CL4/A16-3(S1)(GCJ)
	U.S.S. OMAHA
	At Sea,
	12 November, 1941
	S E C R E T
	From: Commander Task Group 3.6. To    : The Chief of Naval Operations.       Subject: German Motor Ship ODENWALD Disguised as S. S. WILLMOTO, United States Registry - Seizure of.       Reference: (a)  Photographs of this incident (to be forwarded separately)   (b) Recommendation for commendation certain individuals (to be forwarded separately).       Enclosures: (A) Report of Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SOMERS.   (B) Report of Lieutenant George K. Carmichael, U. S. Navy, Officer in charge of Armed Boat Party and who became Commander Salvage Detail (Enclosing statements of following officers and men:  Lt. (jg) William B. Bideman, U.S.N. Boatswain James A. Ferreola, U.S.N.  CORONADA, Henry C., CWT, U.S.N. JONES, Charles R., SM1c, U.S.N.   (C) Extracts from signal log pertaining to seizure of ODENWALD.   (D) Statement of JOLLY, Jesse H., ACMM, U.S.N.   (E) Intelligence Report No 1-41 by Lieutenant Commander H. de B. Clairborne, U.S. Navy, regarding information obtained from ODENWALD officers, disposition of material, ship's log, accounts and papers.   (F) List of officers and crew of ODENWALD.   (G) Memorandum to all hands, U.S.S. OMAHA, dated November 10, 1941. (Separate) (N) Personal envelope for each officer and crew member of ODENWALD, including finger prints, correspondence from GERMANY, and photographs where obtainable.
	1.        On 6 November 1941, Task Group 3.6, consisting of U.S.S. OMAHA (Captain T.E. Chandler, U.S. Navy) and U.S.S. SOMERS (Comdr. J.C. Metzel, U.S. Navy), was steaming on course 228° enroute to RECIFE, BRAZIL.  At 0450 went to usual dawn general quarters.  At 0506 sighted a darkened vessel bearing 251°T., and changed course to intercept and investigate her.  Standard speed at this time was 14 knots.  At 0512 increased speed to 18 knots, and at 0516 went to 25 knots.  Approximate position at this time was:  Latitude 00-43 North, Longitude 27-44 West.
	- 1 -

 

	2.        The ship was directed by searchlight to make her international call, but no answer was made by light.  Upon closing her it was found that she was flying the United States flag, which United States painted on each side just below the bridge.  From her signal halyard was flying KIGF", the international call of the U.S. merchantman WILLMOTO.  On the stern was painted WILLMOTO, PHILADELPHIA".  The name WILLMOTO" was also painted on the bow.  Numerous attempts were made to get her to answer signals, but to no avail.  A signal was then made "STOP YOUR ENGINES AND HEAVE TO".  Upon coming close aboard the Commanding Officer, by megaphone, asked, "Why don't you answer signals".  There was no answer.  The question was repeated.  Still no answer.  Then questions were asked as follows:
	Q. Where are you from? A. Capetown. Q. Where are you bound? A. New Orleans. Q. Why don't you answer signals? A. No answer. Q. What is your cargo? A. General cargo.
	3.        OMAHA continued cruising around the vessel and, noticing that some of her characteristics did not coincide with those of WILLMOTO in "Merchant Ships of the World, 1940"; and, also, that some of her personnel were distinctly un-American in appearance, decided to send a boarding party to board her.  At 0637, in approximate position Latitude 00-40 North, Longitude 28-04 West, a boarding party in charge of Lieutenant George E. Carmichael, U.S. Navy, left the ship to board the vessel.  Immediately after the boat was lowered into the water the vessel hoisted "FOX MIKE", meaning:  "I AM SINKING.  SEND BOAT FOR PASSENGERS AND CREW".  At the same time they began abandoning ship.  This was the first positive assurance that something was wrong.  At the same time some packages were thrown overboard, and SOMERS signalled that a large package had been thrown overboard from the bridge previous to our coming close aboard for hailing.
	4.        At the time the boarding party reached the ship. about 0545, two explosions were heard which appeared to be in the after part of the ship.  Two lifeboats had already been lowered into the water.  The boarding officer ordered all other men back aboard the ship.  At 0658 the boarding officer sent the following message to OMAHA:
	"THIS IS A GERMAN SHIP X THEIR CREW IS TRYING TO LEAVE THE SHIP X THEY SAY IT IS SINKING AFT X I TRIED TO GET DOWN THERE BUT SMOKE PREVENTED X I AM BRINGING THE CREW BACK ABOARD."
	5.        Upon being certain of her German nationality, secret despatch 060850 was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations with Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Commander Task Force 3 as information addresses.  Both planes were catapulted with orders to keep a vigilant
	- 2 -

 

	lookout for submarines and surface ships.  SOMERS was directed to keep a careful patrol around OMAHA.  All officers and crew, with the exception of the Captain and one officer were brought on board OMAHA.  The Captain and other officers were brought aboard later.  The total number, listed in enclosure (F), was 45.  The boarding officer was instructed to do everything possible to save the ship, with due regard for the safety of our own men.
	6.        The boarding officer then signalled that the ship was the German vessel "ODENWALD".
	7.        The German radio officer stated to JOLLY, Jesse H. ACMM, a member of the boarding party, that the ODENWALD" had sent a despatch to the German Government prior to abandoning ship saying that they were being followed and overtaken by battleships, not stating the nationality, and that they were scuttling the ship.  The radio equipment had been destroyed.  The high frequency transmitter was on 16965 or 16560 Megacycles for sending to DAN (NORDREICH RADIO).
	8.        Efforts to save the ship were immediately undertaken, isolating the flooded areas and starting all drain pumps available.  A detail from the engineer's force was sent on board to try to get the engines in operation.  The German Chief Engineer was twice sent to the engine room to assist in starting the engine; he was adamant in his refusal to offer any assistance or information whatsoever.  He was then returned to OMAHA.  Each of the German engineer officers were taken to the engine room, without knowledge of the others, for the purpose of getting the engines started.  Each refused, with the exception of Second Engineer SEIDL, who, at gunpoint, reluctantly gave a little assistance.  This officer remained on board ODENWALD during the trip.
	9.        At 1740 one engine was in operation.  At 1810 Task Group 3.6 with ODENWALD got underway on base course 283° T., SOMERS patrolling ahead maintaining listening watch, OMAHA following astern.  All lifeboats were lowered to the rail and manned in case of emergency.  At this time it was the intention of the Commander Task Group 3.6 to proceed toward SAINT PAUL ROCKS and there beach the ODENWALD should it be impossible to get her into port.  At 1955 the boarding officer signalled that ODENWALD was going ahead on both engines.  Flooding was under control, with only a 2-1/2° list.  The Task Group and ODENWALD were making good 9.2 knots.  Since it now appeared that ODENWALD was out of immediate danger and that beaching would not be required, set our course to avoid SAINT PAUL ROCKS, and thence for TRINIDAD.
	10.        At this point it is desired to invite attention to the fact that, at the point of interception, Task Group 3.6 had nearly completed a patrol of 3,023 engine miles, much of which was at high speed in connection with the OLWEN affair, and at that time was but 657 miles from RECIFE, to which port it was expected to return.  The Task Group Commander in his early despatches therefore reported that it would not be possible to make any other port.  However, as a result of careful calculations, it appeared
	- 3 -

 

	that without breakdowns, bad weather or further trouble, the Task Group could arrive in TRINIDAD; the OMAHA with 1,000 gallons margin and the SOMERS with about 9,000.  Despite these low figures, and in view of the desirability of not involving BRAZIL in this matter, the Task Group Commander recommended proceeding to TRINIDAD, 2,200 miles distant, and set course for that port.  That the Group arrived is due to the splendid work of the Engineer Departments in both ships.  On board OMAHA every conceivable economy was placed in effect and the First Lieutenant, Lieut. Comdr. John A. Glick, rendered valuable assistance through the consolidation of oil residues in empty tanks, thus materially reducing the figures of 40,000 gallons normally considered as unavailable in this class of ship.  The Engineer Officer, Lieut. Comdr. William J. Whiteside, is deserving of special credit for his performance.  On board SOMERS similar economics were instituted and also a sail, believed to have a reduced consumption by 5 gallons an hour, was rigged.
	11.        According to the ship's papers, which are believed to be correct, the ODENWALD carried the following cargo:
	ITEM METRIC TONS Raw rubber 3857  Oats 545   Peanuts 900   Oatmeal 7   Truck Tires (Goodrich) 105   Tannic Acid 97   Brass 360   Copper 50   Dried Fruits 25   Wax 3   Roots 26   Steel 226   Hair 0.5 Fish Oil 3.5 4Nuts 17   Tea 4           TOTAL 6223
	Some of the cargo was jettisoned in order to inspect holds for leakage and trim the ship; however this amount was very small and many of the tires were recovered by OMAHA and SOMERS and will be returned at the first opportunity.
	12.        It should be here pointed out the unswerving determination, courage, aggressiveness and general performance of duty of Lieutenant George K. Carmichael, U.S. Navy, and the Armed Boat Party and Salvage Detail under his command undoubtedly saved the vessel.  Just as he was boarding the bombs exploded while the German crew were abandoning in evident panic.  Though he had no idea what other bombs might be ignited
	- 4 -

