Headquarters
  
 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A16-3 (21)  
  Serial 86  
 
April 10, 1942
  
     
 
From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
     
Subject: Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast.
     
Reference: (a) Comeastseafron conf. despatch 302218 of March 30, 1942.
  (b) Comeastseafron secret ltr. A16-3(30),
  (c) Comeastseafron secret despatch to Cominch 101640 of April 10, 1942.
 
     
          1.                Enemy submarines have been extremely active on our Atlantic Coast during the last month and at the present time they are more active than ever. A close plot has been made of the approach of these submarines to this coast and concerted action has been taken to concentrate al available forces in the active submarine areas in order to take offensive action against them and at the same time protect merchant shipping.  
     
          2.                Realizing that we would have this increased activity the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, on March 30, sent reference (a) to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, requesting additional destroyers. The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, at that time understood fully the necessity and need of destroyers in other activities but also was fully aware of the fact that the sinkings of tankers on this coast would not only seriously lessen our tanker tonnage but would jeopardize the continuance of war production activities in the Eastern Seaboard.  
     
          3.                The division of destroyers which was assigned has been of the greatest assistance in meeting an increasingly critical situation. Without the services of these vessels the sinkings undoubtedly would have been greater. From time to time the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet has assisted by assigning additional destroyers for varying periods depending on the availability of individual units. It has been during this periods that it has been possible to take additional aggressive action and make some progress in holding down attacks. An analysis of the period March 12 - April 8 shows that from March 12-31 we averaged 2.15 destroyers actually in operation per day and that there was a daily average of 1.315 torpedoings along the coastal shipping lanes  
     
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Headquarters
  
 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A16-3 (21)  
  Serial 86  
 
April 10, 1942
  
     
  Subject:               Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast.  
     
     
  (within approximately 30 miles of the shore line) and during the period April 1-8 with a daily average of 4.75 destroyers operating, there were .875 torpedoings per day. Actually during one period of three days, we had 6, 5, 6, destroyers operating and there were no sinkings. At present we have only 2 destroyers actively operating with this command.  
     
          4.                In reference (b) the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier recommended certain anchorages along the coast. This plan has been approved but it will be some time before these anchorages are mined and capable of acting as secure anchorages.  
     
          5.                Plans are now being formulated for a convoy system to be placed in effect, if escort ships be available, about 15 May.  
     
          6.                The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier is using and will continue to use every available unit, not only for offensive but for defensive purposes, along this coast. Strict orders have been given to masters of all merchant shipping.  
     
          7.                As stated above our forces have been concentrated in active submarine areas. A temporary anchorage with patrol vessels for protection is being put in effect now south of Cape Lookout. It is proposed that this anchorage will be used as an overnight anchorage and that such ships as are available will escort merchant shipping from Cape Lookout to the Chesapeake anchorage.  
     
          8.                Today a message has been sent, reference (c) requesting the assignment to this command of additional destroyers. It is sent with the full realization that there are other activities besides the Eastern Sea Frontier but also with the realization that the sinkings of ships, tankers especially, on this coast is a serious matter resulting, if continued, in dire consequences to our war effort.  
     
          9.                It must be realized that operations against submarines at this time are very different from that existing in the first World War. We are combating a submarine with a surface speed of approximately 20 knots. In several instances these submarines have dashed in at night on the surface, delivered an attack and retired at high speed on the surface.  
     
 
- 2 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Headquarters
  
 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A16-3 (21)  
  Serial 86  
 
April 10, 1942
  
     
  Subject:               Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast.  
     
     
          10.              Until the Eastern Sea Frontier forces are augmented by planes and especially by fast ships capable of keeping the sea, a very critical situation will continue to exist and the loss of merchant ships will continue even though every means at our disposal is being utilized. The next three months will be extremely critical in view of the almost certain increased activity of enemy submarines and the lack of delivery to this command of surface ships now under construction.  
     
          11.              The situation now demands additional positive steps to meet the increased activities of an aggressive enemy. Escorting of vessels must be adopted.  
     
          12.              It is urgently recommended that fast ships capable of combating submarines be assigned this command at the earliest time possible and that steps be taken to the end that delivery of new fast ships and patrol planes to this command be given maximum priority. We are sorely in need of adequate forces to combat the present submarine menace. If such forces are not supplied to this command in the near future it is recommended that consideration be given to the stoppage of tanker sailings until adequate escort vessels are made available.  
     
          13.              The transmission of this document via Registered Mail within the continental United States is authorized.  
     
     
    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS  
     
  Copy to:  
          Opnav.  
     
 
- 3 -
  
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
Headquarters
  
 
Commandant Third Naval District
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A14-1  
  Serial 119  
 
April 14, 1942
  
     
 
From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
     
Subject: Convoys between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay.
 
