NAVY DEPARTMENT |
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS |
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Report on M. S. ODENWALD |
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(including interrogation of Crew), a freighter |
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of the Hamburg-American Line |
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abandoned on November 6th, 1941, |
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in position |
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Latitude 00° 41' N., and Longitude 28° 04' W., |
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and salvaged by |
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a task group of the U.S. Navy. |
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(Op-16-F-9 File No. 1,01,000,000) |
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March 12, 1942. |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS |
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I |
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Abandonment and Salvage of the M.S. ODENWALD |
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| At dawn on November 6, 1941, a task group of the United States Navy, consisting of the U.S.S. OMAHA (Captain T. E. Chandler, U.S.N.) and the U.S.S. SOMERS (Comdr. J. C. Metzel, U.S.N.), light cruiser and destroyer respectively, were en route to an assigned patrol area, when a strange ship was sighted, distant approximately 11 miles. All battle stations had been manned at daybreak. The strange ship was sighted about five minutes afterward. Approximate position was latitude 00° 00', longitude 26° 00' W. OMAHA and SOMERS increased speed and commenced to close range on the sighted vessel immediately. OMAHA transmitted searchlight signals in an attempt to establish the ship's identification, but no answering signals were observed. | ||
| On approaching to within visual distance OMAHA observed the following facts concerning the strange vessel: | ||
| 1. At the yardarm was flying the flag hoist indicating that she was the WILLMOTO of Philadelphia. | ||
| 2. The American flag was flying aft. | ||
| 3. On her stern there was freshly painted in white lettering WILLMOTO, PHILADELPHIA. | ||
| 4. On each side of the hull at the bow there was freshly painted in white lettering WILLMOTO. | ||
| 5. On top of her bridge there was erected a fore and aft signboard with WILLMOTO in evidence on each side. | ||
| 6. Painted on canvas which was affixed to the lower bridge screen on both sides were American flags which could be removed easily if desired. | ||
| 7. An American flag painted on canvas also covered one of her cargo hatches so as to be in full view from above by aircraft. | ||
| A comparison of her actual appearance with the photograph of the WILLMOTO appearing in Lloyd's Register of Merchant Ships of the World, which book was available on the OMAHA, disclosed that the sterns were not the same. The WILLMOTO in the book had a counter stern, whereas this ship had a cruiser stern. Furthermore the three islands | ||
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| on this ship were not as high as those on the silhouette of the WILLMOTO in the book. Otherwise the comparison was very close. | ||
| OMAHA, having been unsuccessful in her attempt to communicate by signal searchlight with this vessel and further, having observed the above suspicious differences in a comparison with the ship she was claiming to be, ordered her to heave to - which she obeyed without hesitation. OMAHA then took a position which allowed megaphone communication with the vessel and by megaphone asked her "Why don't you answer our signals?" No reply was given to this question, but to the questions "Where are you from?" and "Where are you bound?" were given the replies "Capetown" and "New Orleans" respectively. Again the question "Why don't you answer our signals?" was asked but no reply given by the other ship. Those replies that were given came forth only after an apparently lengthy conference of those on the bridge of the other ship, and the replies were in broken English. | ||
| SOMERS had taken a position on the other side of the ship and at this time observed and reported that objects were being thrown overboard into the sea from the bridge on that side. | ||
| OMAHA decided to send a boarding party for further investigation and commenced lowering a boat with a party of several men and an officer - all armed. As the boat was being lowered WILLMOTO commenced lowering her lifeboats, hauled down the flag hoist indicating her identity and hoisted the International Code Pennant "Fox Mike", meaning "I am sinking. Please send boat for passengers and crew". As the boat with boarding party neared WILLMOTO two explosion occurred in the ship, aft, and explosion smoke emerged from her smoke pipe. At this time part of her crew had embarked in two of her lifeboats and men were descending on Jacob's ladders to embark in the third and fourth lifeboats. Members of her crew were equipped with hatchets and were standing on deck prepared to cut the ladders when all had embarked. Two members of the crew, either from fear of being machine-gunned or believing their ship would explode and sink quickly, jumped into the sea from deck. They were picked up by their own boats. | ||
| The boarding officer forced those men descending the Jacob's ladder back up the ladder, and with the help of his armed boarding party grouped them on deck, demanding that information be given concerning the location of any unfired explosions or time bombs. He also signalled to OMAHA the WILLMOTO was a German ship in disguise and the crew was scuttling her. The German crew was adamant in refusing to give information about the location of explosives and possible means of preventing additional damage. The boarding officer | ||
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| forced the Germans still on board to accompany the boarding party in their inspection of the sinking ship. Smoke filled compartments prevented a thorough inspection at this time. | ||
| On receiving the signal from the boarding officer that this was a German ship in disguise OMAHA lowered a boat with fire and rescue party and equipment. Additional men with diesel engine experience were also embarked in this boat which reached WILLMOTO before the third and fourth lifeboats were loaded. With this equipment a more thorough inspection of the damage was possible, not only by inspecting the smoke-filled compartments, but also by sending a diver in the water to inspect the hull from the outside. | ||
| Additional explosives were not found, although several smoke candles with Japanese labels were discovered at selected locations (one in galley range) and cans of Benzine were distributed strategically, ready to be poured on deck and set afire. | ||
| First indications were that the ship could be saved because the extent of the damage was not as great as the Germans had planned and there were only leaky seams in the hull instead of open holes. Furthermore, the generators were still operating which afforded the benefit of electric power and lights. Difficulty was encountered in operating valves in the drainage system however and soon the ship took a decided list to port and trim by the stern. Salvage seemed hopeless and the boarding officer so signalled to OMAHA which directed that everything of value be saved. The Germans continued in their refusal to help and declared that the ship would sink within 30 minutes. This they repeated every 30 minutes. By noon however, the proper drainage set up was found, the damage was isolated and the ship's pumps commenced to remove the water faster then it leaked into the ship. Salvage operations continued uninterrupted except for the despatch of additional gear and equipment from OMAHA. By early afternoon the salvage party succeeded in starting one engine and about 1800 WILLMOTO was underway at about 9.5 knots with both engines operating. | ||
| The Germans were dismayed by their failure to properly scuttle the ship and were at first inclined this failure on the inferiority of the Japanese explosives used. Later their ire shifted and the Captain was held responsible for not succeeding in scuttling his ship. | ||
| One member of her crew stated that upon being approached by OMAHA and SOMERS, she reported by radio to Berlin that she was being pursued by warships and was scuttling in compliance with previous instructions. Another member of her crew also stated that previous to her contact with with OMAHA and SOMERS she was sighted by two British | ||
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| corvettes, with an exchange of calls, following which she reported that a German raider had been sighted to southward. The two corvettes thanked WILLMOTO and immediately proceeded on a southerly course in search of the reported German raider. | ||
| ODENWALD accompanied by OMAHA and SOMERS, arrived at San Juan, P.R., during afternoon of November 17th. Officers and crew of the ODENWALD were delivered into the custody of the Army Provost Marshal upon arrival, and on November 19th the ODENWALD was turned over to the United States Marshal. | ||
| A statement prepared by the Captain on November 29, 1941, for use by counsel in connection with the proceedings on the subsequent libel filed against the ship and cargo by the United States is of interest in this connection and is appended hereto as Annex B. | ||
II |
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The 41st Voyage of the ODENWALD |
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| The ODENWALD was built in Hamburg in 1923 and at the time she was abandoned and salvaged she was on the last lap of her 41st voyage, from Hamburg to Hamburg. | ||
| The ship sailed from Hamburg in April 1939 for the Far East. She touched at various Philippine outports, then headed for Japan, and after brief stops there, left Nagoya for Los Angeles on August 12, 1939. | ||
| Meanwhile war clouds continued to gather over Europe. When at sea for two weeks, on August 26, 1939, and having reached latitude 44° 07' N., longitude 146° 31' W., both engines of the ODENWALD were stopped from 1345 to 1430; the "Outboard symbol of sovereignty (Hoheitsabzeichen) was painted out, the ship's name was changed provisionally to DENWAL, and the smoke stack was painted black." | ||
| On August 27 the compass course was changed from 114° to 245° and the log entry for that day reads: "1630 running on opposite course, destination Japan." This reversal in course was pursuant to the standing orders of the German Government to all merchant vessels to seek refuge in the nearest friendly port in the event of war. | ||
| Thereafter the ship's boats were repaired and otherwise made ready, and hard-tack and drinking water were stowed. On August 30 | ||
