EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
MARCH 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER II
  
 
 
 
THE DESTROYERS
  
     
          In this month, 27 ships were sunk by enemy action within the waters of the Frontier. In this month, shipping schedules were disrupted; the morale of merchant crews steadily deteriorated; insurance companies ceased writing policies on cargo vessels. In this month, when the total losses equaled the sum of the losses for January and February, all hope that the Germans would be unable to carry out a sustained attack along this coast vanished.  
     
          Since the NORNESS went down 76 days ago, 53 ships have followed her to the bottom, and 300,000 tons of shipping have been destroyed. Should the March rate of sinkings continue, almost 2,000,000 tons will be lost within these coastal waters in 1942. The history of the Frontier in the month just past is the history of the war beneath the sea.  
     
          In this submarine warfare,, the initiative must always lie with the submarine. Those in control of the U-boats can, with relative freedom, determine the time, the location and the method of attack, and therefore in their hands is placed the ultimate decision about the shape and nature of the conflict. For those on the defensive, this is a constant disadvantage. With them lies the necessity to adjust to changing conditions, to improvise answers to new techniques, to follow after an enemy shifting into new territories. Inevitably there is a time lag between the action  
     
 
 
 
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of the attacker and the response of the defender -- a period of grace in which the submarine can operate with increased effectiveness and freedom. Success in anti-submarine warfare depends greatly on the rapidity with which those on the defensive can act to close the gap of this time lag.
  
     
 
        In the first months of this year, the Germans have suddenly shifted the weight of their submarine power from the trade routes between this country and England to the coastal waters of North America. An attempt to meet this threat against our merchant shipping has been made in a variety of ways, such as the routing of ships, the daylight sailing, the methods of patrol and search, already discussed in previous diaries. But, from the beginning it has been understood that the dangers from the submarine can be eliminated only through the action of superior forces. Such forces have not been available in the last three months. There was a shortage of every kind of ship and plane that could be used effectively against the U-boat, but especially there has been an insufficient number of destroyers. This type of vessel, with its speed, maneuverability, superior sound gear, and ability to keep the sea in conditions that drive smaller craft into port, is the deadly and traditional enemy of the submarine.
  
 

 

  
 
        In the Atlantic this past month, the primary limitation of the destroyer has been that there were not enough of them to go around. Adequate protection for one area could be given only at the expense of some other one. It was
  
     
 
 
 
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therefore, the policy of the higher command to concentrate the greatest number of ships in what were believed to be the areas most endangered, leaving the theatres of less active submarine operations with less protection than was desirable. The risks involved in such procedure were obvious; but the decision was imposed by the limited number of destroyers available.
  
     
          In accordance with this general principle the policies of distribution begun in February were continued as far as the Eastern Sea Frontier was concerned. Destroyers were assigned to temporary duty here, as a rule, when they happened to be within the limits of the Frontier on escort duty or for repair and overhaul. On March 8 the availability of destroyers for work in the Frontier was somewhat increased by the following dispatch from Cinclant:  
     
 
When such employment is practicable and does not interfere with escort fleet vessels, tasks, and fleet operations, destroyers and other suitable escort ships making passage through Sea Frontier Zones incident to scheduled movements should be utilized to fullest extent in the protection of merchant shipping. So that plans may be made to employ them as above in such cases Commander Sea Frontiers concerned and Cinclant should be informed.
 
     
          A few examples will demonstrate how these principles for the assignment of destroyers actually worked in practice. On March 10, Cinclant sent the following dispatch to the DAHLGREN:  
     
 
 
 
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CESF administrator degaussing and other material needs of DAHLGREN. Proceed to Barnagat Light at best speed. Report to CESF for temporary duty to terminate in New York 18 March ready for escort duty.
 
     
          On the same day CESF sent the DAHLGREN orders to patrol the area from Atlantic City to Winter Quarter upon her arrival. March 11, the next day, the ship began her temporary duty in the Frontier. Twenty-four hours later, when word was received that her orders had been changes, CESF sent the ship the following message:  
     
 
What will be your fuel requirements. Return New York by 1600 Q 14 March. Fuel and Provision 15 March. Proceed Key West 16 March.
 
     
          By this change of orders the temporary duty of the DAHLGREN was reduced from one week to about three days.  
     
          Cinclant on March 7 informed CSEF that the DUPONT and the COLE would be made available temporarily while they were waiting to escort the DEVONSHIRE to Charleston. They were thus able to increase the effectiveness of our patrols for 48 hours before going off on their new duty.  
     
          By such manipulation as this it was possible to keep some destroyers at work in the Frontier on almost every day of the month. One ship, the HERBERT, remained under CSEF for eighteen days, and two more, the DICKERSON and the ROPER, for eight days each. These three ships were the backbone of the destroyer strength as the following table reveals.  
     
 
 
 
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  NAME OF SHIP
DAYS PATROL IN FRONTIER
 
 
  HERBERT
18
   (2 days in port)
  ROPER
8
    
  DICKERSON
8
   (1 day escort duty)
  DALLAS
5
   (1 day escort duty)
  UPSHUR
4
    
  TARBELL
4
    
  DAHLGREN
4
   (1 day escort duty)
  GREER
3
    
  ELLIS
2
    
  DUPONT
2
    
  COLE
2
    
  HAMILTON
1
    
  MACOMB
1
    
  EMMONS
1
    
   
                  Total 14 Ships
           63 Days
   
   
   
   
 
     
          The average number of destroyers per day in the Frontier was thus about two. In actual practice this average was usually maintained, although on two days there were no ships at all operating in our waters.  
     
