Headquarters of the
	Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
	Serial: 868
	File A16-1
	February 7, 1942
	From: Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier. To: Chief of Naval OPerations   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet       Subject: Readiness.       References: (a) OpNav Conf. ltr. Op-10 Hu 1/30/42 (SC) A16-1(4) Serial 0510 of 31 Jan. 1942.   (b) OpNav Conf. ltr. Op-22-A2 (SC) A16-3(9) Serial 0115422 of 23 Oct. 1941.       Enclosure: (A) Com. 3, Conf. ltr. A16-3, Serial 785 of 29 Jan. 1942 to C.O. Naval Vessels.   (B) Com. 3, Res. ltr. QW20(A16-3(4) QS-1 of 29 Jan. 1942 to Masters Merchant Vessels at Shipyards.   (C) Com. 3, Res. ltr. QW20 (A16-3(4) S74 of 30 Jan. 1942 to Masters Armed Merchant Vessels.   (D) Com. 3, Res. ltr. QW20 (A16-3(4)/QC-No/ND3/S74 of 31 JAn. 1942 to Capt. Arthur Maraden, R.N. British Ministry of War Transport.   (E) Com. 3, Res. ltr. QW20 (A16-3(4)/QC-No/ND3/S74 of Feb. 7, 1942 to Mr. Orvind Lorentzen, Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission.   (F) List of available Army and Navy aircraft.   (G) List of available patrol vessels.
	1.                As directed, copies of reference (a) have been sent to the Commanding General Eastern Theatre of Operations and to the Commanding General First Air Force.
	2.                In the matter of joint Army and Navy training outlined in reference (b), such exercises were held frequently up to the time that war was declared. These exercises were planned for closer cooperation and coordination of air and surface vessels, communications, etc., between the Army and Navy. Since that time all efforts have been concentrated in meeting by joint action the enemy submarine activities in coastal waters. This joint action has served to a marked degree in training and in taking the place of joint exercises. In the future, when opportunity offers and when forces are not engaged in actual activities against enemy submarine or air attacks, joint Army ands Navy training will be continued.
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	February 7, 1942
	To: Chief of Naval Operations.   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet     Subject: Readiness.
	3.                The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier is fully in accord with statements made in reference (a). Every activity under his command has been kept on the alert constantly since 7 December last. In the opinion of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier there is not only a possibility but a distinct probability that our Eastern Coast will receive an air attack when weather conditions are favorable. This air attack may come direct from the shores of Europe or from mobile bases in the way of vessels capable of carrying and catapulting large sea planes. With this in mind, the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier has conferred frequently with the Army in order to bring into being and have available every defensive and offensive unit to repel an air attack. In New York the Army is woefully lacking in sufficient anti-aircraft guns. It has been roughly estimated that in order to protect this vital industrial New York area, a rectangle of about 10 by 9 miles, it is necessary to have about 500 anti-aircraft guns of 3" to 5" in caliber. At present it is understood that there are about 50 such guns placed in this area. In order to augment this fire, the Commandant Third Naval District has given orders that guns' crews of all naval vessels in this port and all merchant ships undergoing repair at the different navy yard and private shipyards and alongside piers must remain on the alert ready to fire in the event th a particular ship is attacked from air or an attack is made in the immediate vicinity. In addition to this, the British officer controlling British merchant shipping in this port, as well as the Norwegian officer in control of Norwegian ships have been requested to give similar orders to their ships lying in this port. There are attached hereto enclosures (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) which have been issued not only in this District but sent to other Districts of the Eastern Sea Frontier command, all with the object of bringing to bear the greatest volume of anti-aircraft fire in case of attack. In addition to this, security measures have been taken and instructions issued to all shipbuilding plants outlining plans for security. Copies of these instructions have been sent to other Districts.
	4.                It is needless to note that there are vital areas along the Eastern Frontier which are today without protection and which should not be protected from an air attack. It is understood that the Army has not sufficient guns for this purpose. Navy guns are being placed at Floyd Bennett Field. There are numerous other plants, however, such as the Federal Shipbuilding Plant, without local protection or with insufficient protection from Army or Navy guns.
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	February 7, 1942
	To: Chief of Naval Operations.   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet     Subject: Readiness.
	5.                In order that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet may be thoroughly informed as to the means for information and security and the means to meet submarine and air attacks, the following information is given showing the status of air conditions on the Eastern Sea Frontier as of 1 February.
