| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| File No: FF13-2/A16-3/ |
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET |
11-WGC-1dg |
| |
|
|
| Serial: 02335 |
AIR FORCE |
|
|
|
|
(Administrative Command), |
|
| |
U.S. Naval Air Station, |
|
| |
Norfolk, Virginia. |
|
| |
CONFIDENTIAL NOV 14 1943 |
|
| |
|
|
| |
| From: |
Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet. |
| To: : |
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. |
| |
|
| Subject: |
Anti-Submarine Action by Composite Squadron TWENTY-FIVE - (U.S.S. CROATAN). |
| |
|
| Reference: |
(a) CinCLant conf. spdltr ser. o2986 dated 7 October 1943. |
| |
(b) ComFair Norfolk conf. airmailgram 211912 of October 1943. |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
1. Corrective action directed by subparagraphs (a) and (b) of reference (a) has been taken as follows: |
|
| |
(a) Repairs to the fuel oil delivery pump have been effected by the Norfolk Navy Yard. An alteration to permit use of a 600 gallons per minute ballast pump for fueling is now being effected in the Card on a trail basis. THis will supply a total of approximately 1200 gallons of fuel oil per minute. |
|
| |
(b) The Commanding Officer of the CROATAN has been directed to state the reasons for taking on fresh water at Casablanca. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
2. Comment as requested in reference (a) is submitted in two parts; the attack itself and subsequent events. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
THE ATTACK |
|
| |
|
|
| |
NARRATIVE: |
|
| |
|
|
| |
This submarine was sighted by the flash of its gun fire at a distance of four or five miles. It appeared to come from aft, from one gun spasmodically, and consisted apparently of time fused explosive shells. The VF immediately attacked, making three strafing runs while the VT circled twice within range. After the third strafing run and when it seemed apparent to the VT pilot that the submarine was not going to dive, the VT attacked by dropping four depth charges spaced 60' apart by intervalometer, with hydrostatic fuses set for 25' and dropped directly up the track on the submarine from an altitude of 200'. Neither plane was hit by AA fire. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
COMMENT: |
|
| |
|
|
| |
A submarine on the surface presents the best opportunity for a kill and should be attacked immediately with every weapon available, except in unusual circumstances. The VF proceeded properly. The VT should have followed in behind as closely and as quickly as possible. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
The drop was made from 200' by seamans eye. The drop should have been made from not more than 100' and preferably from 50'. In any dropping problem |
|
| |
|
|
| |
- 1 - |
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
 |
 |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| File No: FF13-2/A16-3/ |
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET |
11-WGC-1dg |
| |
|
|
| Serial: 02335 |
AIR FORCE |
|
|
|
|
(Administrative Command), |
|
| |
U.S. Naval Air Station, |
|
| |
Norfolk, Virginia. |
|
| |
CONFIDENTIAL NOV 14 1943 |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Subject: Anti-Submarine Action by Composite Squadron TWENTY-FIVE - (U.S.S. CROATAN). |
| |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
| |
|
|
| |
altitude is a very critical factor, much more than speed. Accuracy of bombing by seamans eye deteriorates very rapidly when the drop is made from over 100'. Below 100' accurate dropping by eye is at best difficult for even the most experienced. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
The drop was made directly up the submarine track. This gave the pilot a minimum allowable deflection error and made the minimum use of his large allowable range error. It is thoroughly realized that a small submarine making ten knots can out-maneuver any but the most agile aircraft. For best chance of hitting, however, the attack track should be at a 30° angle with the submarine track if possible. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS |
|
| |
|
|
| |
NARRATIVE: |
|
| |
|
|
| |
First contact had been transmitted at 1800. After the attack at 1815, the submarine continued to circle and fire apparently undamaged. At 1820, the VT sent a bearing report. At 1830 the VF departed for base. At 1910, the submarine submerged and at 1932 the VT left the scene for base arriving at 1945. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Aboard the ship an attack team had been sent out to investigate an HF/DF at about 1800. At 1805 a :tallyho" was relayed by the screen. At 1828 a repeat of the word "pig" was received from the plane and at 1837 a coded message was received. An attack team was sent out about 1845 but failed to make contact. In order to launch any further attack teams, it was necessary to land and fuel returning planes. In accomplishing this, two crashes delayed action long enough to allow darkness to terminate operations. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
COMMENT: |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Communications between plane and ship were poor to non-existent, causing delay and confusion at a critical period when time was vital, due to approaching darkness. The failure of the aircraft receiver can be attributed to any of several causes but would not have prevented the concentration of additional aircraft at the "scene of action" if the aircraft's transmitter had been on frequency and the proper reports had been made. The maintenance of radio silence projects no new disadvantageous condition upon aircraft radio equipment with the possible exception of moisture accumulation. This may be overcome if sets are turned on daily, even when |
|
| |
|
|
| |
- 2 - |
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| File No: FF13-2/A16-3 |
|
11-WGC-1dg |
| |
|
|
| Serial: 02335 |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
CONFIDENTIAL NOV 14 1943 |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Subject: Anti-Submarine Action by Composite Squadron TWENTY-FIVE - (U.S.S. CROATAN). |
| |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
| |
|
|
| |
not in use, for a period long enough to dry them out. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
To avoid or recognize slippage of dial settings, radiomen, after each catapult shot, should immediately check receiver and transmitter against established calibrations. This should be set forth as squadron doctrine. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
From 1800 to 1828 the persistent repetition by the pilot of "Tally Ho, Pig, Pig, Pig" only prevented transmission of more helpful information. During the fifteen minute period from time of sighting to first attack, had the pilot sent a plain language amplifying report, that vessel of the screen receiving the contact report could also have relayed this information which probably would have resulted in parent vessel's despatch of aircraft already in the air in other sectors to assist. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Through the garbled or incorrectly coded message received by the carrier at 1837 was correct as to bearing and so did not necessarily adversely affect subsequent action, it is considered that there are few occasions in anti-submarine warfare when pilots of carrier aircraft will be able to employ cryptographic aids. This action is an excellent example of an occasion when use of plain language is completely justified. The short time until sunset, coupled with recognized receiver trouble that would not permit receipt of messages resulting from a garbled transmission, should have influenced the pilot to elect an appropriate and immediate plain language report. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Security gained by cryptographic means serves no purpose if its employment permits escape of the quarry. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
This was the first war cruise of this ship and carrier group. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
It is felt that two attack teams is a minimum which should be held in reserve in the striking group and that three teams would be better; further, that such teams should be used for definite contact and not sent out to follow down HF/DF bearings. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
The function of the SC radar has not been mentioned in the narrative of this action. It is felt that the proper functioning of this equipment should have given some clue to the situation. The VF plane, which strafed the submarine should also have arrived with data at about 1845. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
 |
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
