U-boat Archive - U-546 - Flaherty Report



	U.S.S. FLAHERTY (DE-135)

	PART IV: Narrative Account of Engagement with U-546.

	(All Times, Zone Plus 2 in this narrative, GCT in ASW-1)

	1. On 23 April 1945, while operating with CortDiv 4 under overall command of CTG 22.3 in BOGUE, FLAHERTY was ordered to proceed to BOGUE for refueling. Upon arrival at BOGUE about 1200, a submarine was reported sighted by plane about 70 miles NE. CTU 22.7.1 (CortDiv 4) was ordered to scene with all escorts. FLAHERTY requested permission to proceed to scene of contact, and this was granted. Preceded at maximum speed, and joined scouting line just as datum point was passed at 1710.

	2. After preliminary sweeps produced negative results, CTU 22.7.1 divided the scouting line, FLAHERTY remaining with the southern group consisting of PILLSBURY, FLAHERTY, NEUNZER, FREDERICK C DAVIS, and HAYTER, in that order from north to south, OTC, CTU 22.7.1 in PILLSBURY. Distance between ships 3500 yards, sonar keying interval 2000 yards, speed 16.8 knots. At 1811 NEUNZER investigated contact, results negative. At 1816 FAHERTY investigated contact, which dropped from "promising" to "fish" classification; too mushy, no doppler, wide, no movement. At 2134, F.C. DAVIS obtained contact "sharp and clear", reporting at 2138 that "It was picked up off port bow and passed down port side at high speed." DAVIS lost contact at 2153.

	3. At 0000, 24 April, NEUNZER and DAVIS commenced "Observant." DAVIS reported "Tonight's targets were more like a sub, but range rates were not. We could get no depth indications." (DAVIS had 147 B). Continued sweeps through the night. The track is indicated on DRT tracing submitted as enclosure. At 0750 FLAHERTY sighted metal life raft 500 yards on starboard beam. Circled it at close range for investigation. It was empty. Tried sinking it with 20 M/M fire, but attempt was unsuccessful and rejoined scouting line.

	4. At 0829 F. C. DAVIS reported "Am investigating possible contact." At 0840, an explosion was seen on Davis' port side amidships. Manned Battle Stations; proceeded at full speed to DAVIS assistance. DAVIS' mast down and ship breaking in two, submerging amidships. 0850 Sonar contact on port bow classified as wake of NEUNZER. Proceeding to scene to pick up survivors. 0857 DAVIS' stern portion sank. 0900 DAVIS depth charges exploded. Sonar gear failed, all power relays going out. At 0902, gear commenced operating after replacing of fuzes. However, these and subsequent explosions caused more damage than was readily apparent. 0910 Lying to in slick of DAVIS' wreckage picking up survivors. Survivor lines were fired from both port and starboard side to empty D.C. cases. Lines were being thrown to men on both sides of the ship, and some men from one raft had reached the

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	starboard rescue line when at 0918, Cozens, Roger W., Chief Sonarman, USNR, 618 87 52, on the stack, reported "probable submarine bearing 340°(T), 2000 yards, down doppler." Ship's head was 310°(T), and the DAVIS' bow was just off our starboard bow. The wreckage was reported to Cozens, who announced he had both it and the sub on the sonar. Cozens quickly classified contact as "positive submarine, very deep, down doppler." Orders were given to cut loose the survivor lines, and stand by for A/S attack.

	5. 0920, Requested CTU 22.7.1 to provide assisting ship for A/S attack. PILLSBURY was designated. Sub reported as very deep, target width narrow, sub throwing "knuckles." While waiting for PILLSBURY to establish contact, sub started evasive tactics, throwing "knuckles," and heading for us or our wake. His tactics were very similar to those we had experienced a month before off Guantanamo Bay with one of our subs. 0930 PILLSBURY's FXR gear drowning out echoes. 0940 PILLSBURY established contact, FLAHERTY reported ready to attack. 0942 FLAHERTY ordered to make H/H attack. Sub moving slowly, but with definite bearing movement. At 575 yards, Cozens reported traces fading, sub very deep. Recorder was set to 300 feet. 0951 Fired H/H results negative. PILLSBURY still had contact. 0958 FLAHERTY regained contact. 1005 Recorder failed to key stack. This was quickly repaired by recorder operator, Middleton, Warren C., Jr., SoM2c(T), 817 17 94. 1010 Lost contact when PILLSBURY passed too close to sub. 1017 Regained contact, with marked up doppler. Almost immediately after regaining contact, sonar plainly indicated a noise like torpedo being fired. The release of air was plainly heard, followed by a high propeller beat. The sub was on our starboard quarter, our speed 10. It was a very awkward and tense moment, but word was passed to "stand by for torpedo, all ahead full, right full rudder, stream the FXR ." No torpedo was sighted, and it was decided the sub must have been making a knuckle and speeding up. FXR was taken in, speed reduced to 10, and at 1020 FLAHERTY was ordered to reattack. At 1022, lost contact at 475 yards, indicating the sub was coming up. Fired H/H with 300 feet on recorder. ASAP reported the ship in excellent position for D/C attack, and I decided to make one to drive the sub back down. Between sinking of the DAVIS and the reported torpedo fired at me, I wanted to keep him down. A 13-charge pattern (Mark VIII) was dropped on all-magnetic setting, dropping time starting when plot and ASAP showed us crossing sub's track. Ship had been brought to 15 knots by the Pit Log, and 15 knots and 43 seconds were set on recorder. At 27 seconds, and again at 54 seconds after "Fire 3" two almost simultaneous explosions were felt. Later, when the sub captain was brought aboard, the first question he was asked was, "Were you first damaged about ten this morning?" He replied in English, "Yes," but his watch kept different time from ours, so I don't know how valuable his reply was.