 

	he forced the Germans on that side back aboard their ship and, in spite of smoke from explosions, immediately began his efforts to save the ship which had already taken an appreciable list and had settled slightly by the stern.  Following the boarding the long hours of arduous and skillful work of the Detail in going aboard a strange, foreign vessel which had been bombed and flooded and getting that vessel again in operation, is in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service.  Appropriate commendation for those concerned will be the subject of separate correspondence.
	13.        It is a source of extreme gratification that, throughout this undertaking, there was no injury to personnel either German or our own.
	14.        It is strongly recommended that, for the reason explained in enclosure (R) Second Engineer SEIDL be never again confined with his former shipmates.  It would be deplorable for him to become the victim of violence at the hands of his own countrymen while in the custody of the United States Government; and for an offense of which he is not guilty.
	15.        The German officers and crew of ODENWALD have been quartered on board this vessel since 6 November.  In this climate, with a following trade wind, it was not practicable to keep them below and entirely segregated.  Use of heads and washrooms, messing and some time in the open air was necessary.  While they did not witness any evolution of importance, such as aircraft recovery, they still must have learned a great deal about life on board ship and have formed a very accurate idea of our efficiency, state of training, morale and the general character of our operations.  It is accordingly deemed essential that these men be denied any opportunity to convey their knowledge to friends or associates who might in turn transmit it to Germany.
	16.        In conclusion the Task Group Commander wishes to commend the conduct of all personnel under his command.  Despite ODENWALD'S explosions, list and evident danger of sinking the OMAHA's rail was always lined with volunteers who were with difficulty restrained from entering the boats bound for salvage duty.  On board the OMAHA all hands who remained bore the greatly added burden of work and watches imposed by the absence of the Salvage Party and the necessity for guards, the deprivation of lights and water and other incidental hardships with splendid spirit.  Nor should it be forgotten that this state of training and high morale reflects great credit upon the former Commanding Officer, Captain P. P. Powell, U. S. Navy.  Whom I relieved only 22 days before this incident occurred.
	17.        A supplementary report will be forwarded upon completion of the operation.  Photographic films desired by the Department are being forwarded under separate cover.
	18.        Due to the urgent nature of this report, and the fact that my immediate superior, Commander Task Force 3, has sailed from TRINIDAD, the report is being forwarded direct to the Chief of Naval Operations, with copies to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander Task Force 3, SOMERS and the Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
	T. E. CHANDLER.

 

	Serial 0476                                             U.S.S. SOMERS (381)
	C O N F I D E N T I A L                                                                         c/o Postmaster
	New York, N.Y.
	10 Nov 1941
	From: The Commanding Officer. To: The Commander Task Group 3.6.   U.S. Atlantic Fleet.     Subject: Capture of German Ship ODENWALD.     Reference: (A)  Comtaskgroup 3.6 dispatch 090855 of Nov. 1941.
	1.        The following report is submitted as directed by reference (a).
	2.        Initial conditions were as follows:  On the morning of 6 November 1941, Task Group 3.6 was patrolling enroute from search for raider which fired on British S.S. OLWEN to Recife, Brazil, zigzagging on base course 225° (T) in accordance with plan 6, speed and standard speed 14 knots, using Zone plus 2 time.  SOMERS was on station 1340 in Condition of Readiness 3 with extra dawn detail posted, boilers #3 and #4 steaming #1 and #2 at 100 lb. pressure.  Full moonlight.  Daybreak was at 0430.
	3.        At 0510 sighted a strange ship bearing 259° True.  Before report could be sent, received signal "INVESTIGATE STRANGE SHIP BEARING 215° True".  Sounded preliminary call to General Quarters and increased speed to 27 knots.  Target appeared to be on course about 280° True, speed 9.  First range was 22,500, making position of target when sighted 00°-39' N., 27°-53' W.  Set course 265° True to torpedo firing position on nearer bow of target, in accordance with Taskgroup 3.6 doctrine.  At 0522 went to General Quarters.  At 0525 slowed to 16 knots to cut in boilers #1 and #2.  At 0542 commenced increasing speed to 27 knots.  As OMAHA was well to the right and not far behind, changed course to head for position on port bow of target.
	4.        At about 7000 yards and again at about 4000 yards signalled target with day blinker "AA - PRB - NNJ".  The second time target flashed once in answer but observing that OMAHA was signalling target, SOMERS ceased signalling.  At 5000 yards could make out flag hoist "KIGF" which was call of U.S. flag ship "WILLMOTO".  Since the sun rose before SOMERS entered arc of masthead and side lights, it is not certain that they were out, but it is certain that target was otherwise completely darkened.  At 2500 yards could see "WILLMOTO" and "PHILADELPHIA" on stern, and U.S. Ensign spread - not painted - on side.  Upon passing about 1500 yards abeam could make out U.S. colors spread on #2 hatch and "WILLMOTO" painted on bow.  As appearance did not agree with description of Deck Erections in Lloyd's register, called away boarding party and prepared boat for landing.
	- 1 -

 

	5.        At 0605 DEAN, Edward R., C.F.C.(PA), USN, reported ship had same hull design as German Navy Survey Ship "METEOR" which he had seen at Miami, Fla., in 1938, reported this by signal.  At 0615 commenced patrolling on port bow of target, distance about 2200 yards.  At 0630 target threw two large packages overboard from port wing of bridge.  Reported this by signal.  My attention was called to it by O"BRIEN, Eugene A., S.M.2c, USN.  Meanwhile OMAHA had hoisted a number of International signals which the target acknowledged by code pennant but failed to answer.
	6.        At 0635 OMAHA ranged close aboard the target, hoisted signal "HEAVE TO", and shortly thereafter lowered a boat.  Target hove to and at 0643 hoisted signal "AM SINKING, SEND BOATS FOR PASSENGERS AND CREW".  At 0644 target threw another large package over port wing of bridge and began to lower port lifeboats.  Reported these facts by signal.  At 0646 heard muffled explosions, and saw puffs of smoke from stack and from vicinity of No. 4 hatch.
	7.        At 0650 Comtaskgroup 3.6 signalled "GERMAN SHIP DISGUISED AS AMERICAN, KEEP CAREFUL PATROL AROUND US".  Commenced circling OMAHA and target at about 750 yards, maintaining Anti-submarine lookout and listening watch at 12 knots.  Had Ensign Leonard C. Zitnick, D-V(G), USNR, make such photographs as were practicable from this time on.  OMAHA boarding party hauled down U.S. Ensign over German Ensign for a short time, then hoisted U.S. Ensign over German Ensign at the fore truck.  At 0826 Comtaskgroup 3.6 signalled "BELIEVE WE HAVE SAVED HER".  Soon afterward he disclosed name to be ODENWALD.
	8.        SOMERS maintained patrol around the two ships throughout the day while OMAHA completed salvage of ODENWALD and capture of her crew.  Picked up a number of floating objects seeking possible books and papers, but none of them yielded any information.  Sent SHOEMAKER, Leslie J., C.M.M.(PA) USN, the only man aboard with heavy Diesel experience, via OMAHA boat, to join the prize crew.  At about 1800, on signal, smashed derelict ODENWALD lifeboat with 1".1 and Cal. .50 gunfire, but did not succeed in sinking it.  At 1815 ODENWALD got underway, course 283° True, speed 10.  On signal, took station 2000 yards ahead patrolling at 14 knots.  At 1910 on signal ceased patrolling and changed course to 305° True.
	9.        The information requested by reference (a) regarding SOMERS shortage of fuel is as follows:
	SOMERS is not operating economically because she has steamed about 51,000 miles since last tender overhaul and has about $9,000.00 in undelivered material including many spare parts ordered as urgent since January.  For example the cruising feed pump is disabled for lack of spare parts and neither auxiliary feed pump will carry the load of 10 knots because tender job of installing oversize valve piston rings is needed.  Ballasting is restricted because of leaky sluice valves.
	- 2 -

 

	With fuel on hand on 7 November, I estimated that with ideal steaming throughout, favorable winds and full benefit of current, we could reach Trinidad with 12,000 gallons, of which 3,000 is unavailable.  This counted on maximum economy including securing the laundry and stopping fresh water baths, and on burning both Diesel fuel and excess lubricating oil.
	With reliability below normal, I urged that we fuel at some intermediate port, in succession, one ship maintaining continuous guard on ODENWALD outside.  However, upon learning the compelling reasons for trying to make Trinidad from your estimate of the situation, I made unqualified recommendation to proceed.  I informed my crew of your margin.  All hands are engaged in an enthusiastic effort to gain the ability to fuel the OMAHA.  Up to the present time SOMERS performance has been about 12% better than predicted.
	J. C. METZEL.

