Headquarters of the
 
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A16(046)  
 
April 10, 1942.
  
     
          1.                The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier appreciates very much the skill of the masters in handling their ships and the courage of the officers and crews in operating their ships under these war time conditions  
     
          2.                All masters may be assured that the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier is using and will continue to use every means available for the protection of merchant shipping. You are further assured that in case of torpedoing of vessels immediate assistance will be sent with dispatch to the torpedoed vessel and to the rescue of her crew.  
     
          3.                The torpedoing of vessels has three very serious results:  
     
 
  (a) It leads to the loss of valuable ships and cargo essential to our war effort.
  (b) It may lead to the loss of life.
                          (c)  It becomes necessary in certain instances to take naval vessels away from hunting and attacking submarines to proceed to the rescue of survivors.
 
     
          4.                The masters of merchant vessels working with the Navy can do much to lessen the danger of torpedoing and to assist in destroying enemy submarines.  
     
          5.                The following are a few of the things masters can do to help in this important work:  
     
          (1)    Follow closely the routing instructions. A number of ships have been torpedoed by not following the prescribed sea lanes. When, however, a submarine is reported in the track of a vessel a master may change course to clear the submarine. If at night or during thick weather, he must keep in mind the track of vessels moving along the coast in opposite direction in order to avoid the hazard of collision.  
     
          (2)    Whenever possible, use zig-zag day and night, changing course frequently.  
     
          (3)    Keep radios constantly tuned to 500 kilocycles in order that the latest directives may be received immediately as to change of routing or as to proceeding to a directed anchorage. The radio auto alarm must be kept in good operating condition so that operator (on "one-operator" ships) will be called to receive emergency messages immediately. Maintain radio silence except in case of extreme emergency (this  
     
 
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  is very important). No personal or private radio sets are to be permitted on board.  
     
          (4)    Attempt to traverse the dangerous areas during daylight. To this end masters will be given instructions before departure from port as to certain areas to be traversed during daylight and where to anchor during darkness. Such anchorage during darkness may be changed from time to time. So much more protection can be given by plane and surface vessels during daylight that this is very important.  
     
          (5)    Keep your ship completely darkened at night. The faintest light showing may endanger your ship.  
     
          (6)    Upon arrival in port report to naval authorities ships sighted showing lights, also report lights on shore which would form a lighted background for submarine attack.  
     
          (7)    Keep lookouts alert at all times. These should be selected, reliable men, instructed and trained as lookouts by competent officers. If possible they should have glasses. Remember that the eyes of lookouts become tired and these men should not be kept on watch too long without being relieved. Every master knows the best position for lookouts during the night or thick weather to sight buoys, lighthouses or breakers. The same rule should apply with extreme alertness in looking for submarines.  
     
          (8)    Remember that in daylight submarines generally submerge showing only their periscope but during darkness or thick weather they will probably be on the surface with only the conning tower showing.  
     
          (9)    When a vessel has a guns' crew at least one man should be at the gun at all times and the remainder of crew in the immediate vicinity ready to man the gun at a moment's notice.  
     
          (10)  Fear of attack by submarine must never prevent or delay the gun's crew in attacking at once. Care must be exercised, however, to be sure that you open fire on an enemy submarine and not on a friendly patrol boat or other friendly vessel.  
     
          (11)  If your ship be torpedoed, do not abandon ship immediately unless absolutely necessary, but use every means available to keep her afloat. Several ships have been saved in this way.  
     
          (12)  See that the mate on watch knows the recognition signal and uses it. Report on arrival in port any vessel which fails to use proper recognition signals.  
     
          (13)  It must be remembered that attacks by submarine, especially at night, take place with very little or no warning. The only chance of preventing attack or of destroying the submarine is by constant vigilance and by being on the alert at all times ready to take immediate action.  
     
 
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          6.                The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier will welcome suggestions by any master as to the submarine problem which now confronts all of us. We must all work together to the same end, and that is, the destruction of enemy submarines and the safe passage of merchant ships.  
     
     
     
     
   
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
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HEADQUARTERS
  
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
  
 
 
  File: A7-1/L11-1/A8-6  
 
April 22, 1942
  
     
 
BULLETIN #1
  
     
  TO MASTERS OF ALL MERCHANT SHIPS:  
     
          1.                In a recent sinking of a tanker the engines were not shut down after the first torpedo struck, although the entire engine room staff, including the engineer on watch, escaped in a life boat.  
     
          2.                As a result of the neglect to shut down, the tanker "spewed burning oil" over a large area, burning alive the Master and eight men who were attempting to get free in a boat launched forward of the flames.  
     
          3.                The need for calm, collected action on the part of the engine room staff was tragically apparent in this instance.  
     
          4.                The ship's engines should be immediately shut down or reversed after torpedoing and the vessel brought to a full stop if abandonment is to be carried out. This will limit the perked of burning oil to a minimum and facilitate normal launching of boats and rafts.  
     
     
     
     
     
   
/S/    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
 
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
HEADQUARTERS
  
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
  
 
 
  File: A7-1/L11-1/A7-2  
 
April 22, 1942
  
     
 
BULLETIN #2
  
     
  TO MASTERS OF ALL MERCHANT SHIPS:  
     
          1.                In two recent sinkings of vessels in the Caribbean the submarine commander was fully informed concerning all details of armament, crew, cargo, etc. of the vessels sunk. This he demonstrated by coming alongside the life boats. Informing the Master of the sunken vessel of the above details - in one case, correcting the Master when the latter gave him false information.  
     
          2.                The "leak" had apparently occurred in ports of departure, and, since the submarine commander was in possession of such details as number in gun crew, armament, etc., it is reasonable to suppose that he was also informed concerning the vessel's routing and had lain in wait along the track she would take.  
     
