UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET |
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ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT |
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150 CAUSEWAY STREET |
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BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS |
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A16-3 (2) |
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Serial 0497 |
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4/rem |
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CONFIDENTIAL |
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1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. |
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2. References (a), (b), and (c), and the report analyzed in enclosure (A) are evidence that the forces in the area are waging a vigorous and intelligent war on submarines. The attack discussed in enclosure (A) came as a result of seven and one-half days of coordinated air-surface effort to find and sink a submarine on which an RDF contact had been obtained. It is very gratifying to note the successful coordination between ships and planes on the occasion of this sinking. That success indicates quite strongly that the anti-submarine problem had been given consideration well in advance of the time when an opportunity to attack was presented. |
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P. R. HEINEMAN. |
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ANALYSIS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY AIRCRAFT. |
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Unit: VP-74 Unit Report No. 11 Aircraft Type: PBM-3C. | ||
Aircraft No. 74-P-5 | ||
Aircraft Commander: Lt(jg) H. C. Carey U.S.N. | ||
Base of Operations: Aratu Sea Base. | ||
Location of Attack - Latitude 11-00 S. | ||
Longitude 35-35 W. | ||
Date: May 17, 1943. | ||
Time: 0856 (Zone plus 3). | ||
1. The airplane was flying at an altitude of 6000 feet on a concentrated air-surface hunt for a submarine. Weather was good with unlimited visibility, and scattered clouds. Radar contact was obtained on a fully surfaced submarine 28 miles ahead. Immediately thereafter the submarine was sighted through binoculars. An attack approach at full power was begun without delay, and in a few minutes the submarine started to submerge. At that time it was noted that another plane of the squadron was delivering an attack on the submarine. Passing over the point of submergence about 40 seconds after the first plane’s bombs exploded, the pilot withheld his bombs and began to circle. Soon the submarine was sighted returning to the surface at a range of about one-half mile on the starboard beam. A diving attack was launched, and at an altitude of 100 feet, airspeed about 190 knots, and target angle 2250, six Mark 44 bombs with fuses set to function at 25 feet were released, using intervelometer control with a 72 foot corrected spacing. The resulting explosions bracketed the submarine just forward of the conning tower, and within a minute a series of 20 coordinated strafing runs was begun. During these runs a flashing explosion lasting about one minute was observed to occur just abaft the conning tower of the submarine. The submarine continued on the surface in a down by the stern condition, maneuvering erratically and leaving a trail of oil. Fifty-six minutes after the bombing attack the submarine stopped low in the water, and its crew started to abandon ship. In order to prevent scuttling or manning of the deck guns the plane kept up a continuous strafing. About 10 minutes after the submarine stopped, two surface vessels which had been brought to the scene by the joint effort of both planes arrived and started shelling. The pilot of this plane acted as spotter for the ship’s gunfire. After four direct hits, the submarine nosed over and sank. About 50 survivors were picked up by the surface vessels. The plane remained in the vicinity for three hours and eighteen minutes after the attack, at the end of which time it departed, having received orders from the base to do so. | ||
2. The execution of this attack and the subsequent activities are considered excellent in every detail. The report of the action is very complete and very well prepared. According to the comments of the squadron commander this pilot sighted the submarine, set up the bombing panel, directed the approach, dropped the bombs, directed the machine gun fire, and kept the base well supplied with accurate information by radio. Under his direction the photographer got some unusual action pictures of the attack by the other plane. He even went one step further and spotted all the shots for the surface ships by voice radio. Other comments by the squadron commander are concurred in. |
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ANALYSIS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY AIRCRAFT. |
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(Continued) |
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3. Comments on the activities which culminated in this attack were made in the analysis of the attack which forced the submarine to return to the surface. | ||
4. In view of the observed position of the bomb explosions and the fact that the crew of the submarine started to abandon ship approximately 10 minutes before the assisting surface vessels opened fire, and as almost the entire crew of the submarine took to the water, it is considered that as a result of this attack the submarine was sunk. | ||
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