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	6. At 1028 PILLSBURY lost contact. PILLSBURY and FLAHERTY started searching area, going into "observant" at 1058. Several contacts were made in the area, but neither ship was able to develop them. Final plot shows that some of these must have been the sub. 1110 Scouting line (including northern group from previous evening) was formed, and at 1122 FLAHERTY and PILLSBURY fell in on scouting line, which was to eastward of area, sweeping on course 270°, distance between ships 3000 yards, keying interval 2000 yards, speed 10. FLAHERTY fell in with VARIAN on starboard beam JANNSEN on port beam. 1152 Ships closing to 2000 yards distance. At 1156 Middleton, who had relieved Cozens on the stack picked up good sonar contact bearing 353°(T), distance 1700 yards, and almost immediately the sonar gear failed. But the contact had been reported over TBS to OTC as being immediately ahead of VARIAN, and the VARIAN picked it up as it passed down her port beam, and dropped back to investigate, assisted by JANSSEN. The sonar casualty was a relay that had been broken by the explosion of DAVIS' depth charges. Cozens had it located and repaired by 1235.

	7. At 1218 VARIAN conducted a creeping attack. JANSSEN dropping. Explosions 243 seconds after "Fire 1." 1235 VARIAN conducted JANSSEN and HUBBARD on joint creeper, 300 yards between ships. Explosion 203 seconds after "Fire 1." 1236 Scouting line opened distance to 2500 yards. 1254 NUENZER went into join "3-ship creeper." 1259 VARIAN classified contact as positive submarine. VARIAN temporarily lost contact as result of D/C disturbances. 1318 VARIAN regained contact. FLAHERTY replacing JANSSEN for 3-ship creeper. 1328 VARIAN directing NUENZER, HUBBARD, FLAHERTY in 3-ship creeper, ships being in that order from port to starboard, distance 300 yards. 1342 "Fire 1" FLAHERTY dropped only 20 charges, the ship having been making 10 knots in order to gain position shortly before "Fire 1" and was out of target area before racks could be reloaded. 1352 VARIAN conducting HUBBARD in over area in effort to establish sub's depth. Results negative. 1406 FLAHERTY made sonar contact, classifies as definite sub. Commenced run to ahead thrown attack. 1414 Delayed attack, range fouled by HUBARD. 1414 All ships lost contact. 1428 FLAHERTY and VARIAN commencing "observant." 1439 NEUNZER reported contact, doubtful, range 2000, no doppler, no movement. Plot indicated good possibilities, however. 1451 HUBBARD made contact on NEUNZER's target, as did VARIAN. 1513 NUENZER coached VARIAN in effort to establish depth of sub. VARIAN reported depth of 580 feet on 147-B, when at about 700 - 800 yards from target. NUENZER coached VARIAN in on creeper. 1519 "Fire 1" Explosions 110 seconds later. 1524 VARIAN returned to scouting line, replaced by CHATELAIN. 1528 NEUNZER having difficulty retaining contact. CHATELAIN established contact at 2750 yards. 1535 FLAHERTY established contact at 1700 yards. (See DRT traces) Classified as positive submarine. 1547 CHATELAIN conducted HUBARD, FLAHERTY, NEUNZER (from port to starboard) in 3-ship creeping attack.

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	Distance between ships 175 - 250 yards. 1553 "Fire 1" Explosion 45 seconds later from FLAHERTY's charges. During the attack there were numerous explosions, some 8 - 10 (counting all 3 ships) from premature explosions. Other were going off at obviously extreme depth. It was impossible to keep track of any but our own first explosion. Plot reported "it looked good."