          3.                Ship masters must make every possible effort to see that their crews give out no information.  
     
          4.                There is no question but that many fine ships and men have been lost through loose talk in waterfront bars. The enemy agent is literally everywhere and always on the alert for information of value to his government.  
     
     
     
     
     
   
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
 
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
HEADQUARTERS
  
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
  
 
 
  File: A7-1/S82-2/L11-1  
 
April 22, 1942.
  
     
 
BULLETIN #3
  
     
  TO MASTERS OF ALL MERCHANT SHIPS:  
     
          1.                In three recent tanker sinkings a heavy loss of life has occurred when life boats which had already gotten clear of the burning ship "drifted" back into the flames.  
     
          2.                The words "drifted back" occur in the Survivor Reports of each of these sinkings, and in each case the weather was stated to be calm with sea smooth.  
     
          3.                The apparently needless loss of life in these three sinkings alone, numbered forty, including one Master.  
     
          4.                It is difficult to understand how these unfortunate incidents could have occurred if the boats consumed in the fife had been properly equipped with oars and rowlocks, and Ship-masters are urged to assure themselves of the proper state of readiness of lifeboats at all times.  
     
     
     
     
     
   
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
 
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
HEADQUARTERS
  
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
  
 
 
  File: A7-1/A14-1/S24-2  
 
April 23, 1942.
  
     
 
BULLETINE #4
  
     
  TO MASTERS OF ALL MERCHANT SHIPS:  
     
  The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier's Memorandum for Masters of all Merchant Ships, of April 10, 1942, paragraph 7, is amplified as follows:  
     
          1.                The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier wishes to emphasize the supreme importance of good lookouts in combating enemy submarine activity. To this end, the following recommendations are made.  
     
                  (a)    Lookouts should be selected by the ship master with due regard to keenness of vision at night. It should be noted that men of equal vision in daylight do not by any means make equally good lookouts at night. So called "night blindness" is much more common than generally supposed and its presence can only be detected by actual test under conditions of darkness and twilight.  
     
                  (b)    Lookouts must be impressed with the importance of their duty. Their vigilance may save their vessel and shipmates.  
     
                  (c)    In addition to the crow's nest, at least one lookout should be stationed on the forecastle head, and one on each wing of the bridge. The lookout on the forecastle should cover a sector or four points on each bow. The lookouts on the wings of the bridge should cover from four points on the bow to two points abaft the beam. The region of maximum probability of sighting will be between four and six points on each bow and about one quarter to one mile away from the ship.  
     
                  (d)    Lookouts should stand short watches; one hour on and two hours off is satisfactory. They should be provided with binoculars if possible and be required to use them frequently.  
     
                  (e)    Lookouts should be at their station 15 minutes before taking over so that their eyes may become accustomed to darkness. No one on deck should be permitted to smoke.  
     
                  (f)    There should be no noise or talk on the bridge or on deck which might interfere with the lookouts' hearing. He must listen as well as look.  
     
                  (g)    If there is moonlight, lookouts should be particularly vigilant on the side of the ship away from the moon, as the submarine would probably attack from that side to get a silhouetted target.  
     
     
   
/s/      ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
 
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
HEADQUARTERS
  
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
  
 
 
  File: A7-1/ESF  
 
April 24, 1942.
  
     
 
BULLETIN #5
  
     
  TO MASTERS OF ALL MERCHANT SHIPS:  
     
          1.                A large number of drownings during severe weather have occurred because men on life rafts and in the water have been so chilled from immersion and exposure as to be unable to grasp and hold on to life lines thrown to them by rescue vessels.  
     
          2.                It is urged that Shipmasters provide each member of their crew with a short length of 21-thread manila line into one end of which is spliced a 4" galvanized snap hook, to be knotted around the life jacket.  
     
          3.                These short lengths of manila line should be stitched to the canvas so that they will not be lost. Upon getting into the jacket and fastening the tapes, the wearer will then bring the ends of the lanyard around him and fasten them with a square knot with the hook directly in front of him and easily accessible. This will give men in the water whose hands have become too numb to hold on to rafts or to life lines of rescue vessels a quick and sure method of attaching themselves thereto.  
     
          4.                It is also suggested that the members of merchant crews be encouraged in the purchase of small flashlights which can be secured to the top edge of the jacket by their ring. These have proved in the past to have been of the greatest value in picking up men in the water during the hours of darkness. There is an electric light which clips to the life belt, manufactured by a British firm ("EASCO"). This is at present under investigation and will be reported on in a further bulletin.  
     
     
   
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
 
     
     
  S.S. BUNTING  
      Flag Secretary  
     
 
 
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
HEADQUARTERS
  
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
  
 
 
  File: A7-1/S35-6/ESF  
 
April 25, 1942.
  
     
 
BULLETIN #6
  
     
  TO MASTERS OF ALL MERCHANT SHIPS:  
     
          1.                In a recent instance of the torpedoing of a tanker off the Middle Atlantic Coast, a large number of lives were lost due to the ignition of oil on the water when a life ring with attached calcium-carbide water-light was thrown from the deck of the sinking vessel. It is feared that this circumstances has happened on other occasions although this is the only definite instance which has been brought to the attention of the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.  
     
          2.                On April 18, 1942 the Department of Commerce issued a regulation requiring the removal of calcium-carbide water-lights from life saving equipment on tankers and the substitution therefore of electrical equipment.  
     
          3.                The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier suggest that tankers of all nationalities comply with the foregoing.  
     
     
     
     
   
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier
 
     
     
  S. S. BUNTING  
  Flag Secretary