     
          1.                It is proposed to establish a convoy system between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay as soon as practicable. The following proposed plan is submitted for your comment, recommendation and report as to when a convoy plan can be put into operation.  
     
          2.                A proposed outline of the method is given for only one end of the route; namely, Cape Lookout. The other end of the route, Hampton Roads, would be the same. These details have been omitted with a view to determining its practicability and not as a plan to be followed necessarily in detail.  
     
 

        3.                Protected Anchorage.             

  
     
                             An anchorage for ships has been established at Lookout Light. Pending the laying of the protective mine field and anti-torpedo net, this anchorage is being protected by patrols equipped with listening devices.  
     
                             While the number of ships seeking refuge in this anchorage will vary each day, it is considered that normally there will be less than twelve, and that the maximum will not exceed twenty. As the number of ships seeking refuge increases, it is essential that this anchorage be adequately patrolled, the vessels equipped with listening gear, depth charges, and with guns as far as practicable. The position of the patrol and its distance from the anchorage will depend upon whether all merchant shipping is in behind the breakwater or whether it extends to the westward.  
     
          4.                Forming and Despatching of Convoys.  
     
                             At the present time the vessels are proceeding singly at early daylight from this anchorage to the Capes of the Chesapeake and are given the maximum amount of air and surface protection available. These vessels will normally arrive off Wimble Shoal at about dark.  
     
                             It is proposed that, instead of proceeding singly, vessels seeking refuge at Cape Lookout be organized into a convoy, sail at early daylight, and be escorted into Chesapeake Bay.  
     
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 119  
 
April 14, 1942
  
     
 
To: The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
     
Subject: Convoys between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay.
 
     
                             It is proposed to have a minimum convoy speed of 9 knots. Vessels unable to maintain 9 knots will proceed independently. Vessels of 13 knots or over will proceed independently, or with the convoy, depending upon the amount of submarine activity and weather conditions in the waters through which they must pass.  
     
                              The ships of the convoy will get underway at early daylight, will be formed up upon clearing the anchorage, and will proceed in formation, accompanied by their escort, and by all air escort available.  
     
 

                            Inasmuch as the convoy leaving Chesapeake Bay will have left before daylight it should meet the northbound convoy during daylight and no difficulty should be experienced in passing one another.          

  
     
                              At the present time merchants ships coming from the southward are being instructed to regulate their time of speed to arrive at Cape Lookout before dark.  
     
                              The necessary arrangements would have to be made at Morehead City Base to board each ship as she stands in to the anchorage, and proper steps should be taken to see that each ship anchors in the berth assigned. The ship will be boarded immediately and the master interviewed. It will be determined whether he has Mersigs, and if not, and entitled to the same, they will be issued and receipt taken. The ship's name, nationality, and speed will be ascertained. The master will be given necessary general instructions and a diagram of the convoy, showing his number and position in it.  
     
                             A standard formation of four ships to a column will be adopted; distance between columns 1000 yards; distance between ships 600 yards.  
     
                             Masters must be thoroughly impressed with the necessity of carrying out orders, station keeping, darkening of ship, radio silence, etc.  
     
 
- 2 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 119  
 
April 14, 1942
  
     
 
To: The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
     
Subject: Convoys between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay.
 
     
                             The master of one of the better ships will be designated as Commodore and instructed to hoist a distinctive flag.  
     
                             It may be desirable, as soon as can be arranged, that the services be obtained of five Merchant Marine Reserve officers to act as Commodore.  
     
 

        5.                Escorts       

  
     
                             The minimum escort for a convoy of any appreciable size should be one slow ship (speed 10 to 12 knots) and three fast ships (14 to 20 knots). All ships of the escort should be equipped with listening devices.  
     
                              If only one slow ship is available, she should take position ahead of the center of the convoy at a distance of 4000 to 5000 yards, depending somewhat upon weather conditions, submarine activity, and amount of air escort. It would be preferable to have two slow ships, in which case they would both be stationed ahead of the convoy.  
     
                             The three fast ships should be stationed: two patrolling the area to seaward of the convoy, and one patrolling in the rear.  
     
                             The position of the vessels patrolling to seaward depend somewhat upon the weather conditions and submarine activity. It is considered that by day they should patrol an area of from 2000 to 10,000 yards to seaward of the convoy, and during darkness close in to approximately 2000 to 3000 yards. The third fast vessel should patrol astern of the convoy at a distance of 1000 to 1500 yards.  
     
                              It is important that fast escorts patrol their areas, and not keep stationed.  
     
                              If a destroyer is available, it will be added to the escort, and the escort should be increased whenever vessels are available. As a part of the doctrine, it is most important that there should be sufficient escorts so that, in the event of submarine contacts, at least one escort vessel can be diverted from the convoy to maintain contact with the submarine and use every effort to keep her submerged and to destroy her.  
     