 

	U.S.S. OMAHA
	11 November 1941.
	From: Commander Salvage Detail, German Motor Ship Odenwald. To: The Commanding Officer.     Subject: Report of Salvage of German Motor Ship Odenwald Flying United States Ensign and Bearing Name "WILLMOTO".
	1.        While at action stations, shortly after dawn November 6, my Captain directed me to take an armed guard, to board a vessel which he had stopped and to investigate her.  The vessel was showing U. S. Colors, and bore the name WILLMOTO, PHILADELPHIA.
	2.        In company with a boarding party (named in appendix A) I proceeded toward the ship.  Shortly before arriving, I noticed the vessel lower her boats.  We came along her starboard side where two boats were in the water and sea ladders were rigged.  The personnel on this side were just beginning to get into the boats.  The First Officer who was in charge, when we came alongside, said, "We are sinking; we are a German ship.  I went on board and immediately asked to see the Captain.  They said the Captain had gone.  With the armed guard, I rounded up the crew remaining on board.  The first officer, who spoke English with a British accent, said the ship had been blown up and was sinking.  The signalman was directed to inform OMAHA that the ship was being scuttled.  Part of the armed guard was directed to keep the crew under guard to prevent further sabotage and to protect the lives of the people on board against any further igniting of explosives, while H. C. CORONADO, CWT, and myself directed the First Officer and the Chief Engineer to take us to the scene of the explosions.  They took us to the motor room.  Just as we started in several cans were observed which looked to be explosives.  The First Officer said they were smoke-making devices.  A box was also observed which contained what looked to be pyrotechnics or flame torches.  Thereafter the cans and box were thrown overboard.  In the motor room there were numerous five gallon cans distributed about which, from the odor, appeared to contain gasoline or benzine.  At this point a member of the armed guard was detailed to cover that area and ordered to prevent anybody from setting the ship on fire.  On the way down to the scene of the explosion the German officers were told that if they had any time bombs they had better say so, as we would all be blown up with the ship.  They said the explosions were all over but the ship was sinking.  We proceeded to the port after bulkhead of the engine room where the gasses of explosion were heavy.  The gas had an odor as if it might be a vesicant or lung irritant; but, since the German officers did not seem to reluctant to enter the gas area, it was then assumed that the gas was nothing more than that generated by the detonation.  The gas was so persistent in this area that we were unable to see what damage had occurred, but we could see that there was flooding in the motor room.
	3.        We returned topside; men of the armed guard were directed to make a search to see if they could find any sea cocks open.  The Germans said that the sea cocks were not open but that the bottom of the
	- 1 -

 

	of the ship had been opened to the sea by the explosions.
	4.        About this time the German Captain's boat came alongside and he came on board.  He didn't add anything to our information, but insisted that his ship was sinking.  Both he and the First Officer were permitted under guard to go to their cabins to get personal belongings.  CORONADO accompanied the First Officer and came back with several pistols.
	5.        The Captain of the OMAHA sent me a signal and offered to send any assistance needed.  He gave me full freedom of action and sent officers and men, over and above that called for, but who were definitely needed to isolate damage.  A list of such officers and men is annexed hereto.  In the first party he sent over Machinist Waltrip, together with engineers and artificers.  This was most timely in that Mr. Waltrip and his men succeeded in isolating the flooded area and in getting drain pumps started to combat the flooding.  Mr. Waltrip succeeded in closing a large watertight door in the after bulkhead of the motor room which had been left open to facilitate flooding.  He also found two manhole plates in this bulkhead removed and replaced them.  These actions made this bulkhead watertight and undoubtedly prevented the ship from sinking.  He also found and closed a sea suction valve which was open and which was admitting water into the motor room, an extremely large space.
	6.        A close check was kept on the motor room.  On first observation it was believed the port engine had been put out of commission, and the German said one engine was out of commission, but this was proved false on later investigation.
	7.        An estimate was made as to what equipment was needed and the ship was signalled.  Already, however large and efficient salvage party was on its way and arrived just as F. E. King, SF1c, went over the side to see if he could locate the hole in the bottom through which the ship was flooding.  Inspections gave us to believe that all the flooding was occurring in the after part of the ship.  The Captain and First Officer were questioned in an effort to determine the damaged areas, but only surmises could be made from their replies.  The ship was taking a starboard list.  The Captain had previously said she would do this and then take a port list and sink and that the only way to get to the damage was by diving operations, which statement was in fact true at that time.  Just before King entered the water a shark was observed swimming around the vicinity.  Pistol shots were fired to frighten the shark, but neither King nor the shark appeared to be frightened and King went about his work.  He was unable to observe any rupture on the side or bottom of the ship from the starboard quarter.  Subsequently Carpenter A. L. Alton made a similar unsuccessful dive.
	8.        With the aid of the salvage parties, pumps were placed in operation, cargo was shifted and some jettisoned in an effort to reduce the list (which changed from starboard to port) to lighten the ship and to locate the flooding which appeared to be underneath number four and five cargo holds.  Approximately 400 bags of oats and peanuts were jettisoned at this time.
	- 2 -

 

	9.        I had men searching the ship for explosives and fire making devices.  Much new electrical wiring was observed and numerous cans of benzine were found about the ship conveniently arranged for igniting.
	10.        With the exception of the German First Deck Officer, I sent all officers and crew aboard and those lying off in life boats to the OMAHA.
	11.        At about 1300, the ship was settling and listing badly to starboard.  I sent to the OMAHA such papers as I could then find, together with various items of value.  I also jettisoned 20 bales of rubber and 75 tires.  At about 1430, the engines were gotten into commission and shortly thereafter we gained on the flooding.  We had difficulty with the air compressor and one at a time I received the German Chief Engineer Officer and another German aboard.  They were not helpful and I returned them to the OMAHA and received Officer William Seidl who was also uncommunicative.  At 1800, the ship developed about six degree list to starboard and we lost control of flooding.  Through draining the flooded starboard after tank into the engine room and taking suction from there, we managed to regain control.  At about 1930, the ship was gotten underway.
	12.        There are annexed hereto statements of several members of the salvage party.
	G. K. CARMICHAEL.

 

	12 November 1941.
	From: Commander Salvage Detail, German Motor Ship Odenwald. To: Commanding Officer.     Subject: Report of Passage from Scene of Salvage of German M.S. Odenwald to Vicinity Trinidad, B.W.I.
	1.        At about 1815 zone plus 2 time, November 6, after about 12 hours of effort, the engines of the salvaged German M. S. Odenwald, scuttled by her crew, were turned over and the vessel, in company with U.S.S. OMAHA and U.S.S. SOMERS, proceeded with salvage crew and two German passengers, all listed in an appendix hereto.
	2.        The problems faced were numerous.  Notably among them was the fact that the ship had apparently had her outer shell ruptured by explosives and was taking water continually in the area centered around her shaft alley tunnels and probably, though not established, in numbers 4 and 5 cargo holds.  She was listed about 5 degrees to starboard and control of the flooding was had by continuous pumping of the flooded areas with two small bilge pumps and one large ballast pump.  The latter pump, apparently unable to take a direct suction on the flooded area, was brought into service by having it take suction on the motor room bilges into which the flooded area was drained off by slacking off on manhole plates on the after bulkhead of the motor room.
	3.        Gradually the water level in the flooded area was reduced by continuous operation of the three pumps mentioned; the list was reduced and control of the flooding and the list was had.
	4.        Another problem of moment was the fact that the salvage crew was unfamiliar with the machinery plant of the salvaged ship, thus making it necessary that all systems be traced out to gain an understanding of the plant.  Sounding of all fuel and water tanks were undertaken and accurate water and oil inventory was finally obtained after much search of tank capacity tables that involved much computation.  These matters required great physical hardships on the engineering personnel.  Since the ship was so dependent on these operations, three watch stations were kept manned to insure that the pumping would not cease - a generator, an electrical distribution board and the three pumps.
	5.        Within two hours after the ship was gotten underway, the engines were worked up to 117 r.p.m. an approximate speed of eight and one half knots.  Continuous pumping kept the water level steady.
	6.        Thereafter the pump began to gain over the flooding.  Thorough search of the ship for fire hazards and explosives was accomplished.  More five gallon cans of benzine were found, together with several bomb like objects, all of which were thrown overboard.  Careful examination of
	- 1 -

 

	the fire fighting system was carried out and a fire fighting organization was made up.  An abandon ship organization was also set up.  The engineering force continued to familiarize themselves with the engineering system.
	7.        The personnel were organized as follows:
	Lieutenant (jg) Wideman - Executive and Eng. Ensign Weatherwax - Deck Force Ensign Wagenals - C & N 4- men Ensign Vance - S & H 5 - men Bos'n Ferreola - Deck Force 22 men Carp. Alton - C & R 5 - men Mach. Waltrip - Eng. 18 - men
	8.        Certain security measures were instituted and maintained in order to reduce the chances of any mishap preventing the safe arrival of the salvaged ship into a U. S. Port.  Among these were hourly C & R soundings taken of all holds equipped with sounding tubes which were reported to officer of the deck with amy marked changes to commanding officer, a continuous security patrol at night to inspect all parts of the ship for fires.  A rigid guard of the German Officer maintained to prevent any further effort to scuttle, to set fire to, or to damage the ship, thus endangering the lives of the personnel on board, continual efforts to reduce fire hazard, including fire hoses connected and lead out so as to be accessible to all holds and cargo and study and instruction in the operation of CO2 system installed aboard.
	9.        Personal effects of officers and crew have been gathered and for the most part transferred to the Omaha.  Ship's work to get the vessel in shape had continuously gone forward.  Efforts to locate source of flooding, if any, beneath the after cargo holds have been maintained without success.  In this connection diving operation have been carried on by Carpenter Alton who has entered the starboard shaft alley via the after escape hatch.  Work to square away holds, ships equipage and staterooms and their contents is going forward in so far as the limitations of personnel will permit.
	G. K. CARMICHAEL.