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| the masts and ventilators were painted grey and the "smoke stack changed (red top with white K and lower part black, Japanese company)." The log also records: "name changed to M.S. MIHO MARU. Home port - Kobe." | ||
| On September 15 at 0515 the ship arrived in Yokohama. Her purposeless trip from and to Japan had taken 33 days 16 hours 15 minutes during which the ship had averaged 8.96 knots and covered 7240 sea miles. In Yokohama the total tonnage carried was given as 8223 tons, as follows: Cargo - 7612 tons, fuel oil - 42 tons, fresh water - 108 tons, ballast water - 181 tons, and equipment - 280 tons. | ||
| At that time the officers and a few others were the only German members of the crew. The rest were Chinese who had signed the ship's articles in Shanghai on July 6, 1939. These Chinese were mustered off before the Chinese Consul on October 20th, and were transferred to the S.S. PRESIDENT PIERCE for return to Shanghai. | ||
| Shortly after their arrival in Yokohama the entire ship's company was examined to determine whether its members were capable of military service. The crew went about unloading cargo and on November 2 discharge of the entire cargo was completed. It had consisted largely of sugar, copra and ore in bulk, and of hemp and some general cargo. | ||
| On November 16, the cook's mate, Johann Peine, requested that he be mustered off as a member of the crew on the ground that he was an American citizen and did not care to work on a ship subject to German war regulations. The Captain warned Peine that he should consider whether he would not by leaving the ship at this time subject himself to penal action in the future. Peine stood his ground, on the advice of the American consul, and on December 14 was mustered off and subsequently forwarded to the United States. | ||
| On November 1, 1939, Captain Reinhold Duelcke was transferred to the local hospital, but returned shortly thereafter. In December of the following year he was again taken to the hospital for several weeks, and in March, 1941, went on leave from which he did not return until May. It seems probable that as Captain Duelcke remained a sick man, as soon as the German authorities decided to order the ODENWALD to attempt a homeward passage, he was replaced. His successor was Captain Gerhart Loers, who was not of the Hapag service, and who had scuttled his last command, the EISENACH (North German Lloyd), in the harbor of Puntarenas, Costa Rica, on March 31, 1941. Captain Loers reported for duty on July 8, and was formally placed in command on July 17, 1941. | ||
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| As soon as Captain Loers assumed charge the ship was readied for the homeward journey. She went into dry dock, took on fuel oil and water, and loaded cargo from various German ships in Yokohama harbor. She took on some barley, dried fruit, wool, tannic acid and ore from the QUITO, OSORONO, and BOGATA; casings, bristles, copper bars, ore and barley from the RHAKOTIS; and 3,857 tons of crude rubber and 102 tons of Goodrich auto tires, fish oil, peanuts, and tea from the RAMSES. The total cargo loaded in Yokohama was 6,223.2 tons. | ||
III |
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The Homeward Dash |
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| The ODENWALD LEFT Yokohama on August 21, 1941. Clearance papers had been issued on the 14th day of the eighth month of the 12th year of Showa (August 14), by the Japanese Imperial Customs at Nagoya, for New Orleans, first port Los Angeles. Subsequently Captain Loers obtained new clearance papers for Valparaiso with no intermediate stops. However, the log book in no case indicates any destination, this being left blank on each page. | ||
| The ship left Yokohama with 6,223 tons cargo, 1193 tons of fuel oil, 300 tons drinking water, and 280 tons of equipment. Prior to sailing she had also taken on board hydrophones (Unterwasser-Schallempfänger) (No. 1286D), and had also received from the M.S. RAMSES a smoke box (Nebelapparat). | ||
| It was presumably known as early as June 5, 1941, that the ODENWALD would make a run for home. On that day the First Officer had obtained a certificate from the German Legation in Peking certifying that he had been in Peking for two years and was returning home for good. | ||
| It may also be that it had been planned at one time to send the ODENWALD out as an auxiliary war vessel. There is no doubt that the last trip, which was commenced on August 22, was accepted by everyone as being a "war" cruise. There is also a reference in a letter to the First Officer, from German friends in Peking, written on July 1, 1941, in which the hope is expressed that the ship "won't have to put to sea as a man-of-war." | ||
| The log reveals that as early as December 5, 1940, the ship had received 557.8 tons of fuel oil from the M.S. REGENSBURG, and that subsequently she had taken on 151.6 tons from the M.S. HAVELLAND, and 915 tons fuel oil and 22 barrels diesel oil from unascertained source. | ||
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| It seems to have been a practice, however, for the German ships in Yokohama to transfer oil from one ship to another as needed, and the log shows that under date of July 31, 1940, the M.S. HAVELAND came alongside and received 160 tons of diesel oil from the ODENWALD. | ||
| The crew was made up from remnants of the original crew of the ODENWALD complemented by additional men from other German ships marooned in the Far East. Officers and crew totaled 45 men, 7 under the normal complement of the ship. | ||
| The clearance papers were issued in the name of the ODENWALD. Shortly after she had taken her departure from Japan her name was changed to M.S. NIKKA MARU; and after she had rounded the Cape and was well in the South Atlantic she changed her identity for the last time to that of an American merchantman, the M.S. WILLMOTO out of Philadelphia, Pa. Thus in the course of her existence since 1923 the ship was known by the names of ODENWALD, ASSUAN (Vide V - Ship Data), ODENWALD, DENWAL, MIHO MARU, ODENWALD, NIKKA MARU, and WILLMOTO, in that order. | ||
| In response to a direct question the Captain admitted that he, a Lloyd captain, had taken command of the ODENWALD, a Hapag boat, by the orders of the "Marine Department of the German Embassy at Tokio". This he clarified subsequently by admitting that his orders had come from the German Naval Attache, and that the agents of the two German lines in Japan had had nothing to do with his designation as master of the ODENWALD. | ||
| The Captain also admitted that the orders to sail for home had been received direct from Germany, and had been given by the O.K.W., the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) by short-wave radio. | ||
| The first day after leaving Yokohama airplanes were sighted. In the diary of a crew member, these are described as British planes. The officers testified, however, and their answer seems more plausible, that the planes were Japanese. | ||
| On September 23, at daybreak (0545), while drifting in approximate position latitude 15° 05' S., longitude 127° 59 W., an unknown ship was sighted. The ship was immediately placed in a state of alarm, and the engine room instructed to get underway. At 0615 the telegraph was set "full speed ahead", and both ships fled on opposite courses. | ||
| Memoranda that were examined show that a real effort was made to identify the stranger ship. A number of silhouettes were drawn, and Groener, the German version of Lloyds Register, was consulted. One penciled note bore the statement, in the Chief Officer's handwriting, | ||
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| that the Third Engineer, Otto Schulz, was correct in his surmise that the strange ship was the British merchantman DENBIGHSHIRE. In fact the Third Engineer's guess was accurate. Yet during their interrogation every officer questioned denied that the "disturber of the peace", as the Chief Officer characterized the DENBIGHSHIRE in his navigational notebook, had been identified, and refused to make a surmise as to its nationality or name. | ||
| No further excitement interrupted the passage of the ODENWALD until on November 4 the radio operator intercepted an SOS from the British tanker OLWEN that she was being attacked by surface raider" at 0531 GMT. The OLWEN gave her position as latitude 03° 04' N., longitude 22° 42' W. | ||
| The operator heard a number of land stations, whose call letters were not contained in the lists available to him, repeat the call for help. These signals continued to be sent but gradually diminished in strength as the day began to break. Then at 0653 the operator intercepted the message from NERK, which, by reason of the proximity of the sender was received "very loud" on the ODENWALD. The message read: "Steer south west, I am coming to your assistance, speed thirty knots." The message must have caused considerable consternation on board the ODENWALD. The operator knew that the call letters were those of an American war ship. He made entry to this effect in his log, but he was unable to identify the ship further. | ||
| In an attempt to avoid meeting the American warship the course of the ODENWALD was immediately changed from 325° true to 290° true. The ship continued on that course until 0900 the same day when it turned back to 325° true. That course was maintained until daybreak,. November 6, when the ship was intercepted by the OMAHA and SOMERS. The deck log for that day, written by the American boarding officer, reads as follows: | ||
| "At 0637 by order of Captain T. E. Chandler, U.S. Navy, commanding U.S.S. OMAHA, with a boarding party, boarded the German M.S. ODENWALD, then flying and showing ensigns of the United States and bearing the name "WILLMOTO", Philadelphia. Upon arrival at about 0646 explosions were heard aboard ODENWALD and her officers and men were abandoning ship, which was then in a sinking condition. Those officers and men who had not yet left the ship were kept aboard while it was ascertained that she was sinking from flooding aft and in the motor room as the result of scuttling by explosives which had opened her bottom to the sea. Investigation revealed what appeared to be bombs and filled open cans of Benzine prepared for igniting. Salvage parties arrived from OMAHA; one man arrived from U.S.S. SOMERS. Officers and men aboard, except one first officer, and those in life | ||