     
 
- 3 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 119  
 
April 14, 1942
  
     
 
To: The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
     
Subject: Convoys between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay.
 
     
                             To maintain such a convoy, it would appear that four sets of escorts are necessary, as indicated in the following table:  
     
 
ESCORT CYCLE
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOOKOUT
  
 
HYPO
  
Leaves
Arrives
Arrives
Arrives
 
 
 
 
Monday
A
 Thursday
A
 Tuesday
A
 Wednesday
A
Tuesday
B
 Friday
B
 Wednesday
B
 Thursday
B
Wednesday
C
 Saturday
C
 Thursday
C
 Friday
C
Thursday
D
 Sunday
D
 Friday
D
 Saturday
D
Friday
E
 Monday
E
 Saturday
E
 Sunday
E
Saturday
F
 Tuesday
F
 Sunday
F
 Monday
F
Sunday
G
 Wednesday
G
 Monday
G
 Tuesday
G
Monday
H
 Thursday
H
 Tuesday
H
 Wednesday
H
 
     
          6.                The forces available for escort and patrolling the anchorage are those of the Fifth Naval District, mainly, eight British trawlers, two Coast Guard 165', four Coast Guard 125', one PY Tourmaline, one PE Eagle 19, four 110' PC's, twenty Coast Guard 83 footers. Classifying as slow the eight trawlers, four Coast Guard 125 footers, one PY Tourmaline and one PE 19 gives a total of sixteen slow escort vessels. Classifying as fast the two Coast Guard 165 footers, four PC 110 footers and twenty Coast Guard 83 footers gives a total of twenty-six fast escort vessels.       
     
 

                           Assuming that each convoy has an escort of two slow and three fast, four sets of escorts will necessitate a total of eight slow and twelve fast. Approximately fifty percent of the ships available. This should allow for rest, overhaul, etc.  

  
     
          7.                 The section Base at Morehead City should have as a minimum a commanding officer, executive officer, medical officer, supply officer, repair officer with technical assistant for radio and listening gear, and an anti-submarine tactical officer.  
     
                              A captain of the Port, or Convoy Despatcher, with two officer assistants (boarding officers) are essential. This officer is responsible for the details of anchoring, getting underway, assignment of berths, indoctrination of masters, forming and despatching of convoys. This is a most  
     
 
- 4 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 119  
 
April 14, 1942
  
     
 
To: The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
     
Subject: Convoys between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay.
 
     
  important part and must be filled by an energetic, forceful, and seafaring man of experience, and of good personality. The success of the whole convoy plan depends largely on this officer.  
     
 
                           A similar group of officers must also be at the Lynnhaven Roads end of the convoy route.
  
     
     
          8.                It is realized that the foregoing plan utilizes practically all available patrol vessels of the Fifth Naval District. At the same time, by concentrating our shipping and patrol vessels as escorts, the best possible protection will be given.     
     
 

        9.                In addition to surface escort, air coverage is to be provided. This coverage should take particular care to thoroughly cover a wide area in vicinity of convoy, particularly just before darkness.

  
     
          10.              Your comment is invited at an early date as it is desired to start this plan as soon as possible.  
     
          11.              Transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS.  
     
 
 
     
     
 
- 5 -
  
     
     

 

 

     
     
 
Headquarters
  
 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A14-1  
  Serial 218  
 
April 28, 1942.
  
     
 
From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
  The Commandant, Third Naval District.
  The Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I.
     
Subject: Coastal Convoys - Boston - Halifax - Sydney.
 
     
          1.                It is proposed to start the coastal convoy system between Boston-Halifax-Sydney in the immediate future.  
     
          2.                Pertinent understandings with the British authorities follows:  
     
 
  (a) That westbound Atlantic convoys, after detaching vessels of the Halifax section, will be escorted to the Boston area. Upon arrival in the Boston area, vessels bound for Boston or Portland will be detached and southbound vessels proceed independently through Cape Cod Canal.
                             
  (b) That the escort, under British control, consisting of two DD's (fuel capacity 100,000 gallons and three Corvettes (69,000 gallon fuel capacity) will proceed to Boston for servicing and emergency repairs prior to returning with a northbound convoy.
         
  (c) That there will be two slow convoys northbound from the Boston area, consisting of 10 to 20 vessels, every seven days. Included therein will be shipping of all speeds, except specially and independently routed ships.
     
  (d) (1) That westbound convoys will be routed by the same authorities as at present, emergency diversions being made by the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, the Flag Officer, Newfoundland, or the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier as necessary in their respective zones.
     
    (2) That northbound convoys (Boston to Halifax) will be routed by the Commander Eastern Sea
 
     
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 218  
 
April 28, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys - Boston - Halifax - Sydney.
 
     
 
    Frontier, or the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast in their respective coastal zones.
                             
  (e) That the timing of northbound coastal convoys be coordinated to fit in with the sailings of established trans-Atlantic convoys from Halifax and Sydney.
     
