U-boat Archive - U-409 - U-boat Activity in the Mediterranean

S E C R E T

This Report contains

INFORMATION on RECENT GERMAN U-BOAT ACTIVITY

in the MEDITERRANEAN

obtained from

INTERROGATION of SURVIVORS of

U. 4 0 9

SUNK by H.M.S. "INCONSTANT"

12th JULY, 1943.

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Distribution:-

C-in-C Mediterranean	3
C-in-C Levant	1
D.N.I.	3
Captain (S) One	1
Captain (S) Eight	1
Captain (S) Ten	1
Comnavnaw	2
J.I.C.A.	4
S.O. (I) Mediterranean	2
S.O. (I) Levant	1
S.O. (I) Malta	1
S.O. (I) Gibraltar	1
S.O. (L) Levant	1
AIR CSDIC AFHQ	2
RAF Coastal Command	1
CDR AFHQ	1
RN CSDIC MEF	1
RN CSDIC Malta	1
File	2

Reference Number: SR.A.1./0343 Date: 1st August 1943.

Naval Section (Lawrence Grant WHITE)

C.S.D.I.C., Lieutenant, USNR,

A.F.H.Q. for R.O.B. ROMO, Lieutenant, RNVR.

(Note:

The information contained in this Report has been obtained from Prisoner of War Sources. It should NOT therefore be accepted as fact, until confirmed from other sources.)

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Page 1. S E C R E T.

INFORMATION on RECENT GERMAN U-BOAT ACTIVITY

in the MEDITERRANEAN

obtained from

Interrogation of Survivors of

U. 4 0 9

Sunk by H.M.S. "INCONSTANT" on

12th JULY, 1943.

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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

U.409, a German 500-ton U-boat commanded by Oberleutnant z.S. Hans-Ferdinand MASSMANN, was sunk in position 37⁰17' N, 03⁰55'E, by H.M.S. "INCONSTANT" on 12th July, 1943. (See PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION REPORT - CSDIC - AFHQ - N.10 of 16-7-43)

2. U-BOATS OPERATING FROM TOULON.

U-boats under the command of the following C.O.'s were stated to have been in TOULON between July 11 - 29, 1943, 1943, while U.409 was in port:

MEHL	(371)
KOENENKAMP	(375)
BRULLER	(407)
SCHONEBOOM	(431)
SCHOMBURG	(561)
BRANDI	(617)

U-boats commanded by DIGGINS and FRANKEN had been in TOULON prior to U.409's arrival but did not return while she was in port.

It was stated that the number of U-boats generally in TOULON in recent months varied from 4 to 7.

3. 29th U-BOAT FLOTILLA.

It is believed that as of 1st July, 1943, the 29th U-boat Flotilla was still formally based at SPEZIA under the command of Kapitänleutnant FRAUENHEIM. P/W from U.409 maintained that in spite of the fact that their boat had been sent into the Mediterranean, she was still attached formally to the 9th Flotilla, BREST, of which she bore the device when sunk. These P/W stated that U.409 was a "guest boat" at TOULON. Documents recovered from U.409 revealed that this U-boat was attached for supply, repair, etc., to a section of the 29th Flotilla based on TOULON under the administrative control of a "Stützpunktleiter" (Base Commandant) Korvettenkapitän der Reserve (Lieut-Cmdr., Reserve) von FREEDEN.

It is likely that the 29th Flotilla now embraces the entire Mediterranean, with boats of the Flotilla using four bases (TOULON, SPEZIA, POLA and SALAMIS). It has been established from various sources that several of the more successful C.O.s, notably BRANDI, have changed their bases frequently in recent months. It was stated that these boats are constantly being assigned to "new" operational areas in direct relation to the volume and importance of Allied shipping involved, whereas the remainder of the boats are likely to make several patrols in one operational area.

4. CHANGES IN ARMAMENT.

(a) 88 mm. Gun.

