweep, stopping often, around the outside of the area where the survivors were located. Individual survivors were first brought to the side of HAYTER by members of the HATER crew who thoughtless of their own life or injury jumped from the side of the ship into rough and shark infested waters. These individual survivors were then brought to the side of the ship by rescuers were lines were secured about them from the deck. | ||||||||
(ENCLOSURE B) | ||||||||
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S E C R E T | ||
USS HAYTER (DE-212) |
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REPORT OF RESCUE OF SURVIVORS FROM THE U.S.S. FREDERICK C. DAVIS (DE-136) | ||
6. These men were assisted or hauled aboard, the majority of them being unable to assist themselves. Heaving lines were thrown to rafts and life nets, thus enabling the rafts and nets to be pulled alongside of the HAYTER and making it possible to remove the survivors from them. The crew members of the HAYTER went into the rafts to assist the survivors aboard and in one instance the HAYTER was forces to leave a raft on which there were three of the HAYTER crew members and an unconscious survivor, whom they were trying to assist aboard. These men were not picked up until approximately one and one half hours later. The HAYTER also used empty depth charge cases with buoy lines attached, which were thrown from the "K" guns. Individual survivors clung to this buoy line and it was then possible to pull the survivors to the side of the ship and bring them aboard. After the majority of life rafts and nets had been emptied of survivors the ship's boat was put into the water with a volunteer crew to pick up the single survivors remaining. It was under extreme difficulties that the boat was launched due to the roughness of the seas and the roll of the ship and at many times it appeared that the boat was about to be swamped. In fact, when the boat returned to the ship and commenced six inches of freeboard remained. | ||
7. The HAYLER remained in this area until 1644 Zebra during which period she had rescued sixty-six living survivors and eleven dead. Subsequently one of the living survivors died. All those who could be spared from their General Quarters stations took part in the rescue of survivors and in the administering of first aid and nursing. As brought out in enclosure (B), some men were revived by the artificial respiration given them by members of the crew of the HAYTER. | ||
8. At 1644 Zebra the HAYTER was ordered to proceed to the U.S.S. BOGUE to transfer survivors. All living survivors and four of the dead were transferred to the BOGUE, between 2123 and 2259 Zebra, using breeches buoys under extremely difficult conditions due to heavy seas and darkness. | ||
9. On 25 April 1945 at 1600 Zebra, burial services were conducted at sea for eight of the perished survivors from the U.S.S. FREDERICK C. DAVIS. Prayers were offered for the honored dead by the Commanding Officer and the Division Medical Officer. The usual honors of volleys and taps were carried out. On 4 May 1945 all survivors of the DAVIS who were able to be transferred, were taken aboard the HAYTER and the U.S.S. HUBBARD (DE-211). These survivors were transported to N.O.B., Argentia, Newfoundland and from there to Boston, Mass. | ||
10. Enclosure (A) are photographs of the rescue operations and burial services held aboard the U.S.S. HAYTER (DE-212), which were taken by the ship's photographer. Enclosure (C) is a copy of the statement of "Thanks" prepared by the officers and men of the DAVIS and presented to the officers and men of the U.S.S. HAYTER (DE-212). | ||
(ENCLOSURE B) | ||
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U.S.S. HAYTER |
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(DE-212) |
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File No. De212(TE)/P6 | ||||||||||
Serial No. 001 c/o Fleet Post Office, | ||||||||||
New York, New York, | ||||||||||
27 April 1945. | ||||||||||
S E C R E T | ||||||||||
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1. Conditions - FREDERICK C. DAVIS (DE-136) was torpedoed at 0840 on April 24, 1945 and sank shortly thereafter. Rescue of survivors was started at 0937 and completed at 1305. Men were in the water from one half to three hours. Water temperature was 57° F. A thin diesel oil slick was spread over the surface of the water. Twenty minutes after the torpedoing two deep water explosions occurred; presumably two of the sunken ship's depth charges. Seventy seven persons were brought aboard the U.S.S. HAYTER (DE-212). Seventy seven persons were brought aboard the U.S.S. Hater (DE-212). Of these, eight were dead, three dies within ten minutes after being brought aboard. One more died several hours later. The remainder survived and were in sufficiently favorable condition to be transferred to the U.S.S. BOGUE (CVE 9) about 2000. Four dead were also transferred to the U.S.S. BOGUE (CVE 9). | ||||||||||