  (f) That air coverage will be arranged under the existing arrangements between U. S. Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force.
     
  (g) That the Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast (Canadian) have a liaison officer with the Commandant, First Naval District.
     
  (h) That the British will establish a pool of special stores in Boston as a terminus of light, flags and spares for Commodores of the convoy - and a few spares for ships without convoy equipment.
         
  (i) That a small pool of British signalman will be established in the Boston area for the convoy Commanders (Commodores).
 
     
          3.                The berthing facilities of Boston harbor are insufficient to accommodate the 10 to 20 ships that will form the northbound convoy. Cape Cod Bay (near the eastern end of Cape Cod Canal) and Buzzards Bay are the nearest and most suitable places available. To both places there are a number of objections. Local conditions of weather, canal traffic, and security will, at times, make it desirable to assemble and to organize the convoy in one or the other places.  
     
 
- 2 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 218  
 
April 28, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys - Boston - Halifax - Sydney.
 
     
          4.                It is therefore planned: To assemble and organize the convoy in Cape Cod Bay or Buzzards Bay, under the Commandant First Naval District. Northbound shipping will be routed to Cape Cod Bay via Long Island Sound and Buzzards Bay. Upon arrival in Buzzards Bay, the Commandant First Naval District will exercise control of shipping, designating the assembly point and arranging for the canal transit. The Commandant First Naval District will issue the necessary orders and routing instructions to the convoy and escort under directives issued by the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.  
     
          5.                The execution of the foregoing plan cannot be placed in effect until additional personnel and facilities are provided. It will require, inter alia:  
     
 
  (a) An expansion of personnel in the Port Director's Office.
                          (b) A station ship at Buzzards Bay, and/or Cape Cod Bay.
  (c) Expansion of the Section Base at Woods Hole, Mass.
  (d) A sub-station of the Port Director's Office in the Cape Cod Canal district, and Woods Hole.
  (e) Additional patrol boats.
  (f) Additional security measures in Buzzards Bay and Cape Cod Bay.
 
     
          6.                Until the plan set forth in Paragraph 4 above can be placed into effect, the Boston-Halifax convoys will be assembled and organized in New York under the Commandant Third Naval District. The Commandant Third Naval District (Port Director, New York) will:  
     
 
  (a) Assemble, equip and organize the convoy in New York, except for those vessels that load and sail from Boston. The latter will join the convoy at the rendezvous with the escort.
                                 
  (b) Hold a pre-sailing conference in New York. As the escorts base at Boston, Massachusetts, the escort commander will not ordinarily be present at the pre-sailing conference. The Port Director, New York, will inform the Port Director, Boston, for passing on to the escort Commander and to the masters of ships joining the convoy from Boston,
 
     
 
- 3 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 218  
 
April 28, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys - Boston - Halifax - Sydney.
 
     
 
    of any decisions reached of which they should have knowledge. (If practicable, a representative of the Port Director, Boston, should be present at the pre-sailing conference).
                             
  (c) Route shipping as independent units to the rendezvous where the convoy is to be formed and where the escort joins the convoy. Ordinarily the rendezvous will be in Cape Cod Bay. Shipping that can transit the Cape Cod Canal will be routed via Long Island Sound and Buzzards Bay.
     
  (d) Route the convoy under directives issued by the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
         
  (e) Furnish the Commandant, First Naval District with essential information
 
     
          7.                 The Commandant, First Naval District, or his designated representative, will:  
     
 
  (a) Equip and issue the necessary orders and instructions to the escort Commander and the masters of those ships joining the convoy direct from Boston.
                             
  (b) Exercise the control of shipping from and after it reaches the northern half of Buzzards Bay.
         
  (c) Arrange for the transit of shipping through the Cape Cod Canal.
     
  (d) Arrange for services to the escorts.
     
  (e) Arrange with the British Liaison Officer for placing aboard of the Commodore's ship any British stores and signalmen that will be required. Information thereon will be furnished by the Port Director, New York, prior to the sailing of the convoy ship.
 
     
 
- 4 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 218  
 
April 28, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys - Boston - Halifax - Sydney.
 
     
 
  (f) Furnish the Commandant Third Naval District (Port Director, New York) with essential information.
 
     
          8.                 The Commandants of the First Naval District, Third Naval District, and Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I., will initiate measures to place the foregoing plans into effect as soon as practicable.  
     
          9.                The transmission of this document via registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.  
     
     
    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS  
     
     
     
     
  Copy to:  
      Cominch  
      Cinclant  
      BuNav  
      CNO  
      COAC  
     
     
     
 
- 5 -
  
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
Headquarters
  
 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A14-1  
  Serial 269  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
  The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
     
Subject: Convoy System, East Coast - Gulf area.
     