	8. Ships lost contact, and commenced "observant," being joined by COCKRILL. By 1651 HUBBARD, CHATELAIN and NEUNZER rejoined scouting line. 1652 - 1907 FLAHERTY assisting COCKRILL in investigating a doubtful contact, the two ships rejoining scouting line at 1710. Course 090°(T), distance 2500 yards, speed 10. VARIAN on our right, OTTERSTETTER on our left 1728 VARIAN made sonar contact bearing 155°(T), range 1550 yards. All ships slowed to 7 knots. KEITH, on VARIAN's right, dropped back to assist VARIAN. 1739 KEITH and VARIAN both classified contact as "possible," echoed mushy, slight movement. 1742 PILLSBURY (CTU 22.7.1), FLAHERTY and NUENZER dropped out of line to assist. PILLSBURY and FLAHERTY preparing for creeper, VARIAN directing, KIETH maintaining "standby" contact. 1750 Obtained sonar contact on target, 178°(T) range 2300. KIETH obtained depth of sub as 220 feet on 147-B, and was ordered to make ahead thrown attack. 1756 VARIAN and FLAHERTY classified target as positive submarine. 1800 "Standby the firing" from KEITH. 1801 KEITH delayed attack, range fouled by PILLSBURY. 1802 FLAHERTY offered to assist VARIAN in H/H attack, and was directed to make the attack, with VARIAN assisting. 1804 Commenced run. Plot showed sub had been making another "H" turn, and then was turning to port, steadying upon a course approximately east as FLAHERTY came in on a heading 087(T). All indications were deep quarter to stern chase. Sonar contact was maintained perfectly through a "pill," clearly shown on recorder. Virtually no bearing movement. VARIAN gave information that the target was turning to north, but FLAHERTY plot and ASAP showed east, and I trusted my own team implicitly. Recorder was set on 150 feet depth on assumption that the sub's rise as indicated by KIETH would continue. 1813 Fired H/H, turned right full; 20.6 seconds later there was an underwater explosion. Large air bubble and oil came to surface. 1815 Closed for reattack. Traces were too wide for H/H attack. Requested permission to make magnetic setting D/C attack. Permission not granted. Turned right full to open for another attack, and established contact on starboard beam about 245°(T), range about 2000 yards. Reported this contact to VARIAN who said it did not agree with hers, which was now deep on our quarter. So we shifted to VARIAN's target, turned left to open out and at 1831 made second H/H attack on course 210° on clear echo, but wide trace and no doppler. Results negative. It was right into the oil slick from previous H/H explosion. Turned left full, and at 1839 sub was seen surfacing on our starboard quarter, bearing 190°(T), range about 2300 yards. Gave word over TBS,

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"She's surfacing, stand by your guns," and gave "commence fire" to our guns. Ahead full, right full rudder to course 160°. The sub's surfacing was met by a large volume of enthusiastic fire by all ships, although no direct hits were observed. The sub was seen to flash its signal light repeatedly, which furnished a convenient point of aim.

9. The disposition of ships at this time is shown in accompanying sketch. Our track at this time was bringing us into line of fire of the NEUNZER to the east, and they were requested to cease fire. Torpedo tubes were ordered trained to port, using visual sight, target speed zero. Turn was made to the right to unmask the port guns and to clear the NUENZER's line of fire. 1843-1/2 Fired two torpedoes. Runs were hot, straight and normal. It was then seen that the sub was sinking rapidly by the stern. One torpedo (right torpedo) passed just ahead of the sub, and the other passed immediately over the submerged stern of the target. Depth setting was ten feet. 1844 Sub sank, latitude 43-48 N, longitude 40-14W (based on afternoon sun line); ceased firing. 1845 Closed target area to pick up survivors.

10. 1903 Commenced picking up survivors. Recovered submarine's commanding officer, Kapitanleutnant Paul Just, and four enlisted men, Behnke, O/907/35; Berger, U.O., 33539/42; Rustmaeyer, 558347/42; Treinies, 975/43. Other vessels picked up remaining survivors. 1918 Secured from Battle Stations. Weather during day was cool, sea moderate.