 

	THE JETTISONED CARGO
	The cargo jettisoned consisted of about seventy five tires, four hundred bags of oats and peanuts and twenty bales of rubber.
	This was done in our efforts to locate the source of the flooding, to reduce the list on the ship, and to lighten the ship.  In this connection it also occurred to me that the tires and rubber would float and might be picked up.  Jettisoning of the tires and rubber was therefore partly dictated by a desire to preserve property at a time when I had very little hope that the ship would remain afloat, since she was then filling, had a bad list and we could not locate the source of the flooding.
	I add that while hoisting the ship's life boats, one was lost when the hoisting point gave away and permitted it to flood.
	Lieutenant, U. S. Navy,
	Commander Salvage Detail

 

	U.S.S. OMAHA
	9 November 1941.
	From: Lieutenant (jg) William B. Wideman, U.S.N. To: Commander Salvage Detail, German Motor Ship ODENWALD     Subject: Narrative - Engineering.
	1.        At about 0645, 6 November 1941, the repair party arrived on board the German M.S. ODENWALD.  The repair party went below.  Two diesel driven generators were running, one was dismantled for overhaul.  Morrison CEM, was stationed on the main switchboard on the 3rd platform deck of the engineroom.  GERALD, CMM, and WILSON, MM1c, were stationed on the generators.  The engineroom was filled with smoke, from an explosion in the shaft alley.
	2.        On the after engineroom bulkhead, port and starboard sides, two large manhole plates had been removed.  These manholes lead into No. 4 cargo hold.  A draft was coming out of the holds, so Machinist WALTRIP and GERALD, CMM, immediately closed them.  The ship's company had carelessly left the plates, nuts, bolts and wrenches right on the floor plates beside the holes.  If they had kicked the plates and all into the bilges, operations would have been seriously hindered.
	3.        The shaft alley opened into the engineroom through a large gear and rack driven water tight door, distant controlled from the upper engineroom grating.  The shaft alley was flooded to a depth of about four feet and the water was running into the engineroom.  At the distant control mechanism for the shaft alley door the ship's company had left all tools and gear intact.  They had made attempts to remove the hand wheel, but apparently did not have time.  This door was closed immediately to prevent flooding engineroom bilges.
	4.        The engineroom bilges had about six inches of water and the only evidence of sabotage was a valve cast iron manifold that had been cut in two with a chisel.  This act, however, had been done some time before as shown by the rust on the edges.  The valves were closed and no water was coming into the engineroom.  Later two manholes on the forward engineroom bulkhead, corresponding to the two aft were found with plates etc. nearby.  These led into No. 3 cargo hold.  They were immediately closed.  Also the engine cooling water was discharging into the bilges.
	5.        This showed that they intended to flood through the shaft alley and No. 4 double bottoms into the engineroom and on into No. 3 hold.  Great credit is due Machinist Waltrip, Gerald, CMM and Rausch, MM1c, for their quick action and leadership in finding and closing up the holes, thereby confining the flooding to a limited area.
	- 1 -

 

	6.        In the after starboard side of the engineroom are two electric-motor driven, 3 stage bilge pumps, MORRISON, CEM, started the after one, and Machinist WALTRIP, assisted by PHILLIPS, CMM, VANCE, MM1c, BRANNON, MM1c, FITZWATER, MM1c and CHESHIRE, Manth1c, traced lines and placed this pump on the engineroom bilges.  The second was then lined up on the shaft alley tunnel.  By this time, about 0700, the ship had taken a 5° list to starboard.  This gradually worked off and the ship then listed about 5° to port.
	7.        Forward of the bilge pumps was a large two stage electric motor driven water-ballast pump.  With the aid of RAUSCH, MM1c, who had some knowledge of German, it was possible to trace the lines and finally place this pump on the bilges.  The starboard manhole plate was then backed off to permit water from No. 4 hold to run into the engine room bilges.  The plate was adjusted so that the water coming into the bilges could be handles by the pumps.
	8.        The repair and salvage party consisted of Machinist Furman D. WALTRIP, GERALD, Earl F., CMM, PHILLIPS, Herbert B., CMM, MORRISON, Sidney E., CEM, SALDANO, Cerepio P., CWT, FITZWATER, Oscar T., MM1c, RAUSCH, Andrew J., MM1c, BRANNON, Robert T., MM1c, VANCE, Dale W., MM1c, BRANNON, Robert T., MM1c, FROZZO, Salvatore A., MM1c, WILSON, Elmer H., MM1c, CHESHIRE, Frank A., Msmth1c, PERRY, Olicer A., MM1c, PEAR, Ernest E., MM2c, WILSON, Ralph W., Bmkr2c, MONTEITH, Jess W., F1c, ORIOLES, James L., EM3c, MURRAY, Clarence R., AMM2c, KING, Franklin E., SF1c.  All of these men never hesitated to go right to work in the engineroom bilges, 5 decks below the main deck and only escape outlet.  They worked in a smoke filled, strange engineroom with efficiency, coolness and despatch.  They prevented the sinking of the M. S. ODENWALD.
	9.        At about 0915 I came aboard and received instructions from Lieutenant CARMICHAEL to take charge of the engineroom and do everything possible to (1) keep the ship afloat, and (2) get the motors started.
	10.        At about 0936 commenced preparations to get the main engines started.  The main air banks for starting the engines, had been bled down to about 4/5 the required starting pressure.  The main air compressor was started to build up this pressure.  This machine draws 300 amps running and trouble was encountered in controlling the power on the switchboard.  The generators could not be paralleled because of speed variations, so the load had to be divided between the two generators.  MORRISON, CEM, very quickly traced out the panels and determined the board wiring systems.
	11.        At about 1030 GERALD, CMM, turned over the starboard engine three times in an effort to start it.  This simply bled off the main air tank.  However, we knew we could jack the engines, and felt confident that they could be started as soon as we could build up sufficient air pressure in the main air tanks and scavenge airbanks, as no evidence of any sabotage to the machinery could be found any where.  The ship's company was so confident that she would sink that they had made no attempts to disable machinery.
	- 2 -

 

	12.        About 1400 reported to Lieutenant CARMICHAEL that we would try to get the ship underway within an hour.  This was indeed an optimistic viewpoint, as was soon proved.  Preparations were commenced topside to get underway.  They commenced hoisting boats.  The use of the deck winches, air compressor, three bilge pumps and the ship's load was entirely too heavy a load for the generators.  Each time a winch was cut in the load dropped rapidly.  MORRISON, CEM, on the board did an excellent job in keeping the load and preventing the stopping of the pumps.  With the slowing down of the generators caused by overloading, No. 1 generator commenced to lift her safeties.  The quick work of GERALD, CMM, prevented the generator from stopping.  This generator continued to slow and pop-off for about 15 minutes with load variations.  We had noticed that the scavenger air dropped rapidly with the speed, causing the safeties to pop-off.  This showed little or no reserve air in the bottles and immediate efforts were made to trace the air system on the generators.  The main air compressor was secured until boats could be lifted.  A method of boosting the scavenger air was traced on the generators and an alert watch was posted.  A continuous effort was made to learn the generator systems quickly and thoroughly in order to insure power to the drainage pumps.
	13.        SCHUMAKER, CMM, from the SOMERS was received aboard.  GERALD, CMM, PHILLIPS, CMM, and SHUMAKER, CMM were detailed to trace out fuel, air, cooling water and lubricating oil systems on the main engines during this lull in preparations for getting underway.  All engineers were detailed to learn what we could about the engines under the tutelage of SHUMAKER, GERALD, and RAUSCH.  We all traced markings, tried to fathom the purposes for valves with such markings as "Von Einblassepumpe", "Anlassebehalter", "Zudenahlassluft-behaltern".
	14.        After looking at them many times, tracing and retracing lines, these names began to assume meanings.  The men present who had served with Diesel installations before, particularly GERALD and SHUMAKER, were invaluable in helping to accumulate the information necessary to start such a large plant.
	15.        About 1230 the boats were in and the compressor again started and lined up to the main air banks.  Repeatedly the compressor was secured to relieve the load.  The compressor made no headway on the tanks and it soon became apparent that we did not have it lined up properly.  It seemed to build up a pressure within its own banks or in the line, and bucking this pressure, overloading the generator until it became necessary to secure the compressor to prevent stopping the generator.  The compressor safeties were not lifting, she simply was not putting out the air.  Each overloading required securing the compressor, wrestling with the main board, racing around the No. 1 generator to keep her from running away, etc.  The ship's First Engineer, Schroeder, was sent aboard about 1300 to assist, but he steadfastly shrugged his shoulders, looked complacent and refused to give even a hint with his eyes.  About 1330, when it became apparent that he was detracting attention more than aiding, Mr. Schroeder was sent topside.  About 1400 the ship's Fourth Engineer was sent aboard.  Likewise he was of no assistance.  He made a show of helping but did nothing.  No. 1 generator took
	- 3 -