References: (a) Report of informal board to organize Gulf-Caribbean-Halifax Convoy System.
  (b) Secret memorandum of Cominch and CNO, dated April 2, 1942, Serial 00253.
  (c) Cominch secret letter, Serial 0675, dated April 23, 1942.
 
     
          1.                Paragraph 3 (e) of Reference (b) approves paragraphs 31 to 34 inclusive of Reference (a) and directs the establishment of the convoy system between the Gulf and Hampton Roads as soon as a sufficient number of suitable escorts are available; estimated as 15 May 1942.  
     
          2.                Paragraphs 53, 54, 55 of Reference (a) outline the necessity for adequate escort and minimum acceptable standard of escort strength. For convenience, these paragraphs are quoted herewith:  
     
 
    "Escort Strength
                             
    "53. While it is recognized that the strength of escorts may have to be meager, it should be borne in mind that effective convoying depends upon the escorts being in sufficient strength to permit their taking the offensive against attacking submarines, without their withdrawal for this purpose resulting in unduly exposing the convoy to other submarines while they are on this mission. Any protection less than this simply results in the convoy's becoming a convenient target for submarines.
         
    "54. As a result of experience on the North Atlantic, it now appears that the minimum strength that will afford reasonable protection is five escorts per convoy of 40 to 50 ships, of which all should make 18 knots (the maximum at which sound gear is usable), and be
 
     
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 269  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Convoy System, East Coast - Gulf area.
 
     
 
  equipped with sound and depth charges; and two should be destroyers to permit ranging to the flanks and astern and rejoining without waste of time.
                            
  "55. It is suggested that until adequate escorts are available a limited number of destroyers be used to attach themselves temporarily to convoys in turn, to stiffen up the escorts while passing "sore spots". Small PC's might also be used in this manner when available."
 
     
          3.                Comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations on the foregoing are as follows:  
     
 
  "(j) Paragraph 53 - Noted.
                            
  "(k) Paragraph 54 - Five such ships are a minimum. Slower ships, to the maximum extent available, are to be used also, even though they are only able to remain in company for "legs" of the entire trip or to develop contacts.
   
  "(l) Enclosure (A), Paragraph 1 - Such number of destroyers are not in prospect. By months, escort vessels of the capacity of 173' sub chasers or equivalent are estimated to become available in the three Sea Frontiers concerned, as follows:
   
 
 
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Eastern
9
4
5
2
1
0
2
0
Gulf
2
2
1
1
2
1
0
0
Caribbean
7
3
1
2
4
2
0
0
TOTAL
18  
9
7
5
7
3
2
0
                 
                 
                 
 
     
          4.                (a) With the forces presently and prospectively assigned to the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, he has assigned the following vessels to this escort duty:  
     
 
- 2 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 269  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Convoy System, East Coast - Gulf area.
 
     
 
 
(a)
 9 DD's
                         
(b)
 5 PG's (new Corvettes)
 
(c)
 2 PG's (PG57, Plymouth; and PG54, St. Augustine).
 
(d)  
 9 PC's (175' class) (4 to be loaned temporarily).
 
(e)
 2 PE's (Eagle boats).
  (f) 4 CGC (165' class) (ARGO-ICARUS-DIONE-CALYPSO).
  (g) 12 Trawlers (10-12 knots, coal burning, British manned).
 
     
                  (b)    The foregoing craft will be divided into five escort groups, approximately as follows:  
     
 
    GROUP A B C D E
                          9 DD's   2 1 2 2 2
  5 PG's (Corvettes)   1 1 1 1 1
  9 PC's (175')   1 2 2 2 2
  2 PG's (old)         PG57 PG54
  10 Trawlers   2 2 2 2 2
               
  Reserve for maintenance, short "legs," replacements, etc.: 4CGC (165' class), 2 Trawlers, 2 PE's.
 
     
                  (c)    There will remain for local escorts, attack units, offshore rescue work, special duty, etc., the following vessels:  
     
 
  3 PE's (Eagle Boats), maximum speed 14-16 knots, cruising speed 10-12 knots; unreliable materially.
                          2 PC's (110' new). 15 knots.
  3 PC's (110' old). 10-12 knots.
  1 PC (93' old). 10-12 knots.
  10 CGC's (125' class), maximum speed 10 knots.
  1 PCGC (165') TALLAPOOSA, Maximum speed 12 knots; cruising speed 6.3 knots.
  2 CGC's (155-158') CARRABANSET and PAMLICO; speed 10-13 knots.
  5 PY's: PY 12 SYLPH, 75' maximum speed 14, cruising speed 10; PY13 SIREN, 168', maximum speed 12; cruising speed 10.5; PY16 ZIRCON,
 
     
 
- 3 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 269  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Convoy System, East Coast - Gulf area.
 
