U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30309A

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 July 1942

PG30309a

1.July 1942.

I.	U 66	-	CF 27	U 136	-	BF 50	U 203	-	Op(EB)	U 505	-	DO 94
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	DO 95	215	-	Op(BB)	508	-	AE 91
	68	-	DE 84	154	-	BC 28	332	-	Op(CB)	509	-	AE 93
	84	-	DD 58	156	-	CE 79	373	-	BE 81	571	-	DD 57
	87	-	BC 74	157	-	Op(DA)	379	-	AE 91	572	-	BF 90
	89	-	CB 46	158	-	DC 64	402	-	BC 95	575	-	DD 67
	90	-	AO 40	159	-	DE 89	404	-	CB 48	576	-	BC 95
	96	-	off Nazaire	160	-	DF 26	406	-	off Nazaire	578	-	BE 69
	107	-	CD 46	161	-	Op(EB)	432	-	BF 47	582	-	CF 32
	116	-	BE 92	166	-	DF 43	437	-	DD 76	584	-	Op(CA)
	126	-	Op(ED)	171	-	AK 77	458	-	AL 42	596	-	AN 30
	128	-	EF 41	172	-	ED 23	459	-	CC 57	597	-	Bergen
	129	-	Op(DL)	173	-	BC 95	460	-	BC 95	653	-	BF 40
	132	-	BB 18	201	-	BE 92	461	-	AL 18	701	-	Op(CA)
	134	-	DD 56	202	-	Op(CA)	502	-	CE 88	704	-	AO 40
	135	-	BE 86				504	-	CE 24	754	-	CB 99

	On Return Passage: U 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 578 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107 - 596.
	Entered Port: U 96 - 406 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 171 position: 28.6. AK 61 2 mast top sighted, probably destroyer. Course NE 29.6. freighter in AK 58. Course east, 18 knots. Ak 82 smoke.
		U 584 position 28.6. DC 1323 via CA 8729 in westerly direction high speed convoy. 2 steamers and 2 destroyers.
		30.6. CA 8773 to DC 1525. Convoy consisting of 3 steamers and 2 destroyers. In DC 1528 heavily armed freighter on northerly course. 1.7. in DC 1336, freighter of 8,000 GRT on northerly course. Strong aerial protection.
		U 67 On 29.6. sank motorboat type "British Unity" in DB 4987 (8,407 GRT) 110⁰.
		Spasmodic traffic on 25m line in the Cape vicinity. Number of fishing craft - isolated patrols, at night occasional air activity. Intention - to proceed to DA 93 via DA 47. Further report see cypher IV d).
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DA 7568 - CA 2696 - DO 85/86 - ED 1595 - DC 13 - DM 16 - BB 76 - DC 11 - DA 75 - DC 1237 - DB 8134 - CA 34 - DC 1147 - ED 15 - DF 45.
	d)	Nothing.

IV.	Current operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	New course U 379, U 509 in CC 30. U 509 same grid after

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execution of special task. (laying of weather buoys).

Took supplies on board from U 460:

U 576	-	32 cubic m - 8 days provisions
U 173	-	52 cubic m
U 402	-	34 cubic m.

Capacity of tanker: total, 430 cubic m. and 157 days provisions.

U 67 in operational area DB on 24.6. heard one U-boat twice during the day and on the night of 28.6., sighted one U-boat. This was probably U 157, which has not reported since 9.6., but whose presence is presumed on account of several action and sighting reports. W/T equipment probably out of action.

with reference to c) 2) U 404 took supplies from U 459 on board.

Reports of Success:

U 67 sank one ship of 8,407 GRT.

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U-boats as of 1st July 1942.

I.	In operation 1.6	1)	313
	Commissioned in June		21
			334
	Losses in June	2)	3
	In service 1.7		331

		1)	In the summaries not so far received (in error): U 412 reported in service in April, U 706 in March.
		2)	U 573 (Heinsohn) (CO) sold to Spain. U 568 (Preuss) veteran ship 24.5.42. not reported to have put out of Messina 2.6. No information U 652 (Fraatz) veteran ship 26.42 to Fliebos, eastern Mediterranean. Scuttled.

II.

Distribution:

	II	VIIa	VIIb/c	VIId	IXb/c	IXD1	IXD2	XB	XIV

In action:	-	-	95	3	38	-	-	1	3	140
Trials:	-	-	94	3	23	1	5	3	3	132
Training:	37	4	16	-	2	-	-	-	-	59

	37	4	205	6	63	1	5	4	6	331

III.

In June:

Became operational :	+	12
Total number increased by:	+	18	(plus two losses at the beginning of the month)
Number of boats on trials increased by:	+	6	(plus two losses at the beginning of the month)
Number of training boats unchanged:	+/-	0

IV.

Operational U-boats were distributed as follows on 1.7.42:

Atlantic	101	boats
Mediterranean	16	boats
Norway area	23	boats
	140	boats.

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In June in Atlantic:

Daily average at sea:	59.2	boats.
Of these, in operations area:	18.7	"
Proceeding to Op. area:	43.3	"
Proceeding from Op. area:	19.7	"

VI.

Put out in June:

From home waters	13	boats.
From W. France	30	boats.









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2.July 1942.

I.	U 66	-	CF 45	U 153	-	DO 89	U 332	-	Op(CB 70)	U 571	-	DD 71
	67	-	DB 73-Op	154	-	BC 15	373	-	BE 83	572	-	BF 80
	68	-	DE 59	156	-	CE 83	379	-	AE 88	575	-	DD 86
	84	-	DD 73	157	-	Op(DA)	402	-	BC 89	576	-	CC 33
	87	-	BD 93	158	-	DD 17	404	-	CC 57	578	-	BF 50
	89	-	CB 47	159	-	DE 68	432	-	BF 60	582	-	CF 37
	90	-	AN 30	160	-	DF 51	437	-	DO 21	584	-	CA 81-Op
	107	-	CD 29	161	-	Op(EB)	458	-	AL 68	596	-	AO 70
	116	-	BE 97	166	-	DE 66	459	-	CC 57	597	-	AF 70
	126	-	Op(ED)	171	-	BC 39	460	-	CD 13	653	-	BF 48
	128	-	BF 12	172	-	DO 96	461	-	AK 63	701	-	Op(CA)
	129	-	Op(DL)	173	-	CD 15	502	-	CE 68	704	-	AN 30
	132	-	Op(BB 10)	201	-	BE 97	504	-	CE 31	754	-	CD 16
	134	-	DD 49	202	-	Op(CA)	505	-	ED 12
	135	-	BF 71	203	-	Op(EB)	508	-	AE 85
	136	-	BF 40	215	-	BE 70	509	-	AE 86

	On Return Passage: U 596 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 578 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107.
	Entered Port: U 432 - La Pallice; U 596 - Kiel.
	Sailed: U 752 - St. Nazaire; U 86 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 160 reports from DE 2947. No traffic sighted.
		2)	U 215 position: BB 70 no traffic. Off Halifax a/c and escort. Lights as in peace time.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sighted in CA 73 - DM 61 - BB 63.
		2)	U-boat attack in EL 12.
		3)	SOS from American tanker "Gulfbelle" (7,104 GRT) in ED 96 (U 126?).
		4)	According to Intelligence reports the northern approaches to the Gulf of Paria (Trinidad) are mined.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:

VI.	General:
	A.	The presence of U-boat tankers (U 459, U 116) in the operational area has largely contributed to success. For the first time - in spite of the long lines of approach - it has become possible to retain a large number of boats in this area until their supplies of torpedoes and munitions are exhausted. Supplies could be handed over

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according to position, on the outward, as well as on the homeward journey.

An attempt is to be made as far as possible, to carry out the supplying of boats on the outward voyage. This eliminates the danger of several boats having insufficient fuel for the homeward voyage, should a U-boat tanker not show up owing to engine trouble or enemy action. However, taking June into account with the arrival of the next two U-boat tankers (U 460 and 461) since the middle of June., the supplying has been in practice increased. The failure of the operation "Brasil" and the fact that U 460 was available for operations in the Atlantic made the following possible:

The continuation of operations (3 boats were supplied on homeward voyage) by the Group "Hecht"; and, on the 16.6. the convoy sighted by U 94 in grid AK 8717 proceeding in a south-westerly course, was contacted, and resulted in the sinking of 2 ships of 13,000 GRT and the torpedoing of a ship of 6,000 GRT.

The entire supplying of the Group "Endrass" (the group operating against the Gibraltar convoys) resulting in uncurtailed operations after escort duties in the Caribbean and North American area.

The supplying of outward bound vessels resulting in the use of U-boat type VIIc in North America, U-boat type IXc, in the Caribbean area. This meant a time saving of altogether 3 weeks for each boat in comparison to the time previously needed for the outward voyage - (Kiel-Western France-Op. Area). U 116 put out 27.6. Is detailed for the supplying of a group of 5 type VIIc U-boats proceeding southward. It is necessary to make sure that the U-boat tanker reaches the area of operations at the right time. Before America's entry into the war the U-boat's sphere of action was sufficient (with regard to Pan-American security boundaries). After America's entry in to the war U-boats operated in the North American area which yields good results, isolated boats of type IXc in the Caribbean area. The traffic situation in North American coastal waters began to deteriorate at the end of April 1942. At this time the first taking on of supplies could be carried out from U 459 and thereby the range of action for boats type VIIc and IXb also increased: still more boats will be sent to waters as yet untried and plentiful in traffic.