11. Summary of attacks:--


H/H attacks:
	4:	All by FLAHERTY, #3 being successful

D/C attacks (single ship):
	1:	By FLAHERTY

D/C attacks (creeper):
	1 ship dropping: 2 JANSSEN, VARIAN
	2 ships dropping: 1 JANSSEN, HUBBARD
	3 ships dropping: 2 NEUNZER, HUBBARD, FLAHERTY

Surface attack:
	1	KIETH, NEUNZER, FLAHERTY, VARIAN, PILLSBURY

12. During A/S attack, 20 M/M guns Nos. 9 and 10 are not manned on this ship, their personnel manning the depth charges.

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It is of interest to note that, with the exception of these two guns, every fixed weapon on the ship was fired at the enemy during the day's engagement: both 30 Cal. machine guns (recently mounted on bridge wings), all 20 M/M, the 40 M/M, all 3-inch, the torpedoes, the ahead thrown depth charges, and the depth charges. It was nearly an "all hands" affair as could be made. Ammunition expended was as follows:

3"/50 caliber	SPDN	7045 AA	-	4	rounds
	"	6748 AP	-	22	"
	"	5915 AA	-	25	"
	"	5281WP AA	-	4	"
	"	3375 AA	-	14	"
	"	5102 AA	-	11	"
		Total		80

40 M//M	"	7194 HEIT	-	62	"
	"	7311 HEIT	-	14	"
	"	4860 HET	-	89	"
		Total

20 M/M	"	4707 HEI	-	600	"
	"	4078 HET	-	300	"
	"	4707 HEI	-	20	"
		4078 HET	-	_10
		Total		930

Pyrotechnic - 14 Day markers, Mk. 1, Mod. 1
96		A.S. 7.2 projectiles; Mk. 136, fuzes - 96
49		depth charges Mk. 8
29		Mk. 7 Mod. 1 DC pistols.
20		Mk. 7 Mod. 3 DC pistols.
2		Torpedoes - Mk. 15 Mod. 3 - Serial Nos. 77862, 7788A.
2		Warheads - Mk. 17 - Serial Nos. 17748, 17676.
2		Exploders - Mk. 6 Mod. 6 - Serial Nos. 16810, 16815.
30 Caliber machine gun ammunition - 61 rounds

Ordnance equipment functioned perfectly.

13. I desire to pay tribute to the exceptional performance of the sonar team, especially Chief Sonarman Cozens, whose performance on the stack during the day, combined with his alert and rapid repairs of battle damage I consider to have been invaluable to the original detection and final destruction of the enemy. The C.I.C. team functioned perfectly, also. Through a daylong engagement requiring frequent changes of scale on the D.R.T., they never failed to supply the Commanding Officer with quick and accurate information. The First Lieutenant, Lieutenant W.B. Rose, also made an important contribution to the day's success. The

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	ship was at General Quarters from 0840 to 1918. His repair parties were called upon in rapid succession to rescue survivors, secure from rescue operations and prepare for A/S attack, to provide two meals for the entire crew and serve on stations, to care for survivors, replace large quantities of every type of ammunition, and finally to put the "Prisoner of War" bill into effect. Every task was accomplished in a most expeditious and smooth manner. It was a real contribution to the ship's battle efficiency and showed foresight and training.

	14. At the time rescue operations were stopped at 0918, two DAVIS survivors were actually aboard, and a life line was thrown to a third, Gent, William Thomas, MoMM3c, USNR, 755 59 36, who was being drawn into the screw current of the starboard propeller. Gent was too weak, and his situation was critical. Without hesitation, and at considerable peril to his own safety, Chief Commissary Steward George Martin, USN, 371-80-08, climbed out onto the starboard propeller guard, reached down and helped Gent to the survivor's net and safety. It was a splendid gesture of Martin's, and he is being recommended for citation and award.

	15. During the surface engagement, word came up from the fantail that "a torpedo" was passing astern from port to starboard 10 feet astern of the ship. Subsequently the men involved were questioned closely, and insist that such was the case. They had previously seen torpedoes pass astern from practice firing. It might have been, but inasmuch as we had just fired two torpedoes to port at full speed with right rudder on, it is quite possible that they might have seen the wake of our torpedoes as the stern swung over the wakes.

	16. The C.I.C. team of the VARIAN did an excellent job during the afternoon of furnishing assistance to the attacking ships. VARIAN not only coached the ships in creeper attacks that were probably damaging to the target, but furnished enough information while doing so to permit us to keep a continuous plot of the sub even while our sonar was secured during the creeper attacks. It appears from final plot that the target FLAHERTY picked up on starboard beam at about 1820 was actually the sub, and it was a mistake to drop it simply because VARIAN's plot agreed with the contact in the explosion area. We had gained so much confidence in the VARIAN's information during the day, however, that we did not question her evaluation of a contact that furnished a good echo.

	17. The multitude of explosions, and the shock of gunfire caused numerous casualties of varying importance to the sonar gear, and it was subsequently found necessary to completely

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	retune the radar and sonar gear. All told, however, the performance of all equipment, including ordnance, was excellent. It worked "just like the salesman said it would."

	18. The performance of the crew and officers was of highest calibre. They cheered like a bunch of Dodger fans when the enemy surfaced, and they had a chance to "clinch wif' him," but, after all, it was a great occasion in our lives. We had a chance to avenge the DAVIS.



	H. G. DUFF












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