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| boats lying off were sent to OMAHA. Sent OMAHA various ship's papers and articles to assure preservation. Measures to control damage, flooding and listing, and to find explosives and pyrotechnics included closing openings permitting flooding, operating pumps, shifting cargo, jettisoning of about 75 tires, 20 bales of rubber, and 400 bags of oats and peanuts, searching of ship and diving operations. Hoisted ship's boats and lost one when hoisting point gave way. At about 1700 lost control of flooding, heavy list to starboard and settling by stern. At about 1800 by permitting draining from aft into the motor room and there taking suction on bilges regained control. The engineers succeeded in getting the engines into operation. The boarding party consisted of Lieutenant G. K. Carmicheal, U.S. Navy; Pelosi, A.G., GM3c; Jones, C.R., SM1c; Coronado, H.O. CWT; Kirby, , WT1c; Jolly, J.H., ACMM; Brown, C.R., AOM1c. Salvage officers and crew consist of Lieutenant G.K. Carmichael, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant (j.g.) W.B. Wideman, U.S. Navy; Ensign J.C. Weatherwax, U.S. Navy; Ensign S.E. Wagenhals, U.S. Navy, Ensign G.R. Vance, C-V(S), U.S. Naval Reserve; Boatswain J.A. Ferreola, U.S. Navy; Machinist F.D. Waltrip, U.S. Navy; Herr, G.B., BM1c; Olson, C.H., BM2c; Carlson, W.E. BM2c; Hensley, L.H., RM2c; Little, D.A.R., GM3c; . . . . " | ||
IV |
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The Chief Officer's Navigational Notebook |
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| An item of particular interest, in the mass of written matter taken from the ship and its crew, is the navigational notebook of the Chief Officer. In this book there is a detailed calculation made by the Chief Officer, of the trip from Yokohama to Bordeaux, France, as projected prior to the departure of the ODENWALD from Japan. These navigational calculations are considered accurate. They agree substantially with the astronomical calculations for the war cruise which began on August 22. | ||
| Below are reproduced, in the original, the Chief Officer's calculations: | ||
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| Upon being questioned, the Captain rejected any suggestion that his course had been mapped out for him by the O.K.W. He stated that it was his responsibility as master to determine the safest course. Upon being asked his reason for the course steered after the Cape was rounded, and particularly why the point "Orade" had been selected as an objective, he refused to give any further information. | ||
| Similar questioning of the Chief Officer and of the First Officer, who had been the navigating officers of the ship, resulted in similar refusals to discuss the points "Orade" (lat. 40° 19' N., long. 39° 09 W.), approximately 200 miles W. by N. off the Azores, and "Orfe" (lat. 45° 29' N., long 20° 42' W.), approximately 300 miles due west off Bordeaux, France. | ||
| Instead of attempting to satisfy the questions concerning these navigational objectives by some plausible explanation that they were logical points to steer for, the silence of these officers in this respect would seem to support the view that the points in question were of military importance and secret points, and perhaps designated by the O.K.W. as rendezvous for certain purposes. In any event it would appear clear that they were prearranged points between the O.K.W. and the Captain, and that the latter was definitely charged with the responsibility of arriving with his ship at those places at predetermined times set forth in the Chief Officer's notebook, and which are the bases for all of his computation. | ||
| It is patent that these calculations were made to insure arrival at certain fixed points at definite dates. The first objective, ORADE*, was to be made in 89 days, 10 hours. This time schedule included a factor of safety of 12 days for lost time en route. | ||
| The second point, ORFE*, was to be reached in 93 days, 8 hours. | ||
| The belief that these arbitrarily named objectives are prearranged rendezvous is heightened by the fact that under date of October 9th, the Chief Officer made a new calculation which is given below: | ||
(see following page) |
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| *ORADE (Oreade) - from Greek Mythology: one of the nymphs of the mountains and hills. | ||
| *ORFE - (Leuciscus orfus), a name applicable to the nerfling, rudd, or ide. | ||
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| The statement which follows the calculation may be translated as follows: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "18 November, 1941 at 2300-Orade Must-Time! In order to arrive at this time, Cape Horn must be rounded on Thursday, October 18, 1941, at 0800. This has been computed at 9 knots without reserve." | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Other information received by the Office of Naval Intelligence lends support to the theory of the importance of these arbitrary objectives. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Prize crews from the ADMIRAL SCHEER and from the GNEISENAU captured by the British in March, 1941, revealed that it was the custom for German ships not to proceed further west than longitude 42 W., which they reached when about east of the West Indies, and from this position to steer N.E. for Bordeaux. British opinion on this information is that the prizes did not turn east until they had actually reached the latitude of Bordeaux. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| The prisoners gave as a reason for their course that aerial escort could be expected from a distance of 600 miles from the French coast, and a radio beacon 200 miles from the coast. It was revealed that aerial escort was usually provided two days before reaching Bordeaux, and naval escort one day before. It was the understanding of the prisoners that the radio beacon was one of three, all of which | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| changed every night. By means of this radio beacon, they claimed that they could have established their exact position and been guided to Bordeaux. | ||
| More recently further corroboration was obtained of the possible use made of Orfe as an objective. On January 31, 1942, the M.S. SPREEWALD, another of the numerous German ships that had been tied up in Japanese ports, in a similar attempt to run for home, was sunk in approximate position, latitude 45° 17' N., longitude 24° 50' W. while apparently approaching Orfe on the run to Bordeaux. It has been suggested that the SPREEWALD was sunk in error by an Italian submarine possibly because it was masquerading as a British ship. | ||
| It is also known that the ELSA ESBERGER, another German ship that had been in Yokohama since the outbreak of the war in Europe, has now gone into dock at Ferrol. The only way she could have approached her destination was by following a course similar to that pursued by the ODENWALD and the SPREEWALD. Ferrol, while on the west coast of Spain, is on a parallel of latitude less than two degrees south of that of Bordeaux. | ||
| The suggestion has been made by our Embassy in London that there may have been developed a supply line between Germany and Japan. This would seem a plausible suggestion in view of the unusual degree to which the German and Japanese waters of the numerous remaining German diesel-motored ships capable of making a non-stop voyage either via the Cape of God Hope or Cape Horn is of considerable significance, particularly since rubber and other much wanted commodities, necessary to warfare, are obtainable in the Far East. | ||
V |
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Ship Data |
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| M.S. ODENWALD registered under German No. 6200 on March 23, 1923. | ||
| Twin screw steel motor vessel; 2 Diesel motors providing 3100 H.P. | ||
| Speed - ca. 10 knots. | ||
| Original call letters RDJB - later changed to DIEB. | ||
| Dimensions: Overall length - 126.702 meters (415' 8-1/8"). | ||
| Water line - 121.4 meters (398' 3-5/8") | ||
| Beam - 16.53 meters (54' 0") | ||
| Maximum normal draft - 8.35 meters. | ||
| Greatest length of engine room - 14.70 meters. | ||
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| Gross capacity of ship - 14,441.5 cubic meters (5,097.84 R.T.). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Net capacity - 8,519.1 cubic meters (3,007.24 R.T.). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Built at the Deutsche Werft, Hamburg, 1923. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Home port - Hamburg. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Owner - HAPAG. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hamburg Ship Registry Office certificates on July 9, 1935, that on March 30, 1935, entry was made of the fact that the ship "now bears the name ASSUAN", and on October 26, 1938, certifies that on October 21, 1938, entry was made that the ship "now bears the name ODENWALD." | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
VI |
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Cargo |
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| The cargo consisted of: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Some of the cargo was jettisoned in order to inspect the holds for leakage and to trim the ship during salvage operations. This amount was very small, and most of it was recovered by the OMAHA and SOMERS. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| This cargo was taken on in Yokohama, and a majority of it was transferred to the ODENWALD from the Motor Ships RAMSES, BOGOTA, QUITO, RHAKOTIS and OSORNO. Papers recovered reveal that the BOGOTA loaded at Coquimbo, Chile about June 15, 1941, and that its cargo was destined | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| for Hamburg, Germany. The shippers in Chile are indicated as Staudt and Cia., and Walter Hegeler. M.S. QUITO loaded at Coquimbo, Chile, about May 18, 1941, cargo destined for Hamburg. The same shippers are indicated. M.S. OSORNO loaded with ore, wool, pig bristles and miscellaneous items at Talcahuano, Chile, about February, 1941; cargo being destined for Hamburg. The shippers are indicated as Echavarri Hermanos; Wagner, Chadwick and Cia., Ltd.; and Staudt and Cia., Ltd. The cargo of this boat consisted of goods transferred from the M.S. TACOMA and M.S. PORTLAND in the harbour of Talcahuano. The 102 tons of Goodrich tires were received from the M.S. RAMSES in Yokohama about August 20, 1941. There is no indication as to where the RAMSES originally secured this cargo, but members of the crew indicated that a portion was secured in Shanghai. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| The 102 tons of tires shown, were Goodrich 700x20. The following serial numbers were taken from six of the tires at random: 213532812; 376603010; 1121473337; 235704467; 233963010; 1016633119. It was further found that on each tire (under the size numerals of the tires, the numbers with the serial C being under 7.00 and the numbers with the serial E being under the 20) were the following numbers: C 9091-1 E 3861-3; C 9091-7 E 3681-5; C 2352-7 E 3681-3; C 9091-1 E 3681-3; C 9091-1 E 3681-3; C 2353-5 E 3681-3. These numbers as given correspond respectively and are taken from the tires in the same order as the lengthy serial numbers above given. Upon the inner tire flaps appeared the trade mark "U.S.A.T." There were taken various tags and shipping marks all of which indicate that the tires were shipped from the Goodrich International Rubber Company, Manila, P.I., to "B F G" (B.F. Goodrich), Shanghai, via M/2302. Additional serial numbers obtained are as follows: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| From the 3857 tons of rubber aboard the following marks were taken at random: 33 No. 690; 33 No. 783; 354 No. 38; 36 No. 587; 147 No. 1441; 211 No. 2078; 211 No. 2192; 158 No. 954. The numbers 33, 35, 36, 147, 211, 185, were enclosed in a sort of diamond-shaped figure and set apart from them were the numerals following "No." in the following fashion: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| The bales of crude rubber likewise contained mark of a circle with two parallel cross bars intercepting the circumference. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| In the ship's supply locker were found two Diesel oil drums, one of which was empty and the other about two-thirds full. The drums bore the trade mark "CITOL" - Industrial Lubricant. The drums further bore the name of the Tide Water Associated Company, New York. Over the name of the Company appeared the mark "TYROL F4". The drum containing oil bore the steel-stencil drum serial "BOYCO 18-55-39". The empty drum bore the serial number 18-55-8-39, followed by a small rectangular in which appeared the letters PIW. Although somewhat defaced both drums seemed to bear the following paint-stenciled markings: 1945 to Yokohama 205.5 22.2 183.3 200.0 | ||
| In one of the cabins of the ODENWALD were found four bags of inner tube caps. One bag bore the name "Bridgeport Brass Company, Bridgeport, Conn., 800 pieces No. 8 tire valve cup, Tire Valve Division". The other three bags bore the name "Schrader, manufactured by A. Schrader & Sons, Brooklyn, N.Y., Division of Scoville Manufacturing Company, Made U.S.A., 6300 valve caps". | ||
VII |
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Relations between officers and crew |
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| Upon the detention of the ODENWALD crew on November 6, 1941, by request of the Captain, the Second Engineer, Wilhelm Seidl, was kept apart from the rest of the crew on the ground that otherwise he might come to bodily harm. | ||
| The interrogation revealed that the Second Engineer had at all times been thoroughly respected and considered a man of good character and a competent engineer. It appears plain that the existing animus of the crew is based wholly on the suspicion that if it had not been for his assistance the OMAHA crew would not have been able to start the engines of the ODENWALD and thereby save the ship and cargo. | ||
| Seidl himself deplores his separation from the crew with whom he has always gotten along well. He attributes the Captain's request to have him segregated as an attempt to find a scapegoat and to divert the attention of the men from the Captain's own incompetence in not achieving the sinking of the ODENWALD. However, all members of the crew believed Seidi responsible for starting the ODENWALD's engines. They take that position because that is the belief of the Chief Engineer, who, in their opinion is the only competent person to pass on a technical matter of that kind. | ||
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| Relations between the Captain and the crew are quite pointed. The men are presently quartered in pyramidal tents and are distributed according to the arrangements of the Chief Officer. The Captain occupies a tent by himself. The Chief Officer and the First Officer share a tent, and the Chief Engineer and another officer also in separate tent. The balance of the crew are housed four men to a tent. | ||
| All are agreed that the Captain is a competent seaman, but that "morally" he has not earned the respect of his crew. The dislike of some of the younger seamen seems to be based on the fact that the work on the voyage was hard and that on many occasions they were forced to work overtime. However, the real objection to the Captain is based on the fact that he did not succeed in sinking the ODENWALD. Furthermore, the actions of the Captain at that time, in the crew's eyes, were such as to open him to the suspicion that he did not wish the ship to be sunk, but to fall into the hands of the Americans. The Chief Engineer is particularly bitter that he was not permitted to put a torch to the engine, and the other officers are angry that they were not allowed to fire incendiary materials that were distributed throughout the ship, to obviate any possibility of insufficient damage caused by the bombs. | ||
| A full protocol (See Annex C) was drawn up by the Chief Officer on December 5, 1941, and signed by all other officers excepting the Second Engineer, by means of which it was attempted to deprive the Captain of his authority in connection with all matters involving the internal administration within the ship's company. This would seem to assert its power over the Captain. However, several requests subsequently by the Chief Officer for permission to communicate with the Commandant of the Camp where the prisoners are being detained, were refused by the Commandant. | ||
| The charge is made by Lagoni that not alone the deportment of the Captain, but also his political attitude "were absolutely unworthy of a German". Without doubt, the Captain, an older man whose roots antedated the advent of National Socialism, was unable to hide his relief when the appearance of the OMAHA prevented his return to Nazi Germany. | ||
| Captain Loers is of added interest by reason of his previous experience as captain of the EISENACH. He had scuttled that ship at Puntarenas, Costa Rica, in March, 1941. Taken into custody with his crew he was subsequently transported to the United States where most of the crew is now interned. Loers with several other men, supposedly not liable for military service, attempted to return to Germany. They took passage on the NITTA MARU for Japan where their journey was interrupted by the Russo-German war. | ||
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| The situation within the ship's company may be summarized as follows: | ||
| The crew is very much subject to party discipline. At the instigation of the Captain, who is charged by German law with the responsibility of looking after his crew until it is returned to Germany. The Second Engineer is suspected of "treason", and the Chief Engineer will have nothing to do with him. Other elements of the crew indicate that it would be better if the officers were completely separated from the rest of the crew. Weiler, as seaman - a troublemaker on any ship and who was already caused the officers be separated from the men because they had not done their duty. | ||
| Another seaman, Laengle, maintained that the entire ship's company was divided into four cliques, neither of which had anything to do with the other. These groups consisted of 1) ordinary seamen and engineroom personnel, 2) the petty officers, 3) the officers and 4) the captain. | ||
| Laengle represents an unusual situation. He is of Austrian nationality and has a pleasant personality. He is not a party member. Questioned whether he had ever participated in party activity he said that he had "never bothered with such nonsense". He believed that by reason of the fact that he is an Austrian most of the crew did not like him. He manages to get along with them and has one or two friends, but is not happy to be with the crew. | ||
| Laengle's outspoken manner undoubtedly contributed to his difficulties with Nazi party members. He seems to have been equally free in expressing himself in writing. Included in his personal effects is a letter, dated January 6, 1941, from Doris Loper, 1528A Elm Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a young lady whom he had never met but with whom he had become friendly by correspondence. In her letter the girl states: | ||
| "___ I don't blame . . . . (*). . . . very much for not liking the Germans. When I think of all the misery and suffering they are causing innocent people, I know positively, that it would be a pleasure to kill a few of them. ___" | ||
| (*) At this point a word has been cut out of the letter. It would seem plausible that the excised word was "you". | ||
| Luft is another unusual member of the crew. He is referred to by others as "the Communist". According to German law he is possessed | ||
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| of no nationality. He is "staatenlos". His parents were Russian descendants of those Germans who had settled in the Don Basin under Catherine the Great. Luft himself was born in Germany. He had not participated in any Nazi activity, and was too young ever to have participated in any other political activity before 1933 when the Nazi party came to power. He was a sullen, stupid boy and apparently not a competent seaman. The First Officer said that only through an oversight had Luft been mustered, and being "staatenlos" the Hapag Line would probably be unable to get rid of him, as seamen who are not German citizens are considered undesirable. | ||
VIII |
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The First German Prisoner of War |
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| Upon detention of the German crew considerable interest attached to Helmut Ruge when a number of interesting facts concerning him became known that did not completely explain his previous known presence in the Argentine. The interest in Ruge's identity was heightened when information was received that the German Embassy in Tokio had shown concern when the ODENWALD's detention was publicly announced. | ||
| Ruge has a good background and education and unlike most of his compatriots, some knowledge of American history. He tried to impress the interrogator with the statement that he had cause to have the highest regard for America. He alluded particularly to the fact that he was born in 1917, and that his father had told him that after the peace was signed, as a baby he had received the greatest attention from the Quaker relief workers who had distributed clothing and food to German children who might otherwise have suffered from undernourishment and other privations. | ||