 

	off while he was in the engine spaces.  He went over to it, adjusted several things, prevented it from stopping - assisted by my pistol pointed directly at him while he was on the generator.  He would not give us any helpful information regarding the air compressor or engines, professing ignorance of the plant.  So in order to prevent sabotage and distraction he was sent topside also.  No. 1 generator became more erratic, overloading slowed it faster, causing scavenger air pressure to drop, safeties to pop, resulting in further slowing.  The next attempt to run the compressor slowed the generator so quickly that it stopped.  This was approximately 1500.  Several attempts were made by GERALD and SHUMAKER to start the generator, all failed.  We did not boost scavenger air high enough by using No. 2 generator's compressor as booster.  At about 1530 Third Engineer Seidl arrived on board.  He pretended ignorance of the generators and kept advising that we send for the electrician.  But the trouble was in the Diesel, not in the electrical end.  I took out my pistol, tapped him several times in the chest with it, pointed to the Diesel and told him in English, which he had professed not to understand, that the generator was to be running in 10 minutes  -  or ---.  He understood.  After some hesitation and frequent glances at the pistol he commenced to work.  He continued to profess ignorance of the engine, but nevertheless started it on the second attempt.  We had failed to jack it to the proper starting position.  The generator governor would not hold speed and several times it nearly ran away.  It is believed that the Fourth Engineer offset the governor in some way while he worked with it.
	16.        With steady persuasion, Mr. Seidl regulated the air compressor and our air bank commenced to build up.  This accomplished and our closing off one valve to about 1/4 open, rather than wide open.  He worked with the generator, regulating it until it ran steadily at about 40 rpm over speed, but otherwise satisfactorily.
	17.        We then built up the scavenger air bottles and lined up the starboard main engine, ready for starting.  Mr. Seidl was persuaded to start it and after much hesitation he started the engine.  We noticed that he did two things that we had failed earlier to do:
	(1)  He insisted on scavenger air pressure well above the red "operating mark".  He obtained the high pressure air by adjustment of the air compressor.
	(2)  He spun the engine by air until it was turning over at 50 rpm before he cut in the fuel.  We had formerly spun it only 25 rpm.
	18.        We bled air from the starboard engine compressor into the port scavenger air bottle.  This was faster than the independent air compressor and also we were afraid to start this compressor again as the starting panel had become so hot that all the surrounding paint had been burned probably due to our starting so very slowly to enable the board to keep up.
	19.        Mr. Seidl positively refused to start the port engine; but after obtaining the high scavenger air pressure and priming the engine, we started it on the second attempt.  The first try failed because we spun it only to 45 rpm.  The second time we held on until she passed fifty, then cut in the fuel.
	- 4 -

 

	20.        We were underway on all engines!  We built up speed slowly advancing about 10 turns every 10 minutes and checking thoroughly all the time.  Finally the engine was set at the speed most commonly run by the ship before the U.S. Navy took it over.
	W. B. WIDEMAN.

 

	U.S.S. OMAHA
	9 November 1941
	From: Boatswain James A. Ferreola, U.S. Navy. To: Commander Salvage Detail, German Motor Ship Odenwald.     Subject: Statement.
	1.        Upon arrival ERSKINE, CRM, had one life boat hoisted and was preparing to hoist the other three, when hoisting the last boat, which was two-thirds foundered, the hoisting rods in the boat carried away, necessitating abandoning the boat.
	2.        The deck force then continued unloading cargo above the approximate location of the ruptured bottom.
	3.        Continued search for explosives and inflammable material.
	4.        Threw overboard 15 five gallon drums of benzine and 20 smoke bombs.
	5.        Continued eliminating fire hazards.
	J. A. FERREOLA

 

	U.S.S. OMAHA
	9 November 1941
	From: CORONADO, Henry Charles, CWT, U.S.N. To: Commander Salvage Detail, German Motor Ship ODENWALD     Subject: Statement.
	1.        On November the six I was directed to report on the quarterdeck as a member of the boarding party.
	2.        I reported on deck armed with a 45 caliber pistol with two clips of bullets.  Mr. Carmichael, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, was in charge.  We embarked and proceeded to where the vessel we were to board had stopped.  There were eight men in the party.
	3.        As soon as we approach this vessel we could see that they were acting very strange.  They told us that the ship was sinking.  That they blew it up.  The spokesman was the First Officer.
	4.        Mr. Carmichael told them that they better not let the ship sink.  They had two boats in the water.  A ladder was rigged on the side of the ship.
	5.        Our officer had to cross from our Navy boat to one of their boats in order to be able to climb the ladder.  I was right behind him.  My duty was to guard him as I notice that some of these crew of that ship were ready to cut the ropes.  I notice hatchets in their hands.
	6.        He repeated to the German officers not to sink the ship or he was going to have the armed guard fire on them.  As he started up the ladder I had my gun aimed at the German first officer.  As soon as he got aboard I followed him as fast as I could climb the ladder.
	7.        When I reach the top of the ladder Mr. Carmichael already had the situation well in hand.  He ordered the men to bunch together and ask for the captain.
	8.        When I got close to these people I acted to the best of my capacity to render all the help necessary by covering the German officer with my gun.  I passed the word to the armed party to come aboard.  After the armed party came aboard Mr. Carmichael ordered them, to cover the German crew with their guns.
	9.        Mr. Carmichael and myself took charge of the first officer and the chief engineer.  We then made them take us to the place where they said they put the charge of dynamite.  They took us to the engine room.  We could smell gas.  There was lots of smoke.  We notice that the ship was not sinking as fast as the Germans expected.
	- 1 -

 

	10.        They were surprised that the American officer disregarded all the danger and made them go to the worst place they could think in the world.  That was where they had blown a hole in the ship.  I was covering one officer and Mr. Carmichael the other.  I was ready for any bad move that the German officer had made.  That would have been their last one.  I was ready to kill them.
	11.        This officer was scared the ship was not going to last 20 minutes.  As we returned on deck Mr. Carmichael decided that we would save the ship if we got help from the OMAHA and if we acted fast with the men we had aboard.
	12.        All the time we were aboard we thought these people had planted time bombs on the ship.  We didn't care as all of us wanted to save the ship.
	13.        I was ordered to take the first officer down the engine room by myself a second time and check on how fast the water was coming in.  I told this German officer that if the hole on the ship was not very big I was going to plug it.  This officer is a very smooth talker.  I was not taking chances.
	14.        When I return him on deck he was warned by another officer to watch out as I was ready to plug him.
	15.        I took the first officer to his room and then the chief engineer.  I told this officer that my captain was in very bad humor.  That he better give me something to pacify him.  He gave me a gun and bullets.
	HENERY CHARLES CORONADO

 

	U.S.S. OMAHA
	November 9, 1941
	From: JONES, Charles R., S.M.1c, U.S. Navy. To: Commander Salvage Detail, German Motor Ship ODENWALD.     Subject: Statement.
	1.        On the morning of November 6, 1941, while at my general quarters station on the bridge, a ship was sighted.  She was flying a U.S. ensign and also had a U.S. ensign painted on the wings of both sides of the bridge.  The name on the stern was "WILLMOTO" of Philadelphia.  She also had hoisted the international call letters of the "WILLMOTO".  She was unable to reply to our signals so the Captain ordered her to stop.
	2.        A boarding party was called away in charge of Lieutenant Carmichael.  We left the ship and enroute to WILLMOTO we could see that the were lowering their boats and preparing to abandon ship.
	3.        When we arrived one boat was already in the water.  We came alongside this boat.  Lieutenant Carmichael asked them why they were leaving their ship.  An officer who was later identified as the first officer replied that this was a German ship and she was sinking.  Lieutenant Carmichael immediately ordered them aboard and told them to stop the ship from sinking or they would go down with it.  He had me signal OMAHA that this was a German ship.  He then boarded her and were followed by CORONADO, CWT.  The remainder of the party were ordered to not let anymore of the German crew off the ship.
	4.        In a few minutes Lieutenant Carmichael called me aboard.  While I was climbing the ladder three explosions went off in the after part of the ship.
	5.        When I arrived on board Lieutenant Carmichael had the prisoners lined up under guard.  He had me signal the OMAHA that they were attempting to scuttle their ship.  In the mean time the remaining members of the boarding party were forcing the rest of the crew back aboard.  This is with the exception of the two port boats which got off while we were boarding from starboard.  These two boats were lying too a short distance from the ship.
	6.        Lieutenant Carmichael with the first officer left to inspect damages to the ship and look for other explosives leaving the crew lined up under heavy guard.
	7.        I was busy for quite some time signaling reports and information back to the OMAHA.  Very soon we hoisted the U.S. ensign over the Nazi flag.
	8.  The rest of the day was spent trying to save the ship.  The OMAHA sent more men to assist.  I was busy through the day keeping OMAHA informed on efforts to save the ship.
	C. R. JONES.