     
 
  235, maximum speed 13.5 cruising speed 8; PY20 TOURMALINE, 190', maximum speed 12, cruising speed 6.5; PY21 RUBY, 180', maximum speed 13, cruising speed 10.
                          8 Trawlers (British manned, coal burning), speed 9-11 knots.
   
  30-odd CGC's (83'). Experience has shown that the CGC 83' boats can be kept in service about 50% of the time and are of very limited usefulness.
 
     
  An additional 7 patrol boats, 110' class, are scheduled for delivery in MAy.  
     
          5.                To place the Key West - Chesapeake Bay convoy system into execution on X day, we are proceeding according to the following plan:  
     
 
  Minus 15 days: Issuance of General Directive.
                                                  
  Minus 10 days: Escort Task Force Organized.
     
    Organize base facilities at Norfolk.
     
    Organize Service facilities at Key West
     
    Expansion of Port Directors Offices and personnel.
     
    Issuance of instructions to Port Directors.
     
    Issuance of Routing Plan, Special Instructions re routing, escorts, formation, etc. Route plan.
     
  Minus 7 days: Servicing of escort craft for first convoys.
     
  Minus 5 days: Assembly of first escort groups at Hampton Roads
 
     
 
- 4 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 269  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Convoy System, East Coast - Gulf area.
 
     
 
    Commodores and communication personnel assembled at Key West and Hampton Roads.
                                                  
    Coal available at Key West for trawlers, to take partial loads. (500 tons).
     
  Minus 3 days: Assembly of first escort groups at Key West.
 
     
          6.                The attention of the Commander in Chief is invited to the fact that in addition to escorting these convoys, the following tasks remain to be performed in this Frontier.  
     
 
  (a) Protection of ships between the Gulf and the Chesapeake which do not join the convoy as a result of their speed, or because of overcrowding the convoy.
                             
  (b) Protection of shipping between the Chesapeake and New York and Boston which will continue to sail independently.
         
  (c) Special tasks.
     
  (d) Rescue operations (ships and survivors).
     
  (e) Offensive action against submarines approaching or leaving the coast, or operating in localities removed from the convoys.
 
     
          7.                From the data given above, it is apparent that these convoys, consisting of 40 or more ships, will have from three to four escorts capable of making 18 knots or more, which, in the opinion of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, is not entirely adequate. Immediately prior to and after establishment of convoys, the vessels of this command remaining along the coast, by virtue of their speed and armament, are inadequate to take offensive action against submarines or to protect shipping not in convoy.  
     
          8.                Unless directed to the contrary, the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier proposes to start the convoy in accordance with the Commander in Chief's directive of April 2, 1942, about May 15, 1942.  
     
 
- 5 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 269  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Convoy System, East Coast - Gulf area.
 
     
          9.                Transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS  
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
- 6 -
  
 
 
     

 

 

     
     
 
Headquarters
  
 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  A14-1  
  Serial 259  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: The Commander Gulf Sea Frontier.
  The Commandant First Naval District.
  The Commandant Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I.
  The Commandant Third Naval District.
  The Commandant Fourth Naval District.
  The Commandant Fifth Naval District.
  The Commandant Sixth Naval District.
     
Subject: Escort vessels, coastal convoy.
 
     
          1.                Escort of coastal convoys between Hampton Roads and Key West, both north and south bound, will be initiated during May 1942, with escorts grouped as follows and ready for sailings as indicated:  
     
                             (a) Group A.  
     
                                   To report to the commander Gulf Sea Frontier at Key West by noon 12 May 1942, preparatory to sailing with convoy departing Key West for Hampton Roads on 15 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.S. McLEASH
                          U.S.S. DUPONT
  U.S.S. TEMPTRESS (PG 62, Corvette)
  U.S.S. PC 472
  U.S.S. PLYMOUTH (PG 57)
  Two A.S. trawlers, to be assigned by The Commandant Sixth Naval District.
 
     
                             (a) Group B.  
     
                                   To report to the Commander Gulf Sea Frontier at Key West by noon 15 May 1942, preparatory to sailing with convoy departing Key West for Hampton Roads on 18 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.S. BROOME
                          U.S.S. RESTLESS (PG 66, Corvette)
  U.S.S. PC 474
  U.S.S. PC 461
  U.S.S. ST. AUGUSTINE (PG 54)
  Two A.S. trawlers, to be assigned by The Commandant Sixth Naval District.
 
     
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 259  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Escort vessels, coastal convoy.
 
     
                             (c) Group C.  
     
                                   To report to the Commandant Fifth Naval District at Hampton Roads by noon 10 May 1942, preparatory to sailing with convoy departing Hampton Roads for Key West on 14 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.S. ROPER
                          U.S.S. HERBERT
  U.S.S. FURY (PG 69, Corvette)
  U.S.S. PC 471
  U.S.S. PC 473
  Two A.S. trawlers, to be assigned by The Commandant Fifth Naval District.
 
     
                             (d) Group D.  
     
