III (a)  PILOT’S NARRATIVE
 
          While on patrol on an assigned hold down, a white wake was reported by CARLIN in the bow turret just as I identified it through binoculars as a fully surfaced submarine one point off the port bow.  Radar Operator, Ens. Osheim, also getting contact, reported an 18 mile range and noted the time run to attack was begun at 0846.  Weather was good with ceiling and visibility unlimited.  We were flying at 4500 feet on course 170 T at 120 knots.  Increasing power settings to 2400 R.P.M.’s and 34” manifold pressure, a maximum speed of 200 knots was attained.  Turning slightly to port in an attempt to utilize the sun, we made our run in, opening up on scene of action frequency to give position of attack as we did so.  
     
          The submarine, running on course 300 T at about 15 knots, started to crash dive when plane was slightly less than 2 miles away and disappeared when it was still 3/4 of a mile distant.  Crossing the path of the sub at a 50 degree angle about 150-200 feet ahead of the swirl, six MK 44 Charges were released by RICHOZ from an altitude of 50 feet.  They were observed to detonate fifteen seconds after the sub’s submergence.  The detonation pattern straddled the extended course of the sub.  
     
          Immediately after dropping, the plane made a sharp climbing turn to the left to observe results.  Nothing was observed until the second circle, when a large mass of air bubbles was noticed adjacent to the forward edge of the bomb slick.  Halfway around the next circle 90 degrees more to the left, HUNT, the tail gunner, reported U/B resurfacing on our starboard quarter.  It was on a course near the reciprocal of its original course, apparently having made a sharp left turn and moved 1/4 of a mile from the point of attack.  We got into position for a strafing run, observed No. 5 coming in to attack, and turned to keep clear.  We paralleled his course and photographed the attack, then circled left and followed him in on the first of many runs by both planes.  
     
          The U/B got under way about two minutes after Lt(jg) Carey’s attack.  Its engines were smoking heavily and appeared down by the stern with decks awash almost to the after gun.  She first circled to starboard and later pursued a zig-zag (mean course 322 T) to the spot where it eventually went down.  During this run she left a wide oil wake and moved forward at a speed of 8-10 knots.  
     
          At 0928, leaving No. 5 on guard, and sending MO’s I departed to direct the DD’s which were Northwest of us to the attack spot.  Located 29 miles away at 0937 they were headed toward the position and receipted by blinker for our voice message.  When DD’s were about fifteen minutes from scene and within visual contact I received a report from No. 5 that the sub'’ crew was abandoning ship.  
     
 
 

 

 
 

   
III (a)      PILOT’S NARRATIVE (Continued)
 
          Leaving destroyers we returned to scene.  Many survivors were in the water astern of the sub, which now had but slight way on.  We dropped a seven man life raft in their midst and circled, observing the remaining men leave.  Only the C/T and the tip of the bow remained above the surface.  
     
          The DD’s opened fire at 1000 P, scoring several hits before the U/B slid, bow first, under the water at 1009.  Air bubbles rose to the surface at 1018.  
     
          Both planes stood by while the MOFFETT picked up survivors and the other DD provided protection by circling.  74-P-12 arrived at 1115 P and shortly afterwards, returned with No. 5 to base.  We remained to aid in locating survivors, returning to Aratu about 1400.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 

 

 

 

 
 

   
SUMMARY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION, MAY 9-17, 1943
 
          Following an RDF within 100 miles of 130 S, 360 W at 2006 (all times P) May 9, The Commander Fourth Fleet, ordered a sub alert from Recife to Victoria.  At 0720 on May 11, 74-P-11 had a distinct radar contact, unlike those continually picked up from rain squalls, at a distance of ten miles in position 10 S, 350 06’ W.  The area was thoroughly investigated without results.  Thirty minutes later, a radar contacted to an Argentine passenger fruit ship Rio San Juan of Buenos Aires, at 10 S, 34 40 W.  When sighted, she was heading true north; but when she sighted the plane she altered course radically to 090 T.  Her speed was 15-18 knots.  At noon she was sighted again, this time on course 210.  The next day 74-P-6 sought her out and found her at 1115 at 15 45 S., 37 48 W., on course 205 T.  As on the previous day she was passed close aboard and no one was seen on deck.  A little later, 74-P-12 picked up a distinct and similar radar contact 15 miles away, at 12 15 S., and 34 10 W.  The indication faded as the area was approached and search revealed nothing.  On May 14, BT 13 departed from Bahia.  Intensive patrolling was continued.  On May 16 at 1120, Lieut. Gibbs took off from Aratu in 74-P-2 to sweep a 200 mile sector to the Northeast.  Rain and low ceilings prevailing near the base gave way to .5 cumulus with 2500’ base to which he climbed.  At 1351 an object one point on the starboard bow and fifteen miles distant was reported from the bomber’s window.  The radar picked up only the shore, 45 miles on the port beam.  The pilots in a few seconds saw a white wake and at the end of two minutes identified it through glasses as a submarine with decks awash.  The plane was on course 042 T, the U/Boat about 35-40 T.  The plane turned slightly toward cloud cover and to get between submarine and the sun, then increased power and came straight in.  When about half the distance had been covered, both pilots became convinced that it was submerging.  It did, so gradually that no one could say surely when the process began or just when it was completed.  Opinions vary from three miles to one mile and from 65 to 20 seconds, all agreeing that the exact point of submergence was impossible to determine.  The only watch was held by the second pilot, who measured 65 seconds from the time he last saw the C/T.  This time and distance was upheld by four observers.  A fifth thought that they came within a mile or at most two, at which point he started to take pictures.  The observer in the port waist described a “boiling white wake” at ¼ mile.  The first pilot thought “until the last few seconds” that they would reach the submarine still on the surface, and that with ten more knots available they would have done so.  
     