 

 

	EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN U.S.S. ONAHA SS WILLMOTO U.S. REGISTRY (WHICH LATER PROVED TO BE GERMAN SHIP ODENWALD)
	FROM: OMAHA (Captain by megaphone). TO: SS WILLMOTO
	WHY DON'T YOU ANSWER SIGNALS.  (Repeated twice).  (No answer).
	FROM: OMAHA TO: SS WILLMOTO
	WHERE ARE YOU FROM
	FROM: WILLMOTO TO: OMAHA
	CAPETOWN
	FROM: OMAHA TO: SS WILLMOTO
	WHERE ARE YOU BOUND
	FROM: WILLMOTO TO: OMAHA
	TO NEW ORLEANS
	FROM: OMAHA TO: SS WILLMOTO
	WHAT IS YOUR CARGO
	FROM: WILLMOTO TO: OMAHA
	GENERAL CARGO

 

	EXTRACTS FROM SIGNAL LOG OF 6, NOVEMBER 1941.
	FROM: CGG 3.6 TO: SOMERS
	INVESTIGATE SHIP BEARING 251°
	FROM: SOMERS TO: CTG 3.6
	AT 0631 SHIP THREW ANOTHER LARGE PACKAGE OFF BOAT FROM BRIDGE
	FROM: BOARDING PARTY. TO: CTG 3.6
	THEY ARE SCUTTLING SHIP.
	FROM: SOMERS TO: CTG 3.6
	SEE JANES ISSUE 1937 PAGE 226.
	FROM: BOARDING PARTY TO: CTG 3.6
	THIS IS A GERMAN SHIP X THEIR CREW ARE TRYING TO LEAVE THE SHIP X THEY SAY IT IS SINKING AFT X I TRIED TO GET DOWN THERE BUT SMOKE PREVENTED I AM BRINGING THE CREW BACK ABOARD.
	FROM: CGG 3.6 TO: SOMERS
	IS GERMAN SHIP DISGUISED AS AMERICAN KEEP CAREFUL PATROL AROUND US.
	FROM: SOMERS TO: CTG 3.6
	CAPTAIN ARE YOU TAKING ANY PICTURES.
	FROM: CGG 3.6 TO: SOMERS
	AFFIRMATIVE TAKE ALL YOU CAN ALSO.
	FROM: SOMERS TO: CTG 3.6
	SHIP LOWERING TWO BOATS PORT SIDE AND JUST THREW OVER ANOTHER PACKAGE.
	FROM: BOARDING PARTY. TO: CTG 3.6
	- 1 -

 

	EXTRACTS FROM SIGNAL LOG OF 6, NOVEMBER 1941.
	THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THROWING THINGS OVERBOARD IT ADDED JUST THE RIGHT AMOUNT TO MY SUSPICIONS.
	FROM: BOARDING PARTY TO: CTG 3.6
	BOAT PICKED UP A BAG FROM SHIPS STERN ANOTHER LARGE BAG WAS PASSED FROM ONE BOAT TO THE OTHER.
	FROM: CTG 3.6 TO: SOMERS
	KEEP GOOD LOOKOUT IN RAIL SQUALL.
	FROM: SOMERS TO: CTG 3.6
	CAPTAIN ARE YOU TRYING TO SAVE HER.
	FROM: CTG 3.6 TO: SOMERS
	WE THINK WE HAVE SAVED HER.
	FROM: SOMERS TO: CTG 3.6
	WOODEN BOAT BEARING 090 FROM YOU ABOUT SEVEN HUNDRED YARDS X HEAVY ON ONE CORNER AND MAY BE BUOYING SOMETHING.
	FROM: CTG 3.6 TO: SOMERS
	PICK IT UP WITHOUT LOWERING BOAT IF PRACTICABLE.

 

	EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN OMAHA AND BOARDING PARTY.
	Commencing at 0900, 6 NOVEMBER:
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  TRY TO GET NAZI COLORS IF POSSIBLE.
	TO:  OMAHA.  THEY ARE TAKING WATER IN AFTER PART OF SHIP.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BUT DO NOT RISK THE LIVES OF OUR MEN.
	TO:  OMAHA.  AM TRYING TO KEEP THE SHIP FROM SINKING.
	TO:  OMAHA.  HAVE ONE SET NAZI COLORS.
	TO:  OMAHA.  HAVE CHARTS AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR, ON BRIDGE.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  CHECK RADIO SHACK THOROUGHLY.
	TO:  OMAHA.  THEY GOT A MESSAGE OFF.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  SEND GERMAN LIFE BOATS TO OMAHA.
	TO:  OMAHA.  THIS SHIP IS SINKING BY THE STARN RESULT OF EXPLOSIVE UNDER CARGO 0930.
	TO:  OMAHA.  KEEPING CHIEF OFFICER.
	TO:  OMAHA.  HAVE STOPPED PART OF FLOODING SHIP NOT SINKING 0945.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  GOOD WORK.
	TO:  OMAHA.  ONE MAIN DIESEL ENGINE HAS BEEN DECOMMISSIONED 0952.
	TO:  OMAHA.  WITHOUT MOVING GENERAL CARGO CANNOT DO ANY MORE TO PREVENT LETTING SHIP SINK WILL CONTINUE A WHILE YET.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  MOVE GENERAL CARGO, WILL SEND YOU ALL HELP NECESSARY 0955.
	TO:  OMAHA.  PLESE SEND RAUSCH MM1c AND CLIFTON FIREMAN.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  SEND MEN WITH DIESEL EXPERIENCE AND RADIO 1006.
	TO:  OMAHA.  WEAK RADIO SIGNALS ARE BEING RECEIVED ATFREQUENCY WHICH SET.  1008.
	TO :  BOARDING PARTY.  WHAT FREQUENCY.
	TO:  OMAHA.  THE ONE THEY LEFT IT SET ON I WILL TRY TO FIND OUT.
	- 1 -

 

	EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN OMAHA AND BOARDING PARTY.
	Commencing at 0900, 6 NOVEMBER:
	TO:  OMAHA.  FREQUENCY 105 METERS or KCS.
	TO:  OMAHA.  SEND SHALLOW WATER DIVING OUTFIT AND GASOLINE FRIVEN SUBMERSIBLE PUMP WITH HOSE.  1018.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  IF COLORS ARE AVAILABLE HOIST U.S. OVER NAZI 1028.
	TO:  OMAHA.  SHAFT ALLEY FLOODED ENGINE ROOM IS FLOODING SLOWLY PROBABLY DUE TO EXPLOSION CAUSING HOLE IN BOTTOM.  1031
	TO:  OMAHA.  AS YET UNABLE TO FIND SOURCE OF FLOODING IN ENGINE ROOM BUT FLOODING AS YET IS NOT SERIOUS.  1037.
	TO:  OMAHA.  IF AVAILABLE SEND COLLISION MAT POWER VELOCITY TOOLS AND BOILER PLATING.  1044.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  RETURN ONE MOTOR WHALE BOAT.
	TO:  OMAHA.  WE HAVE SUCTION ON ENGINE ROOM BILGES.  1050
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  ONE MOTOR WHALE BOAT SEARCH AREA PARTICULARLY TO WINDWARD PICKING UP ALL OBJECTS.
	TO:  OMAHA.  M.S.G. TO RADIO OFFICER RECEIVER SET TO N.A.A. FREQUENCY CALL SIGN D.N.B. 1100
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  WHAT IS TRANSMITTER SET TO.
	TO:  OMAHA.  REQUEST PERMISSION TO REMOVE CARGO AFTER HOLD 1103.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  PERMISSION GRANTED.  1105.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  YOU DO NOT NEED TO REQUEST ANY STEPS YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY.  1107.
	TO:  OMAHA.  TRANSMITTER APPARENTLY SET FOR FIVE HUNDRED KCS.  1107.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  REMOVE U.S. FLAG FROM STARBOARD SIDE OF BRIDGE 1112
	TO:  OMAHA.  AFTER ENGINE ROOM BULKHEAD HOLE BELIEVE WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL FLOODING.  1115
	TO:  OMAHA.  THIS MESSAGE WAS FOUND IN RADIO SHACK X QQQQ GQKM AT 0-55 NORTH 27 - TWENTY SEVEN FOUR SEVEN WEST ATTACKED BY SURFACE RAIDER 0725 C. 1124.
	TO:  OMAHA.  FLOODING IN ENGINE ROOM UNDER CONTROL X SOURCE OF FLOODING NOT YET LOCATED.  1128.
	TO :  OMAHA.  CAN YOU OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS REGARDING LOCATION OF EXPLOSIONS 1130
	- 2 -

 

	EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN OMAHA AND BOARDING PARTY.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  WILL TRY.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  SEND MOTOR WHALE BOAT FOR VELOCITY TOOLS BOILER PLATES AND MAT.
	TO:  OMAHA.  TO RADIO OFFICER HIGH FREQUENCY TRANSMITTER APPARENTLY ON 16965 OR 16560 FOR SENDING TO DOG AFFIRM NEGAT.  1137.
	TO:  OMAHA.  PLESAE SEND SOME WATER.  1137.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  TO CARPENTER ALTON.  DO YOU KNOW WHERE THREADED STUDS OR VELOCITY POWER TOOLS STOWED.  1145.
	TO:  OMAHA.  GROUP TWO MAGAZINES.  1152.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  THE GERMAN CAPTAIN KNOWS LOCATION POSSIBLE EXPLOSIONS - QUESTION HIM CLOSELY TELL HIM THAT HE WILL HAVE TO REMAIN ON BOARD BELOW DECKS AS INSURANCE THAT BOMBS WILL NOT EXPLODE - LOOK FOR PISTOLS IN OTHER FIRST OFFICERS ROOM.  1155
	TO:  OMAHA.  BELIEVE SHIP WAS MINED UNDER AFTER HOLD CARGO HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET TO FLOODING SHIP NOW LISTING TO PORT CAPTAIN SAYS SHE WILL SINK.  1158
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  SHIFT CARGO AND KEEP TRYING.  1159.
	TO:  OMAHA.  QUESTION ENGINEER GERMAN SHIP AS TO POSSIBILITY PLACING PUMPS IN NUMBER FOUR AND FIVE CARGO HOLD 1240.
	TO:  OMAHA.  ONLY MEANS OF STOPPING FLOODING IS FROM OUTSIDE HULL X FLOODING IS TAKING PLACE UNDERNEATH NO'S FOUR AND FIVE CARGO HOLDS X ONLY ENTRANCE THIS AREA VIA WATER TIGHT DOOR AFTER BULKHEAD ENGINE ROOM X WATER LEVEL PREVENTS THIS X DIVING OPERATIONS RISKY X SHIP LISTED FORST TO STBD THEN TO PORT X CAPTAIN SAID SHE WOULD DO THIS THEN SINK.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  PUMPS FOR CARGO HOLDS FOUR AND FIVE ARE LOCATED ON STBD SIDE AFTER ENGINE ROOM.  1257.
	TO:  OMAHA.  CAN WE USE BALLAST PUMP ON NO'S FOUR AND FIVE.  1248.
	TO:  BOARDING PARTY.  TAKE DOWN NAZI FLAG AND PRESERVE CAREFULLY AS TROPHY.  1301