| Considerable information was known concerning Ruge's activity since the beginning of 1941 from a series of letter which he had written in Yokohama to friends in Argentina and which were found in his effects. | ||
| Upon his interrogation Ruge stubbornly denied that he had ever been anywhere in South America other than Chile, and insisted that he had arrived in Chile on board the M.S. RHAKOTIS in 1939, after the war had commenced, and had remained a member of the crew until that ship sailed for Japan around June 1, 1941. | ||
| His letters tell a different story. It is certain that sometime around the first of the year Ruge had had to leave Argentina. He | ||
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| He refers to his departure as a "flight". He footed his way across the Andes, as he states, "by the usual route taken by spies", and after enduring considerable hardships arrived in Antofagasta, Chile, four months later. There he was taken aboard the M.S. RHAKOTIS, which is known to have been tied up in that harbor more or less since the beginning of the war, and served as Second Radio Officer on that ship's flight from South America to Japan last summer. | ||
| The RHAKOTIS arrived in Yokohama about July 1st. After its arrival Ruge was called to Tokio and employed in the Radio station of the German Embassy there. Thus, Ruge was in Japan for only about three weeks when he was ordered to return to Germany on the ODENWALD. His trip to Japan was, of course, intended to be a homeward voyage, but the Russo-German war prevented a return to Germany across Siberia. | ||
| That Ruge was in a somewhat special category may be indicated by the fact that he was not mustered as a member of the ODENWALD'S crew. Subsequent to the interrogation it was ascertained that Ruge had been one of the crew of the German Pocket Battleship ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE which was scuttled off Montevideo on December 17, 1939. Thus Ruge will always be of historical interest as the first German prisoner of war captured by the United States. | ||
IX |
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Preparations for scuttling of ship |
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| While the ODENWALD was still in Yokohama two bombs were brought on board and placed between the propeller shafts and the hull of the ship. Both bombs were exploded. On the port side of the ship a seam approximately 22 inches in length was opened. A similar opening was caused on the starboard side. | ||
| In Puerto Rico, a seaman, made the following statement which throws considerable light on this subject, to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: | ||
| "I left Germany for the last time in April 1939 from Hamburg, on the SS IYONIA, of the Hamburg America Line. I left this ship in Punta Arenas, Costa Rica, during the first or second week of June, 1939 and worked as a stevedore in Costa Rica until September, 1939. A few days after war was declared I was deported on the M.S. HAVELLAND of the Hamburg America Line, to stay on board this ship as part of the crew, but without signing on, until such time as the first German port was reached. This ship left Costa Rica the latter part of September or | ||
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| the first part of October and went direct to Manzanilla, Mexico. This ship laid there in port for eight months until about June, 1940, at which time it sailed to Yokohama, Japan. On this trip the entire ship was painted gray to conceal its identity. This ship arrived in Yokohama about the middle of August, 1940, having been at sea from Mexico for 41 days. I remained on board the HAVELLAND until one month prior to the departure from Japan of the M.S. ODENWALD, at which time I was transferred to that ship. | ||
| "During the one month prior to the sailing of the M.S. ODENWALD, during which time I was on board as a member of the crew, two real bombs were placed in the lower back part of the ship. Some German from Tokio, Japan arranged the electrical wiring on the ship, connecting the same to the bombs to make it possible for the ship to be destroyed at sea in case of near capture by the enemy. I personally carried one of the bombs in my hands to the aft part of the ship and during the entire time that I had this bomb in my possession, First Officer LAGONI was behind me giving me orders as to where it should be placed. I placed this bomb next and adjacent to the hull of the ship in the starboard tunnel shaft, approximately 15 feet forward from that particular screw. There were approximately 30 smoke bombs placed in different localities on board ship. Our purpose in having these bombs was to use them as a smoke screen with the hope in mind of making the ship invisible to any approaching enemy craft. Fifteen to twenty large cans of Benzine likewise were set in storage places on board ship near materials which would burn easily, such as wood paneling and so forth. | ||
| "The switch to set off the bomb explosion was on the bridge of the ship. My information is that LAGONI threw that switch. It was common talk among the crew that at the final moment the Captain did not wish to blow up the ship and that the First Officer, Mr. LAGONI, actually took command, threw the switch, and ordered the men to abandon ship. Now the Captain is left entirely in the background and shunned by both officers and crew. When the first officer gave the command to abandon ship I started to get in the lifeboat and at that moment the only explosion which I heard in connection with the MS ODENWALD took place. After this boat was manned it was lowered and cast off the ship. We drifted on the sea until we were ordered to return to the ship for the sole purpose of letting the officer in charge of the boat crew return on board the MS ODENWALD under orders of the boarding party. After sitting alongside the vessel for a while, we were then ordered to proceed to the USS OMAHA where we were taken on board. It was common belief among everyone that the ship would sink, so when the order was given to abandon ship, I expected the ship to sink at that time." | ||
| The main grievance which the crew had against the Captain was that he had no comprehensive plan to destroy the ship. The Captain | ||
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| had failed to take the officers into his confidence, and in answer to all questions had stated that he would order suitable measures taken only when the occasion therefor arose. | ||
| The crew was particularly close-mouthed when questioned concerning the bombs. Most of them professed to have no knowledge of the fact that they were on board. Some stated that they had been taken on board in Hamburg when the ship left that port for the last time in April, 1939. All were agreed that the bombs were not of Japanese origin. The Second Engineer stated that they were made on board, and expressed the opinion that the Captain had done a poor job, and that if he had been given more authority in that connection he could, without difficulty, have supervised their installation in such manner that the force of the explosion would have gone, not inward, but rather outward. | ||
| The Captain stated that the bombs had been taken on board in Yokohama. He professed himself unable to remember the exact source of the bombs but did state that they had been transferred to the ODENWALD from other German ships in the harbor. He likewise professed to have no knowledge of the identity of the person who had ordered the bombs brought aboard. He admitted that he personally had thrown the switch in the chartroom which set off the bombs. He also made the statement that the United States Navy had done an excellent job of saving the ship, as he had expected the ship to sink from the effect of the explosions. | ||
| It is true, as stated in the Chief Officer's protocol (Annex C), that the bombs were placed on board in Yokohama. However, his statement that the bombs were installed by "an expert" is of less validity as is that expert's alleged opinion that the bombs would tear holes in the ship as big as barn doors. | ||
| At the time that the attempt was made to sink the ODENWALD on November 6, it appears that the other officers had distributed incendiary material throughout the ship, ready for firing, but upon the Captain's orders were forced to remove most of this. The Chief Engineer had requested permission to set fire to the engineroom but such permission had been refused. It may even be a possibility that if the Captain's orders had been followed in all respects, the bombs would not have been set off. It appears to be a fact that on several occasions, while the boarding party was underway, the Captain had given orders to detonate the bombs but in each instance had countermanded his orders. However, the Chief Engineer, upon observing that the boarding party was armed with machine guns, had, the third time that the Captain's order had been given, quickly closed the electric circuit, so that when the third countermanding order was given, the explosions could no longer be prevented. | ||
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X |
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The Mission of the ODENWALD |
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| From confidential information received it appears that the German Embassy in Tokio expressed much concern when it became known to it that the ODENWALD had been intercepted by the OMAHA. In any event, it is of importance to subject all available facts to analysis with the view of ascertaining the nature of the mission of the ODENWALD in sailing from Japan. | ||
| The ODENWALD carried a valuable cargo, chiefly of rubber. Three officers had rendered service in the German embassies in Peking and Tokio. One of these officers is known to have been a member of the crew of the German pocket battleship ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE, and to have fled from internment in Argentina early in 1941. | ||
| From a study of the amount of fuel oil taken on board at Yokohama and of the daily log showing fuel consumption to the day the ship was abandoned on November 6, it is reasonably certain that the ship did not transfer any oil to any other ship while at sea. The amount of fuel oil on hand at the time of the salvage operations, was 560 tons. When the ODENWALD sailed from Yokohama her tanks were filled with 1193 tons of oil which the chief engineer described, in his formal report to the ship owners, as "pretty dirty and containing very much water". This report also records the fact that through dehydration and cleansing relatively large losses of oil were sustained. On an average daily consumption of approximately 8 tons for the 77 day period of the trip, the total consumption was probably well in excess of 600 tons. This would seem definitely to exclude any possibility of contact having been made between the ODENWALD and German submarines or raiders for the purpose of fueling the latter. In any event there is no evidence of any kind that would point to that conclusion. Furthermore, no facts would tend to support any suspicion that the ODENWALD had fueled while underway. | ||