          At 1357 the swirl was reached, still in pronounced motion and distinct.  Six MK 44 charges straddled the swirl, the last two 120 feet beyond its leading edge.  The plane’s course was almost exactly along the submarine’s track.  From the very slow submergence it may be fairly supposed that the plane never was sighted and that the slow rate of descent continued, leaving her within range in depth.  She was within range in plan if the attack was in fact made within thirty seconds, the possibility of which is suggested by the pilot’s opinion, the time check of the actions of the man who went aft, and the behavior of the water.  Interrogation of prisoners may throw light on this interesting point.  
     
          Lieut. Gibbs offered a thirty mile gambit during which Lieut Voorhies, who was dispatched in 74-P-9 upon receipt of the sighting report , arrived in the area.  After two and a half hours No. 2 reached PLE and returned to base.  No. 9 maintained hold down, landing at Aracaju, the nearest port, a minute or two before dark.  Meanwhile Lieut Esch took off in heavy rain in 74-P-14 a radarless (PBY 5B).  He followed the hold down plan devised by Dr. Steinhardt of the ASWRG, a 50-mile square, (modified to stay a reasonable distance from land)  
     
 
 

 

 
 

   
with the contact point in the center, which he flew across every fourth time.  At 2347, at 11 07 S, 35 34 W. a pilot standing in the bow compartment saw in the moonlight a V-shaped wake, course 3000 T.  A flare dropped from 1200 feet disclosed only whitecaps.  74-P-9 left Aracaju at 0630 for a brief return to the contact area, during which he located, and reported to plane 6 the position of the destroyers MOFFETT and JOUETT.  He also followed up a radar contact to the southbound convoy T B 13, informing the base upon his return of its presence in the area and its position.  Returning to base he then passed over what was to be the scene of action, indicating that the submarine was still submerged, and suggesting that it may have surfaced after watching him pass by.
 
          At 0843 74-P-6, having just passed 74-P-9 homebound, visually sighted a surfaced submarine 18 miles distant.  At the same time it was picked up on the radar.  No. 5 was well above, somewhat to the left, and an estimated ten miles astern of No. 6, and made both visual and radar contact just before or at the same time.  Both started in, No. 6 working to the left somewhat to get the sun more behind it.  At 0850 No. 6 dropped six MK 44 DC’s 150’ ahead of the swirl, fifteen seconds after submergence.  The drop was observed as a neat straddle of the sub’s projected course.  Forty seconds later No. 5 passed over the spot, withholding its bombs.  Both planes maneuvered for five minutes, then sighted the bow of the U/Boat, a German 740 tonner, breaking the surface at a sharp angle, a few hundred yards to the left of where it went down and on a reciprocal heading.  Lieut. Carey who had climbed to 1500’ now dove at an angle of 450.  He crossed the now fully surfaced submarine at 100’ altitude and an angle of 450 to the submarine’s heading (it had no way on) and his bombs straddled just forward of the C/T, obliterating all view of the submarine from either plane.  When the column of water subsided, the victim lay still in the center of disturbance.  Meanwhile, Lieuts. Carey and Davis executed the first of 20 or more strafing runs each, during which they poured 4500 .50 caliber slugs at the submarine, its guns, and later, at personnel attempting to man the guns.  After about two minutes the submarine miraculously got under way, with its forward diving planes apparently jammed in an up position, and violent turning maneuvers, either as an attempt at evasive action or because out of control.  After about twenty minutes the diving planes were apparently fixed, and it was soon seen that the appearance of being down by the stern was not attributable to them.  After getting underway, her engines were observed smoking heavily.  On one strafing run a plane reported a flashing explosion between the C/T and the after gun, with fire lasting thirty seconds, believed to be from ammunition.  Her speed, which had been eight knots or more, dropped to three or four knots by 0952 and by 1000, when the destroyers opened fire, was no longer making headway.  The destroyers were led to the scene by Lieut. Davis, Lieut. Carey, in the half hour of his absence, kept the submarine deck clear with strafing runs and sent MO’s while Lieut. Davis got out the amplifying report.  Personnel began to abandon ship when she lost way, and at 1000 were in the water and not more than ten were on deck.  By this time, only prow and conning tower were above the surface.  Destroyers then fired 204 rounds, spotted by Lieut. Carey.  Sliding bow first, the U/B went to the bottom at 1009 after five direct hits.  Nine minutes later air bubbles rose to the surface.  
     
          Our planes remained while survivors were taken aboard the USS MOFFETT, and returned to base.  
     
 

Submitted:        Mills Ton Eyck Jr., Lt(jg) A-V(S)

  
                          John G. Mulook,  Lieut. A-V(S)