It was stated that the 88 mm. gun had been removed from the forward deck of a number of German U-boats operating in the Mediterranean, as its use was not considered practicable in these waters, in view of the fact that surface actions are infrequent. BRANDI and MEHL were stated to have removed the 88 mm. gun from their boats.

(b) Superstructure Modifications.

An additional machine gun platform was said to have been installed in TOULON in the U-boat commanded by MEHL. This platform, comparable to those in some 500-ton boats operating in the Atlantic, was installed abaft, below and adjoining the conventional 20 mm. gun platform ("Wintergarten"). It was indicated that other Mediterranean boats were in process of receiving comparable armament.

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	S E C R E T. Page 2.

	5. COMMUNICATIONS.

	It was stated that U.409 had not been in direct radio contact with either U-boats while while on patrol in the Mediterranean, but had listened in on radio communication between F.d.U. Mittelmeer (Mediterranean Operations Control) and the boats commanded by BRANDI, HEHL and KOENENKAMP.

	6. SEARCH GEAR. (Radar G.S.R.)

	It was stated that although radar had not yet been installed in many 500-ton U-boats operating in the Atlantic, Mediterranean based boats were receiving this equipment in recognition of the growing peril from air attacks, and were being given priority in the installations. One survivor maintained that U.409 had been fitted with Radar and with new G.S.R., incorporating a "Magic Eye" indicator just before - and and in anticipation of - coming into the Mediterranean. The Radar cathode ray tube was installed vertically in the receiver, the blips reading horizontally.
	(NOTE: Further information on Radar and G.S.R. will be the subject of a separate report to be published by AIR Section, CSDIC, AFHQ.)

	7. TACTICS.

	U.409 is believed to have operated independently in the Mediterranean. Where as her C.O. had been accustom in the Atlantic to attack shipping at night on the surface, he was obliged in the Mediterranean to attack in daylight at periscope depth. U.409 fired but one torpedo during the two abortive Mediterranean patrols, sinking a 6000-ton merchant sunk on the 7th July, 1943. (See Preliminary report for details of sinking.)
	It has not been established that U.409 ever surfaced in the Mediterranean in daylight. She was attacked East of Gibraltar on the night of 6th June, 1943, by an aircraft which did not drop bombs but exchanged machine gun fire with her and was driven off (NOTE: Confirmed by Coastal Command). According to P/W, this was her sole encounter with aircraft in the Mediterranean, although it was stated that she was sighted once at night on her penultimate cruise (between June 6-11) and crash dived. It was further stated that MASSMANN had been surprised by aircraft in the Atlantic, and that it was the practice to take defensive gun action rather than crash-dive unless he had ample time.

	8. KNOWLEDGE OF ALLIED A/S MEASURES.

	It is not believed that the officers and men of U.409 had any knowledge of Allied anti-submarine aircraft equipped with weapons other than bombs and machine guns.
	Several prisoners stated that U.409 was being D/F'd "constantly" from shore stations, particularly when the U-boat was off ALGIERS, shortly before she was sunk. One prisoner was convinced that U.409's position at the time of her sinking was communicated to the attacking British Destroyer after a fix had been obtained ashore.
	It was the general belief aboard U.409 that the British Destroyer which sunk her had a "new" echo-sounding gear which established for the attacking vessel the exact depth to which the U-boat was submerged at each stage of the hunt (See Preliminary Report).

	9. MORALE OF CREW OF U.409.

	Morale on the whole was good. Interrogation of survivors revealed little defeatism and a somewhat higher degree of security than has obtained with a number of crews taken in the Atlantic in recent months, although the crew was by no means uniformly security-conscious. Relations of officers and men aboard U.409 appear to have been salutary, the C.O. being "one of his men". This was the more surprising in that a large proportion of the complement had been drafted to U.409 immediately prior to her final patrol to take the places of experienced personnel who had been relieved for reasons of health or further schooling for promotion
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	J.S.P./N.T.H.