| The fact that the ship carried a valuable cargo of essential materials may be accepted as reason enough for attempting the homeward journey. It was, furthermore, observed by the SOMERS at the time of the salvage operations, that numerous packages were thrown overboard from the ODENWALD. | ||
| In view of these considerations and on the basis of all known facts, it seems more plausible to assume that the concern of the Germans was probably directed chiefly to the secret matter carried by the ship, and also to the very valuable cargo of am important war commodity, rather than to any particular individual on board or to any other military consideration. | ||
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XI |
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Party Organization, Indoctrination, and Activities |
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| Seemingly great care was exercised before abandoning ship to throw overboard or otherwise destroy all papers and other evidence showing the party organization aboard ship. It was acknowledged, however, that Lagoni, the chief engineer, was the political leader (Stuetzpunkleiter) of the ODENWALD'S Nazi party cell (Bordzelle), and it is clear that most of the crew were members of the NSDAP (Nazi Party) and/or of the DAF (Labor Front), or of the AO (Auslands-Organisation, Seefahrt). | ||
| Lagoni is a highly intelligent person and there appears little doubt that he, rather than the Captain, was the real leader on board. He is a career officer in the Hamburg American Line service, and in view of the known antagonism that exists between the services of that line and of the North German Lloyd, he resented, although he as well as other Hapag officers were reluctant to say so, the designation of a North German Lloyd captain to the command of the ODENWALD, a Hapag ship. He proved to be thoroughly indoctrinated in Nazi philosophy and intensely anti semitic. As leader of the "Bordzelle" he took his duties seriously and appeared to be zealous in looking after the well-bring of the men. | ||
| There was found on board a small dossier which was the personal file of party activities, of Friedrich Fohrmann, who was the Stuetzpunkleiter of the Bordzelle as well as Chief Engineer during 1935 and 1936, when the ship was known as the M.S. ASSUAN. Fohrmann himself had joined the party on May 1, 1933. His membership number is 1503170. | ||
| These records show that none of the ship's company of the ASSUAN were members of the crew of the ODENWALD at the time the ship was abandoned, with the exception of the Chief Officer, who was Second Officer for one trip in 1935, and the Carpenter, who was on board throughout 1935 and 1936, and who, although not a member of the NSDAP, belonged to the DAF. | ||
| The Fohrmann file gives some indication of party control over its members and of the means employed to indoctrinate the crew of a merchant vessel with the philosophy of the movement and official party propaganda. Included in the records are copies of bulletin notices signed by Fohrmann calling upon each member of the crew to deposit with a designated party member written proof of membership in the party and in the SA. Other bulletins call upon the crew to attend | ||
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| special meetings for their instruction (Schulungsabende) and advice party members that attendance is ordered duty. A complete attendance record was kept of these meetings, and, in fact, everyone attended, including the captain and the officers, unless on watch or otherwise excused. | ||
| This record also includes a summary of the number of party members (Parteigenossen) and of non-party Germans (Volksgenossen) present at each meeting. Each "Schulungsabend" was addressed by a party crew member to whom a definite subject had been assigned, such as "The Right of the German People to Live," "Memorial Celebration for Horst Wessel and Wilhelm Gustoff", "Do You Know Your Fuehrer?", "The Fuehrer as a Boy", "The Fuehrer as a Young Man", "The Fuehrer as a Soldier", ad nauseam. | ||
| The deck log records, that while in Japan, for their relaxation the crew participated in a picnic with the local Yokohama group of the NSDAP. They also listened to a lecture given by the German Consul General on the deportment to be observed while in Japan, and to a talk by the German Naval Attache to all German merchant men tied up in Yokohama harbor. Other pleasures consisted in celebrating the Fuehrer's birthday on April 20th, and in being excused from all duty on June 26, 1941, "by reason of the ending of the campaign in the West." | ||
| It is certain that on this last journey none of the customary political activity was indulged in, and apparently no time was taken for lectures and other means to continue the indoctrination of the crew. The Chief Officer went so far as to declare, with his tongue in his cheek, that "in war time all political activity ceases." | ||
| Insofar as supreme authority on board ship was concerned, the Chief Officer maintained that at no time could a political leader give instructions to the Captain of a ship, and that the latter had the sole responsibility for the crew, ship, and cargo. Captain Loers made a similar statement, but upon being drawn out, admitted that there were occasions known to him where a Captain, who had not followed the orders of the political leader, subsequently was called upon to justify his conduct before the party. | ||
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XII |
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Conditions in Germany |
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| A large number of personal letter were found in the effects of the crew. These letters were mostly of older date, some running back as far as 1937 and 1938, and few were of recent date. As usual, the picture presented by this correspondence is conflicting; however, generally speaking, information culled from the same may be classified under the following heads: | ||
| 1) Food. Germany is better prepared then in the last war, and no one will need to suffer hunger again. | ||
| 2) End of War. Numerous letters express the wish for an early end of the war. The assumptions, of course, that the victor will be Germany. | ||
| 3) Severe Winters. The principal hardship incurred is that of enduring severe and heatless winters. Letters written in 1940 speak of the hard previous winter. 1941 letters allude to the difficult winter of 1940. One letter, written in May, 1941, refers to the first welcome appearance of sunshine, and expresses the hope that the warmth of the sun's rays will presently dispel the wintery feeling still perceptible in everyone's bones. | ||
| 4) Bombings. There are relatively few references to the effects of British bombing raids. This is all the more surprising since the majority of German sea faring men hail from the coastal regions and particularly from the country around Hamburg, Bremen and Kiel. | ||
| Some letter go so far as to say that there has been no bombing, basing that statement on the fact that the writers have not personally seen any. More reliable, perhaps is a letter from the Chief Officer's father under date of May 21, 1941, in which he reports the following, after a trip to Kiel: | ||
| "In Kiel things don't look very pretty, - our former house is ruined (Futsch). We enjoyed peace for two nights and then everything broke loose again." | ||
| Another letter from Hamburg, of the same period reports: | ||
| "The Tommies come off and on, and although the damage and the losses are not of importance, a few bombers are able to get through the defense of Flak and night fighters. No doubt we understand these things better." | ||
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Annex A |
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Biographical Information of the Crew of the ODENWALD. |
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Annex B |
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(translation) |
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| 29 November 1941. | ||
Report of M.S. "ODENWALD" |
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| On the 21st of August, 1941, M.S. "ODENWALD" under the command of Captain G. Loers left the port of Yokohama with destination to the European Continent. | ||
| On the Pacific, we had in part stormy weather. We passed Cape Horn without any incidents. We continued the voyage and passed the Equator during the night of the 5th to the 6th of November, 1941, also without incidents. | ||
| On the 5th of November, at daybreak, a cruiser and a destroyer became visible crossing our course. We continued to navigate our course at the same speed. Soon after, the cruiser and the destroyer passed us, one on each side. We established the cruiser to be of the OMAHA class. | ||
| M.S. "ODENWALD" was made disguised as an American vessel sailing under the name of "WILMOTO", Philadelphia. We had hoisted the American flag. We answered the flag signals demanded by the cruiser "OMAHA" about the departure and destination ports. | ||
| After having exchanged the flag salutations, the cruiser turned off and again ran up aft, coming within call. It was called: "What is your special signal?", and the Captain answered: "We have none". They asked: "Where you come from?" Answer" "Capetown". Question: "Where are you bound for?" Answer: "New Orleans". Thereupon the cruiser "OMAHA" signaled: "You must stop", and this was carried out immediately. | ||
| As both men of war were readily established as neutral Americans, nothing more was attempted. | ||
| Not until the cruiser sent out a motorboat and we could observe that the crew was heavily armed with machine guns and automatic pistols, did we consider that an act of violence of the American Navy was impending, and only then, the order to blow up the ship was given. At the same time, we hoisted the signal F.M.: (ship in sinking condition, send boat to save passengers and crew), and the abandonment of the ship was ordered. | ||
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| As soon as the motorboat of the American cruiser came within call, was warned twice not to come alongside of the "ODENWALD: as at any moment an explosion could be expected. | ||
| The first officer Lagoni who shouted the warning to the motorboat, was answered by the American officer with the order to his crew: "Shoot him down". | ||