	Except for the patrol bombers of the Fleet Air Detachment now at Norfolk, there are no long range naval patrol planes in the Eastern Sea Frontier capable of maintaining a constant patrol offshore and giving adequate protection to merchant shipping. The only naval planes attached to the districts are single-engined planes which, when carrying depth bombs, have a range of very little more than three hours. There is one squadron at Squantum for the First Naval District, which is inadequate to maintain a patrol of the Gulf of Maine as well as to maintain protection for shipping in and out of Portland, Portsmouth, Boston and the Cape Cod Canal.       Newport has one single-engined plane at Quonset one depth bomb.       New York has one squadron of single-engined planes and three single-engined amphibians carrying depth bombs. These are not sufficient to maintain patrols as well as give air coverage to all the convoys and vessels requesting air coverage in and out of New York.       The four lighter-than-air ships of Squadron 12 at Lakehurst are being utilized to the limit, and additional ZNP's are urgently needed, as these airships can maintain, weather permitting, useful sea patrols. They are most valuable for patrol and escort duty.       The Fourth Naval District has no planes capable of attacking submarines. For the protection of the Delaware Capes a squadron should be based at Cape May.       The Fifth Naval District is dependent upon the fleet air detachment at Norfolk for patrol and escort duty. There should be planes permanently assigned for this.       The Coast Guard Air Station at Elizabeth City has recently been assigned three single-engined amphibians carrying two depth bombs each. Larger planes, when available, should be assigned.
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	February 7, 1942
	To: Chief of Naval Operations.   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet     Subject: Readiness.
	The First Bomber Command of the Army has been maintaining patrols from Westover, Mitchell and Langley Fields, with flights in the morning and in the afternoon. Insufficient equipment, transfer of crews and units, and inexperienced personnel have contributed to the handicaps under which the Bomber Command has been operating, resulting in an average of not more than three planes from each field per flight.     The First Air Support Command has a number of small planes with short range, which have been used for observation patrols, but lacking armament, they are ineffective against submarines.       It is impossible to guard the Frontier waters properly with the aviation equipment now available.              6.                The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier cannot too strongly emphasize the lack of sufficient air force on this Frontier to defend it properly and to patrol sea-borne trade along the coast, escort convoys, etc. in a proper manner. It is urgently and strongly recommended that steps be taken immediately to supply this coast with sufficient heavy long distance planes equipped with bombs and radio, in order that daily flights may be made to seaward and that a constant day and night patrol be maintained along this coast. In order to maintain an effective patrol along this Frontier the following is the minimum which should be assigned for this duty:       1 Squadron of patrol planes at Charleston or at Jacksonville.   1 Squadron of patrol planes at Elizabeth City, N.C.   1 Squadron of patrol planes at Norfolk, Va.   1 Squadron of patrol planes at Cape May, N.J.   1 Squadron of patrol planes at Naval Air Station, New York.   1 Squadron of patrol planes at Quonset.   1 Squadron of patrol planes at Squantum.
	This estimate is made having in mind the additional planes in the way of bombers and support planes to be furnished by the Army.
	7.                There is attached hereto as enclosure (F) a list of available Naval aircraft and available Army aircraft as of 1 February, which force, Army and Navy included, has been used to the limit to search for and attack enemy submarines which have been operating off this coast for the last few weeks.
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	February 7, 1942
	To: Chief of Naval Operations.   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet     Subject: Readiness.
	8.                As to surface vessels, there is attached hereto as enclosure (G) a list of all surface vessels attached to the Eastern Sea Frontier and Naval Districts as of 1 February. It will be noted that the large proportion of these vessels are incapable of going to sea and maintaining a patrol which in the opinion of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, is urgently needed at this time.
	9.                It is absolutely essential that a number of vessels be used to guard efficiently the approaches to important harbors such as Norfolk, New York, Philadelphia, Narragansett Bay, Boston and Portland. It has not been considered sound policy to withdraw these vessels, which are constantly on duty night and day, and have them proceed to sea on patrol, even if they are capable of doing so, by reason of the fact that it is absolutely essential that these approaches be guarded.
	10               Every effort has been made to expedite the laying of booms, submarine nets, sound loops, mine fields, in the approaches to the important harbors. Vessels, however, are absolutely necessary to guard these approaches in conjunction with other defensive measures.
	11.               The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, during the submarine activity off this coast, has used every possible available vessel for patrol along the coast but at no time has there been available over 10 such vessels for coastal sealane patrol. In some instances these vessels, small as they are, had to be used for rescuing survivors from sunken merchant ships in heavy weather at considerable distance offshore.
	12.               It is considered absolutely essential for the proper protection of merchant shipping along this coast to have a surface, as well as an air patrol, and at least 15 destroyers should be assigned to the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier for such duty.
	13.               The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier is well aware that all of this information is well known to higher authority, but he feels that it is his duty to call attention to this condition at the present time.
	Recently there have been numerous letters received from the masters of merchant ships plying along this coast complaining of insufficient air and surface protection.
	In the opinion of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier there will be increased submarine activity on this coast in the coming spring.