On examination of the question as to whether the system used in the last few months is the right one, the following evaluation of the potential will be apparent:

Sunk per boat in the sea day.
	January 1942	209 GRT
	February 1942	378 GRT
	March 1942	409 GRT
	April 1942	412 GRT
	May 1942	426 GRT
	June 1942	404 GRT

Here, the fact must be taken into account that the figures for June are adversely effected by the large number of returning boats (about 30) and a medium number of outward bound boats which have a fairly long voyage to their field of operations. The potential was in fact as high as that of May if not higher. It would still be wrong then, to start purely anti-convoy operations again with medium forces. The traffic situation must be exploited as long as it yields

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	numerous isolated successes with the minimum number of losses. Furthermore attention is drawn to the fact that operations in coastal waters with for the most part strong aerial protection and medium, if inexperienced sea defense is an excellent training for anti-convoy operations.

C.	In order to provide reinforcements against the increasingly strong English air protection in the Bay of Biscay I had a conference on 2.7. in the Luftwaffe High Command Operational H.Q. and with Goering. I reported the enemy's position in the air in the Biscay area; that having attained complete protection from bombing in port and built U-boat facilities, he has transferred his attacks to the waters off the coast and therefore made the surface passage of U-boats by day and night a risky proceeding as English a/c are equipped with D/F apparatus.
	The U-boat Arm has suffered considerably from losses and damage in the Biscay area - as much as the enemy himself. English a/c meet absolutely no opposition in the Biscay area, reinforcements are urgently needed.
	The Chief of General Staff has approved the dispatch of more Junkers 88's.
	As a result of this conference 24 more Junkers 88's have been designated to the Luftwaffe Atlantic Command for the war in the Biscay area.

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3.July 1942.

I.	U 66	-	CE 91	U 136	-	BF 40	U 215	-	CB 12	U 509	-	AE 87
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	ED 24	332	-	Op(CB 70)	571	-	DC 98
	68	-	DE 65	154	-	EB 24	373	-	BE 69	572	-	BF 70
	84	-	DC 96	156	-	EB 35	379	-	AL 31	575	-	DO 31
	86	-	off Lorient	157	-	Op(DA)	402	-	BC 85	576	-	CC 29
	87	-	BE 72	158	-	DD 22	404	-	CC 64	578	-	off Nazaire
	89	-	Op(CA 50)	159	-	DF 45	437	-	DO 17	582	-	CF 58
	90	-	AN 30	160	-	DE 52	458	-	AK 86	584	-	Op(CA)
	107	-	CD 36	161	-	Op(BE)	459	-	CC 57	597	-	AF 72
	116	-	CF 35	166	-	DE 67	460	-	BC 95	653	-	BF 40
	126	-	Op-ED	171	-	BC 64	461	-	AK 67	701	-	Op(CA 79)
	128	-	DQ 73	172	-	DP 49	502	-	BE 85	704	-	AN 30
	129	-	Op(DL)	173	-	BC 97	504	-	BE 77	752	-	BF 50
	132	-	Op(BA)	201	-	CF 37	505	-	ED 16	754	-	CC 63
	134	-	DD 71	202	-	Op(CA)	508	-	AL 32
	135	-	BF 73	203	-	Op(EB)

	On Return Passage: U 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107 - 578.
	Entered Port: U 578 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 126 position: Traffic sighted in ED 96-98-99.

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Steamers approaching from Caribbean Sea and east, making for Granada. Strong traffic junction in ED 9650 - day and night strong air, slight sea protection. The area around Trinidad is suitable as an operational area for several boats. Stiff Trade winds by day.

Sunk:	29.6. small sailing vessel left as wreck.
	1.7. on voyage - 7,000 GRT freighter.
	3.7. "Gulfbelle" - 7,104 GRT in ED 9691 with last torpedo. Course 270⁰. Left it unmaneuverable condition, drifting with a strong stern list.
	Total tonnage including torpedoing: 48,253 GRT.
U 172:	23.6. small sailing vessel sunk in EB 8234 27.6 steamer sighted in EC 4555, course 160⁰. Mainly stiff to stormy Trade winds. 2 torpedoes left. Intended to operate on return voyage about DR-DQ.
U 202:	Double and single miss on large freighter type "Brastagi" - northerly course - 15 knots in CA 8469.

U 159 sighted in CD 9155 large passenger steamer - course 0⁰ - doing 16 knots.

None.

American U-boat patrolling in DD 18. U-boats sighted: DO 97 - DA 8442 - DB 1517 - CA 87 - CA 7338.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

None.

According to assignment Group North received the following action areas of U-boats on the outward voyage:

U 597 grid AE 93.

U 90 grid AE 99.

U 704 grid AF 74.

Dispositions are intended to be kept for 24 hours. The passage of heavy English units through this area is expected.

U 89 is to be given the waters off New York as sphere of action. Nucleus there.

U 582 - 201 - 572 - 136 - 752 are to be incorporated into Group "Hai". It is intended to form these boats into a reconnaissance line from CF 7250 to 8150 patrolling on a course of 185⁰ to the south to the latitude of EJ 95. The aim is to enclose the convoy routes and isolated traffic. Lines to the west will be extended by U 116. A boat will escort the group as tanker. Final operation is planned between Freetown and FC 30 fueling in grid ER.

The following disposition is ordered until all boats have reached the line of reconnaissance:

U 582 - CF 72 - 75 - 78; U 201 - CF 210 - CF 46 - 49 - 73; U 116 - CE 98 - 99.

None.

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V.	Reports of Success:
	U 126 - 1 sailing vessel, 1 freighter (7,000 GRT) 1 ship (7,410 GRT) torpedoed.
	U 172 - 1 sailing vessel.

VI.	General:
	The following inferences may be made from the convoy operations to the months of May and June - after the return of the boats and conference with the Commanding Officers.
	1)	Anti-convoy operations are still possible. The conditions of defense have changed slightly in comparison with those of Autumn 1941.
	2)	Presence of (enemy) surface Radar has not yet been absolutely confirmed. The sighting and beating off of boats by the enemy can in many cases be traced to the rash behavior of young boats inexperienced in convoy work.
		The older boats keeping in touch are also forced to dive in sympathy, owing to this behavior.
	3)	Veteran boats have launched attacks. This will also be possible for new boats in later convoy operations as soon as the number of attacking boats causes a splitting up of the defense forces.
	4)	All convoy duties are greatly influenced by adverse weather conditions (ONS convoys experienced stormy, variable weather, fog; Gibraltar convoy calm on 2nd day, seaway 0)
	5)	Results of 4 operations (ONS) of Group "Hecht" - 17 ships, 1 destroyer, 1 ship torpedoed (no losses); Group "Endrass", 1 operation against HG resulted in 5 ships, 1 ship torpedoed, no losses.
	6)	The tactical experience derived from these convoy operations with special regard to the behavior of the boats in the convoy, has been passed to Training Flotillas, U-boat instructional Divisions.

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4.July 1942.

I.	U 66	-	CE 73	U 136	-	BE 90	U 215	-	Op(CA)	U 571	-	DN 31
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	ED 41	332	-	Op(CB)	572	-	BE 90
	68	-	DF 18	154	-	DM 88	373	-	BF 48	575	-	DO 28
	84	-	DC 97	156	-	BE 93	379	-	AL 26	576	-	CC 19
	86	-	BF 50	157	-	Op(DA)	402	-	BC 79	582	-	CF 87
	87	-	BE 82	158	-	CC 74	404	-	CD 17	584	-	CA 97
	89	-	Op(CA)	159	-	CD 69	437	-	DN 62	597	-	AE 93
	90	-	AF 75	160	-	DE 57	458	-	BD 13	653	-	BF 54
	107	-	CE 13	161	-	Op(EB)	459	-	CC 57	701	-	Op(CA)
	116	-	CF 64	166	-	DE 73	460	-	CD 13	704	-	AN 30
	126	-	Op(ED)	171	-	BC 85	461	-	AK 88	752	-	BF 40
	128	-	DQ 43	172	-	DO 95	502	-	BE 91	754	-	CC 56
	129	-	Op(DK)	173	-	CD 13	504	-	BE 84
	132	-	Op(BA)	201	-	CF 56	505	-	EC 39
	134	-	DC 95	202	-	CA 85	508	-	AM 17
	135	-	BF 60	203	-	Op(EB)	509	-	AL 24


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	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 43 - 454 - Kiel; U 71 - 552 - St. Nazaire; U 507 - 130 - Lorient.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 161 position: Traffic searched for in lower third of EB and upper third of EL. I EL 2318 on 28.6. craft probably escort vessel sighted. In EL 2316 freighter 190⁰. Otherwise no traffic. Bad visibility until 1.7. On 4.7. just off Colon steamer with a/c escort sighted. Course 160⁰. Heavy a/c protection, several escort vessels. Sank "Sampablo" (3,305 GRT) by pier with 2 torpedoes in Puerto Simon. No defense.
		U 458 Sank on 30.6. in AL 4224 steamer "Mosfruit" (2,714 GRT) course 75⁰. Otherwise nothing sighted on trip.
		U 136 at 1700 in CG 1160, 2 destroyers very far apart from one another and a long way off to the west of them smoke trails sighted. Course NW. This refers to a HG convoy already contacted in the morning by a/c in CG 15. U 136 received orders not to operate and to continue on her westerly course.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: AM 4275 - DB 97 - DL 68 - DC 14 - BC 2974 - DD 49 - DC 14.
		(X) A/c attacked U-boat with depth charges in AE 9994.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	U 508 received order to steer on a course CC 70 after execution of special task.
		U 172 is to endeavor to carry out return voyage if possible without reinforcements. Will be directed to traffic in DP and DQ.
		In the event of ships being sighted operate without regard to fuel situation.
		New areas of Attack:
		U 203 and 575 operate according to situation report of U 126 of 3.7. (area around Trinidad).
		U 134 The coast of Florida to the south to approximately 24⁰ N.
		U 571 in DA 90 according to situation report of U 67.
		U 437 south of Yucatan. Channel between 16 and 21⁰ North and 76⁰ 30' and 87⁰ West.