| Shortly, one after the other, two explosions took place. The American motorboat was at that time out of the danger zone. The port lifeboats of the M.S. "ODENWALD" were lowered to the water, were occupied and could take off without hindrance. The starboard lifeboats also were lowered to the water, a small part of the crew of the "ODENWALD" had already occupied the boats, when, under threat of arms, a further occupation was prohibited by the officer of the American motorboat. In spite of this menace, those members of the crew still hanging on the ladder, occupied the lifeboats. | ||
| In the meantime, the American motorboat fastened to Lifeboat No. 1 and the Americans boarded the ship. By threat of arms, the rest of the crew, still on board the M.S. "ODENWALD", was obliged to stay on board the sinking ship. By order of the American officer, those members of the crew who were occupying lifeboats No. 1 and No. 3 had to return to the sinking ship. It was due to the protest of the 1st officer H. H. Schmidt that at least two men could stay on each lifeboat so to avoid that the boats would break up against the sides of the ship. Those members of the crew who were retained on board the sinking ship, were forced to step up near hatch No. 3 and near the railing. | ||
| As first act of the boarders, the Chief Engineer Schroder was obliged at gun point to enter the engine room accompanied by the American officer and two men, and was ordered to close the sea valves and to stop the leak. The Chief Engineer refused to do this. In the course of events, the Chief Engineer Schroder twice more at gun point was led into the engine room. The carrying out of the orders was again refused. | ||
| Thereupon, the American officer in command, proceeded to search the whole ship. After a long while, that part of the crew which had stepped near the hatch No. 3 was obliged to abandon the ship, with the exception of the 1st Officer H. H. Schmidt, who alone had to enter the American motorboat. All four lifeboats were ordered to the "OMAHA" under heavy guard. The Captain, who was in lifeboat No. 2, came alongside the starboard side and again boarded the steamer. He was menaced, under threat of violence, that he would | ||
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| blow up with "ODENWALD" if he did not divulge the secret if and where further explosions could be expected. The answer was: "All right, then I stay on board". The American officer then shouted to the cruiser "OMAHA" that the Captain was too old, that he wanted a younger officer. The Captain was then forced to abandon the M.S. "ODENWALD" and he was exchanged with the 1st Officer H. H. Schmidt. In the course of events, the cruiser "OMAHA" sent a strong crew aboard, and tried in vain to put the machinery in working condition. | ||
| During the forenoon, the Chief Engineer Schroder, who was on board the "OMAHA" was demanded to make known the positions of the valves of hatches four and five. Through an interpreter the Chief Engineer indicated the positions of the valves where they never could be found. | ||
| Towards 13 o'clock, the Chief Engineer was again forced to board the M.S. "ODENWALD", he stayed on board about two hours. During this time, he was led three times into the engine room and he was ordered at point of gun to put into operation the principal engines and pumps. The execution of these orders was refused by him. | ||
| The condition of the engine, principally the air for starting and the compression was such, that it would take days for a crew not well acquainted with the engines, to bring the same into working condition. The flood-gate was closed and under pressure forced water from the outboard discharges. | ||
| As all promises and threats were in vain, the Chief Engineer was led again on deck and later transferred to the cruiser "OMAHA". When he came on board and again when he left the ship, he observed that M.S. "ODENWALD" had lowered about 1 to 1-1/2 M. in the water at the stern, and that all outboard discharges of the engines, which formerly were located about 3/4 M above the waterline, were already below same. | ||
| Towards 15 o'clock, the 1st Electrician Schroder was obliged to leave the "OMAHA" and to board the "ODENWALD". After his arrival, he was sent to the engine room where he lowered the oil pressure of Diesel No. 1, in order to cause the same to drain from the bearings. | ||
| Going over the engines, the 1st Electrician established that there was about 20 atmospheres of starting air and no intake air. He also saw that the water in hatch No. 4 stood about 1 M above the flood gate, as from small leaks in the same different places were noticeable through which the water was leaking. | ||
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| Then the 1st Electrician was again led on deck, but was obliged to go back to the engine room as Diesel No. 1 was knocking strongly. He thereupon turned Diesel No. 1 off. This caused the starting compressor to cease to function because the extra Diesel was necessary for it to do the requisite pumping. Then the 1st Electrician was ordered to start the principal engine. After his first refusal, he was obliged to obey orders at gun point. The 1st Electrician then started the principal starboard engine but without setting the fuel regulator to "open," thereby causing the greater part of the starting air to become used up. As the starting compressor could not run, by reason of the non-operating Diesel, the American prize crew was presented with a further problem to resolve. | ||
| To 1st Electrician Schroder certain promises were made as: first bring the M/S "ODENWALD" to port, then a prompt forwarding to Germany. | ||
| After his continuous refusals to execute any of the orders, the 1st Electrician was again led to the upper deck and later was sent back to the cruiser "OMAHA". | ||
| In the course of the afternoon, on the cruiser "OMAHA", inquiry was made among the crew of the "ODENWALD", whether any one knew how to operate the compressor. No one responded. | ||
| About 16 o'clock the 2nd Engineer Willy Seidel was sent on board the "ODENWALD" from the cruiser "OMAHA". Two hours later, the ship was underway. Details are not known to us. The 1st Officer H. H. Schmidt, who was detailed by force on board the "ODENWALD" in place of the Captain, and who had been forcibly compelled to remain on the bridge for approximately 30 hours, was sent back to the cruiser "OMAHA" in the forenoon of the 7th of November. | ||
| All orders given and all acts on the part of the Americans were backed up by force of arms, i.e., with cannons of both men-of-war pointed at the M.S. "ODENWALD", and with machine guns and automatics menacing the crew. | ||
| From private conversations with officers and members of the crew of the cruiser "OMAHA" it appears that the American men-of-war were waiting for the M.S. "ODENWALD" for more than three weeks. | ||
| Also, on the first day of these conversations it was ascertained by us that in the opinion of the Commander of the cruiser "OMAHA" the search for the M.S. "ODENWALD" was to have been given up at 15 o'clock. | ||
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| On the basis of the above facts, I, Gerhard Loers, as Captain of the M.S. "ODENWALD", and as a lawful representative of the Hamburg-America Line in Hamburg, Germany, demand the immediate restoration of the steamer and her entire cargo. | ||
| Any and all kinds of claims of third persons and of the crew, for wages and personal belongings, as well as all other rights are specially reserved by me. | ||
| (Signed) | ||
| Gerhard Loers | ||
| Captain, | ||
| M.S. ODENWALD | ||
| (Signed) | ||
| W. Schroder | ||
| Chief Engineer | ||
| (Signed) | ||
| Wilhelm Lagoni | ||
| 1st Officer | ||
| (Signed) | ||
| Hans-Hermann Schmidt | ||
| 1st Officer | ||
| (Signed) | ||
| Walter Schroder | ||
| Electrician | ||
| (Signed) | ||
| Karl Behnk | ||
| Boatswain | ||
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Annex C |
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(Translation) |
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| Detention Camp, December 5, 1941. | |||
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| On the 19th of November, 1941 Captain Gerhard Loers was relieved of his authority as commanding officer on the ground of the herein after specified accusations; outwardly, however, the Captain remained the responsible officer in order not to damage our prestige aboard. | |||
| The thing came about in this way. The Captain allowed himself to be called a "traitor to his country" by the ordinary seaman, Karl Luft, and accused of having intentionally let his ship fall into the hands of the American vessel, - and this in the presence of the American Commandant of the Camp, Captain Krueger. Captain Loers listened to this affront in silence, in spite of the fact that the Commandant of the Camp remarked that he had a special place for such people, where he would be glad to confine him. | |||
| As Ordinary Seaman, Karl Luft, likewise insulted the entire ship's command with the same reproaches. I called him to account for it, whereupon I was designated with the same words in a direct confrontation. | |||
| Following this a council of the officers was held, in which the Captain was also taken into consultation. The following decision was made: Surrender of the ordinary seaman Karl Luft to the American authorities for safe custody. In addition the deposition of Captain Gerhard Loers, as he had evidenced no qualities of leadership during the whole time. | |||
| My assumption of commanding authority followed by unanimous desire of the entire crew. | |||
| The Luft affair was brought to a conclusion in this manner. Since he, as one without nationality (staatenlos), had striven from the beginning with every means at his disposal to demand American citizenship, he was removed from the Camp by the American authorities after a four and a half hour hearing. Colonel Schriver, who | |||
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| conducted this hearing, demanded of us a guarantee for the safety of the seaman Karl Luft, which we were not able to give him. | ||
| In my quality as commanding officer in the Camp three former members of the crew of the EISENACH made a report to me on the same day concerning Captain Loers, their last Captain, with respect to unbelievable conditions on that, his previous ship. Thereupon I demanded that these declarations be repeated before the Captain, which the men immediately promised. I then went to the Captain and aquatinted him with this incident. He demanded to be confronted with the three former members of his crew. In my presence and that of the First Officer H. H. Schmidt the accusation were repeated; in this circumstance the Captain conducted himself like a coward. The refusal of the Captain to muster these men on in Yokohama was thus made more than clear to me. | ||
