EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
MARCH 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER I
  
 
 
 
THE SUBMARINE SITUATION
  
     
 
        The first week of the month was unexpectedly and pleasantly free from enemy activity. Not one ship was sunk until March 7. For the following two weeks, however, the submarines maintained the most severe attack yet felt on this coast. In the course of fourteen days, 21 ships were sent to the bottom. The worst 24 hours occurred on the 16th when four ships were lost, but on the 18th, with a score of three, was almost as bad. Eight vessels, almost one-third of the total for the month, were destroyed in the three days from the 16 through the 18th. After that the velocity of the sinking rate diminished but as the month ended, vessels were going down at an average of a little better than one a day.
  
     
          Little change in the method of attack was noticed during the month nor was there a noticeable shift in the location of the hunting. Hatteras, with its deep water, remained the favorite spot. Twelve ships were attacked and sunk in this area. It was estimated that ordinarily, three U-boats were operating near this danger spot, with perhaps four, five, or six at work in other parts of the Frontier. Though the major theatres of attack remained the same, it is believed that the submarines have entered the Frontier on westbound courses diferent from those previously used. Instead of sweeping down the coast from Newfoundland, the enemy appears to head for Hatteras directly from European waters. A probable explaination for this change is the greater security afforded  
     
 
 
 
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shipping between Hatteras and New York by the introduction of daylight voyages broken at night by lie overs at the Chesapeake and the Delaware.
  
     
 
        To meet the increasing severity of submarine attack the changes in sea lanes considered in another chapter were introduced. This major attempt to strengthen our defenses against the U-boat was supplemented throughout the month by other methods. Additional secrecy about ship departures was sought when on March 5, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered that the merchant practice of hoisting flags to indicate imminent departure be stopped. One week later the same office suggested that whenever possible ships should leave port after dark.
  
 

 

  
 
        On March 12, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier recommended the institution of "scarecrow patrols" as a means of reducing submarine effectiveness. It has been noticed that the U-boats are particularly sensitive to the airplane, diving as soon as one makes its appearance. It was the idea of Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier that this sensitivity could be taken advantage of by sending out civilians in unarmed planes on "scarecrow patrols". The enemy would by this process be forces under water at more frequent intervals than at present, thus restricting the range and increasing the difficulties of his operations. A few days later this proposal was rejected by Cominch on grounds of "operational difficulties."
 
     
          Ever since the beginning of the submarine war on this coast, evidence has been accumulating which indicates that the U-boats have been assisted in their night attacks by lights from shore which silhouette vessels against the sky. Steps were taken to reduce this hazard during  
     
 
 
 
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this month. On March 4, a conference at the War Department, attended by officers of the Army and Navy, agreed that action in this matter was a Navy function. Accordingly, on March 14, the Chief of Naval OPerations sent out a directive to the Naval Districts suggesting that a "dim out" of coastal lights should be undertaken. Blackouts were not considered necessary in view of the fact that "Supression of bright lights showing to seaward" would in all probability reduce the glare against which vessels were so plainly silhouetted. Steps were taken to put this directive into effect along the coast.
  
     
 
        All these methods were supplementary to the fundamental defensive measure -- the patrolled sea lanes. All probably reduced somewhat the risks to our coast wise shipping; in how great a degree is impossible to calculate. But none of them separately, nor all of them in combination served to contain the number of sinkings within safe limits. Should this warfare continue as it has begun, it is possible to anticipate not only profound dislocations of our domestic economy but the retarding of the entire war effort of the Allies as well.
  
 

 

  
 
 
     
 

 

  
     
     
     
 
 
 
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