                                   To report to the Commandant Fifth Naval District at Hampton Roads by noon 13 May 1942, preparatory to sailing with convoy departing Hampton Roads for Key West on 17 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.S. SEMMES
                          U.S.S. DICKERSON
  U.S.S. READY (PG 67, Corvette)
  U.S.S. PC 478
  U.S.S. PC 496
  Two A.S. trawlers, to be assigned by The Commandant Fifth Naval District.
 
     
                             (e) Group E.  
     
                                   To report to the Commandant Fifth Naval District at Hampton Roads by noon 16 May 1942, preparatory to sailing with convoy departing Hampton Roads for Key West on 20 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.S. DECATUR
                          U.S.S. McCORMICK
  U.S.S. IMPULSE (PG 68, Corvette)
  U.S.S. PC 476
  U.S.S. PC 477
  Two A.S. trawlers, to be assigned by The Commandant Fifth Naval District.
 
     
 
- 2 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
  A14-1  
  Serial 259  
 
April 29, 1942.
  
     
 
Subject: Escort vessels, coastal convoy.
 
     
                             (f) Reserve Replacements.  
     
                                 To report to the Commandant Fifth Naval District at Hampton Roads by noon 10 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.C.G. DIONE
                          U.S.C.G. CALYPSO
  U.S.S. PE 19
  U.S.S. PE 55
  Two A.S. trawlers, to be assigned by The Commandant Fifth Naval District.
 
     
                             (g) Reserve Replacements.  
     
                                   To report to the Commander Gulf Sea Frontier at Key West by noon 12 May 1942:  
     
 
  U.S.C.G. ICARUS
                          U.S.C.G. ARGO
 
     
          2.                Commandants will take steps to have the vessels indicated to the above groupings ready for the service required, and will issue the necessary movement orders, including this command in the distribution.  
     
          3.                It is essential that units concerned be furnished with "Mersigs" in addition to the usual communication allowance. Care should also be taken to see that recognition signals are issued. Full information as to mine fields should be given.  
     
          4.                Base facilities will be provided for all escort vessels by The Commandant Fifth Naval District. The Commander Gulf Sea Frontier will furnish services and voyage repairs to units reporting at Key West.  
     
 
        5.                Transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.
  
 
 
    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS.  
     
  Copies to:  
      The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations  
      The Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
      The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.  
      The Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier  
      The Commander Panama Sea Frontier.  
      The Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Forces, Aruba.  
     
     

 

 

     
     
 
Headquarters of the
 
 
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
  
 
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
  
 
New York, N. Y.
  
  File A14-1  
  Serial 300  
 
May 3, 1942.
  
     
 
From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
     
Subject: Coastal Convoys.
     
References: (a) ComEastSeaFron secret ltr. A14-1, Serial 269, dated April 29, 1942. .
 
     
          1.                In accordance with the Commander's-in-Chief instructions concerning convoys to operate between the Gulf (Key West) and Chesapeake Bay on a 3-day cycle each way, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier has issued necessary directives to start this convoy - the first sailing from Key West on 15 May, and from Chesapeake Bay on 14 May.  
     
          2.                In order that the Commander-in-Chief may have a clear picture of what has transpired in recent weeks, the following is submitted:  
     
          (a)               There have been progressive steps taken both by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and by the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier to improve conditions in the Eastern Sea Frontier command.  
     
          (b)               About three weeks ago, when sinkings on this coast were at their maximum, we seldom had more than two destroyers available for Frontier duty. Since then the number of destroyers has been increased and now we have nine permanently assigned. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, whenever possible, adds one or more destroyers for temporary duty. All of these destroyers have rendered valuable service in both offensive and defensive operations.  
     
          (c)               Twenty British trawlers have reported to this command and, after overhaul, have been on active duty at sea for the last three weeks.  
     
          (d)               A number of 83' Coast Guard cutters have been added to the Frontier forces. Due to their radius of action, armament, and only fair mechanical reliability, their usefulness is restricted; yet they can be used for patrol of anchorages and for escort duty over short "legs".  
     
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys.
 
     
          (e)               About 12 yachts have been acquired recently and are being placed in active commission.  
     
          (f)               Five 175-footers and one 110-footer have reported for duty. These 175-footers are extremely valuable ships for this duty and we are in urgent need of more of them. The allocation of these boats up to September 1st gives this command only 15 additional.  
     
          (g)               Three British corvettes have arrived in New York, are now being fitted out, and should be actively engaged on sea duty within the next week. Two more British corvettes are expected to arrive within the next few days.  
     
          (h)               In addition to these surface craft there has been a very material increase in the number of Navy aircraft assigned to this Frontier. About 70 OS2U's have been received and assigned to strategic positions along the coast. Furthermore, the crews of Army planes now under this command, as well as crews of Navy planes, have gained valuable experience and are becoming much more efficient in anti-submarine offensive and defensive action.  
     