| Up to that day I had always excused the Captain and taken his part against the crew; now, however, even my patience was finally exhausted. | ||
| During the whole cruise the Captain acted most peculiarly. | ||
| In all my service as ship's officer I was always accustomed to receive clear and unambiguous commands. Under the command of Captain Loers I never got a positive order expressed with the emphasis requisite for all orders concerning the ship. After the execution of any work it was always censured by the Captain and for the most part put an end to. Through the monstrous egotism of this man complaints from the crew continually arose, which caused me to become a buffer between the command and the crew during the entire cruise, through the fact that the Captain either ignored or paralyzed every measure absolutely necessary in war-time and personally refused to abide by every prescription for safety. Under these circumstances it was difficult to impress upon the men the necessity for these regulations. | ||
| The deportment and political attitude assumed by the Captain defied all description and were absolutely unworthy of a German. The Captain complained continually about the regulations which were necessary in the third Reich and indeed it seemed to him beyond all doubt that Germany, through this war which it had systematically sought, was facing ruin. | ||
| The mood of the whole crew suffered perceptibly from this, all the more because he depicted the end o our trip in the darkest colors. Moreover in his opinion American internment was the most favorable thing that could happen to us. | ||
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| On the other hand all the rest of the crew was imbued with the certainty of brining the ship and cargo successfully home. All the measures necessary in the event of capture, in order not to let his ship fall into the hands of the enemy, were systematically taken lightly by him, or even forbidden. | ||
| On the morning of the 4th of November we established from a radiogram that American warships were in the neighborhood. Thereupon we altered our course. In the course of the day we discussed several times our procedure in the event of possible capture by American naval forces. In the unanimous opinion it was cleat to us that, if we sighted American naval forces, we would be completely lost and would have to act exactly as if we had sighted an English warship. It was the Captain's view to let things be decided by the circumstances of the moment, in spite of the fact that we officers asked often enough for clear orders. Herr Voss and I questioned him personally in addition as to procedure to follow if we sighted an American vessel, but we were never given positive instructions. | ||
| When on the morning of November 6, 1941 at dawn two American units were sighted, we, that is the whole ship's staff of officers, made up our minds that we had to try to get through as an American, and that if this did not succeed, we would scuttle the ship to prevent its capture. | ||
| Now for the first time the Captain forbade us to set fire to the ship, even if it were blown up. | ||
| He forbade all preparations for completely destroying the ship, in spite of ordering it to be blown up as soon as the American came alongside. | ||
| (In Yokohama the explosives were put aboard by an expert, who declared to us that the bombs would tear holes as big as barn doors. This gave us a feeling of security that this would suffice to keep the ship from seizure by the enemy.) | ||
| As soon realized that a flag salute and continuing the trip would not be enough, we were hailed and asked for a special signal. As we could not reply to this, a heavily armed boat was put off by the cruiser "OMAHA". | ||
| In spite of the Captain's contrary order I had Benzine and incendiary material (Rotfeuer) laid ready by the hatches with instructions not to light it without orders. The Captain, who saw this, called my attention to it immediately and ordered me to gather up these materials and put them away. | ||
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| The Chief Engineer W. Schroder had likewise had everything made ready for firing the engine room. | ||
| Now it was clearly seen that the American's boat was heavily armed. The Captain gave the order for setting the signal" F.M. (Am in sinking condition: send boats to rescue passengers and crew). Moreover the Captain gave the order to clear the engine room, as the ship was to be blown up. | ||
| Now the Chief Engineer appeared on the bridge again to receive more specific orders. In reply to his question, "What shall be done now, Shall I fire the engine room?" he was strictly forbidden to do that. His objection, "Suppose the explosive did not work" was laid aside with the words, "Then I can't do anything about it. Go to your boat and fish me out afterwards." My objection, that if the ship could be blown up, it could also be fired, was answered by a strict prohibition against setting it afire. Meanwhile the Captain had given the order to swing out and man the boats. | ||
| I was now alone with the Captain on the bridge. From there I called to the heavily armed boat for the first time not to come alongside, as the ship was sinking. Then I asked the Captain for further orders and he gave the command to blow up the ship. This was, however, immediately retracted by him. This occurrence was repeated three times; but the last time I had already set the lever for the explosion and could not pull it back. | ||
| I now went to the starboard side of the main deck, where the crew was already clambering into the boats. The American boat was about to board our number one boat. I called to the boat a second warning not to come alongside, as the ship was sinking and an explosion would follow immediately. The answer of the American officer was an order to his crew to shoot me down. Now I waited by No. 3 hatch for the explosion, which occurred exactly as it should. After the two bombs had exploded at short intervals, I went to the port side where my boat was waiting for me as agreed. The Captain appeared immediately afterwards and was taken aboard. When I was about to put off, I noticed that on the port side no hole could be seen. The electrician W. Schroeder and I wanted to go aboard now and set fire to the ship, for which there still was opportunity, as the Americans were still busy with the starboard boats and were not yet on board. The Captain, however, forbade us to do this with the following words: "On the starboard side there is a big hole. This will suffice perfectly to sink the ship". | ||
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| Now we put off, as the ship was settling on one side. For a time we pushed ahead, then, however went back alongside on my orders, as other members of the crew in the starboard boats had been forced to go back aboard the sinking ship. | ||
| Repeatedly, I had to remind the Captain that his place was on board. When we came alongside the Captain was allowed aboard, but I was not permitted to do so. | ||
| And now follows the report of First Officer H. H. Schmidt, who was back on board. | ||
| The Captain came aboard again on the starboard side and was taken to his cabin. After some time, when I was already separated from the starboard boat crews and had to enter a motor boat, the Captain was brought and, separate from me, had to enter another boat. In the belief that the ship was farther along in sinking I asked whether I might go back aboard to my room, which I was permitted, but only under strong watch. After my return to the boat the Captain likewise asked and made inquiries about his remaining effects. He was also permitted to go aboard and then succeeded in saving all his effects. After further waiting the Captain was ordered aboard again. I saw him slowly boarding the pilot ladder. After five minutes I got the same order. When I came on board I saw the Captain, apparently completely broken up sitting on a box. He called to me amongst other things, "Herr Schmidt, I am an old man, I cannot go on any longer". I was then separated from him and had to remain aboard for him. End of First Officer H. H. Schmidt's deposition. | ||
| Continuation of Chief Officer W. Lagoni. | ||
| The Captain and I were lodged together on the "OHAMA" in one room. When we were alone together here, the Captain reproached me for not having given the order to set the vessel on fire, saying that he was much afraid of fire. | ||
| However, on the "OMAHA" the Captain did not give the slightest impression of an old broken man rather the impression of a happy man who had done his duty. He even remarked to his officers that we were better provided for there than on the "ODENWALD". During the twelve days on the cruiser he did not once concern himself about his crew, not even asking for permission to visit his men. | ||
| During a conversation with Chief Engineer Schroeder, First Officer H. H. Schmidt and with me concerning Second Engineer W. Seidel, he reproached us for not having set the ship on fire ourselves. In any case it was obvious from this conversation that he liked to consider | ||
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| the failure of his nerve as the reason. There is no question of this, however; it was all rather a matter of calculated action. For, if one puts credence in the deposition of the men on the "EISENACH", it was an exact repetition, only this time with a bad ending. | ||
| What feeling of honor this man had is obvious from the following. The corps of officers had to appear to be photographed on the "OMAHA". After this picture was taken, the Commandant wanted a picture of the Captain by himself and showed the latter where to stand. Captain Loers, however, wasted to be photographed under the guns of the cruiser, which the Commandant permitted, shaking his head. | ||
| This is a report on the events concerning our Captain, made a month later. The reason for it is the uncertainty in which we live. | ||
| As Captain G. Loers is giving cause for conflict again here in the Camp, I see myself forced to attempt to report this matter now to some German authority, in the hope that a representative of the Embassy may appear here. | ||
| To give these lines the needed authority the entire corps of officers of the motorship "ODENWALD" vouches for their authenticity. | ||
| W. LAGONI | ||
| Chief Officer. | ||
| 1st Officer - Hans Hermann Schmidt. | ||
| 2nd " - Herbert Jantz. | ||
| 3rd " - Werner Voss. | ||
| Radio Opr. - H. Ruge. | ||
| Chief Engineer - Schroeder. | ||
| 3rd Engineer - Oto Schulze. | ||
| 3rd Engineer - Karl Lonsing. | ||
| 4th Engineer - F. Metzner. | ||
| Electrician - W. Schroeder. | ||
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