          In the course of the month CESF made several attempts to increase the destroyer strength in his command. On the 5th he sent the following request to Cinclant:  
     
 
That additional subs will reach this coast in two or three days is indicated and that all available destroyers be assigned this command is considered essential. To replace the JACOB JONES it is requested that a destroyer be detailed immediately.
 
     
          Two days later, on the 7th, the first ship was sunk by submarine action; next day another followed her to the bottom. On the 8th, Cinclant, in his dispatch quoted above, ordered that destroyers making passage through Sea Frontiers "be utilized to fullest extent in the protection of merchant vessels" when "such employment is practicable."  
     
 
 
 
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        By March 11, five ships had been sunk in the Frontier and on that day Com5 informed CESF that at least four destroyers were urgently required for minimum patrol and escort in the district waters. This request had to remain unfulfilled, since, for the next two weeks, the average daily destroyer strength in the whole Frontier remained unchanged.
  
     
          On March 30th CESF sent to Cominch the following dispatch:  
     
 
Planes sighted four subs as follows at 1512Q in 33-35N; 76-12W. At 1255Q in 34-44N; 76-10W. At 1345 Q 35-55N; 75-15W. At 1458Q in 36-10N;74-50W. It is believed that two additional subs were sighted in Hatteras Lookout Area. Due to critical situation and to lack of adequate patrols available with sound equipment, recommend detail of at least four destroyers for immediate duty. Current situation of available destroyers as follows: ROPER searching for survivors CITY OF NEW YORK, HERBERT returning New York for fuel, NOA just returned New York, sails just as soon as can be ready. DICKERSON, TARBELL under repair Norfolk. GREER escort.
 
     
          Next day reply was made by Cominch:  
     
 
Your knowledge of other demands for DD's as imperative as your own is not given sufficient credit in your 302218.
 
     
          It is clear that all the imperative demands for destroyers in the Atlantic could not be answered. It is clear that destroyers operating to reduce the risks in a particular area are taken away from some other area where the hazards are correspondingly increased. It is also clear that it is impossible to define the exact degree of risk which may exist at any moment in any endangered sector. But figures are available which do define the relative effectiveness of the submarine  
     
 
 
 
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in the last month in the various theatres of its activity. These figures are not complete, but they may be taken as nearly correct. And the general situation they reveal may be accepted as entirely accurate.
  
     
         Throughout the world in the month of March 79 allied and neutral vessels were sunk. Of this total four were lost in the Indian Ocean and the Far East, one was sunk in the North Sea and 74 went down in the Atlantic. All but four of the 74 were lost in the coastal or offshore waters of North America, west of 50 West. These sinkings can be broken down into geographical areas:  
     
 
  Halifax Sector
5
  
  Caribbean SF
19
  
  Gulf SF
3
  
  ESF
27
  
  ESF Offshore
12
  
  ESF Outside 500 miles
4
  
 
     
          In other words, 88.61% of the world sinkings occurred in the North Atlantic during the last month and 49.37% of the world sinkings occurred in the Coastal and offshore waters of this Frontier alone. Of the total Atlantic sinkings 55.71% were within the limits of the Frontier.  
     
          A surprising factor was the comparative safety of the sea lanes to England during this period. Along those traditional hunting grounds 519 ships completed the passage from the new world to the old. Of these, one, a straggler, was torpedoed off Halifax. In terms of these figures, by far the most critical area during March, was the Eastern Sea Frontier.  
     
 
 
 
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          The allocation of destroyer strength does not conform to the situation revealed in the above figures as closely as might be expected. The statistics of destroyer distribution that follow must be read with caution for, without some interpretation, they give a distorted picture. It must not be assumed, for example, that every destroyer attached to the Atlantic Fleet is always available; and of those available, it must not be assumed that all could be taken from the Fleet they were built primarily to protect. But the figures as they stand, give an indication of the several areas that were given special priority in the distribution of destroyers and also an indication of the kind of duty that was considered most imperative.
 
     
         Throughout the month there were ordinarily 73 destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet. Of these, there were every week, an average of fifteen laid up for repair and overhaul. All these ships were kept at sea longer than was desirable from the point of view of efficiency. But, between a less efficient ship and none at all, the choice was clear in this critical period.   
     
          On any average day during the last month, therefore, there were about sixty destroyers available for duty. In the first two weeks 27 of these, or, nearly 50%, were distributed along the arc that runs from Casco, through Argentia and Hvalford, to Londonderry. During the last two weeks about twenty, or one-third the available strength, was located in this area. By putting the figures for tonnage losses and destroyer distribution together the following situation is revealed. This table omits the percentage of destroyer strength present in ESF -- roughly 25% --  
     
 
 
 
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which was assigned to ordinary duties with the Fleet and was, therefore, not available for service under CESF in the war against the submarine. It also shows only the average distribution throughout the month in the three specified areas, but this average conforms quite closely to the actual destroyer strength present from day to day. These two minor qualifications in no way distort the picture of the situation described by figures in the table which reveals that in the area most greatly endangered by the submarine, the least destroyer protection was available.
  
     
 
AREA
PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TONNAGE SUNK IN AREA
PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE DESTROYER STRENGTH IN AREA
     
Caribbean & South of ESF to Recife 27.85% . . . . . . . 28.55%
     
Northern Waters (Halifax, Argentia, Havlfjord, Londonderry Sectors 6.33% . . . . . . . . 41.67%
     
ESF 34.20% )  
               ) . . . . . . 4.99%
ESF (Including Offshore Boundary 500 Miles to Sea 49.37% )  
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 

 

  
 
 
     
 
 
 
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