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U 84 The left half of DM.

U 597 - 709 - 90 receive orders to proceed on the course ordered in the Atlantic. (see cypher IV b) 1) of 3.7.42)

None.

Boats will be informed of the identification signs of Argentinean Merchant ships.

With immediate effect: Armed attacks without warning may be made against:

1)	All Brazilian merchant ships, that means also against unarmed and all shipping identified as Brazilian.
2)	Brazilian warships, only if they show fight or are engaged on convoy escort work for shipping not confirmed as Brazilian.

Reports of Success:

U 161 - 3,305 GRT

458 - 2,714 GRT

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5.July 1942.

I.	U 66	-	CD 96	U 134	-	DC 89	U 203	-	Op(ED )	U 509	-	AL 18
	43	-	AO 40	135	-	BF 60	215	-	Op(CA)	552	-	BF 50
	67	-	Op(DA)	136	-	CF 36	332	-	Op(CB)	571	-	DN 24
	68	-	CE 88	153	-	EC 64	373	-	BF 40	572	-	CG 12
	71	-	BF 50	154	-	Op(DL)	379	-	AL 01	575	-	DO 49
	84	-	DN 22	156	-	BF 49	402	-	CC 22	576	-	CC 41
	86	-	BF 40	157	-	Op(DA)	404	-	CD 24	582	-	Op(CF)
	87	-	BE 67	158	-	CC 57	437	-	DN 59	584	-	CB 71
	89	-	Op(CA)	159	-	CE 43	458	-	BD 44	597	-	Op(AE 93)
	90	-	Op(AE 99)	160	-	DE 78	459	-	CC 57	653	-	BF 60
	107	-	BD 94	161	-	Op(EB 89)	460	-	CC 36	701	-	Op(CA)
	116	-	CF 81	166	-	DE 74	461	-	BD 15	704	-	AF 75
	126	-	EE 18	171	-	CC 36	502	-	BF 71	752	-	BF 70
	128	-	DQ 24	172	-	DP 47	504	-	BE 86	754	-	CC 57
	129	-	Op(DK)	173	-	CD 17	505	-	EC 56	454	-	AO 40
	130	-	BF 50	201	-	Op(CF 40)	507	-	BF 50
	132	-	Op(BA)	202	-	CA 92	508	-	AM 72

	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 126 - 502 - 107.
	Entered Port: U 135 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 701 position: increased sea and air vigilance since 28.6. On 2.7. freighter (2,000 GRT) sighted with 3 suspicious escort craft. Probably trap (Q-ships). Otherwise, no traffic out or inside 200m line.
		2)	U 373 was taken by surprise by enemy a/c in BF 8256. No damage.

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		3)	U 134 sighted Swedish steamer "Vehezia" in DC 4951. Course 15⁰. Boat received orders to sink ship.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DD 49 - DL 6865 - EL 2312 - DL 69 - DK 57 - DB 5938 - DC 11 - DA 81 - DK 5579 - EC 83.
		A/c sighting: BF 4864 - BF 8251 - BF 4933.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	U 160 received orders to proceed to field of operations via western half of EE according to situation report.
			U 126 (Trinidad waters) to proceed.
		2)	U 754 to proceed to operational area round Hatteras after taking on supplies.
	c) -	d)	None.

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6.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AO 30	U 134	-	DC 49	U 215	-	Op(CA)	U 509	-	AK 63
	66	-	DF 31	136	-	CF 37	332	-	Op(CB)	552	-	BF 81
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	EC 91	373	-	BF 82	571	-	DM 33
	68	-	CE 67	154	-	Op(DL)	379	-	AK 65	572	-	CF 38
	71	-	BF 81	156	-	BF 49	402	-	CC 15	575	-	DO 75
	84	-	DN 12	157	-	Op(DA)	404	-	CD 31	576	-	CB 64
	86	-	BF 72	158	-	CC 57	437	-	DN 76	582	-	Op(CF)
	87	-	BF 81	159	-	CE 29	454	-	AO 30	584	-	CB 84
	89	-	Op(CA)	160	-	DP 26	458	-	BC 92	597	-	AE 91
	90	-	AM 31	161	-	Op(EB)	459	-	CC 59	701	-	DC 12-Op
	107	-	BD 93	166	-	DD 98	460	-	CC 36	704	-	AE 93
	116	-	Op(CE)	171	-	CC 68	461	-	BC 63	752	-	BE 98
	126	-	EE 21	172	-	DP 54	502	-	BF 49	754	-	CC 57
	128	-	DE 86	173	-	CC 68	504	-	BF 54	653	-	off Brest
	129	-	Op(DK)	201	-	Op(CF)	505	-	EC 49
	130	-	BF 48	202	-	CB 48	507	-	BF 48
	132	-	Op(BA)	203	-	Op(ED)	508	-	AL 88

	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 128 - 126 - 156 - 502 - 107.
	Entered Port: U 653 - Brest.
	Sailed: - . -

- 11 -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 332 position: In course sector 315⁰ since 28.6. No traffic from Hatteras.
		2)	U 701 sighted convoy consisting of 4 destroyers 5 steamers in CA 8740. Course SW medium speed. Patrol of area decreasing.
		3)	U 402 reports presence of Portuguese ship "Thamelisboa" in CC 4230. Course 90⁰. Boat received orders not to attack.
		4)	U 379 sighted corvette in AK 8195. On north-easterly course. No opportunity to attack.
		5)	U 154 position: small freighter hunted from DL 9199 to 9723. Otherwise no traffic. No surface but strong a/c patrol. On 6.7. fishing vessel sunk in DL 6471. Plan to operate in southern half of DL. Received orders to remain in the straits.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 73 - DM 31 - DB 9973 - DD 4591 - DA 9228 - DK 54 - EC 5837 - DB 98 - DD 48.
		A/c reports U-boat in AM 2463.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	U 86, 552, 71, 90, 704, 597 received orders to steer a course to AK 69.
		U 379 is to occupy AK 80 as area of attack until the arrival of the previously mentioned boats. It is intended to form a sweep with these vessels in the reconnaissance lines to the SW on the England-America convoy route. Later this is to be extended and eventually operations in North American area are planned.
	c)	1)	U 508 has carried out special assignment (laying of weather buoys).
		2)	Taking on of supplies carried out.
			U 754 from U 459. Fuel situation altogether 93 cubic m.
			Provisions for 30 days.
		3)	U 171 from U 460. Fuel situation altogether 342 cubic m. Provisions for 125 days.
	d)	1)	As U 158 has not arrived at the supplying position, U 459 is to transmit a D/F signal.
			The ordered position report still stands.
			As this is the fifth time U 158 has not reported the loss of the boat must be presumed eventually.
		2)	Permission to attack isolated craft on Route A north

- 12 -

		of 5⁰ South is given.
		The boundary between 0⁰ and 5⁰ South is near 20⁰ West.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 154 - 1 fishing craft.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AO 30	U 134	-	DC 74	U 215	-	Op(CA)	U 509	-	AK 59
	66	-	DF 28	136	-	CF 50	332	-	DC 28-Op	552	-	BF 40
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	EC 75	373	-	BF	571	-	DM 26
	68	-	CF 42	154	-	Op(DL)	379	-	AK 82	572	-	CF 50
	71	-	BF 40	156	-	BF	402	-	CC 42	575	-	ED 14
	84	-	DM 35	157	-	Op(DA)	404	-	BD 86	576	-	CB 58
	86	-	BE 60	158	-	CC 57	437	-	Op(DM)	582	-	Op(CF)
	87	-	BF	159	-	CE 35	454	-	AO 30	584	-	CB 94
	89	-	Op(CA)	160	-	DP 51	458	-	BC 89	597	-	AE 88
	90	-	AM 15	161	-	EB 83	459	-	CC 59	701	-	DC 12-Op
	107	-	BE 81	166	-	DD 88	460	-	CC 36	704	-	AE 86
	116	-	Op(CE)	171	-	CC 64	461	-	BC 91	752	-	CF 32
	126	-	DP 82	172	-	DP 37	502	-	BF	754	-	CC 48
	128	-	DE 56	173	-	CC 83	504	-	BF 60
	129	-	Op(DK)	201	-	Op(CF)	505	-	EB 93
	130	-	BF 40	202	-	CB 86	507	-	BF 70
	132	-	Op(BA)	203	-	Op(ED)	508	-	AL 94