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	February 7, 1942
	To: Chief of Naval Operations.   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet     Subject: Readiness.
	Planes and ships should be made available NOW in order to meet this condition.
	14.               The transmission of this document via registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.
	/s/    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
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	.Headquarters of the
	Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
	File A16(O-6)
	Serial 979
	February 26, 1942
	From: Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier. To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet       Subject: Convoy for protection of coastwise shipping along Eastern Sea Frontier.       Reference: (a) COMINCH despatch 121245 February.       Enclosure: (A) List of ship movements from New York.
	1.                Reference (a) directed the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier to submit plan for a convoy system to protect coastal shipping in this Frontier. In submitting the following, the recommendations of all Naval District Commandants on this subject have been considered.
	2.                Recently, for a period of over one month, this Frontier received from the respective Naval Districts a daily report of movements of all merchant vessels. These reports showed the following average daily southward movements:
	(a) From west end of Cape Cod Canal to New York, via Long Island Sound 13       (b) From New York to Delaware Capes 18           (c) From Delaware Capes to Cape Henry 20           (d) From Cape Henry to South of Charleston, South Carolina 15
	The average daily movements northbound were about the same. In this connection, enclosure (A) gives quotations received from a report of the Third Naval District concerning movements of ships from New York.
	3.                In meeting the present problem of protection of shipping in coastal waters, the following should be considered:
	(a) Number and speed of vessels requiring protection (see preceding paragraph)     (b) Availability and capabilities of vessels to be used for escort purposes.         (c) Availability and characteristics of airplanes to be used for escort air coverage.
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	February 26, 1942
	Subject: Convoy for protection of coastwise shipping along Eastern Sea Frontier.
	(d) Safest routes to be used.     (e) The question of compelling certain overseas merchant vessels now being routed to seaward to use coastal lanes.
	4.                Taking into consideration the above, the following conclusions are reached: At present there are not available a sufficient number of escort vessels with adequate armament and speed to protect properly any system of coastwise convoys which could be devised for the movement of the number and types of vessels that would be involved. It is recommended that no attempt be made to protect coastwise shipping by a convoy system until an adequate number of suitable escort vessels is available.
	5.                To meet the present situation, in lieu of the employment of convoys, it is considered that the following procedure should hold:
	(a) Every possible use to be made of inland waters and canals. This to include the Cape Cod Canal. Vessels of 30 feet draft and any length can safely transit this canal. If necessary, cargo adjustment can be made to meet draft requirements. Long Island Sound to be used as well as the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. This canal will cary a draft of 23 feet and a length of ship of 460 feet. A somewhat longer ship can be taken through with less draft.     (b) Ships to be routed inshore as close as safe navigation permits, using north and south bound lanes. Light-draft vessels to move in lanes inshore of deep-draft vessel lanes, where such a distribution can be made. Particular danger points to be passed during daylight.         (c) The coastwise lanes to be given all possible protection with every type of available surface craft and air coverage. To do this properly at the present time, additional units, both surface and air, are urgently needed.         (d) Submarine attacks at the moment are largely off shore; if the coastwise inshore lanes are again seriously threatened, daylight runs between such points as New York, Delaware Capes and Hampton Roads will have to be resorted to, with a concentration of available patrol in lengthy sections such as those of Hatteras.         (e) All shipping, including overseas shipping to and from the West Indies, South America and Cape Town to be routed along
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	February 26, 1942
	Subject: Convoy for protection of coastwise shipping along Eastern Sea Frontier.
	Delaware to Virginia Capes, distance 146 miles. Some of these ships would rejoin regular convoys southbound from Hampton Roads.         (f) It is estimated that there would be about 4 ships daily, with speeds varying between 7 and 8 1/2 knots. Rather than to slow down the 10-knot convoy, it is recommended that a slow convoy at 7 knots sail every fourth day from New York southward (16 ships in each convoy).     (g) This convoy would also be run during daylight hours between New York, the Delaware and Virginia Capes, where they would anchor over night.         (h) For the 10-knot convoys between New York and Key West sailing every two days, estimated at 26 ships each convoy, the following schedule is given as an example:
	SOUTH BOUND, 10-KNOT             LV.   NY AR.   DEL LV.   DEL AR.   HR LV.   HR AR.   K.W. July 1 July 1 July 2 July 2 July 3 July 7   "   3   "   3   "   4   "   4   "   5   "   9   "   5   "   5   "   6   "   6   "   7   " 11   "   7   "   7   "   8   "   8   "   9   " 13 etc.
	NORTH BOUND, 10-KNOT             LV.   K.W. AR.   HR LV.   HR AR.   DEL LV.   DEL AR.   NY July 8 July 12 July 13 July 13 July 14 July 14   "   10   "   14   "   15   "   15   "   16   "   16   "   12   "   16   "   17   "   17   "   18   "   18 etc.