 

	STATEMENT OF JESSE HOMER FOLLY, ACMM, CONCERNING BOARDING OF GERMAN SHIP ODENWALD - 6 NOVEMBER 1941
	Upon approaching the ship with the Boarding Party they were attempting to lower quickly two boats.  They were throwing in their baggage and lowering themselves down the lines into the boat.  Lieutenant Carmichael, ordered all of that to cease; ordered the men back aboard ship.  As Mr. Carmichael was climbing up the side there were two explosions deep in the after part of the ship.  When that occurred he ordered all the landing party to come aboard.
	Upon boarding the ship Mr. Carmichael took the German Captain and one C.P.O. (armed) and proceeded to examine the ship for any fuses or time bombs or other explosives, sending the German Radio Officer forward to look for any code books and put out of commission the radio apparatus.  It had already been destroyed.  The German Radio Officer spoke good english and informed the C.P.O. (myself) that they had already notified the German Government that they were being chased and overhauled by some battleships, and that they were destroying their ship according to their instructions.  We stood guard over the Captain of the German ship while he packed a few private articles of wearing apparel.  He was not allowed to destroy any documents while in our presence.  I picked up all the private correspondence letters, etc., that I could find, broke open locked drawers and brought back to the OMAHA and turned them over to the Captain.
	There were 11 members of the German crew in the German boat in which I returned to the ship.  These men were allowed to bring a few items of clothing which was needed.  This was unloaded on the fantail.  All men were thoroughly searched upon arrival on board.
	I examined the forward main hole and found some to contain rubber tires (Goodyear), size 700 x 20, and numerous small packing boxes, contents unknown.
	JESSE HOMER JOLLY

 

	SPECIAL REPORT ON SEIZURE OF M.S. ODENWALD, FLYING U.S. FLAG, DISGUISED AS S.S. WILLMOTO, U. S. REGISTRY.
	I.        DISPOSITION OF M. S. ODENWALD'S RECORDS AND PAPERS.
	1.        The papers, accounts, and records of the M.S. ODENWALD were examined and placed in a large box which will be returned to the ODENWALD.
	2.        The ship's log for her present cruise is separate and is being kept on board the ODENWALD as a continuous official record.
	3.        Four books, two titled "World's Merchant Ships", and two titled "Worlds Men of War" are being kept on board for use of this vessel.  They are valuable books for purposes of identification.
	4.        The ship's registry papers, the current loading diagram and her false clearance papers will be returned to the ODENWALD in a separate envelope.
	II.        DISPOSITION OF M. S. ODENWALD'S MATERIAL ITEMS.
	1.        Six (6) .54 caliber Colt revolvers and two (2) German pistols were confiscated and placed in the armory.  The six .45 caliber revolvers are numbered as follows:  B.S. #169, 172, 173, 174, 175, and 178.  One German pistol is of unknown make, about .32 caliber #16.  The other pistol is a DREYSE about .22 automatic #182210.  These are privately owned, will be sold to OMAHA personnel as souvenirs and the proceeds will be paid to the owners.
	III.        DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS OF OFFICERS AND CREW.
	1.        All personal effects of officers and crew were brought on board the OMAHA and all clothing, trinkets, etc., were returned to their owners.
	2.        All personal correspondence, pictures, passes, identification cards, etc., were held and examined.  Separate envelopes were made up for each officer and crew member in which was placed correspondence from German, identification cards, passes, a personal picture if obtainable, and all pictures of ships.  Pictures of a personal nature were returned to their owners.  These individual jackets will be created and forwarded as an enclosure to this report.
	3.        Cameras were confiscated and will be returned to their owners upon leaving ship.  Films were confiscated and placed and placed in the personal envelopes.
	IV.        SPECIAL COMMENTS ON OFFICERS AND CREW OF M. S. ODENWALD.
	1.        HANS HERMAN SCHMIDT appears to be a higher type German than the average merchant marine officer.  He is well educated and very well informed.  He seems well acquainted with naval ships and customs.  He is recommended for special attention.
	- 1 -

 

	2.        HANS LAENGLE.  Included in this jacket is a diary of particular interest.  LAENGLE has already been detained in the United States by Immigration Authorities and sailed from San Francisco for Japan on the S.S. NITTA MARU on 21 June, 1941.
	3.        DARL HEINZ STUMPF has relatives in New York City.  Seems to correspond with various people in quite a few ports and can write fluent English.  While detained on board the OMAHA he has not disclosed that he speaks English well.
	4.        WILHELM SEIDL, Second Engineer.  This man was detained on board the ODENWALD by the Salvage Party.  The officers of the ODENWALD on board the OMAHA believe him responsible for helping to start the engines and, as a consequence, consider him a traitor and have threatened to kill him.  As a result of this he is being kept on board the ODENWALD until she reaches port.  It is strongly recommended that he be kept away from his countrymen.  Further comments on this matter will be found in the conversation.
	5.        GERHARD LOERS, Captain of the ODENWALD, sailed from San Francisco on the S.S. NITTA MARU on 21 June, 1941.
	6.        KARL AUGUST KADLER likewise sailed on the NITTA MARU from San Francisco on 21 June, 1941.
	7.        GEORG JUENEMANN likewise sailed from San Francisco on the NITTA MARU 21 June, 1941. The passenger list of the NITTA MARU may be found in the album of HANS LAENGLE.
	8.        KARL HOLSTEN's name does not appear on the roster of the crew, and was apparently not aboard the ODENWALD.  Yet some personal letters of his were picked up aboard the ODENWALD.  Attention is invited to the fact that he was a member of the crew of the S.S. COLUMBUS and evidently interned at ANGEL'S ISLAND, SAN FRANCISCO on 8 July 1940, and at a later date appeared in Japan aboard the ODENWALD.
	In covering the personal correspondence of the officers and crew of the ODENWALD it was found that they were made up largely from personnel of other German ships in various ports.  No direct questioning was made relative to their former activities.  It was believed better to wait until they recovered from their failure to destroy the ODENWALD before questioning them.  It is felt that when they arrive in the United States they will be much more talkative.
	V.        CONVERSATIONS WITH OFFICERS OF M.S. ODENWALD
	1.        Immediately after capturing the M.S. ODENWALD an effort was made to discover whether or not there were further explosives placed on board the vessel.  The Chief First Officer would not state how many mines were aboard, nor would he state whether or not all mines had exploded.  He did state, however,
	- 2 -

 

	that the explosives were detonated electrically and that the electric circuit to these mines had been closed when they attempted to scuttle the ship.  The boarding party discovered three boxes containing explosive-like contents.  The Second Chief Officer identified these as smoke candles.  Japanese labels from these boxes were sent to the OMAHA by the boarding party and a quick brief translation showed that these boxes contained smoke candles with ignition matches.  The Second Chief Officer stated that they were for the purpose of laying a smoke screen.
	2.        During the first day of capture all officers constantly maintained that the ship would sink and that the engines would not be started.  On the second day of capture the Second Officer finally admitted that there was no use fooling any longer; that it was apparent that the ship would not sink; that the engines were running properly, and that everything was all right.  He further stated that the boarding party was doing a good job.
	3.        The First Chief Officer, although refusing to answer questions concerning the mining of the ship, stated that he knew that he and the Captain would have to answer if anything happened aboard the ODENWALD and that he believed that everything was all right.
	4.        The Chief Engineer, although reluctant to talk, did cooperate in giving the location of the pumps to drain the after holds which were flooded.
	5.       From conversations with the officers it was ascertained that the ODENWALD had been in Japan for approximately two years, that constant efforts were being made to take her out.  They finally succeeded in obtaining their cargo from various sources.  In this connection it is interesting to note the history of the U.S. tires on board as shown by the enclosed card.  It appears that the Captain, the Chief First Officer, and the Chief Engineer had all information and orders for the trip and the other officers knew little concerning the plans to reach Germany.  The Junior Officers had been told that if they got through the day of November 6th they would be safe.  They all started that they believed they had only ten hours left in dangerous waters.  They had all been promised that they would be home for Christmas.
	6.        All officers had been away from Germany for a period of about two years and knew little of the internal situation.  During these two years many of the officers and crew had been in Japan and had a good knowledge of conditions in that country.  They stated that when they first arrived in Japan that everything was plentiful and cheap, but by the time they left there was a scarcity of everything with a great increase in prices.  One thing in particular was mentioned - that they had not had a cup of coffee in months and months.  They gave the impression that the Japanese are very hard pressed for supplies and that they did not think very much of Japanese ways and methods.
	7.        From their effects it was seen that they were all on a more than friendly basis with the Japanese girls.  Their baggage contained quantities of Japanese made shirts and pajamas.  They also had brought great quantities of woolen-like socks.  Their civilian suits were of Japanese make, of a poor material.
	- 3 -

 