2. Condition of Survivors - Shock, chills and acute anxiety greatly predominated and obscured practically all other symptoms until they diminished. About one third were in good shape and needed no treatment other than dry clothes. About one third were shaking so badly that they couldn't undress. About one third were unconscious or semi-conscious. Three who were not breathing were revived by artificial respiration rendered by members of the crew. The survivors generally showed only minor injuries, a fractured clavicle, fractured ribs, three minor third degree burns, multiple lacerations and contusions. Several complained of abdominal pain and pain in the back suggesting internal injury from the underwater explosions. | ||||||||||
3. Treatment - Practically all treatment aboard this vessel was emergency. Most patients snapped back to normal with amazing rapidity under warm blankets with a dose of brandy. Those with weakened circulation or respiration received coffee by mouth, coffee enema or caffeine cum sodium benzoate intramuscularly or intravenously according to the individual cases. Ephedrine sulfate intramuscularly was very effective in restoring normal pulse and blood pressure. Four cases required blood plasma to restore pulse volume and blood pressure. Morphine sulfate and large doses of assurance reduced fears, nervousness and excitement. | ||||||||||
(ENCLOSURE C) | ||||||||||
File No. De212(TE)/P6 27 April 1945. | ||
Serial No. 001 | ||
S E C R E T | ||
Subject: Survivors USS FREDERICK C. DAVIS (DE-136); emergency treatment of. | ||
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4. Remarks and Observation - Another hour in the water would undoubtedly have resulted in the loss of several more lives. Conversely others would have survived had earlier rescue been possible. Obviously, rapidity of rescue is an all important factor in saving lives in the cold water of the North Atlantic. | ||
(a) The Officers and men of the USS HAYTER (DE-212) showed remarkable courage, ingenuity and capability in rescuing and treating the survivors. They risked their lives going over the side to drag the "singles" to safety. They rendered emergency aid with alacrity and wisdom and nursed the patients with tenderness and a rough good will that played a large role in restoring the boys morale as well as their bodies to normal. | ||
(b) With one exception all survivors wore life jackets. With one exception all of these were kapok. It was noted that if the top tie was fastened the man's head was held out of the water even if unconscious. If the tie was not fastened the man's head was permitted to flop in the water. | ||
(c) The rescuers reported that several men who appeared very definitely dead in the water rapidly revived when taken aboard. | ||
5. Survivors names and further details will be reported by the U.S.S. BOGUE (CVE 9). | ||
EDWARD R. McKAY. | ||
(ENCLOSURE C) | ||
TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE U.S.S. HAYTER | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The survivors of the U.S.S. F.C. DAVIS, (DE-136) wish to thank all of you for the many things, big and small, which you did during the disaster which befell our ship; for your gallant conduct, your selflessness, your excellent and tender care, your spirit of sympathy, warmth and understanding. We are far more grateful to you then we shall ever be able to express. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
We feel that you know what it was like; you saw the ship go down; you were in the water with us; you administered first aid to the injured and those suffering from shock; you were beside our bunks cheering us up and giving freely of everything you had; you made every possible effort to save the dying; you buried with reverence, our dead. We believe then that you will understand what the meaning is to us of what you yourselves did. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
We cannot think of the sinking of the U.S.S. F.C. DAVIS except as the bitter loss of our ship and our shipmates. In the tragedy, however, there is one thing which we can count as a gain; and that is the experience of knowing in time of greatest need how kind fellow Americans can be. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNED: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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(ENCLOSURE D) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||