		Note: The above schedules do not consider the Gulf Stream Current. Thus the escort leaving New York July 1 would return to New York July 14, and then again take out a convoy on July 17. This provides for unseen delays and short time in New York. The escorts arriving in New York would leave again again in 3 days
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	February 26, 1942
	Subject: Convoy for protection of coastwise shipping along Eastern Sea Frontier.
	later. Therefore, 8 escort groups would be required as a minimum, and the total number of escort vessels needed would be determined by the number essential in each group, plus a certain number necessary for relief. To provide more time in New York, 10 escort groups should be arranged for.     (i) For the 7-knot convoys between New York and Key West, sailing every 4 days (16 ships to each convoy), the following schedule would be followed as an example:
	SOUTH BOUND, 7-KNOT             LV.   NY AR.   DEL LV.   DEL AR.   HR LV.   HR AR.   K.W. July 2 July 2 July 3 July 3 July 4 July 10   "    6   "    6   "    7   "    7   "    8   "   14   "  10   "  10   "  11   "  11   "  12   "   18 etc.
	NORTH BOUND, 7-KNOT             LV.   K.W. AR.   HR LV.   HR AR.   DEL LV.   DEL AR.   NY July 11 July 17 July 18 July 18 July 19 July 19   "   15   "   21   "   22   "   22   "   23   "   23   "   19   "   25   "   26   "   26   "   27   "   27 etc.
		Note: The above schedules do not consider the Gulf Stream Current. The escort leaving New York July 2 would thus return to New York July 19, and take the next convoy out of New York July 19 and take the next convoy out of New York July 22. This is to provide for delays and short time in New York. This would require 5 escort groups as a minimum; and the total number of escort vessels would be determined by the number of such craft needed for relief. To give more time in New York 6 groups of escorts should be provided.
	8.                It is considered that for the 10-knot convoys the escort speed requirement should be at least 14 knots; and at least 12 knots for
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	February 26, 1942
	Subject: Convoy for protection of coastwise shipping along Eastern Sea Frontier.
	the 7-knot convoys. At the present time there are available in the Frontier but 9 vessels, exclusive of the EAGLES, which are unreliable, that have a speed of 14 knots or better. There are also but 19 vessels with a speed between 12 and 14 knots. This latter grouping includes 10 125-foot Coast Guard cutters, 5 EAGLE boats, 3 PY's, and 1 165-foot slow Coast Guard cutter. The foregoing takes all vessels of the Frontier that have any possible qualifications for the duty in question, and would leave harbor entrances and coastal sea lanes practically unpatrolled. It is felt strongly that, even though convoys should be used, it is essential that harbor entrances and coastwise lanes be patrolled for the protection of vessels proceeding singly.
	9.                Twenty-four British trawlers are due to report shortly to this Frontier. All but three are coal burners and the speed of all is 10 knots. It is not considered that these vessels would be satisfactory escort units, due to their slow speed, even with the 7-knot convoy, unless backed up by a much faster escort unit, so that an enemy submarine attack, with its much higher surface speed, could be properly met and driven off. In this connection, it is pointed out that an improperly escorted convoy is more vulnerable, and subject to greater losses, than ships proceeding singly, particularly when routed close inshore.
	10.               With reference to the total number of escort vessels required for this convoy duty along the Atlantic Coast, the following figures are furnished:
	10-knot Convoy (26 ships) 10 groups @ 4 = 40   7-knot Convoy (16 ships)   6 groups @ 3 = 18     58
	11.               The number for Cape Cod, Boston to Halifax and return, is as follows:
	10-knot Convoy (10 ships) 1 group @ 2 = 2           (every 6 days)   7-knot Convoy (10 ships) 1 group @ 2 = 2           (every 6 days)   For relief, additional            1 group @ 2 = 2     6
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	February 26, 1942
	Subject: Convoy for protection of coastwise shipping along Eastern Sea Frontier.
	12.               The minimum requirements for escort vessels from the above two paragraphs is 64.
	13.               In connection with the above, so far as it applies to this Sea Frontier south of New York, it is believed that, due to the limitations in capabilities of the escorts involved, reliefs should be arranged at Hampton Roads and Charleston.
	14.               In case it becomes necessary to initiate the coastwise convoy system, it is recommended that it be done gradually, and that the first section be that south of Hampton Roads. The next section that should be undertaken would be Cape Cod - Boston - Halifax.
	15.               The transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.
	/s/    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
	Copy to
	Cinclant (with Enclosure (A))   CNO (     "        "       (A))   Comgulfseafron (     "        "       (A))   Comthree (without   "       (A))
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