	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 128 - 126 - 156 - 502 - 107.
	Entered Port: U 504 - 156 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 162 - Lorient; U 510 - 598 - 658 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 84 unsuccessful attempt since 5.7. to pass through DM 23. Continually forced beneath surface by strong air and surface patrol and Radar suspected at night. A/c with search light sighted. Boat received orders to carry on according to circumstances. No confirmation of Radar on American coast.
		U 129 sank "Cadmus" (1,855 GRT) on 1.7. in DK 6636, "Gundersen" (1,841 GRT) in DL 4146 on 2.7. Both vessels on course 300⁰ from Belize to Galvestone. Sank "Tuapse" (6,326 GRT) in DL 6575 on 4.7. Course 345⁰. Very strong air patrol from 5.7.
		U 571 sank freighter (10,000 GRT) from northward bound convoy in DM 2646 on 7.7. Sighted American ship "J.A. Mofet" (9,788 GRT) on southerly course in DM 2824 on 8.7.
		U 67 position: No traffic on line DB 4972 to 4732. Traffic (bunches of ships) in both directions in DA 6997. Strong air patrol by day, slight surface patrol at night sank freighter (4,000 GRT) 30⁰ in DA 9326 on 6.7. Sank American ship "Harwood" (6,610 GRT) course 215⁰ in DA 6997 on 7.7. Boat reports possible presence of U 157 as U-boat sighting intercepted on 7.7 and torpedo detonation heard.
	b)	None.

- 13 -

	c)	U-boat sightings: DB 78 - CA 34 - BA 36 - DB 82 - DB 91 - DM 26 - CB 3471 - DD 51 - EB 67 - DK 5481 - DN 35 - DA 93.
		U-boat attacks: DM 2533 - DM 28.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	New positions received: U 130 and U 507 = FC 50; U 171 = DN 84.
		2)	Order received by Group "Hai" (see IV b) 3) of 3.7.) for the boats U 582 - 201 - 136 - 571 - 752 to remain in turn in reconnaissance channel on 10.7. at 0400. From CF 7255 to 8245 course 185⁰. Days reckoning 150 sea miles. U 116 to extend patrol strip to the W. To occupy the following as operational area until 10.7.:
			U 136 the grids CF 54 - 57 - 81
			U 572 the grids CF 55 - 58 - 82.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 129 - 3 ships 10,022 GRT
	U 571 - 2 ships 19,788 GRT
	U 67 - 2 ships 10,610 GRT.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

8.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AF 72	U 134	-	Op(DM)	U 215	-	Op(CA)	U 509	-	AK 84
	66	-	DF 46	136	-	Op(CF)	332	-	Op(CB)	510	-	AO
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	Op(EB)	373	-	BF 60	552	-	BE 29
	68	-	CF 25	154	-	Op(DL)	379	-	Op(AK)	571	-	DM 19
	71	-	BE 65	157	-	Op(DA)	402	-	CB 65	572	-	Op(CF)
	84	-	DB 94	158	-	CC 57	404	-	BD 96	575	-	ED 46
	86	-	BE 65	159	-	CF 21	437	-	Op(DM)	576	-	CB 72
	87	-	BF 60	160	-	DP 72	454	-	AF 72	582	-	Op(CF)
	89	-	Op(CA)	161	-	EB 69	458	-	CC 36	584	-	CC 87
	90	-	AL 39	162	-	BF 50	459	-	CC 57	597	-	AL 31
	107	-	BE 91	166	-	DC 93	460	-	CC 36	598	-	AO
	116	-	Op(CE)	171	-	CC 82	461	-	CD 10	658	-	AO
	126	-	DP 64	172	-	DP 36	502	-	BF 40	701	-	Op(CA)
	128	-	CC 88	173	-	CC 87	505	-	Op(EB)	704	-	AL 32
	129	-	DL 92 - Op	201	-	Op(CF)	507	-	BE 99	752	-	CF 37
	130	-	BE 96	202	-	CB 69	508	-	BE 12	754	-	CB 92
	132	-	Op(BA)	203	-	Op(ED)

	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 161 - 126 - 128 - 502 - 107.
	Entered Port: U 87 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 203 position: Proceeding from "Anegada" via DP 79 to Trinidad since 28.6. Nothing sighted in these waters for three days except neutral vessels. Request free hand for voyage along coast. Boat received orders to remain in Operational Area round Trinidad - more important coaling station and therefore more traffic. A lull of several days is thought probable.

- 14 -

		2)	U 437 sighted U-boat on northerly course in DL 9459. Probably U 129.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sighted in DM 31 - DB 47 - DM 31 - DL 32 - DD 51.
		Unidentified ship torpedoed in unconfirmed position. American motor tanker "Moffert" (9,788 GRT) torpedoed in DM 28. U-boat attack in ED 96.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	U 571 freedom of movement in Caribbean Sea.
	c)	1)	U 86 reports heavy bombers 5th July, only one torpedo tube partially in action. Bombardment in Biscay area.
		2)	U 458 reports provisions taken on board from U 460. State of fuel: 298 cubic m. Provisions for 190 days.
	d)	1)	The following order is given on the supposition that U 158 has an engine and W/T breakdown and to ensure the possibility of a meeting in the event of her eventual presence.
			U 461 is to remain every second day from 1500 for 4 hours in grid CD 1777. No D/F signal.
		2)	U 173 sighted green star shells in DE 1274. Search so far unsuccessful. It is unlikely however, that U 158 is in this area, but the boat received ordered nevertheless to continue the search throughout the day. Warning will be given of enemy U-boats.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AE 93	U 134	-	Op(DM)	U 215	-	Op(CA)	U 510	-	AN 30
	66	-	DF 71	136	-	Op(CF)	332	-	Op(CB)	552	-	BE 24
	67	-	Op(DA)	153	-	Op(EB)	379	-	Op(AK)	571	-	DM 11
	68	-	CF 31	154	-	Op(DL)	402	-	CB 59	572	-	Op(CF)
	71	-	BE 29	157	-	Op(DA)	404	-	BE 82	575	-	Op(ED)
	84	-	DN 20	158	-	CC	437	-	Op(DL)	576	-	CA 96
	86	-	BE 64	159	-	BE 88	454	-	AE 93	582	-	Op(CF)
	89	-	Op(CA)	160	-	DO 99	458	-	CC 37	584	-	CC 43
	90	-	AL 51	161	-	EC 43	459	-	CC 88	597	-	AL 25
	107	-	BE 93	162	-	BF 40	460	-	CC 36	598	-	AN 30
	116	-	Op(CE)	166	-	DC 97	461	-	CD 12	658	-	AN 30
	126	-	DP 36	171	-	CC 79	502	-	BF 40	701	-	Op(CA)
	128	-	CC 88	172	-	DP 26	505	-	Op(EB)	704	-	AL 24
	129	-	Op(DK)	173	-	DE 13	507	-	BE 97	752	-	CF 58
	130	-	CG 10	201	-	Op(CF)	508	-	BD 35	754	-	CB 82
	132	-	Op(BA)	202	-	CC 54	509	-	BD 11
				203	-	Op(ED)

	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128 - 502 - 107 - 459.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 564 - 654 - Brest; U 155 - Lorient; U 607 - Kiel.

- 15 -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 201 reports sinking of English refrigerator ship "Avila Star" (14,443 GRT) in CF 4953. Course 20⁰ speed 16 knots.
		U 172 sank in DF 2367 American ship "Santa Rita" (8,400 GRT) course 260⁰, speed 16.5 knots. (Enemy ship) proceeding from Port Said via Cape Town to Boston. Cargo: gold and copper ore, captured German tanks among other things. Extensive chart and map material taken on board U-boat.
		U 90 sighted enemy convoy (No. 31) in AL 1967 at 0547. Easterly course, speed 14 knots. Convoy comprised of 5 freighters, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers. U 704 and 597 received orders to operate on convoy - U 379 only under favorable conditions. Continuation 10.7.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 7356 - ED 1211 - DM 43 - CA 73 - DB 81 - CA 52 - ED 12.
		U-boat attack in DA 92.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	U 704, 71, 597, 552, 90, 379, 86 incorporated in Group "Wolf" and receive orders to remain in reconnaissance channel from AK 3947-6955. Course 240⁰, days reckoning 130 sea miles on 13.7. at 1600. Boats arriving previously are to occupy ordered positions as patrol lines at a depth of 30 sea miles until departure.
	c)	None.
	d)	U 173 reports search for U 158 broken off. No success.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 201 - 1 ship 14,443 GRT.
	U 172 - 1 ship 8,400 GRT.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