	8.        Their contacts in Japan seemed to be: first, the German Embassy, which apparently worked the whole scheme of departure with the Hamburg-American Line agent.  They frequented, the German bars in Tokyo and Yokohama.  They were all well aquatinted with KETTEL, owner of the Rheingold Bar, Willi Bolke of De Fledermaus Bar, and in Yokohama with the proprietor of the Hamburg Bar.  They stated that German beer was still obtainable in Japan but too expensive and that the Japanese had maintained a good quality of their beer.
	9.        The officers have stated that they lost the last war, but they would win this one.  They stated that the cause of the war was the Versailles Treaty which never allowed Germany to regain normal living conditions.  They further stated that in the confusion existing in Germany after the last war the Jews from all over Europe flooded Germany and finally gained control of both Government and finance and making living conditions intolerable.  They further stated that Communism was a grave menace and that the German people did not want it.  They have been taught to believe that England, France and Germany should form a European anti-Communist bloc and establish a European sphere of influence.  The United States would be considered an outside friendly power with its own American sphere of influence.  Russia was to be destroyed and Asia and Asia and Africa were to come under the two spheres of influence.
	10.        The Germans apparently do not take the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis seriously.  They are contemptuous of both the Japanese and Italians.  All of their invasions of small countries and their international politics are described as necessities of war.
	11.        In conversations with the German officers the subject of Rudolph Hess was mentioned.  They stated that they were just as surprised as everyone else, and that they believed Hess wa a great idealogist and that he firmly thought that by going to England he could show the English the absolute necessity of forming the anti-Communist bloc and that England, France and Germany were to all attack and destroy Russia.
	12.        The writer asked the officers of the ODENWALD if they had not been in the habit of coming into the port of San Pedro, California, before the war, and they all stated that that was one of their ports of call.  The writer then said "The Wesser used to come into San Pedro, but that she is not Hamburg-America Line.  She is North German Lloyd".  At this point the Captain of the Odenwald who was walking nearby came over and said, in German, told the officers to stop talking about the Wesser.
	13.        The young radio officer is apparently pleased over his capture and the prospects of staying in the United States for the duration of the war.  He stated to the writer that he considered himself very lucky to be captured by an American warship and not by a British ship.  He further stated that in Europe they were always making war, that his grandfather had had to go to war; that his father had had to go to war, and now he, likewise, would have to fight.  (He is very talkative and responds to kind treatment).
	- 4 -

 

	14.        The Chief First Officer particularly asked the writer to get word to Berlin as soon as possible that they were all safe so that their families would not worry about them.  The writer stated that naturally this would be done, but not until port was reached and the writer further stated that anyway no new of their capture would be out until we arrived in port.  They said nothing to this, but the writer's impression was that they all knew the radio operator had gotten off a message to Berlin saying that they were scuttling the ship.  (The Chief First Officer is likewise very talkative but will not answer certain questions concerning the ODENWALD).
	15.        CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE CAPTAIN OF THE OMAHA AND THE CAPTAIN OF THE ODENWALD
	November 9, 1941.  Today the Captain feeling very cheerful and expansive.  Her are some of his remarks:
	Apparently he came aboard 18 August because he said, with a deprecatory smirk, that the other Captain was sick.  In discussing the bombs he said that the bomb installation work was begun under his predecessor and, I judge, finished about the time he arrived.  He said he had been warned that they were of terrific power and said they were "big" holding his hands out to indicate a dimension of about five feet.  I then asked him if that was why the crew left in such a hurry and he nodded to indicate that it was.  I followed by asking if it was the expectation that by blowing a large hole in the engine room and 4 and 5 holds that these large compartments would enough to sink the ship.  Again he nodded and followed with "Somebody made a mistake".
	He then said "Captain, you know it is a terrible thing to have to sink your ship.  I have been at sea all my life and never had to do anything like that".  I told him that I certainly could sympathize with his feelings and he added something to the effect that "He could not do as he wanted to do - that he just carried out his orders and did the best he could for his country.  In this I concurred, telling him that I thoroughly understood.  He concluded that "Everything was all right now but that the first day had been terrible".  He was, in fact, sick that day and our Doctor had given him Barbitol that night.
	November 10, 1941:
	Today the Captain spoke about Second Officer Seidl.  He stated that he hoped I could arrange matter that he would never come back to the ship and also that they could be sent to different camps.  To this I replied that I would keep him over aboard the ODENWALD and would recommend that they be sent to different camps.  I added, however, that Seidl was merely being retained to read labels, etc., and had not actually helped very little with advice and had volunteered nothing whatsoever.  I emphasized that he had been in no sense a traitor and had done nothing to which they could take exception.  The Captain replied that he realized this but nothing would make his crew believe it and he feared they would kill Seidl if they ever got their hands on him.  He added that it would be a terrible thing to have his men kill one of their own number.  I replied that I understood and would do my best.
	- 5 -

 

	November 11, 1941:
	Today at lunch Captain Loers presented me with a Japanese cigarette case in appreciation of the treatment he and his officers and crew had been accorded by all hands.  He once again expressed the hope that they would remain in the custody of the Navy as long as possible.
	We again discussed the case of Second Engineer Seidl who that morning had begged to be returned on board OMAHA on the ground that, since he was merely insurance against bombs, any other officer would serve just as well.  I told him that in reality Seidl had rendered practically negligible assistance and that his retention on board had been merely as it had happened.  I explained that the little help he had given was insignificant and had been under compulsion.  I added that I regretted that circumstances had placed an innocent man in the position of a traitor in the eyes of his countrymen.  He said he understood and believed me but that he never could convince his officers or crew.  They had been assured that we could never get the ship going and that Seidl was the only German on board when she started.  He added that his Chief Officer had told him just before coming to lunch that all the officers felt that Seidl would never rejoin them.  He therefore asked that Seidl never come back to OMAHA and that he be sent to a different camp from the rest of the group.  I replied that, despite my regret at this turn of the events, I would defer to his judgment and would strongly recommend to my Government that his request be complied with.

 

	LIST OF OFFICERS AND CREW OF GERMAN M.S. ODENWALD
	Captain Gerhart Loers First Officer Wilhelm Lagoni First Officer Hans Herman Schmidt Second Officer Herbert Jante Chief Engineer Wilhelm Schroeder Second Eng. Wilhelm Seidl Third Eng. Otto Schulz Third Eng. Karl Lonsing Fourth Eng. Frederick Metzner I.W. Off. Werner Voss II W. Off. Helmut Ruge Electrician Walter Schroeder
	Earl Herman Albrecht   Egon Martsch Frowalt Axt   Werner Kewes Richard Bartsch   Kurt Neidworok Gunther Baumgart   Helmut Pittermann Karl Behmt   Bernard Puls Alois Cichy   Helmut Sager Heinz Dreschler   Hans Schmidt Hans Huttler   Ludwig Schmidt Helmut Jenken   Werner Schrgeser Hans Jonat   Otto Stein Georg Junemann   Karl Heing Stumpf Karl August Kadler   Hans Truben Ernst Krahahn   Karl Thiemsberg Martin Koch   Adolf Virgin Hans Langler   Johann Weiler Heinrich Lucas   Johamp Wilbertm Karl Luft

 

	U.S.S. OMAHA
	At Sea,
	November 10, 1941
	MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HANDS:
	Article 16 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy reads as follows:
	Removing property from a prize.  16.           No person in the Navy shall take out of a prize, or vessel seized as a prize, any money, plate, goods, or any part of her equipment, unless it be for the better preservation thereof, or unless such articles are absolutely needed for the use of any of the vessels or armed forces of the United States, before the same are adjudged lawful prize by a competent court; but the whole, without fraud, concealment, or embezzlement, shall be brought in, in order that judgment may be passed thereon; and every person who offends against this article shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  (R.S. Sec. 1624, Art. 16.)
	The entire OMAHA ship's company both those who were fortunate enough to constitute the salvage party, and those who remained on board have performed splendidly in the apprehension and salvage of the ODENWALD and the Captain is justly proud of your work.  Some day, perhaps, the story may be released and when it is every detail is sure to be discussed at length.  This being the case the Captain does not intend the good name of the entire ship's company to be sullied by the thoughtless act of some souvenir hunter.
	In the confusion of the first few hours it was inevitable that some things should be lost for, fearing that the ship might sink, the Captain himself sent the signal "Save everything of value".  However, now that it appears that all danger of sinking has passed, it is the intention to return all articles of ship's equipment to her except that colors and ship's bell are, by tradition, the property of the Captain to dispose of at his discretion.  All articles of personal equipment have, insofar as practicable, already been returned to their owners and it is the intention to complete restitution as soon as the ship arrives at her destination and we can visit her.  A few articles of ship's and personal equipment appear to be missing and it is desired that they be turned in at once to the Gunnery Officer, who has been detailed as Officer in Charge of ODENWALD material.  No stigma will attach to men now having in their possession or knowing the whereabouts of such material; but they are directed to turn in or report such knowledge as they may have immediately.  After 1600, November 10, 1941, the Captain intends to enforce the provisions of the above quoted article with complete impartiality and ruthlessness and to recommend for trail by General Court-Martial any and all offenders.
	It is directed that this order be published at quarters to all divisions and that each Division Officer shall take further appropriate steps to have its contents made known to any men who may not be present when the order is read.
	T. E. CHANDLER,
	Captain, U. S. Navy,
	Commanding.

 

---

 

Click the icons to view the associated records
	Return to the M.S. Odenwald page