          (i)               Fishing boats along the coast have been organized as reporting vessels for enemy submarines and aircraft.  
     
          (j)               For the last three weeks there has been maintained a patrolled anchorage behind Cape Lookout where merchant ships have anchored at night. Escorting ships, simulating a convoy, and all available planes have protected shipping between Cape Lookout and Chesapeake Bay during daylight. A limited amount of air and surface escort has been established between New York and Delaware and Chesapeake Bay, where only daylight sailings are in effect, all merchant shipping being directed to seek anchorages in Chesapeake Bay and Delaware Bay during the night. Directives have been in effect for some time for Commandants not to sail ships independently, north or south bound from Chesapeake Bay to the Delaware, or south bound from New York unless conditions permit air escort.  
     
          (k)               The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, which will take ships up to a draft of 25 feet and a length of 500 feet, has been used for all ships which can use it, so that practically all empty tankers southbound from the Delaware and Chesapeake Bay have transited this canal.  
     
          (l)               Coastal lanes for vessels have been brought closer to the coast, particularly in waters between Cape Fear and Cape Lookout and Cape Hatteras.  
     
 
- 2 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys.
 
     
          (m)              It has been suggested to the Commander Gulf Sea Frontier that he arrange to have vessels pass Cape Canaveral at about 1600 each day. This plan has insured northbound ships with speed of 10 knots passing the vicinity of Brunswick, another dangerous spot, and Cape Fear during daylight, in order to anchor behind Cape Lookout before dark.  
     
          (n)               In addition to the above, an advantage is now accruing to us in that the days are growing longer, which is a real advantage in view of the fact that most of the submarine action has taken place during darkness. Furthermore, the fact that vessels pass close to the coast in relatively shallow water enhances the difficulty of submarines attacking submerged.  
     
          3.               The above outlines briefly steps which have been taken to increase the safety of shipping traversing the coast between the Gulf and New York. As a result of these improvements there have been only two tankers sunk in sea lanes along the coast during the last three weeks, although enemy submarines have been extremely active.  
     
          4.               Even with all of these improvements, the surface and air forces assigned the Frontier command are still extremely inadequate; but it is hoped that in the near future this condition may be remedied.  
     
          5.               It is recognized that there are certain advantages in a complete convoy system. The grouping of ships makes it possible to concentrate such escort, air and surface, as is available; the convoy permits easier diversion; it also requires the enemy to come within range of the escort in order to make an attack, thereby making counter-offensive possible.  
     
          6.               It is submitted, however, that there is a difference of value between an ocean convoy and a coastal convoy. The ocean convoy offers much more opportunity for diversion, whereas the diversion of a coastal convoy is relatively limited. Considering the convoy system along this coast, it is not believed that there is any diversion possible to prevent the convoy passing through critical submarine areas and it will not be too difficult for submarines to concentrate in groups for attack in the paths of convoy.  
     
          7.               Inasmuch as our experience to date indicates that submarines operating off the coast generally attack during darkness, the value of an air escort for the convoy is to a certain extent lessened; but, notwithstanding this, the air escort will be continued in its maximum strength.  
     
 
- 3 -
  
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Subject: Coastal Convoys.
 
     
     
          8.               The great weakness of the convoy system as planned is that a great number of ships will continue to ply the sea lanes along the coast other than those in the convoy and consideration must be given to their protection. While this condition will prevail the entire length of the coast it will be aggravated between Chesapeake Bay and New York. In planning for the convoy, and in analyzing the forces available for escort, attention is invited to reference (a), which shows that when escorts are provided for these convoys, the remaining forces on the Atlantic Coast to protect sea lane shipping will be extremely meager.  
     
          9.               It is well realized that the convoy system has been stressed by its proponents. This command has really had the convoy system (although weak) in effect for the last three weeks in certain stretched of the coast (from Cape Lookout to New York). A step-by-step movement along the coast has been instituted; as more vessels and more protected anchorages become available it is planned to extend this method south from Cape Lookout using the Key West anchorage as an assembly point and routing daily a certain number of ships with as much air and surface escort as may be available.  
     
          10.               In view of the above, and in view of the success which has been attained during the last three weeks, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier recommends that the convoy system, as at present planned, be delayed until at least 1 June to test further the present system.  
     
          11.               Inasmuch as all of the directives and plans for the convoy system have been issued, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier is now ready to place it in effect in approximately eight days prior to the movement of a first convoy. Therefore, when it is decided to start the convoy, it is requested that at least eight days notice be given in order that the sea lanes may be cleared of tankers and valuable cargo ships while vessels of this command are proceeding to Key West and to Chesapeake Bay in order to act as escorts for the convoys.  
     
          12.               The transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.  
     
     
    ADOLPHUS ANDREWS  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
- 4 -