10.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AE 86	U 153	-	Op(EB)	U 379	-	Op(AK)	U 571	-	Op(DA)
	66	-	DE 98	154	-	Op(DL)	402	-	CB 49	572	-	CF 81
	67	-	Op(DA)	155	-	BF 57	404	-	BF 91	575	-	Op(ED)
	68	-	BF 55	157	-	Op(DA)	437	-	Op(DM)	576	-	Op(CA)
	71	-	BE 24	158	-	CC	454	-	AE 86	582	-	CF 72
	84	-	Op(DM)	159	-	BE 96	458	-	CC 28	584	-	CC 29
	86	-	BE 52	160	-	BE 17	459	-	CD 71	587	-	AL 19
	89	-	Op(CA)	161	-	EC 29	460	-	CC 29	598	-	AN 30
	90	-	AL 19	162	-	BF 47	461	-	CD 17	607	-	AO
	107	-	BF 55	166	-	DN 22	502	-	BF	654	-	BF 61
	116	-	CE 93	171	-	DD 39	505	-	Op(EB)	658	-	AN 30
	126	-	DE 84	172	-	DE 79	507	-	CF 32	701	-	Op(CA)
	128	-	CD 74	173	-	DE 14	508	-	BD 26	704	-	AL 18


- 16 -

U 129	-	Op(DK)	U 201	-	CF 73	U 509	-	BE 39	U 752	-	CF 82
130	-	CF 37	202	-	CC 29	510	-	AN 30	754	-	CB 76
132	-	Op(BA)	203	-	Op(ED)	552	-	AL 37
134	-	Op(DM)	215	-	Op(CA)	564	-	BF 61
136	-	CF 73	332	-	Op(CB)

	On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128 - 502 - 107 - 459.
	Entered Port: U 68 - Lorient.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 31 see cypher IV a).
		2)	U 166 sighted small convoy in DO 7185 consisting of 2 steamers and 2 destroyers. General course 170⁰. 6 misses.
		3)	U 89 position: Bottoming by day since July 6th in CA 2878 to 5229 by night from 2799 to 5217. No traffic inside 20 m. line for 4 nights.
			Deep channel traffic - only neutral vessels.
			Strong seaway, slight air patrol.
		4)	U 507 sighted loaded freighter (5,000 GRT) with escort in CF 3423. Course 130⁰, 14 knots. Beaten off on attacking. Depth charges. Proceeded.
		5)	U 129 nothing sighted since 8.7 from DL 9459 to DM 7223. Operated to the SE.
		6)	U 437 nothing sighted since 8.7 in DL 97 to EA 37 and 39. Operating as far as EB 39 then to the NW.
		7)	U 571 sank "Micholascuneo" (1,051 GRT) with gunfire on 9.7 in DM 4328. Strong aerial defense on the coast from DM 32-18. Medium isolated traffic.
		8)	U 172 reports results of the sighting material "Santa Rita".
			In Cape Town 40 - 50 ships.
			Course from Cape Town on major arc via DQ 2391 - DN 1111 to Charleston. Continuing along coast to Chesapeake Bay. Ships are only to ply between Norfolk, New York and Hatteras during the day - to anchor in Chesapeake Bay or Delaware Bay if necessary. Barrage regulations for Cape Town, Boston and New York. Warning of mines off Chesapeake Bay. Area round Wimble Shoal whistling buoy and Diamond Shoal lightship is only to be navigated by day.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DB 47 - DB 91 - BB 63 - DA 9247 - CA 81 - CA 52.
		Aircraft reports U-boat in BE 9370 - BE 9386.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 21:

- 17 -

		U 90 maintains contact. The convoy has long-range protection by a/c and destroyers. Owing to the high speed - 16 knots - it is impossible to come up to it. Order received at 1330 to break off operations and to proceed to patrol channel. Last position 1425 in AL 0245. Course east, speed 16 knots. U 90 missed four times owing to excessive distance.
	b)	U 43 and 454 are assigned to Group "Wolf". Steering orders AK 02, day's reckoning 150 miles. U 89 is allowed freedom of movement to the south as a result of her traffic report.
	c)	Have carried out supply: U 202, 31 cubic m. fuel, provisions for 14 days. Remaining on tanker 228 cubic m. provisions for 83 days.
	d)	U 502 reported for the last time from BE 85 on 3.7. According to schedule the latest date for putting in was 8.7. Loss as a result of depth charges must be presumed.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 571 - 1 ship 1,051 GRT.

VI.	General:
	It would seem from the boat's reports that traffic in the American area has considerably diminished since about 3rd July; the probable reason being the heavy losses sustained at the end of June. The decrease to traffic greatly aggravates the entire American shipping position although it is unavoidable on account of the otherwise unpreventable losses. For the prosecution of the U-boat war this means a falling off to the numbers of sinkings. Now it is possible to see yet another great advantage in being able to supply U-boats from U-tankers. The boats can out last the lull to traffic and take advantage of the ensuing spate which is sure to follow - until their torpedoes etc. are exhausted.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

11.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AE 84	U 153	-	Op(EB)	U 379	-	Op(AK)	U 571	-	DB 79(Op)
	66	-	DQ 16	154	-	Op(DL)	402	-	CB 49	572	-	DH 12
	67	-	Op(DA)	155	-	BF 40	404	-	BE 60	575	-	Op(ED)
	71	-	AL 87	157	-	Op(DA)	437	-	DL 39(Op)	576	-	Op(CA)
	84	-	Op(DM)	158	-	CC	454	-	AE 87	582	-	DG 33
	86	-	BE 16	159	-	BF 70	458	-	CC 46	584	-	CC 29
	89	-	CA 54(Op)	160	-	ED 65	459	-	CD 54	597	-	AL 41
	90	-	AL 42	161	-	EC 65	460	-	CC 29	598	-	AF 87
	107	-	BF 60	162	-	BE 90	461	-	CD 10	607	-	AN 30
	116	-	DG 32	166	-	DN 83	505	-	Op(EB)	654	-	Lorient
	126	-	DE 58	171	-	DD 61	507	-	CF 29	658	-	AF 79
	128	-	CD 82	172	-	DE 85	508	-	BD 51	701	-	Op(CA)
	129	-	DL 92(Op)	173	-	DD 62	509	-	BC 87	704	-	AL 19
	130	-	CF 58	201	-	DG 33	510	-	AF 79	752	-	DH 13
	132	-	Op(BA)	202	-	CC 29	552	-	AL 52	754	-	CA 96
	134	-	Op(DM)	203	-	Op(ED)	564	-	Lorient
	136	-	DH 11	215	-	Op(CA)
				332	-	Op(CA - DC)


- 18 -

	On Return Passage: U 459 - 202 - 584 - 159 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128 - 158 - 107.
	Entered Port: U 107 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 463 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 32 see paragraph IV a).
		2)	U 584 sighted periscope in CC 3652 (possibly U 202).
		3)	U 576 obtained contact with a convoy at 0230 in DC 1239. Course 300⁰. Received orders to attack and to report further contact for other boats. Convoy in DC 1336 out of sight at 0330. U 576 pursuing.
		4)	U 66 sank "Trigler" ( 6,363 GRT) in DE 9773 on 9.7. course Lobito - New York. Boat proceeds to special assignment.
		5)	U 154 position: Double miss on fast freighter in DM 1856 on 9.7., speed 16 knots, course 220⁰. Apart from neutral vessels nothing sighted in DL 60 and 44. Request permission to operate via DM 18 to DB 80 and on to Galveston.
		6)	U 134 position: Passenger freighter of type "Klipfentein" unsuccessfully trailed in DD 6874 on 29.6. Course 95⁰, speed 18 knots. Double miss on "Venezia" in DC 1987. Course 0⁰, speed 13 knots. From DB 9330 via 9123 to 9432 no air or surface patrols - no traffic since 8.7.
		7)	U 203 sank "Cape Verde" (6,914 GRT) in ED 9694 on 11.7. Heavily armed. "Stanvac Palenbang" (10,444 GRT) in ED 9694 on 11.7. Both ships were on a course of 270⁰. Shot up. Homeward bound. Position: Ships proceed on east/west course through the Trinidad - Granada narrows. Strong air activity, poor hydrophone conditions there.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DB 4744 - BB 54 - DB 91 - DD 1462 - BB 5482 - DB 9138 - CA 5197 - BB 6386 - EL 13 - DL 94 - ED 95 - CA 54 - DD 17.
		A/c reports oil patch in AM 5133 or 2373. U-boat attack in ED 99.
		British ship "Cortona" (7,093 GRT) torpedoed in DC 3910 (U 201 or 116).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 32:
		Convoy sighted by U 201 in DG 3639. Course 200⁰ medium speed.

- 19 -

Corvette and one steamer reported in DC 3665 at 1601, speed 12 knots, 210⁰. Convoy had split. One section out of sight - course 170⁰. Command decided to let remaining boats belonging to Group "Hai" operate on the eastern section. U 572 established contact in DH 1745 at 2045 and maintained it until 0300 in DH 4141. The boat was then beaten off, depth charges were dropped. Last known course 180⁰, speed 10 knots. Convoy sighted as consisting of 4 steamers, 3 destroyers.

The reports of successes received this morning show that still other boats have attacked, U 201 2 ships of 7,093 GRT and 7,000 GRT - 14,093 GRT.

U 582 1 ship of 8,000 GRT.

U 201 considers the convoy to be broken up.

The boats received orders to report their position if there is still no contact after dawn.

b) -

None.

There has still been no report up to date on U 158 and she must be presumed lost. However, the tanker is again to take up her position on 14.7 and wait for U 158.

Reports of Success:

U 66	1 ship	6,363 GRT
203	2 ships	17,358 GRT
201	2 ships	12,093 GRT
582	1 ship	8,000 GRT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

12.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AL 22	U 153	-	Op(EB)	U 332	-	Op(DC)	U 552	-	AK 66
	66	-	DQ 72	154	-	Op(DL)	379	-	Op(AK)	564	-	BF 55
	67	-	Op(DA)	155	-	BE 93	402	-	CA 93	571	-	Op(DA)
	71	-	AL 71	157	-	Op(DA)	404	-	BF 49	572	-	DH 42
	84	-	Op(DM)	159	-	BF 81	437	-	Op(DM)	575	-	Op(ED)
	86	-	AL 78	160	-	Op(ED)	454	-	AL 22	576	-	Op(CA 87)
	89	-	Op(CA)	161	-	DO 78	458	-	CB 66	582	-	DG 63
	90	-	AK 66	162	-	CF 33	459	-	CD 65	584	-	CD 18
	116	-	DG 62	166	-	DN 76	460	-	CC 94	597	-	AK 62
	126	-	DE 23	171	-	DD 58	461	-	CD 17	598	-	AF 47
	128	-	CD 67	172	-	DE 91	463	-	AO	607	-	AN 30
	129	-	Op(DK)	173	-	BD 59	505	-	Op(EB)	654	-	BF 55
	130	-	CF 72	201	-	DG 63	507	-	CF 54	658	-	AF 73
	132	-	Op(BA)	202	-	CD 18	508	-	BD 48	701	-	Op(CA)
	134	-	Op(DB)	203	-	Op(ED)	509	-	BC 86	704	-	AK 39
	136	-	DH 41	215	-	Op(CA)	510	-	AF 73	752	-	DH 42
										754	-	Op(CA)

	On Return Passage: U 459 - 202 - 584 - 159 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 32 see paragraph IV a).
		2)	U 402 sighted large passenger steamer in CA 9390

- 20 -

			general course 330⁰, speed 17 knots. No contact established.
		3)	U 576 reports unsuccessful search for convoy. Last known position 0330 DC 1236. Consisting of 6 steamers, 2 destroyers, 2 auxiliary cruisers.
		4)	U 437 position: No traffic between 16 and 21⁰ N in the south, west and north. Small freighter trailed in EB 2492. Sunk by U 129. No surface or aerial patrols.
		5)	U 505 position: Nothing sighted from Mona to sea area of Colon. Operational area searched, nothing except small freighters and escort vessels sighted. Regular medium to strong air activity. No surface patrols. Visibility good, often spoilt by heavy storms.
		6)	U 571 sighted enemy U-boat under surface in DL 2321. Boat operating in DM 27 and 28.
		7)	U 67 position: Ordinary daytime traffic with E/W course. Nothing sighted to the west along 25m line to DA 8364 on 10.7. Searched without success in 12m near Trinity. There is the possibility that ship anchor by night in shallow water - sunk: Tanker of 8,000 GRT in DA 9252 on 10.7.
		8)	U 84 sank freighter of 7,500 GRT in DM 5283.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 8478 - CA 57 - ED 12 - CA 87 - EB 79 - DN 9564 - CA 31 - EL 21.
		English a/c reported attack on U-boat in BF 7354 and BF 5556 (U 159) .
		U-boat attack in DO 78.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 32:
		All boats with the exception of U 136 reported their position. U 116 sank "Shaftsbury" (4,284 GRT) in DG 6283 at 1132 and took the captain on board. According to his statement the convoy ended at night. Convoy consisted of about 20 vessels, mostly bound for South America. Group "Hai" received instructions to continue to search for ships. Reconnaissance channels are again planned for early morning on 14.7. from DT 19-29. U 752 again sighted the convoy in DH 7111 at 2205, course south, speed 10 knots, but was beaten off after an hour. It appears, contrary to the statement made by the captured prisoner, only the ships destined for South America were released from the convoy. Latest position in DH 7117 at 2315. Contact was not again established by morning. U 201 sank the steamer "Sithonia" (6,723 GRT) from the western section of the convoy in the course of the night.
	b)	1)	U 454 and 43 received instructions to extend Group "Wolf's" line of reconnaissance to the northwest and to occupy the positions AK 0234 and AK 2882. New departure time limit 15.7. 0000.

- 21 -

U 132 is free to break off operations if the operational area is considered unfavorable.

None.

U 159 experienced a heavy depth charge attack during the night voyage in the Biscay area.

Reports of Success:

U 67	1 ship	8,000 GRT
84	1 ship	7,500 GRT
116	1 ship	4,284 GRT
201	1 ship	6,723 GRT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

13.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	AL 16	U 153	-	Op(EB)	U 332	-	Op(DC)	U 552	-	Op(AK)
	66	-	DP 98	154	-	Op(DM)	379	-	Op(AK)	564	-	BF 40
	67	-	Op(DA)	155	-	BE 91	402	-	CA 94	571	-	Op(DL)
	71	-	AK 66	157	-	Op(DA)	404	-	BF 40	572	-	DG 90
	84	-	Op(DM)	159	-	BF 60	437	-	Op(EB)	575	-	Op(ED)
	86	-	Op(DM)	160	-	Op(ED)	454	-	AL 13	576	-	Op(CA)
	89	-	Op(CA)	161	-	DO 82	458	-	CB 64	582	-	DG 96
	90	-	Op(AK)	162	-	CF 26	459	-	CE 18	584	-	CD 25
	116	-	DG 86	166	-	DM 99	460	-	CC 97	597	-	Op(AK)
	126	-	CC 97	171	-	DD 73	461	-	CD 17	598	-	AE 91
	128	-	CE 41	172	-	DE 66	463	-	AN 30	607	-	Kristiansand
	129	-	Op(DK)	173	-	DD 84	505	-	Op(EB 89)	654	-	BF 40
	130	-	CE 99	201	-	DG 95	507	-	CF 73	658	-	AE 67
	132	-	Op(BA)	202	-	BC 99	508	-	BD 74	701	-	Op(CA)
	134	-	Op(DM)	203	-	EE 45	509	-	CD 14	704	-	Op(AK)
	136	-	DG 90	215	-	Op(CA)	510	-	AE 90	752	-	DH 71
										754	-	Op(CA)

	On Return Passage: U 459 - 203 - 202 - 584 - 332 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128 - 159.
	Entered Port: U 159 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 103 - Lorient.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 509 trailed large fast freighter for several hours without success in CC 6615. Course 260⁰, speed 16 knots.
		2)	U 116 sighted ship of type "Andalucia-Star" in DG 9163. Course north, speed 16 knots. U 130 and U 507, in a position north of this received orders to follow this up during daylight. Ship was not found again.
		3)	U 166 reports: Convoy to Windward Passage, consisting of 11 steamers, 2 flying boats, 3 destroyers. Southerly course, speed 12 knots, forced to submerge. Continue pursuit. Sank steamer of 3,000 GRT and one sailing vessel.
		4)	U 67 sank tanker of 10,000 GRT with course of 100⁰ on 13.7. 2 hits, 2 misses. Boat trailed another tanker with course 135⁰ to DA 9858, forced by flying boat to submerge. Protracted return voyage.

- 22 -

		5)	U 575 position: Medium to heavy traffic round Trinidad. Putting in on course of 270⁰ to ED 9680 then 235⁰. Putting out on a course of 35⁰. Sunk: "Portland" (2,648 GRT) in DN 96 on 4.7. Proceeding from Puerto Rico to Cuba. "Inanda" (5,985 GRT) in ED 9679 on 9.7. 40⁰.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 5787 - DO 7885 - CA 86 - DB 73 - ED 98 - DM 12 - DB 88 - DA 98 - CA 88 - DN 76 - DD 1145 - DC 11 - DN 84 - DS 61.
		British freighter "Sagaing" shot up by U-boat in AK 3653.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 32:
		U 572 sighted the convoy again shortly after sunrise in DH 7456 and maintained contact spasmodically until nearly 2300. The enemy steering a southerly course of 180⁰. Speed 9 to 10 knots. 5 steamers were sighted with protection ahead on the beam and astern Boats are requested to give their position in order to provide a complete picture of the situation. In addition U 752 is in DH 7783, U 582 in DH 2393, U 116 in DG 9189, U 201 reports contact with a destroyer and the sighting of 2 smoke trails in DT 2188(?) course 30⁰. The following are concerned with an operation on the western convoy: U 752 - 582 - 572. The boats received instructions to attack and give continuous contact reports - (Ink note: U 752 also came up at midday) U 572 lost touch at 2300 in DT 3176 in poor visibility. At 0200 U 752 also reported having lost contact. Last position DT 3183 course 130⁰, speed 9 knots, very strong protection. Boat suspects surface and underwater D/F. None of the boats have yet attacked.
		U 201 has also lost his escort in the darkness and poor visibility. Continuing operations in South America Route. No further reports.
		Convoy No. 33:
		U 71 reports sighting convoy in AK 3975 at 1343 northerly course, medium speed. Group "Wolf" receives orders to operate. U 704 is in the vicinity and requests D/F (note) signal. All boats in Group "Wolf" should be in a position to attack. The following W/T message with T.O.O. 1855 was received at 2000 from U 71: Sheared off, general course west, speed 8-10 knots. According to an improved position (fix?) the convoy was in AK 6242 at 1400 hours. Bad visibility, fog drifts.
		U 552 sighted 2 destroyers in AK 6236 on westerly course at 1935 and at 2400 in AK 6223 and was beaten off by sweep astern. The first course given by U 71 must have referred to a convoy proceeding on an easterly course. Presumably the boats are therefore about 7 hours to the NE and so far astern of the convoy. As it appears impossible to come up to it in the weather prevailing - west wind, strength 7-6 and the chances are too slight to

- 23 -

justify using so much fuel, the boats received instructions to return in patrol lines. No further reports received. The operation is thereby broken off.

U 437 received orders to proceed through the Windward Passage and to search for traffic on the north coast of Cuba and the Old Bahama Channel. A decision regarding supply will follow.

U 126 has carried out supply operations from U 460. Position: 160 cubic m. provisions for 70 days.

Reports of Successes:

U 66	1 ship	3,000	1 sailing ship
67	1 ship	10,000
575	2 ships	8,633

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	Op(AK)	U 154	-	Op(DM)	U 437	-	Op(EB)	U 582	-	Op(DT)
	66	-	EE 23	155	-	BE 88	454	-	Op(AK)	584	-	CD 32
	67	-	Op(DA)	157	-	Op(DA)	458	-	CB 57	597	-	Op(AK)
	71	-	Op(AK)	160	-	Op(ED)	459	-	CE 23	598	-	AE 85
	84	-	Op(DM)	161	-	DO 65	460	-	CC 97	607	-	AN 30
	86	-	Op(AK)	162	-	CF 26	461	-	CD 17	654	-	BE 64
	89	-	Op(CA)	166	-	Op(DN)	463	-	AN 30	658	-	AE 82
	90	-	Op(AK)	171	-	DD 77	505	-	Op(EB)	701	-	Op(CA)
	108	-	BF 50	172	-	DF 43	507	-	CE 99	704	-	Op(AK)
	116	-	Op(DT)	173	-	DD 78	508	-	CD 13	752	-	Op(DT)
	126	-	CD 71	201	-	Op(DT)	509	-	CC 68	754	-	Op(CA)
	128	-	CE 19	202	-	BD 78	510	-	AE 91
	129	-	Op(DK)	203	-	EE 27	552	-	Op(DT)
	130	-	CG 62	215	-	Op(CA)	564	-	BE 91
	132	-	Op(BA)	332	-	DC 22	571	-	Op(DA)
	134	-	Op(DM)	379	-	Op(AK)	572	-	Op(DT)
	136	-	Op(DT)	402	-	Op(CA)	575	-	Op(ED)
	153	-	Op(EB)	404	-	BF 60	576	-	Op(CA)

	On Return Passage: U 459 - 203 - 202 - 584 - 332 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128.
	Entered Port: U 404 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 98 - 588 - 751 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 509 sighted suspicious looking vessel of 1,000 GRT, in CC 9253 and presumed with certainty to be a Q-boat.
		2)	U 134 position: No traffic on Florida coast. Presume diversion via DN 11.
		3)	U 84 position: Crooked Passage and Old Bahama Channel - no traffic sighted.
			Slight coastal traffic off north coast of Cuba apparent. Medium air, no surface activity. Sighted tanker in DM 43 and DM 19.
		4)	U 658 Smoke trails sighted in AE 8813. No more exact identification.
		5)	U 752 sighted large isolated steamer on a course of 170⁰ in DT 3736. Speed 14 knots.

- 24 -

		6)	U 582 sank British ship "Domala" (8,441 GRT) in DT 6153 on a course of 170⁰. Speed 11 knots.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: BA 94 - BA 61 - CA 49 - EB 89 - DC 12 - AL 21 - CA 54 - DB 8897 - DM 1227 - DA 92.
		U-boat attacks in DN 78 - DA 91.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 32:
		The convoy has not again been intercepted and the operation is therefore broken off. Group "Hai" has orders to form a reconnaissance line in the following order: U 201, 582, 572, 752 from DT 6325 - DT 6325 and to proceed at 2000 on 15.7. on a course of 170⁰ - daily reckoning 150 miles, as the main line of traffic is presumed to lie to the east of Cape Verde.
		Convoy No. 34:
		U 130 reports convoy (SL 115) at 1649 in DG 9163 on a course of 0, speed 8 knots. Boat has permission to attack and orders to give constant position reports. U 507 and Italian boat "Calvi" also operate on the convoy. U 130 beaten off by destroyer at 2243. Last position DG 6768, course 355, speed 8 knots. U 130 sighted Italian U-boat "Calvi" at 0030 in DG 6732 unable to submerge and burning as a result of heavy artillery fire from destroyer. U 130 was forced to submerge in an attack on this destroyer. Contact was again lost and was not again established until morning. The operation continues.
	b) -	c)	None.
	d)	U 136 (Group "Hai") has not answered numerous messages. The last report originated from CG 11 on 5.7. On 4.7. the boat sighted a Gibraltar convoy but received orders not to attack and proceed. It is possible that after giving the position report on 5.7., U 136 ran into the convoy escort again and was lost, or that the boat was in action with Convoy No. 32 without previous warning and was destroyed. There was no further information and the loss of the boat must be presumed.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 582 - 1 ship 8,441 GRT.

VI.	General: None.

- 25 -

15.July 1942.

I.	U 43	-	Op(AK)	U 153	-	Op(EB)	U 379	-	Op(AK)	U 575	-	Op(ED)
	66	-	EE 27	154	-	Op(DM)	402	-	Op(CA)	576	-	Op(CA)
	67	-	Op(DL)	155	-	CF 24	437	-	Op(DN)	582	-	Op(DT)
	71	-	Op(AK)	157	-	Op(DA)	454	-	Op(AK)	584	-	BD 58
	84	-	Op(DM)	160	-	Op(ED)	458	-	CB 73	588	-	BF 50
	86	-	Op(AK)	161	-	DP 17	459	-	BE 77	597	-	Op(AK)
	89	-	Op(CA)	162	-	CF 51	460	-	CC 97	598	-	AL 31
	90	-	Op(AK)	166	-	DM 98	461	-	CD 10	600	-	AO 40
	98	-	BF 50	171	-	DN 36	463	-	AF 47	607	-	AF 70
	108	-	BF 40	172	-	DF 25	505	-	Op(EB)	654	-	BE 58
	116	-	Op(DT)	173	-	DO 15	507	-	DC 31	658	-	AE 79
	126	-	CD 49	201	-	Op(DT)	508	-	CD 18	701	-	Op(CA)
	128	-	CE 26	202	-	BD 84	509	-	CC 97	704	-	Op(AK)
	129	-	Op(DK)	203	-	EE 34	510	-	AL 33	751	-	BF 50
	130	-	DC 64	215	-	Op(CA)	552	-	Op(AK)	752	-	Op(DT)
	132	-	Op(BA)	217	-	AO 40	564	-	BE 85	754	-	Op(CA)
	134	-	Op(DM)	254	-	AO 40	571	-	Op(DA)
				332	-	CB 75	572	-	Op(DT)

	On Return Passage: U 459 - 203 - 202 - 584 - 332 - 67 - 172 - 161 - 126 - 128 - 588.
	Entered Port: U 588 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 201 reports the sinking of the British ship "British Yeoman" (6,990 GRT) in DG 9975. Boat considers that operations on the point of intersections, South American routes and Karibik - Gibraltar in DT 10 would be profitable.
		2)	U 754 Nothing sighted between Diamond and Lookout for three nights.
		3)	U 402 Battery explosion after heavy bombing and depth charge attack. Boat continues to operate off the coast.
		4)	U 584 sighted large tanker in BD 9111, course 180⁰, speed 18 knots.
		5)	U 129 position: No traffic in EB 10 and 20 since 11.7. American vessel "Tachire" (2,325 GRT) sunk in EB 2143 on 12.7. Course 345⁰. Requests freedom of movement.
		6)	U 571 sank large, zigzagging steamer in DM 1976. Probably modern naval type of at least 15,000 GRT. General course 90⁰. The boat also sighted convoy in DM 2775, westerly course medium speed. 8 vessels (sighted) no contact established.
		7)	U 160 position: sighted 2 large freighters in Tobago Passage on 11.7. Westerly course. Double miss. On 15.7. freighter in ED 9978, course 210⁰. No night traffic

- 26 -

intercepted owing to poor visibility. Tracking of sighted ships greatly hindered by air activities.

b) -

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Convoy No. 34 has not been contacted again. U 507 and U 130 received orders to discontinue search if there is no contact before nightfall. Begin southerly beat on a (Greek A) 27⁰ West and 26⁰ West. Concerted action with Group"Hai" is intended.

U 134 has been designated DA 90 as new operational area.

U 509 reports having taken on supplies from U 460. Taken on - 60 cubic m. fuel, provisions for 45 days.

U 153 A wireless message was received for the last time on 30.6. in which a sinking in DP 4769 on 29.6. was reported. The boat is to occupy the lower third of EB (off Colon) as operational area. According to the U-boat sightings from there it must be in position already. A more exact confirmation is not possible. The boat has not replied to numerous signals.

U 215 reports traffic situation from CB 12 on 3.7. in the area covered. He received orders to operate in the waters south of Nova Scotia or if there is no traffic to proceed to Hatteras. The boat has not reported since then. Information on the time and place of the sinking is not available.

U 701 operated on a convoy consisting of 5 steamers and 4 destroyers in CA 8740 on 7.7. It is unlikely that the boat was lost in action against these units.

The loss of the above three boats is presumed.

Reports of Success:

U 201	1 ship	6,990 GRT
129	1 ship	2,325 GRT
571	1 ship	12,000 GRT

- 27 -

REPORT MADE BY B.d.U. TO FUEHRER ON 14.5.1942 IN THE PRESENCE OF THE NAVAL HIGH COMMAND


The report follows with a series of tabulated surveys.

1)	U-boat Figures:
	124 U-boats were in action on 1.5.: 85 in the Atlantic, 19 in the Mediterranean, 20 in Arctic; opposed to this there was a large number of 114 U-boats ready for action in the Baltic - apart from training ships. 49 of these 114 U-boats have taken longer than the normal period of 4 months from commissioning to readiness for action - and should therefore have been already in action. This hold up must be overcome by all means.

2)	U-boat Operations:
	U-boat warfare is a fight against enemy merchant tonnage. American and English tonnage work in conjunction and are therefore to be considered as a single unit. It is right then to sink ships where they are most plentiful and cheap - i.e. with comparatively slight losses to ourselves. Not to aim at sinkings in a specified area in return for a low sinking level. This sentence means, when there is no military consideration simultaneously playing a part; as for example when relieving the army of a burden, as by the action against the Murmansk convoys.
	When planning a significant U-boat operation one must also not loose sight of the question of economic disposition of the boats. The use of boats in the American area is right according to this standpoint of economic deployment. From 15.1. to 10.5. 1942 we sank 303 ships with a total tonnage of 2,015,252 GRT. The use of U-boats in this area is also in line with the opinion that the sinkings are a race with merchant shipping construction. America is the largest enemy ship builder. The shipbuilding industry area lies in the eastern states and it, and the industries connected with it, relies considerably on oil fuel. The main American oil area lies on the Gulf of Mexico, and for this reason the larger part of the American tanker tonnage used in the coastal traffic is from the oil fields to the industrial area. 112 tankers with a total tonnage of 927,000 GRT have been shot up in the period mentioned, two thirds of which belongs to this American transport tonnage. For each tanker which is shot up the Americans loose not only the oil transport but it effects their new construction adversely. Therefore the sinking of this American transport tonnage seems to me especially important. Also the Americans will be directed to ship their oil by sea at least during the next year. The construction of a supplementary oil pipe-line over land connections, would take a long time and could not achieve the same results and those attained by the sea route transport. Also the transport of those same oil supplies which will now be shipped by sea cannot be transported to the same extent in tank wagons on the railway. Furthermore - a change over to coal fuel by American industry is not practicable. Even if the Americans decrease the total demand considerably by limiting private use, the sinking of tankers will have a dislocating affect on the eastern American industry and also on new construction.
	The race between enemy ship construction and U-boat sinking is to my mind, not hopeless. The American construction

- 28 -

	plan for the period Autumn 1939 - end of 1943 consists of 2289 ships with a total tonnage of 16.8 million GRT. Of these 191 ships with a total tonnage of 1.5 million GRT have been completed up to the 31st December 1941. According to this, the Americans must complete their construction plan to the years 1942/43 with the following tonnage: 2098 ships with a total tonnage of approximately 15.3 million GRT. If one takes it, that of these he can build in 1942, 6.5 million GRT and in 1943, 8.7 million GRT, and adds to this the potential production of England and the Commonwealth, which amounts to 1.6 million GRT, then the enemy production for 1942 equals 8.2 million GRT, and in 1943 about 10.4 million GRT. That would mean again that we would have to sink 700,000 tons a month in 1942 in order to keep even with new construction, everything in excess of this would signify loss to the enemy. We already, however, sink 700,000 a month - that is - Germany, Italy and Japan by means of U-boats, Air Forces, surface craft and mines. Already then, there is a concrete decline in enemy tonnage under all circumstances. Apart from this - their construction figures are given by enemy propaganda as the aim of their building scheme. Our experts doubt whether these figures will be attained and estimate the construction potential of the enemy powers at 5 million GRT in which case the sinking of 4,500,000 tons per month is necessary in order to cancel out these figures. Everything else lessens the tonnage.
	To be on the safe side, the B.d.U. assumes the highest figures for construction potential to be correct and can only stress once again that it depends on sinking ships as soon as possible, to damage the enemy. Today's sinkings are more effective than those in 1943.
	The B.d.U. intends to deploy U-boats in American waters for as long as these prove productive. In this connection the effect of the U-boat war will be carefully evaluated that means that the average daily sinking level of every U-boat at sea will be assessed. This level was 209 GRT in January, 378 in February, 409 in March and 412 in April. So far only a slight increase is apparent. We are on the right lines with U-boat operations in American waters. The estimate of the daily potential also shows the cost to the sinking figures produced by the use of Norwegian based U-boats. Also, if one takes it that of the 20 Norwegian based U-boats operating only 10 per month are at sea, these 10 boats would, according to the given monthly potential, sink about 400 GRT per U-boat and sea day and 120,000 GRT per month in the Atlantic - for the most part lacking in Norwegian Operations. At the moment the ratio of time in port to time at sea approximates 60:40, a condition resulting from adequate shipyard capacity in the Western yards.
	The situation in the American Area will one day change. There are already indications that the Americans are striving to master the great sinking figures. She has built up a considerable air protection force and uses destroyers and patrol craft for coastal defense. All these, though, are without war experience and offer a yet no serious threat. In any case the U-boats with

- 29 -

	their extensive war experience are superior to the defense. The American airman see nothing, and the destroyers and patrol vessels proceed at too great a speed to intercept U-boats and likewise having caught one they do not follow up with a tough enough depth charge attack. The shallow American coastal waters are very favorable for safe, protected traffic. The American has the following possibility for an eventual system with which to protect his traffic.
	a)	The formation of so-called "War channel" protected by nets and mine barrages, through which coastal traffic could be directed. I don't think the Americans will choose this method as it would demand too great an outlay.
	b)	The other method is the concentration of traffic into convoys. He will advisedly follow this procedure and direct his convoys along the coast through shallow water. The amount of traffic and thereby our chances of success, will be slighter. I think though that as long as the convoy protection is still inexperienced we can attack even in shallow water. We are still in a position to do this thanks to the fact that we don't put our hopes on large U-boat types. The B.d.U. will then proceed with mining operations against American traffic - the reason for not carrying this out so far, has been that it was more economical to equip U-boats with torpedoes for busy daily traffic. In order to prepare for the anticipated flow of traffic, mining of Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay and New York is already planned for the new moon period in the middle of June.

(Marginal note: shallow water must be sown with mines (if necessary with time fitting) in order to force ships into deeper water.)

	In the next few days boats with mines on board will put out for this undertaking. If there is a further deterioration in the chances of success in the American area, a large number of U-boats will be diverted to convoy warfare in the North Atlantic. The most difficult aspect of the warfare has always been the finding. The B.d.U. hopes that this will be lessened by the increasing numbers of boats and that the attacking and shadowing will be facilitated.
	Cooperation with the Atlantic Command will then come more into the foreground. This cooperation with the Luftwaffe has made difficulties, as practice in combined operations over large areas has been lacking and such concerted action cannot be improvised. It has also produced success (see statistical compilation) Long-range planes are urgently needed. The anticipated numbers of U-boats will make it possible to cover far away traffic areas the attacking of which has been possible owing to the presence of the U-boat tanker. The operational range of our U-boat types with and without tanker supply can be seen from available charts. We are in a position to operate with the 517 ton boat in the Gulf of Mexico and off Panama and likewise down to the Cameroons and Bahia, for 14 days with tanker support, with the 740 ton boat, to La Plata and Cape Town for two weeks. The first boat of type IXd II will appear in the Autumn, with which it will be possible to operate with certainly to the latitude of Mombassa in the Indian Ocean.

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	The B.d.U. considers therefore, that the outlook is favorable considering the large numbers of U-boats to come, and the variety of operational possibilities. The question of defense has also to be considered in connection with the U-boat outlook. The U-boat losses are at the moment exceptionally low. (see table) Without a doubt they will again increase in convoy warfare and in area with stronger defense. (see table of convoy warfare losses) In this connection it is necessary to improve U-boat weapons by all means so that the U-boat is still equal to the enemy defense. The most important development is the torpedo non-contact pistol which makes torpedo hit against destroyers more certain and therefore puts the U-boat in a more advantageous defense position, and above all speeds up the sinking of torpedoed ships. In this way we save torpedoes and it would be an added defense, in that the U-boat could leave the scene of action more quickly. A non-contact pistol would also have the advantage of sinking torpedoed ships very quickly so that we could no longer rescue the crew. This heavy loss in ships crews will doubtless make the manning of ships to the great American shipbuilding scheme more difficult.
	The U-boat Arm believes in its material and that it can fight. Success depends on bringing U-boats out of the Baltic as soon as possible and principally, in having as many U-boats at sea - in operation as possible.

		(Signed): Dönitz.



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Supplement to K.T.B. for B.d.U. of June 24, 1942 for "U 66"

If an alternative target is ordered for mining operations mines are to be laid in the approaches to Port Gastries (on the island Santa Lucia) and sown as much as possible in the narrowest channel at a depth of 8-20 m.

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